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Abstract 
Since the early 1990s, urban renewal in the peri-centre (inner city) of Santiago de Chile 
– a metropolis where urban development is part of a strategic national economic agenda 
– has produced high-density blocks and large-scale redevelopments in decayed 
neighbourhoods. However, as the rent gap theory suggests, urban decay may be not a 
‘natural’ process but a form of market regulation that seeks to devalue both the building 
value (BV) and the capitalised ground rent (CGR), increase the potential ground rent 
(PGR), and therefore produce a rent gap large enough to attract large-scale redevelopers 
to these areas.  
Based on a case study of the south-western peri-centre of Santiago from 1990 to 2005, 
this thesis documents: first, significant variations in the CGR in the peri-centre and 
diverse forms of accumulation of the rent gap by large scale developers. Second, the 
roles played by the state in subsidising this market and regulating the rent gap through 
local master plans and national building guidelines. Third, the uneven application of 
housing upgrading programmes by many peri-central municipalities that limit 
alternatives to mid-density urban renewal, and the effects produced by the devaluation 
of the CGR in the use and exchange land values of peri-central neighbourhoods. Fourth, 
the capacity shown by organised neighbourhood communities to create alternative 
forms of control of PGR increases.  
The thesis concludes that, although the rent gap theory provides an effective tool to 
examine the political and economic conditions leading to gentrification, it needs to be 
contextualised for Latin America. Control of the rent gap and of its uneven impacts in 
terms of spatial distribution and accumulation, greater social participation in the 
definition of urban and building regulations, and more accountable management of the 
housing upgrading programmes are policy issues that need to be addressed by the 
Chilean public sector if the current model of urban renewal is to help to improve social 
reproduction in the peri-centre of Chile’s capital city.  
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 1 
Introduction 
A case of rent gap exploitation 
In Santiago de Chile, a market of urban renewal has taken place producing high-density 
blocks and large-scale redevelopments in some peri-central
1 dilapidated neighbourhoods. 
Based on the Rent Gap Theory, the present thesis proposes that the decay of these areas 
might not be naturally produced but is the effect of state policies seeking to devalue the 
local capitalised ground rent (CGR), increase the potential ground rent (PGR) and 
enlarge and make possible the accumulation of a peri-central rent gap by private 
developers. This is illustrated with the case of Pedro Aguirre Cerda (PAC), a peri-
central comuna
2, for the period 1990-2005.  
Amidst an international economic context that propels urban centres to compete for 
access to global economic spheres (Sassen, 1996), since the 1990s, most Latin 
American cities attempt to expand their CBDs and restructure their declining inner cities, 
promoting restoration of colonial heritage, repopulation and the allocation of local- and 
international-scaled financial functions, whilst trying to boost their local property 
markets (Rojas, 2004). Since 1990, with a return to democracy after 17 years of 
dictatorship, and with the highest national GDP growth rate in more than 30 years, a 
process of restructuring began in the peri-central area of Santiago, first through a high-
density state-financed Urban Renewal Subsidy (URS) programme aimed at attracting 
                                                 
1 Whilst ‘inner city’ can be described as “an ill-defined area close to the central business district in 
capitalist cities, usually associated with dilapidation, poor housing and economic and social deprivation” 
(Johnston, 2000a: 396) and currently target of intense processes of either regeneration or gentrification 
(depending on the observer’s political stance), ‘peri-centre’ is a slightly more specific, policy-related 
concept used in Chile. Peri-centre refers to the inner city, excluding the central area and its immediate 
surrounding ring. The justification for this distinction lies in the extended use of the term by scholars and 
policymakers in Chile, and its direct association to specific comunas and neighbourhoods surrounding the 
metropolitan core in Santiago. Both the terms ‘peri-centre’ and ‘inner city’ are utilised in this thesis 
depending on the context. Further definition in Appendix 1-Glossary. 
2 Local territory governed by a municipal authority. This thesis uses the term comuna to refer to a local 
territory, while ‘municipality’ corresponds to its local authority. Greater Santiago comprises thirty four 
comunas. For definitions of public organisations, laws, schemes, acronyms and other concepts written in 
italics, see Appendix 1-Glossary. 2 
professional middle-classes into a broad but well-delimited Urban Renewal Subsidy 
Area (URSA). This policy was officially justified by the need to repopulate Santiago-
Centre comuna, converting it into a preferential target area for metropolitan residential 
migrations (Arriagada et al., 2007). Within fifteen years, the URS was successful in 
promoting the renewal of an important part of the 19
th-century historical 
neighbourhoods (usually the most fashionable areas of the city) but unable to operate in 
many peri-central districts considered as ‘too risky’ by private realtors.  
To overcome the perception of risk, a second complementary strategy launched in the 
2000s by central state agencies focuses on large and emblematic peri-central brownfield 
sites. The goal was to target usually decayed industrial areas or ageing infrastructure as 
sites for large and long-term developments underpinned by even higher state incentives
3. 
What best epitomises this second strategy is the conversion of the former Cerrillos 
international airport into Ciudad-Parque Bicentenario (CPB), a projected 250-hectares 
new citadel surrounded by freeways, containing high-density middle-class housing, 
offices, a ‘Central Park’ and several additional amenities, closely connected to fast 
transport infrastructures (Galilea, 2006b).  
From 1990 to 2005, in a context of competition among municipalities to attract private 
capital (following Santiago-Centre’s example), practically all the peri-central local 
governments, technically supported by the Ministry of Housing and Planning 
(Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo, MINVU), transformed or attempted to transform 
their local urban regulations
4 in order to maximise the potential of their local space to 
accelerate existing or new urban renewal processes. Nonetheless, as observed in 11 
comunas of Santiago, most of them peri-central, many of these governmental attempts 
to produce new, more flexible urban guidelines have been opposed by local social 
organisations that see those regulatory changes as potential drivers for heritage 
destruction and/or gentrification (MINVU, 2008a). As this thesis shows, the 
mobilisation of Pedro Aguirre Cerda (PAC) comuna’s grassroots communities for an 
                                                 
3 The transfer of underused, large urban spaces from public to private ownership at minimum or zero cost, 
and the inclusion of these spaces within URSA.  
4 See www.conama.cl/rm  3 
alternative redrafting of their local Master Plan, between 2003 and 2005, is a recent 
illustration of this form of resistance.  
A theoretical proposition 
Pedro Aguirre Cerda (PAC), like most of the peri-central space of Santiago, was 
developed by state policies that, from the late 1950s to 1973, built social housing at a 
mass-scale and provided support for upgrading housing in squatter settlements (known 
as  poblaciones). These elements were vital parts of a national project of intense 
modernisation and industrialisation of the city (Castells, 1974, 1985b, 1997; Kusnetzoff, 
1975). General Pinochet’s national programme of neoliberalisation between 1975 and 
1990 ushered a first stage of creative destruction, de-industrialising the space, 
eradicating many grassroots enclaves, and rolling-back the up to then powerful state 
urban and housing apparatuses (Collins and Lear, 1995), separating jobs and residences, 
producing demographic impact and social deprivation, and further reinforcing several 
decades of peri-central decline (Chateau and Pozo, 1987; Kusnetzoff, 1987). 
Nevertheless, most of this space subsisted and crystallised in the current peri-centre 
(Finn, 2006a). Paradoxically, the neoliberal approach to urban regularisation during the 
1980s was based on massive issuing of land titles in Santiago’s poblaciones. This 
explains the current high rates of land-ownership in the peri-centre, a characteristic that 
turned the struggle for the redrafting of PAC local Master Plan into a conflict between 
proprietors and the state.  
From this historical standpoint, the present thesis proposes the following hypothesis:  
The expansion of privately-led urban renewal toward the peri-centre of Santiago from 
1990 to 2005 is based on a second wave of creative destruction, promoted by an 
entrepreneurial state seeking, as part of a broader policy of urban redevelopment, to 
increase the existing rent-gap which is therefore captured by large scale property 
developers. 
This proposition is explained as follows. Essentially, the dialectical oxymoron creation-
destruction is inherent to the production cycles of capitalism (Schumpeter, 1976). For 4 
Harvey (1990, 2006b), urban regions and infrastructures that work as centres of 
accumulation are created and must be ultimately destroyed, because new technological 
advances (e.g. telecommunications, transportation) make them obsolete. But among all 
commodities, the city is probably one of the hardest to be destroyed and replaced 
(Harvey, 1996; Weber, 2002). Hence, in global post-Fordist times, when capital 
massively shifts from primary (commodity production) to secondary (real estate) 
circuits of capital, the process of creative destruction in the city becomes crucial for 
preserving the stability of the capitalist mode of production and its forms of 
accumulation (Harvey, 1985, 1989b).  
Consequently with these structural trends, urban decline is produced when large scale 
land-owners, investors or financial institutions stop committing capital to the 
preservation of deteriorating neighbourhoods and turn to investing in the development 
of different areas. The latter creates a huge difference between the actual land rent 
(lowered by the dilapidated state of the buildings sited there) and a potential land rent 
which is, in market terms, the highest and best use that the plot could host. This 
difference is called ‘rent gap’ (Smith, 1979, 1987, 1996b). 
The continuous process of urban land devaluation increases the rent gap to an extent 
that the potential maximum exploitation and appropriation of the rent by developers 
becomes highly profitable. This process, experienced in the industrialised world over 
the past three decades, when fordist industrial regions started to be abandoned as capital 
searched for (post-Fordist) landscapes that offered better economic advantages (Smith, 
2000a, b), seems to also take place in global peripheral contexts, like Chile’s, through 
similar urban strategies of landed capital expansion (Smith, 2002).  
A common denominator in central and peripheral countries’ strategies for inner city 
redevelopment might be a widespread model of urban entrepreneurialism, which 
integrates local ‘boosterism’
5 with the use of governmental powers seeking to attract 
private sources of funding, new external investments and/or new employment (Leitner, 
1990; MacLeod, 2002). Entrepreneurialism means that initiatives for urban 
                                                 
5 Closely related to a free-market doctrine (Sheppard, 2005), local boosterism is based on the idea that 
certain leading figures, usually from governmental apparatuses, or in alliance with these, are 
indispensable to promote local growth (Mattson, 2005) or position a city in the global arena.  5 
reconfiguration are no longer rationally planned and developed under managerial 
rationales but, conversely, speculative in execution and design. They also aim to 
redevelop predefined specific places rather than comprehensive hinterlands, even if the 
latter are spaces in need of investment for social development (Harvey, 1989a). 
Entrepreneurialism is twinned with a planning ideology, that has globally become a 
widespread rationale, of exploiting images of urban regeneration oriented to attract 
‘creative’ middle-classes (Florida, 2002a, b).  
Yet, distinctively, entrepreneurial urban policies and governance oil the transformation 
of ‘hard’ working-class interstitial areas, by socially ‘cleansing’ the space and 
undervaluing existing social milieus, in ways that have been called ‘revanchist’ due to 
the class contradictions they involve (Atkinson, 2002, 2003a, b; Coleman et al., 2005; 
Niedt, 2006; Smith, 1996b, d, 1998, 1999). A form of entrepreneurial  creative 
destruction might be a sort of state-led redlining that takes place in owner-occupied 
spaces, where although local inhabitants attempt to avoid cycles of devaluation through 
modest investments in repair and maintenance, the state apparatus does not provide 
regulatory frameworks for social housing improvement (Aalbers, 2006; Smith, 1982). 
The hypothesis stated above has been seldom tested in a semi-peripheral, ‘third-class’ 
world city like Santiago de Chile (Kim, 2008; Taylor et al., 2002), where the theoretical 
definitions of rent gap and entrepreneurialism might not be applicable. Therefore, in 
order to avoid incorrect hermeneutics, this thesis’ theoretical contextualisation needs to 
consider several particularities of the case of Chile: first, Chile in the 20
th century did 
not enter properly into Fordism but rather a sort of developmentalist mode of regulation 
that created a particular peri-central space. Second, the Chilean urban apparatus is 
radically different to urban states in most industrialised countries, regarding budget, 
scale of operation, objectives and the lack of comprehensiveness of its social 
programmes. Third, the Chilean system of land taxation is nationally rather than locally 
redistributed. Thus urban entrepreneurialism in Chile might be expected to be more 
reliant on the central-state apparatus. However, as ideology, entrepreneurialism might 
be diffused from central government towards local administrations, heavily influencing 
the drafting of their policies and programmes.  6 
The general objectives of this thesis are three: first, to illustrate historically the 
production of the peri-central (inner city) space of Santiago from 1930s to 1990; second, 
to ascertain and represent graphically the existence of a rent gap produced in the peri-
centre and PAC between 1990 and 2005; third, to examine how Capitalised ground rent 
(CGR) is devalued and potential ground rent (PGR) is valued in the peri-centre from 
1990 to 2005. Based on these objectives, the general structure of the thesis is explained 
next. 
Structure of the thesis  
CHAPTER 1 outlines the methodology of the research. The existing theory and the need 
to understand the case from a historical perspective justify a deductive approach based 
on a literature review. But the contesting social nature of the case also requires an 
interpretivist stance, based on fieldwork and direct contact with participant actors. 
Following single-case study methods (Flyvbjerg, 2006; Ragin, 1992, 1997; Yin, 2003), 
the case is examined both quantitatively and qualitatively. Changes in land price and 
land use are observed using GIS in order to understand the general evolution of the rent 
gap in PAC and its surrounding area, between 1990 and 2005. Approaches to participant 
actors, conducted in 2007, were useful for analysing the political and social implications 
of the rent gap.  
CHAPTER 2 develops the theoretical proposition of the thesis, focusing on the concepts 
of Urban Creative Destruction, Rent Gap and Entrepreneurialism. These theoretical 
elements are appropriate for examining aspects of peri-central renewal, otherwise 
impossible to observe, such as the institutional roles and mechanisms exerted by central 
and local state and other public and private actors in the redevelopment of the peri-
centre of Santiago, and PAC in specific. Research questions, hypothesis and objectives 
are outlined at the end of the chapter.  
Based on bibliographical sources, historical data and interviews, CHAPTER 3 traces the 
production of the peri-central space of Santiago during the 20
th century as an interaction 
of four factors: import-substitution industrialisation, class-monopoly urban rent 
exploitation, state urban and housing systems and emerging urban social movements. 7 
The chapter is relevant to understand what the peri-centre means today, describing also 
its first process of creative destruction, exerted both at primary (local industrial sector) 
and secondary (property market) circuits of capital during the military dictatorship 
(1973-1990). An important conclusion is that the peri-centre is a space that can be 
related to a powerful working-class consciousness, which might be still operative. 
CHAPTER 4 outlines the socio-economic and policy characteristics that currently shape 
the peri-centre of Santiago, analyses its main demographic shifts through census data, 
and identifies its zones of deepest decay. The two strategies of peri-central 
redevelopment that have taken place since 1990 are examined: the Urban Renewal 
Subsidy (URS) and the Ciudad-Parque Bicentenario (CPB) project. 
CHAPTER 5 describes the effects of the market of urban renewal on the uneven valuation 
of capitalised ground rent (CGR) in Pedro Aguirre Cerda (PAC), San Miguel and 
Cerrillos, from 1990 to 2005. The latter two comunas experience ‘forces of renewal’ 
that may affect PAC, and they are also examples of what PAC could become in the near 
future. A more specific analysis produces an estimation of potential ground rent (PGR) 
in four areas of PAC, which were those most targeted by the municipality for urban 
renewal. These areas show an embryonic rent gap raised by the existence of the Urban 
Renewal Subsidy (URS) and Ciudad-Parque Bicentenario project (CPB). However, as 
already mentioned, the process of local Master Plan redrafting – in fact the local 
government’s attempt to produce a new master plan between 2003 and 2005 – was 
contested by the local community, which prepared a counter proposal. The potential 
ground rent arising from that proposal is also analysed in the chapter. 
CHAPTER 6 focuses on the political implications of the redrafting of the Master Plan in 
PAC. The municipal government seems to have attempted to take the local grassroots 
out of the process, in spite of their willingness to intervene in it. Local people joined in 
several groups and unified in a single movement aimed at gaining control over the new 
plan. They identified several effects that the new master-plan might bring: important 
urban areas might disappear and inhabitants might move out of the neighbourhoods, 
crucial problems of dwelling-overcrowding might be left unresolved, and their 
capitalised ground rent (CGR) could become worthless if simply traded at the current 
prices defined by market rules. The chapter analyses the roles performed by three 8 
specific actors (the community, the municipality and the private technical consultant 
firm hired by the municipality) that intervene in the process, their motivations, agendas 
and achievements.  
CHAPTER 7 examines the two mechanisms that contribute to devaluation of CGR in 
PAC. First, the National Law of Planning and Construction (Ley General de Urbanismo 
y Construcciones, LGUC)
6, which currently restricts low-income housing upgrading 
and densification. Second, inadequate implementation at municipal level of the central-
state Fondo Solidario de Vivienda (Supportive Housing Fund, FSV) programme, aimed 
precisely to fund micro projects of small scale renewal in low-income areas, but visibly 
underperformed in PAC and many other southern peri-central comunas. The evidence 
suggests that the underperformance of the FSV programme may be a characteristic of 
the municipalities that have more aggressive agendas for urban renewal.  
Advancing conclusions 
CHAPTER 8 outlines the theoretical and policy conclusions of the research. Despite the 
limitations inherent in any single-case study, the present research offers considerable 
evidence to support the hypothesis. Large rent gap areas exist amidst zones where the 
rent gap seems to have been closed, in the southern and western areas of the peri-centre 
of Santiago. These different levels of closure depend on for how long and how deep the 
market of urban renewal has been developed locally. In general, the evidence collected 
leads to conclude that: a) in Santiago the rent gap is not ‘naturally’ produced simply by 
the market, but helped to be produced through national and local regulations; b) 
although the potential ground rent can be increased through policy, its value can only be 
realised by the oligopoly of building firms that control the market of high-density 
renewal and that decides which space is to be renovated and which not (this is a main 
factor for uneven peri-central development); c) the current ground rent, to be capitalised 
by current low-income owner-occupiers, is kept low through ‘institutional’ mechanisms 
at national and local levels, that restrict the chances for mid-scale upgrading and so 
impede a social capitalisation of part of the rent gap. Based on these factors, a central 
                                                 
6 See Appendix 1-Glossary for reference. 9 
conclusion is that there are two types of capitalised ground rent, based on these uneven 
scales of accumulation. These two types are a low CGR-1, capitalised by current small 
owners, and a higher CGR-2, exclusively capitalised by large scale developers.  
It is also apparent that the current creative destruction in Santiago’s peri-centre is not 
only a replacement of obsolete built stock but might also be an attempt to politically 
undermine consolidated popular poblaciones (former squatter settlements) seen as 
stumbling blocks to entrepreneurial forms of urban redevelopment, due to their high 
capacity for organised political contestation. The historical production of Santiago’s 
inner city, partly based on active social movements, explains these higher-than-average 
capacities for social struggle and for modifying municipal agendas (acting always 
within institutional channels) but not impacting severely on policies of the central state. 
However, the central state sees these forms of contestation, like those of the inhabitants 
of PAC, as ‘irrelevant pitfalls’ in a generally successful process of redrafting local 
master plans in Greater Santiago (amidst the national process of Reforma Urbana; see 
Appendix 1 for definition). This fact denudes both the resistance by the Chilean urban 
state apparatus to include alternative actors into its mechanisms of regulation and the 
high levels of formality and institutionalisation that characterise the post-dictatorship 
social movements in Chile. 
Chilean urban entrepreneurialism appears more fragmented than cohesive, showing 
internal contradictions among different government agencies and a diversity of 
developmental goals. The contradiction rises between, on the one hand, the promotion 
of privately-led urban renewal (including large external capital investment) and, on the 
other, programmes for low-income dwelling densification and neighbourhood 
upgrading. This seems a crucial matter that still lies unresolved by the public sector. 
It is important to stress that the tension observed between change and stability is 
inherent to any historical process of urban development, especially in metropolitan peri-
central spaces in need of infrastructural and social improvement. The issue is what kind 
of change is more appropriate for Santiago’s areas. Since the liberalisation of PAC land 
has proved so far unsuccessful, it seems important to rely on alternative frameworks for 
the social accumulation of the rent gap, i.e. the redistribution of an increased CGR-1 
(the low level of capitalised ground rent) among existing homeowners. More 10 
appropriate building regulations and mechanisms of direct subsidisation to social 
housing upgrading might be needed as important leverages to, on the one hand, reverse 
the current negative demographic trends in the peri-centre and, on the other, consolidate 
peri-central people’s right to the city
7. 
Chile and the Greater Santiago Metropolitan Area (GSMA): 
an overview  
As mentioned above, this thesis seeks to illustrate the existence of a latent rent gap 
produced in Santiago’s peri-centre, the influence of central-state and municipal 
building/planning policies in the enlargement of the rent gap, and a local urban 
movement that struggled to close the rent gap. The high levels of citizen mobilisation 
can be explained by the historical production of Santiago’s peri-centre, namely a 
particularly complex articulation of industrial and residential milieus with high levels of 
working-class consciousness, developed in times of import-substitution industrialisation 
(ISI) between the late 1930s and 1973 (Salazar, 2003) 
However, as will be illustrated in CHAPTER 3, Chile is also relevant for this thesis 
because of its already advanced process of urban neoliberalisation. The latter started 
earlier in the 1970s and lasted longer than in most Latin American countries (Sader, 
2008), underpinned by state policies applied with an ‘iron fist’ during its last and 
longest military dictatorship (1973-1990). This point is relevant because, as will be 
examined later, the current Chilean entrepreneurial model of urban redevelopment, in 
many ways inherited from the dictatorial process of neoliberalisation, contradicts the 
particular urban fabric and social milieu of historical Santiago’s peri-centre. Hence, for 
me as a researcher, Chile offers a strategic context of study because of my 
understanding of my own country’s people, history and interpretation of current events, 
                                                 
7  In Marxian terms, the demand from the working class to recover the use value of a previously 
commodified urban space (Lefebvre, 1996; Merrifield, 2002). 11 
which is greater than that of any other national context
8. Some general data about Chile 
and its capital Santiago are outlined next. 
Chile is a South American country. Its territory occupies a long and narrow coastal strip 
between the Andes Mountains and the Pacific Ocean, bordering Peru and Bolivia in the 
north and Argentina in the east. It is 4,300 kilometres long and on average 175 
kilometres wide, encompassing nearly 757,000 square kilometres of land area (Figure i).  
The Santiago Metropolitan Region, one of the current 15 regions of the country, 
comprises an area of 15,403.2 km
2 and includes Greater Santiago Metropolitan Area 
(GSMA) as the capital of Chile. In 2006, the metropolis covered 641.4 km
2 or 64,140 
hectares. The city is located at an average elevation of 520 m in the country's Central 
Valley. Similarly to almost all Latin American cities, most of the national central state 
is located in the capital, with the exception of the National Parliament which meets in 
the city-port of Valparaíso. According to the 2002 national census, the population in the 
GSMA was 5.4 million people, about 85% of Santiago’s regional population, which was 
6.3 million. The regional population in turn represents around 40% of the national 
population (INE, 2005). This element shows the high urban primacy
9 of Santiago, a 
feature that is reinforced by the fact that between 1996 and 2004, the Region of 
Santiago (i.e. the GSMA and its suburban centres) produced 43.5 % of the national 
GDP (Banco Central de Chile, 2005). 
The GSMA comprises 34 comunas (see Figure ii). Further local sub-centres located 
within Santiago’s Region are excluded from this study, for they have become only 
recently part of the expanding conurbation of the metropolis, since 2000 approximately 
(Trivelli, 2008). 
 
 
                                                 
8 There is also a material reason: the funding of my PhD comes from the Chilean government. One of the 
conditions securing my scholarship was to analyse current urban policies being applied in the country. 
9 Concentration of urban population in the largest city of the country, as it exceeds more than twice that of 
the next largest urban areas (Chase-Dunn, 1985). 12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure i. Chile in South 
America, Santiago 
Metropolitan Region and 
Pedro Aguirre Cerda (PAC) 
comuna in red 
Source: own elaboration 
based on Microsoft Virtual 
Earth 
Figure ii. GSMA with 
Pedro Aguirre Cerda (PAC) 
comuna, Urban Renewal 
Subsidy Area (URSA) and 
Ciudad-Parque 
Bicentenario (CPB) 
project 
Source: own elaboration 
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Santiago is where the country’s “most important functions of general direction, 
planning and control of the emergent productive apparatus” concentrate (De Mattos, 
2000: 50), and is also the country’s main manufacturing centre, despite a radical process 
of deindustrialisation in the 1970s and 1980s. Between 2003 and 2006, 44% of all 
Chilean manufactures were produced in Santiago (Banco Central de Chile, 2008), and 
these represented around 17% of the Region of Santiago’s gross regional product
10.  
Santiago is also probably the third financial centre in South America (after Sao Paulo 
and Buenos Aires). International institutions like UN ECLAC (Economic Commission 
for Latin America and the Caribbean) have their offices there. Due to the expanding 
national and regional service- and finance-oriented economy, and due to the relative 
political stability of the country since the 1990s, many multinational companies have 
located their regional headquarters in Santiago, such as HP, Reuters, JP Morgan, Intel, 
Coca-Cola, Unilever, Nestlé, among others. 
As mentioned above, a process of de-industrialisation occurred during the 1970s and 
mostly affected Santiago’s hitherto industrial peri-central comunas (Gatica, 1989). A 
subsequent process of re-industrialisation occurred during the 1980s in some peripheries 
of Santiago, generating a recovery of Greater Santiago Metropolitan Area (GSMA), 
especially its periphery, as the highest concentration of manufacture in the country (De 
Mattos, 2000). This is due to the city’s better conditions such as access to credit, high 
concentration of population and qualified workforce, access to the inputs and to 
distribution channels for outputs, and adequate and reliable levels of water and energy 
supply. Both processes of de-industrialisation and re-industrialisation are important to 
understand the current peri-central space and the causes of its redevelopment since 1990. 
These two issues are examined in more detail in chapters 3 and 4, respectively. 
                                                 
10  The other main sectors are: financial services (28%); commerce, restaurants and hotels (15%); 
‘personal services’ of education, health, etc. (13%); transport and communications (12%); properties and 
construction (14%) (Banco Central de Chile, 2008). 14 
CHAPTER 1. Epistemological approach and research 
methodology 
1.1. Introduction 
The first step of this thesis is to introduce its epistemological approach and research 
method. As outlined in section 1.2, the research is based on an interpretivist and 
deductive-inductive epistemology, while micro observations of the local space and 
social narratives become instrumental in helping to reveal the social implications of the 
creative destruction of Santiago’s peri-centre. In terms of methodology, this research is 
a single-case study, the phases of which are detailed in section 1.3. Sections 1.4 to 1.6 
justify the selection of the case, and explain the fieldwork and the quantitative analysis 
conducted. Finally, section 1.7 summarises the basic points of the methodology.  
1.2. Epistemological stance 
1.2.1. A non-positivist, inter-subjective and interpretivist approach 
As anticipated in the introduction, this thesis proposes the hypothetical existence of a 
rent gap in the peri-centre of Santiago and, as a consequence, the existence of discourses 
and practices of urban renewal based on an ideology of entrepreneurialism. Whilst the 
first part of the proposition (rent gap) is a fact that can be measured, the latter aspects 
cover contradicting opinions and policy definitions. This confirms the need of an 
interpretivist standpoint (that does not judge but attempts to understand what the 
rationales are for those ideas). It also stresses the researcher’s own position in the case, 
especially when political and social aspects of class emerge and reinforce the need for 
non-positivist perspectives that lend credence to evidence from individual and societal 
experiences.  
Nevertheless, positivism is fundamental for scientific research. It has the capacity of 
building a form of cumulative knowledge based on paradigms of falsification, also 15 
providing precision, reliability and measurability to science if ‘the correct method’ is 
employed. Essentially, all theories are conjectural and thus open to refutation since at 
the end of the day there is no logical distinction between theories and hypotheses 
(Popper, 1998a). Science could hardly make progress in the absence of laws upon which 
to build new knowledge, since the whole realm of physical sciences rests upon the 
shoulders of positivism. 
However, unresolved crucial aspects of positivism emerge when facing the conflictive 
meanings of truth and the ability of science to research in complex social contexts 
(Williams and May, 1996). If knowledge rests in the researcher’s reliability, based on 
evidence acquired through reliable processes that assure ‘scientificity’, an 
epistemological conflict arises when the gathering of evidence is not secured and 
depends on external conditions, out of the researcher’s control. Thus reliability (the 
grade of security about what we see) is not always a sufficient condition for establishing 
‘reality’ (Sturgeon, 1998: 25-6). Furthermore, often in social science many variables are 
consciously or unconsciously ignored by researchers, leading to too limited conclusions. 
So, what is the point of insisting in reductionistic approaches, or in research that aims to 
build total explanation from a reduced number of variables? In social sciences it seems 
size does not matter, but complexity does.  
And there is another problem. Quite often what we see can be an illusion hardly 
separable from what we believe and our own (political, moral?) standpoint. According 
to Berg (2004), any epistemological approach whether positivist or relativist is 
inevitably biased by the researcher’s previous background and beliefs. An appropriate 
method is thus not only a rational matter but also a process where personal inclinations 
and the researcher’s own history intervene. Not only can a human social situation not be 
explained only through factual empirical observations, but also there is no unique truth 
regarding that situation. External tools and methods, independent of the ‘object’ of 
study, usually associated with positive science, seem insufficient given that the 
ontological (philosophical) and epistemological background of the researcher are 
important components of the cases to investigate.  
Because of the ontological background of the researcher, the high complexity of a case 
(number of variables) and the several (uncontrollable) human dimensions involved in it, 16 
an explanatory research might depend more on the relativity of discourses and 
interpretations of the participants than on simply positive facts. This is precisely what 
intersubjectivity means: an important starting point towards the acceptance of many 
simultaneous versions of the truth, which is at the end of the day a matter of consensus 
or even belief (Williams and May, 1996: 37-8). Interpretivism is, in turn, an approach 
that understands (not judges) the complexity of social realms
1.  
However, although purely positivism is disregarded for its limitations when facing the 
complexity and comprehensiveness of social contexts, it is accepted that objective facts 
can nurture the understanding of a case study. Table 1.1 briefly examines 14 specific 
aspects of research, considering the positivism/interpretivism dichotomy, and my 
predominantly (though not entirely) interpretivist positioning. 
Some aspects of the table need explanation. The research’s ‘logical form’ (1) is here 
closer to deductivism due to the complexity of good theoretical explanation existing in 
the literature. However, for the intrinsic nature of a Case-Study Method (CSM), this 
deductivism is oriented toward theoretical adaptation, in a reflexive process that could 
eventually be understood as semi-inductive. In regard to ‘analytic method’ and 
‘population’ (9, 10), both approaches are considered, since quantitative data and 
qualitative information are vital for observing, on the one hand, demographic and 
ground rent variations and, on the other, developmental discourses or interviewees’ 
speeches, at large (metropolitan) and small (neighbourhood) scales. No sampling 
method (11) is used to select the single-case or the informants, but an in-depth analysis 
of the current process of peri-central renewal and its socio-political effects in particular 
areas was conducted at the beginning of the fieldwork. Some disagreement with 
Aunger’s model arises, since the ‘philosophical anthropology’  approach (6) of this 
research is neither mechanistic nor teleological. On the contrary, new and non-
presupposed outcomes are expected as positive elements inherent to case-oriented 
research (Ragin, 1997). Furthermore, the ‘presentation style’ (aspect 14) pursued here is 
                                                 
1 Interpretivism and intersubjectivism are crucial concepts for this research. Although the case studied 
here is controversial, with the several actors’ views often opposed, I assumed all of them provided true 
information. However, when evident contradictions between informants emerged, what prevailed was the 
consistency of the information they provided compared with the bulk of data collected. Fortunately, no 
important inconsistencies were found. See 1.5.1 for further explanation of this point as criterion for data 
collection.  17 
much closer to the dispassionate than the evocative, yet this only comes from my own 
writing style. 
 
  Aspect  ‘Scientific’ / Positivistic  ‘Humanist’ / Interpretive 
1  Logical form  Deductive/ ‘theory testing’  
(theory Î data Î theory)  
Reflexive semi-inductive 
Inductive/ ‘theory building’  
(data Î theory) 
2  Epistemological stance  ‘objective’ (separation between 
observer and observed) 
‘subjective’ (interpretation of 
perception) 
3  Temporal framework  Static (i.e. equilibrium assumed) / 
abstract regularity of correlation 
Processual / historical 
4  Model of causality  Regularity of correlation  Mechanisms generate outcomes 
5  Social ontology  ‘atomistic’ / realist  ‘structural’ / constructivist 
6  Philosophical 
anthropology 
Mechanist / behaviourist  Teleological / intentionalist 
7  Units of analysis  Variables   Themes / motifs 
8  Data collection methods  Survey, formal 
interviews/questionnaires 
Participant observation, interactive 
interviewing, introspection 
9  Analytic methods  ‘quantitative’ (i.e. statistical tests)  ‘qualitative’ (i.e. narrational) 
10  Population / scale  Large (macro scale)  Small (micro scale) 
11  Sampling Representational  (e.g.  random)  None, or ad hoc 
12  Quality assessment 
criteria 
Validity, replicability  Contextual equivalence, 
authenticity, stimulus for social 
action 
13  Research goals  Description / generalisation / 
prediction / causal explanation 
Understanding / social critique / 
advocacy 
14  Presentation style  Dispassionate / informal  Evocative / inspiring 
Table 1.1. Researcher’s positioning within the two paradigms of social science research 
Source: based on Aunger (1995: 107) with adaptation in point 1 
1.2.2. Deductivism and inductivism combined 
As already observed, in in-depth social research it is almost impossible to isolate 
problem from context. But context  is not only external factors but also internal – 
psychological and ontological elements that configure a researcher’s own psyche. The 
nature of the research rests on our own history and capacity for understanding our 
surrounding context (Yin, 2003). These filter our own ontology as researchers, our own 
political thought and even our own disciplinary biases. What ‘I have studied and know’ 
nurtures what ‘I believe’, yet dialectically, the opposite happens too.  18 
Thus previous theoretical backgrounds seem vital to provide tentative explanations for a 
given case, as a way to constantly reinforce the understanding of reality and improving 
our theoretical understanding with the elements taken from ‘reality’. 
Discovery in science is not just about observing the world, as passive receptors of sense 
data, but is dependent upon the process of active and purposive selection. Therefore, there 
is a constant relationship between theory and data. This still leaves the question as to how 
observed and theoretically constituted phenomena are actually presumed to be related to 
one other. (Williams and May, 1996: 19) 
Therefore it might well be possible that purely inductivist approaches are insufficient 
for understanding complex socio-political cases. On the contrary, an approach that 
combines deductivism and inductivism can:  
a)  Be consistent if dense previous theorisation exists, a point that refers to the well 
known image of the researcher standing on giants’ shoulders. The consistent 
pieces of theory to be revised in CHAPTER 2 (i.e. ecological- geographical and 
Marxist-based explanations) are virtually impossible not to take into account. It 
is equally important to analyse their pros and cons in terms of their capacity to 
explain a Latin American urban context.  
b)  Contribute to a more universal and explanatory argumentation about inner city 
renewal, producing conclusions with a certain degree of interest. Higher levels 
of analytical inference can be possible if ‘helped’ with previous theoretical 
understanding.  
c)  Help to achieve a finer understanding, overcoming purely inductive processes of 
observation. However, by no means further processes of inductive observation 
should be rejected, or the advantages of fieldwork disregarded. Inductive 
exploration is not only perfectly compatible with theory but also necessary for 
understanding the inherent complexity of a case, especially when a theory is to 
be tested in a ‘new’ context like the peri-centre of Santiago de Chile. However, 19 
the level of inductiveness here planned considerably differs from pure 
inductivism, like grounded theory method or ethnography
2. 
1.2.3. Definition of a Case-Study Method (CSM)  
Usually for the complexity involved in small scale urban studies, case-oriented 
approaches can observe factors in their real environment, especially when boundaries 
between a phenomenon and its context are not openly manifest. In this fashion, Castells 
wonders:  
[h]ow accurate can be a demonstration based upon a limited number of case studies? […] 
Case studies have always been praised because they permit in-depth analysis, but blamed 
because of their singularity, disallowing any extrapolation of the findings. [However] 
from a historical point of view, all social situations are unique, and so are the findings of 
empirical research. […] If we want to elaborate a theory of urban social movements on 
the basis of historical experiences, we must observe unique situations in which a 
particular phenomenon, considered by our theory to be crucial, is amplified. [When we 
obtain] an understanding of how fully [urban social movements] relate to the evolution of 
cities, that we can compare mobilized and passive neighbourhoods vis-à-vis their 
differential effect on urban function and forms. Thus, while case studies cannot provide a 
systematic verification of established propositions, they are invaluable in the 
pathbreaking efforts of generating new theories. (Castells, 1985a: xix-xx) 
Supporters of case-oriented research claim there is a clear distinction between case-
oriented and variable-based approaches, these not being reconcilable in terms of units of 
analysis, conceptions of causality, and logic of inference (Platt, 1992; Ragin, 1992, 
1997; Yin, 2003). Case-oriented research rests on in-depth explanations about the nature 
and effects of the process to observe. As Castells argues, the uniqueness of every case is 
                                                 
2 Grounded theory’s and ethnography’s over-reliance on the participation and closest approximation of 
the researcher to the context of study implies having professional skills in social communication that I do 
not have. In my personal case, ‘Chilean’, ‘middle-class’, ‘professional’, ‘scholar’ are labels that made 
impossible pretending to act as if I was a normal poblador; this would have been a naïve approach close 
to mere ‘emotional tourism’ (Mattson, 1978). This is a matter of positionality (Jaggar, 1999), or having 
enough sensitivity to distinguish when not to force false situations or superficial observations (Longhurst, 
2003). Moreover, as Garson (2007) claims, through highly participatory and unprejudiced (non-
theoretical) approaches like ethnography or grounded theory, there is always a danger of underestimating 
material (non-cultural) causal forces, overestimating roles of community over individuals or/and 
introducing biased and unnecessary assumptions from the researcher’s own background.  20 
precisely an opportunity to improve the explanatory theory being tested. Case-oriented 
research comprehensively comprises the several variables involved in a case and its 
economic, social and political contexts. Without replacing statistical analysis, case-
oriented research uses statistical and case-oriented methods iteratively, in a way that 
each method produces a need for new research tasks in areas where the other method is 
superior (Bennett and George, 1997a), usually with statistical studies at first. Moreover, 
case-oriented research provides something that variable-oriented studies cannot: it goes 
beyond causal correlation to a proper theorisation about effects.  
Although the use of a small number (small-N) of cases has also limitations, risks and 
potential vulnerabilities (the case might later turn out not to be what it was thought to be 
at the beginning), these designs are possible to be developed in circumstances of 
constrained resources and time, e.g. PhD research. Yet usually too, studies with small 
number of cases, even single-case studies, are not a matter of election by the researcher 
but an inevitable problem when the events underpinning a case are unique or ‘rare’. 
However, this requires careful investigation in order to minimize the chances of 
misrepresentation and to maximize the access needed to collect the case-study evidence. 
If these major concerns are covered, it is possible to conduct single-case research (Yin 
op. cit).  
Single-case study is more appropriate to develop theories (hypothesis, in a Popperian 
sense) upon which several independent variables – differently combined – can interact 
to produce different types or levels of dependent variables. Nevertheless, it does not 
need to be constrained to manage isolated variables by means of statistical control. The 
goal of single-case studies is not to affirm or reject a correlation, but instead to identify 
the conditions under which specified types of events systemically interact with other 
factors to produce specific types of outcomes (Ibid),or in other words, the search for 
necessary conditions for the hypothesis to be verified.  
At a pragmatic level, single-case study might be justifiable depending on what the 
researcher needs to know and the strategies through which he/she plans to approach the 
‘object’. Table 1.2 correlates the type of research question with the kind of research 
strategy recommended, stating material and subjective implications of each case. Case-
Study Method is justified when the basic questions about a reality are how and or why, 21 
when no contextual control is possible, and when the object of research is a 
contemporary event. 
 
Strategy  Form of Research 
Question 
Requires Control of 
Behavioural Events? 
Focuses on 
Contemporary Events? 
Experiment How,  why?  Yes  Yes 
Survey  Who, what, where, how 
many, how much? 
No Yes 
Archival Analysis  Who, what, where, how 
many, how much? 
No Yes/No 
History How,  why?  No  No 
Case-Study Method  How, why?  No  Yes 
Table 1.2. Relevant situations for different research strategies 
Source: Yin (2003: 5) 
Whilst it is true that a single-case study like this one can only lead to limited 
generalisations, it can be even more valuable than variable-based studies since with 
limited resources it can nonetheless conclude and suggest hypothesis for future research 
(Harding  et al., 2002). The evidence collected might also be strong to prove, for 
instance, that a given public policy has helped to increase a rent gap and that another 
has led to its accumulation, or even to question mainstream ideas like the one that 
claims that there is no such thing as gentrification in Santiago-Centre and peri-centre 
(Arriagada, 2007). 
1.2.4. Conceptualising and operationalising theory 
As explained above, the main difference between Case-Study Method (CSM) and 
purely inductive approaches is the presence of a prior theoretical analysis, which in turn 
leads to propositional hypotheses, assuming hypothetical propositions are by themselves 
theories (Popper, 1998a, b). However theories, to be operative, must be processed, 
conceptualised and operationalised (Babbie, 2004) in a way that 22 
should by no means be considered with the formality of grand theory [… R]ather, the 
simple goal is to have a sufficient blueprint for your study, […] determining what data to 
collect and the strategies for analyzing the data. For this reason, theory development prior 
to the collection of any case study data is an essential step in doing case studies. (Yin, 
2003: 29) 
Harding  et al. (2002) define important aspects to take into consideration when 
conceptualising and operationalising in CSM. The accent should be put on necessary – 
but not sufficient – conditions. A single-case study will not be able to identify whether 
an intervening factor is sufficient condition for a determinate effect, rather it will asses 
if there are some forms of correlation and hence necessary factors.  
Furthermore, qualitative case-study data is valuable only if it helps to clarify the relation 
between results and the hypothesis. Also, a single-case study is relevant if it allows 
rejection of potential necessary conditions due to the collected evidence, and can 
suggest possible hypotheses for future case research. Therefore the literature review is a 
process with a specific goal, which is to develop an insightful questioning about the 
case to be researched.  
Conceptualisation, a mental process whereby fuzzy and imprecise notions (concepts) are 
made more specific and precise […] produces a specific, agreed-upon meaning for a 
concept for the purposes of research. This process of specifying exact meaning involves 
describing the indicators we’ll be using to measure our concept and the different aspects 
of the concept, called dimensions. (Babbie, 2004: 122) 
Babbie’s definition implicitly leads to a subsequent sharper form of operationalisation, 
not based on numeric parameters or specific qualitative boundaries, but on 
understanding that processes and relations that produce the phenomena are complex and 
adaptive in time, as Castells has argued: 
[W]e have rejected the construction of a formal theory of urban social change. By a 
formal theory we understand a theory whose main concerns are trans-historical 
comprehensiveness and logical consistency. For the social sciences – whose historical 
and experimental character is quite unlike formal sciences, such as mathematics – the 
crucial test of a theory is its adequacy, rather than its coherence. By adequacy we mean 
the capacity of a series of intellectual tools to generate new knowledge about a given 
phenomenon. Following the teaching of Gaston Bachelard, we believe that the most 
useful concepts are those flexible enough to be deformed and rectified in the process of 23 
using them as instruments of knowledge. It is this capacity of enabling us to understand 
social processes and situations, and not the endless exercise of re-coding experience in a 
comprehensive paradigm, that is the actual test of fruitfulness of a theory. [However, this 
should] not be, a general epistemological position. Someday perhaps we will reach a 
cumulative and comprehensive theoretical paradigm of history and societies, but not now 
and not soon. In the meantime, we need humble but effective strategies of theory building 
that can lead us away from short-sighted empiricism without becoming lost in the 
artificial paradise of the grand theory. (Castells, 1985a: xix-xx) 
1.2.5. Producing analytical inference  
In Case-Study Method, a theory is not only a hypothesis to be tested but also an 
outcome to be produced. However, theoretical construction should not be aimed at 
leading to statistical generalisations but at constructing ‘analytical inference’. The latter 
means that the earlier development of theory (deductive) is employed as a template for 
contrasting the empirical results from the case study (inductive), with the purpose of 
producing new, more contextualised hypotheses, in a recursive way. For this purpose, 
Kuhn’s (1970) ideas are essential: a theory, to be operative and useful, must fulfil the 
five (scientific) values of: 
a)  Accuracy: it must show agreement with the results from observations made. 
b)  Consistency: not only there should be logical internal concordance among the 
different propositions of the hypothesis but also between these and other 
accepted theories. 
c)  Broad scope: the theoretical scope must extend, as much as possible, the sub-
theories that it initially attempted to explain, and the findings and inferences that 
emerge at the end of the research. 
d)  Simplicity: the theory must bring order to phenomena that in its absence would 
be individually isolated and/or confused. 
e)  Be fruitful: the theory should bring up new phenomena or previously ‘invisible’ 
relationships between known phenomena (Hoyningen-Huene, 1992). 24 
Therefore analytical inference must follow logic of replication, which means that the 
research hypothesis needs to be tested (or falsified) according to what the facts and 
interpretations of the case say. But, how should be this replication done? In the case of 
this research, the whole process of producing conclusions should be based on producing 
an Analytical Model (from the evidence gathered) and conducting a process of Pattern 
Matching. Both methods aim at contrasting the hypothesis with the evidence collected 
in the following way:  
a)  Construction of Analytical Models: The goal of this stage is to construct an 
explanatory model of the case which considers: context, actors, their relations 
and roles, instruments used and their intervention over the space, and other 
possible evidence that could help to explain the nature and specificity of the case.  
b)  Pattern Matching: Methodological device used for deciding if the various 
implications predicted by a theory match with the evidence within the case. This 
strategy is even accepted by quantitative-oriented researchers, because it 
elevates the number of observations by looking into the several ‘pieces’ that 
compound a theoretical explanation, also helping to elevate the degree of 
freedom (Bennett, 1997; Bennett and George, 1997a, b; Geddes, 1990; King et 
al., 1994). A process of Pattern Matching helps to decide whether theories are or 
not relevant to a particular case, and need to be reformulated through a reflexive 
process of theorisation (Ragin, 1997). Thus pattern matching, as a process, is 
attempted to confront the theory (conceptual pattern) and the evidence collected 
through fieldwork. However, as it has been stated above, this process should be 
a constant rationale along the study case. A pattern matching should serve to 
contrast detailed descriptions of a sequence of events regarding a single case, 
with the supposed causal mechanisms that underlie that sequence, helping also 
to understand how the factors predicted by a theory operate in a case, and how 
they interact.  25 
1.2.6. Limitations of a single-case study  
However, some scepticism against the reliability of small-N Case Study Methods is 
strong among quantitative-oriented scholars. They understand CSM under logic of 
causal inference, with a clear distinction between independent and dependent variables, 
as it is in statistically-based research (Bennett, 1997; Bennett and George, 1997a; 
Geddes, 1990; Geering, 2004; King et al., 1994; Munck, 1998). Quantitative-oriented 
authors believe that methods used for social and physical sciences should not be 
different. When investigating single events or relationships, they usually propose to 
insulate problem from context, with emphasis in co-variance. From their point of view, 
there are two classical limitations with case-oriented studies: a) the problem of ‘degree 
of freedom’ and b) the representativeness of the case (biased case-selection). These 
elements are examined as follows. 
1.2.6.1. Low degree of freedom 
It arises when the number of possible observations (cases) is equal or inferior to the 
number of independent variables, making the research indeterminate, with little basis 
for causal inferences. Variable-based analysts usually dismiss or subsume minor or less 
important variables, aggregating them into broader operationalisation, in order to obtain 
higher degrees of freedom (Bennett 1997a), and some argue – in a somewhat 
reductionistic fashion – that this could be also recommended for case-oriented research 
(Geering, 2004; King et al., 1994).  
Instead, case-oriented researchers do the reverse: they treat variables qualitatively in all 
their relevant dimensions, trying to disaggregate both ‘independent’ and ‘dependent’ 
ones in types and subtypes (Bennett 1997) in order to not over-simplify the level of 
complexity inherent to a case (for the sake of correlation) but instead understanding 
complex causal mechanisms that are commonly dismissed by positivistic researchers (or 
even the political mainstream). The latter approach constitutes an opportunity for the 
emergence of factors not envisaged in a first instance and opening new gates to 
unexpected theoretical perspectives (Ragin, 1992, 1997).  26 
If the critique of the single-case study method is its low capacity for extracting 
generalisations from a single context studied, Yin seems to be right when he claims that 
variable-based facts are rarely based on single experiments, being instead usually based 
on a multiple set of experiments that have replicated the same phenomenon under 
different conditions (Yin 2003). The same applies to single-case study. It should be 
understood as a process that leads research in newer directions, to be more deeply 
addressed in the long term.  
1.2.6.2. Representativeness of a case and case-selection bias 
A case-study is not representative of a wider population, for it does not resort to the 
tools of statistics. A case study cannot explain nor predict broader analogous situations 
simply based on the representativeness of its selection. On the contrary, cases might be 
considered part of contingent generalisations. This means that CSM researchers are 
interested in finding the specific conditions that underlie a given phenomenon, instead 
of the frequency of occurrence of a given outcome (Bennett, 1997).  
Nevertheless, the impossibility of using statistical criteria to define samples in a CSM 
might create a danger of biased case selection. This means, the researcher could 
eventually select cases, or over emphasise them, as a way to confirm his/her favourite 
hypothesis (Bennett and George, 1997a). Conversely, if the case or cases selected for 
the study are decided in relation to expected behaviours of their dependent variables, or 
their selection was made only among cases when it was known they would achieve 
some expected outcomes, there is always a risk of ‘endogeneity’ (Geddes, 1990; see 
also Appendix 4). 
Therefore, according to Yin (op. cit.), triangulation is needed for gaining reliability in 
small-N case studies. This strategy means to replicate the same case studies following 
different specific methods (or through the selection of different cases). Although 
triangulation is ideal for CSM (especially the replication of a same case by using a 
different method) constraints of time and budget limit the chances to do it in this 
research. There are no chances to replicate the study of the case using alternative 
methods, in order to contest the reliability of the discovering or the meaning of the data. 27 
To some extent, this could be considered as a major weakness inherent even to a PhD 
qualitative case-oriented research, like the present one. Nevertheless, it is convenient to 
insist that CSM is not an exact variable-based form of research but one in which goals 
are theoretical construction rather than statistical inference
3.  
1.3. Research phases 
The structure of this research is an adaptation based on Yin’s (2003) model for small-N 
case studies. Figure 1.1 shows its five main phases: a) analysis, conceptualisation and 
operationalisation of theory (already explained); b) selection of the case; c) design and 
conduction of the fieldwork; d) analysis of the case and e) theoretical and policy 
conclusions. These phases are described later in this chapter. 
The model proposed is iterative. It has two important feedback loops to the stage of 
theorisation. The first one takes place after the fieldwork has been conducted and 
implies a continuous process of adjustment of the preliminarily stated theory with 
pieces of evidence that come from the fieldwork. The second one corresponds to the 
conclusions of the thesis and it results from the dialectic interplay between theory and 
analysis, or pattern matching. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 Selecting a case is harder when the number of possible cases to choose is small, or when the cases to 
research about are rare (Harding et al., 2002). Precisely this research should be considered as a rare case. 
In selecting Pedro Aguirre Cerda comuna as a case study, some degree of bias has to be accepted for the 
obvious limitations that probably there are not too many comunas within the inner city of Santiago, 
similar in size and analogous in spatial allocation within the potential area of expansion for urban renewal. 
In a nutshell, this case study makes statistical generalisations impossible, given the historical and 
geographical uniqueness of the case. 28 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1. Research Stages 
Source: own elaboration based on Yin (2003: 50) 
1.4. Justifying Pedro Aguirre Cerda (PAC) and surrounding 
comunas as case study 
Aware of the complexity that a context like Santiago’s peri-centre implies, the present 
research sought to restrict the analysis to one case study area, where the effects of the 
Urban Renewal Subsidy (URS) and Ciudad-Parque Bicentenario (CPB) and other key 
public interventions were visible in the initial stages of the fieldwork. PAC comuna, 
located in the south-western peri-centre of Santiago, seemed an extremely attractive 
case of analysis. Its selection responds to what Flyvbjerg calls “information-oriented 
selection”, more specifically “critical cases” which are those that allow to achieve 
logical deduction and false hypotheses (Flyvbjerg, 2006: 230). Before conducting the 
fieldwork, an initial approach to this territory showed that PAC has the following 
characteristics: 
a)  Sixty percent of PAC territory is located within the Urban Renewal Subsidy 
Area (URSA), at the north of the comuna. 29 
b)  Its eastern neighbouring comuna, San Miguel, concentrates the second largest 
agglomeration of subsidised urban renewal in Santiago. When this research 
started, there was a good chance that waves of renovation would move into PAC 
(see Figure 4.9, page 180). 
c)  Its western neighbouring comuna Cerrillos hosts the Ciudad-Parque 
Bicentenario (CPB) large urban project.  
d)  PAC space, originally almost entirely produced by state social housing and 
organised squatter enclaves (campamentos), from the 1950s to 1973, has 
crystallised in a very dense structure composed of small plots, narrow streets, 
few open spaces, and a territory surrounded by motorways that currently 
reinforce its spatial isolation. As seen in Figure 1.2, these elements configure 
PAC as one of the four currently densest residential agglomerations in Greater 
Santiago
4, hosting 115,000 people in almost 870 hectares (López, 2005).  
e)  As will be analysed in CHAPTER 5, the evolution of land prices in PAC shows an 
embryonic rent gap, gradually increased by URSA and CPB. Because of this 
transforming context, and despite the almost inexistence of demand for new 
properties during the period under analysis, an important part of PAC seems to 
be attracting the interest of property developers.  
f)  A recently conducted process of drafting a new local Master Plan between 2003 
and 2005 led to a conflictive process of struggle between the municipality and 
the residents (by 2009, the approval of this instrument was stalled; see CHAPTER 
6). An initial enquiry revealed that this process was closely related to factors a), 
b), c) and e) (Saleh, 2006). 
g)  PAC includes two of the largest and most vibrant working-class neighbourhoods 
(poblaciones)
5 in Santiago: La Victoria and José María Caro (the latter is shared 
with Lo Espejo comuna in its southern limit; see Figure 1.3). In addition, there 
                                                 
4 The others are (1) Providencia-El Golf, (2) Pudahuel and (3) San Ramón-La Granja comunas.  
5 For definitions of concepts written in italics, see Appendix 1-Glossary. 30 
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was a very well organised citizen movement, which I started to contact during 
the initial stages of my fieldwork. 
 
Figure 1.2. The 
four densest 
residential areas 
in Santiago6 
Source: own 
elaboration based 
on SII (2001) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It seemed evident that PAC, probably more than most other comunas in Santiago’s peri-
centre, was facing processes of both structural change and social resistance. As will be 
seen in CHAPTER 4, the public strategy for urban renewal exists in Santiago since 1990 
and the CPB emerged as a defined project in 2000. From this perspective, the years 
between 1990 and 2005 seemed an appropriate period to observe. Also, key information 
                                                 
6 Arc View-Spatial Analyst module was used for the analysis. Search radius: 3 km. Density analysis: 
Kernel. URSA and CPB can be seen in the figure. 31 
from the national censuses in 1992 and 2002 could be included in this period, while 
other statistical data was available for this time
7.  
As a low-income area, PAC exhibits relatively low indices of social development. It is 
the fifth of the 34 comunas  comprising Santiago that saw the greatest decline in 
population (-12.17%) between 1992 and 2002. The economically active population in 
PAC is also lower than average, with people aged between 20 and 49, making up less 
than 15% of the total, compared to the 47% of Greater Santiago as a whole. Although 
residential overcrowding is slightly higher in PAC (4.2 people/dwelling) whilst the 
average in Santiago is 3.9 (INE, 2002), severe dwelling multi-occupation is 
concentrated in 20% of PAC territory, in its most deprived poblaciones (SGA-IBERSIS, 
2000). Crime and drug-dealing are also problematic, though this tends to happen in the 
more recently built peripheral poblaciones too. PAC territory is also surrounded by 
motorways that increase its spatial isolation. However, somehow paradoxically, the 
comuna is not among the most deprived metropolitan municipalities of Santiago. As its 
own inhabitants claim, PAC has two advantages compared with analogous low-income 
comunas, especially from the periphery: its centrality
8 and the relatively better quality 
of its infrastructure and networks, built under past policies of state social space 
provision (Kusnetzoff, 1975). 
Nevertheless, the working-class origins of Santiago’s peri-centre explain why there 
have not been important processes of filtering down the social scale, and/or dilapidation 
of residential space in PAC. Although peri-central poblaciones have few amenities and 
minimal infrastructure, they are relatively consolidated and multifunctional spaces for 
low-income housing and informal and formal micro enterprises. Figure 1.3 shows views 
of three main PAC neighbourhoods. 
 
 
                                                 
7 Further information about PAC in Appendix 10. 
8 During the fieldwork, it took me about 15 minutes to travel from PAC’s geographical centre to Santiago 
CBD by public transport.  32 
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Figure 1.3. Views 
of three 
poblaciones in 
PAC  
Source: 
photography taken 
by the author 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.4. Views 
of new residential 
blocks within 
URSA 
Source: a) to c) 
www.portalinmobili
ario.com; d) and c) 
photography taken 
by the author 
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1.5. The fieldwork 
1.5.1. Criteria for data collection and type of data collected 
The main objective of the fieldwork in PAC was to enquire with local actors about the 
social, economic and political implications of the Master Plan redrafting that took place 
from 2003 to 2005 in the comuna. The fieldwork was conducted from March to June 
2007. Beforehand, it became clear that the process of Master Plan redrafting had a 
myriad of complex social and political implications that needed to be enquired with 
different actors.  
A general logic of ‘multiple sources’ aimed at assuring comprehensive and explanatory 
understanding of the case, reliability and external validity for results, and triangulation 
of different discourses. Contradictory discourses were considered as points of 
disagreement inherent to the conflictive nature of the case. The first informants were 
contacted from London. They were scholars from my faculty
9 and one architect from 
the Architects Union. This strategy proved to be a good means of getting further 
contacts in a process of ‘snowballing’. Following the ‘multiple sources’ criteria, the 
fieldwork comprised by and large four sets of activities:  
a)  Contacts at grassroots level: I decided to interview neighbourhood leaders of 
PAC, because they had direct participation in the process of Master Plan 
redrafting (see Appendix 5 for complete list of interviewees, and Appendix 11 
for definition of local Master Plan in Chile).  
b)  Contacting institutions: With the purpose of both interviewing people and 
searching bibliographical data, the following institutions were visited: the four 
largest universities in the city (University of Chile, Catholic University, 
University of Santiago and private Central University), national and regional 
offices of the Ministry of Housing and Planning (Ministerio de Vivienda y 
Urbanismo, MINVU) and the Housing and Development Service (Servicio de 
Vivienda y Urbanización, SERVIU), UN-ECLAC, Pedro Aguirre Cerda 
                                                 
9 Faculty of Architecture and Urbanism, University of Chile. 34 
municipal government and its several technical offices, several NGOs and 
several private firms. Libraries or archives were consulted in these institutions 
when available. 
c)  Direct observation: Fieldtrips to PAC were conducted on a regular basis for not 
less than 4 days a week (within a period of 15 weeks, from March to June), 
including Saturdays, usually staying in the area the whole day. When I was not 
interviewing neighbourhood leaders, the trips to PAC were aimed at 
participating in communal meetings or meetings between grassroots and central-
state officers, visiting PAC poblaciones, taking photographs or just simply 
talking to ordinary people for capturing unexpected impressions.  
d)  Gathering additional information: Although most official reports have no 
security restrictions, and a large proportion is available from the Internet, some 
important data (e.g. PAC urban cartographies) had to be officially requested. 
Recent media reports related to Ciudad-Parque Bicentenario project, PAC 
Master Plan and San Miguel urban renewal were searched regularly over the 
Internet. TV programmes from TV channel La Victoria and leaflets (that 
illustrate the struggle between the local communities and the municipality; see 
CHAPTER 6) were also collected. 
1.5.2. Contacting informants  
The deeper I gained perspective into the implications of the case of PAC, the more 
complex the case seemed and the more actors appeared to have something relevant to 
say about it. Thus the need arose to interview a broader-than-expected array of actors, 
comprised by two main groups: Primary Actors, directly involved in the process of 
Master Plan redrafting in PAC; and Secondary Actors, not directly involved in the 
process but able to give a broader technical perspective of the local case and its context.  
As Yin (2003: 90) recommends, general informants “not only provide the case study 
investigator with insights into a matter but also can suggest sources of corroboratory or 
contrary evidence – and also initiate the access to such sources.” Table 1.4 summarises 35 
the main features of Primary and Secondary actors and their relevance for the case-
study. Primary Actors’ description and roles are detailed in CHAPTER 6. 
 
Type of Informant  N° Interviewees  Description 
Primary Actors 
PAC community leaders 
 
16 
 
From the most emblematic poblaciones of PAC: La Victoria, 
José María Caro, San Joaquín, Manuel Rodríguez, Miguel 
Dávila, Las Lilas, Lo Valledor and others. 
Independent professionals   3  They helped PAC grassroots to learn technical concepts 
and to produce an Alternative Draft Master Plan. 
PAC municipal officials 
and mayor 
4  Entitled technically and politically to lead the elaboration of 
the Master Plan, they controlled the consultant’s 
performance and had to submit the plan to the Local 
Council for its approval.  
PULSO consultants  1  Consultancy firm commissioned for producing the new 
Master Plan.  
Subtotal 24   
Secondary Actors 
Central and Regional 
government (MINVU and 
SERVIU) 
15  Actors not directly related but with ‘institutional’ interests 
about PAC process of renewal. Some of them gave access 
to missing pieces of statistical information and official 
documentary data required. 
Members of Parliament  2  Representing peri-central districts, they observed PAC case 
from the national legislative body.  
NGOs and other 
independent bodies or 
professionals 
3  They observed the process critically. The most relevant is 
‘Defendamos la Ciudad’ NGO.  
Large scale developers 
and National Association 
of Building Firms 
4  Key issues for them are the amplification of the potential 
ground rent in the area and the grant of the public subsidy 
to developers.  
Scholars 11  From UN-ECLAC and the abovementioned universities. 
Experienced scholars with important contributions to 
planning and urban studies.  
Subtotal  35   
TOTAL INTERVIEWEES  59 
Table 1.3. Primary and secondary groups of informants interviewed 36 
1.5.3. Interviewing people  
The most important goal of the fieldwork was not to accomplish a certain number of 
interviews but to obtain a necessary ‘density of evidence’, in order to constitute enough 
bulk and comprehensiveness of information. Initially, I envisaged that 20 key 
informants would be sufficient for the case. At the end of the fieldwork, I had collected 
impressions of 59 people, apart from those contacted through group-based participation 
and those who were not recorded.  
Semi-structured interviews were preferred for their ability to follow some 
predetermined order but, at the same time, be open to unexpected emerging issues. This 
form of enquiry consists of listening, being not judgemental and, perhaps more 
importantly, being careful and systematic with the evidence that informants give 
(Krueger and Casey, 2000; Longhurst, 2003). Interviews were conducted most of times 
in the interviewees’ offices or homes. The order of questions varied in every interview. 
Also, depending on the hierarchy of informants and their expertise, the topics of the 
interviews varied accordingly (see Appendix 6 for interview sheets translated to 
English). Beforehand I explained to all interviewees the topic of my research, and the 
purpose of the interview. I also asked for their permission to record and quote their 
speeches. Everybody accepted.  
The purpose of the interviews was not to analyse discourses or contents. I considered 
discourse analysis methods were out of the needs for the present case. My limited 
knowledge about these methods drove to that decision. However, interviews anyway 
were used as pieces of evidence for the case. The interviews’ questions aimed at 
expanding my knowledge about the case and providing evidence in areas where the 
quantitative or documentary data had not shed enough light. Interviews were 
complemented with notes from informal conversations with local people in PAC 
poblaciones, systematically compiled through a fieldwork diary that I wrote almost 
every night. This systematically gathered impressions and preliminary conclusions 
about the process. 
For the analysis of the interviews, I created a general coding tree (see Appendix 7), 
based on four nodes, namely: a) historical social production of the peri-central space, b) 37 
capitalist production of space, c) current forms of entrepreneurial urbanism and d) 
relevant elements in informants’ discourses. Each node was disaggregated in several 
sub-nodes. N-vivo software was used for coding electronically the transcribed 
interviews, crossing the texts with the nodes and sub-nodes defined in the tree. Some 
nodes were denser, being touched by higher number of informants. This helped me to 
stress or dismiss theoretical aspects according to their relevance in the topic. Nodes also 
helped me to select the most illustrative quotations and place them in the text of this 
dissertation. All quoted pieces of interviews are my translation from Spanish. 
An additional strategy to enquire with people was to participate in five communal 
meetings of collective negotiation between PAC neighbourhood leaders and the national 
authority for Transport
10, very similar to those that took place from 2003 to 2005 with 
the municipality. My aim was to visualise the levels of agency deployed by PAC 
communities in processes of negotiations and to get contact with the most interesting, 
best informed possible participants. These meetings were neither scheduled nor 
programmed by me, but by PAC leaders. I participated in five meetings, where I 
decided to take a passive role, listening and observing and only intervening when I was 
asked to do so. The groups were usually composed of 10 to 15 people and lasted no 
more than 2 hours. They were conducted in a municipal communal facility.  
A sensitive point to bear in mind during the fieldwork was a gap arising from class 
differences between me and low-income PAC interviewees. Initially I thought that 
because of my cultural modes or even physical aspect (I am taller and paler than most 
Santiaguinos), some local people might react resentfully or even refuse to give me 
information. In fact, this fieldwork experience implied a constant questioning myself 
about the grade of reflexivity or ‘positionality’
11 a researcher should exercise in this 
                                                 
10  My fieldwork coincided with that process of negotiation. PAC leaders demanded to the national 
Transport authority an urgent improvement of the route map in the comuna of the recently implemented 
metropolitan Transantiago Transport Plan. The new scheme had left many neighbourhoods without a 
public transport service. I was told by the grassroots leaders that my presence in PAC and constant 
enquiring about urban matters helped to rise people’s willingness to participate in this new negotiation. 
This might have been a positive outcome for their goals, but totally involuntary! See Appendix 1-
Glossary for basic information about Transantiago. 
11 This value – instituted and popularised by feminist social science – means that one, as researcher, must 
be aware of one’s own identity, social condition and political thinking, in order to ethically and fairly 
engage with the interviewees (Cook, 2005; Longhurst, 2003). 38 
kind of investigations. From the beginning I tried to avoid both using typical middle 
class colloquialisms but also pretended to act like a local person. Soon I learned people 
from PAC, especially from población La Victoria, are accustomed to be researched by a 
broad array of scholars
12. This showed me that my class background was of no 
consequence to them. 
1.6. The quantitative analysis 
Two types of quantitative data were used: census data for 1992 and 2002, and annual 
land market data from 1990 to 2005 (Trivelli, 2005), obtained from governmental and 
academic sources respectively. Also, the GIS Database of Santiago-Centre municipal 
government was consulted. This is one of the most complete municipal databases in 
Chile and covers the whole Santiago metropolitan region. Other sources were MINVU 
Urban Observatory and SEREX consultants (Catholic University).  
The information utilised consists of crude digital data. This was processed with Arc 
View, linked through an official code (Cod-Ine) to the Santiago territorial units. Every 
piece of information has a spatial correlation, being easily linkable to its correspondent 
territorial unit. The higher level of disaggregation of the spatial analysis is the 
individual ‘block’, though some analysis was conducted at ‘census district’ level and 
comuna level. Detailed features of the quantitative data can be consulted in Appendix 8. 
1.7. Chapter summary 
The single-case study method outlined meets the epistemological conditions defined in 
the first part of the chapter. The first condition was to explain the phenomena ‘from the 
theory’ and contribute with expanded, better contextualised understanding of the case. 
This deductive-inductive approach, based on iterative feedbacks to the stage of 
                                                 
12 Recent cases were a team of upper-class psychologists from Catholic University that field-researched 
children in 2006, and Janet Finn (2006a, b), an ethnographer from the USA that spent almost one year in 
La Victoria in 2005.  39 
theorisation (see Figure 1.1), helped me to adapt the theories of Creative Destruction 
and Rent Gap to the Chilean socio-political reality. This is part of the abovementioned 
process of ‘analytical inference’, and its outcome can be seen in the final CHAPTER 8 
Conclusions.  
The second condition was to have an interpretivist, non-positivistic approach. The 
fieldwork conducted and all its elements contributed to a more comprehensive 
understanding of the social implications of the case, even considering its controversial 
political nature. The qualitative data collected through semi-structured interviews, 
group-based participation and direct observation was used as evidence in the analysis.  
The third condition was to be coherent with the comprehensiveness of the case. The 
quantitative data gathered was equally important for informing the analysis of the 
research. Part of the spatial analysis was conducted prior to the fieldwork in order to 
define the case study area (see Figure 1.2, for instance). In general, the rule of having 
multiple (and comprehensive) sources of information was important to conduct this 
research’s case study analysis.  
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CHAPTER 2. Establishing a hypothesis of peri-central 
creative destruction  
2.1. Introduction  
This chapter outlines the three conceptual axes of the thesis: a) the inherently capitalist 
process of creative destruction of fixed capital in the city, as a form of capital expansion 
(Schumpeter, 1976); b) the production and uneven accumulation of the ground rent in 
the inner city or peri-centre, comprising a specifically ‘urban’ form of creative 
destruction (Clark, 1988; Smith, 1979); and c) the contemporary forms of public and 
private sectors’ involvement in the redevelopment of the peri-centre in the capitalist 
world, in what has come to be called ‘urban entrepreneurialism’ (Harvey, 1989a). 
Accordingly, the three central sections of this chapter are as follows.  
Section 2.2 defines the concept of creative destruction from its broader meanings, as 
fixed capital that ought to be destroyed for opening space for subsequent rounds of 
investment. In global and historical terms, creative destruction was experienced in 
capitalism in the 1970s, through the switching from Fordist to neoliberal modes of 
regulation, with consequent transformations of economic, political, social and urban 
global structures. This had tremendous implications in the inner cities of the 
industrialised and industrialising world. Santiago is an example of the latter.  
Section 2.3 examines creative destruction as the main driver of property market in the 
peri-centre. According to the rent gap theory, market-led urban renewal becomes 
feasible when a sufficiently large rent gap exists, namely the difference between a 
devalued capitalised ground rent (CGR) and an increased potential ground rent (PGR). 
In both cases, devaluation of the building value (BV) and the CGR are forms of creative 
destruction, needed to enlarge the rent gap.  41 
But creative destruction in the city also needs some state involvement. Section 2.4 
proposes that entrepreneurial policies
1 for inner city renewal are necessary for allowing 
reinvestment in the places of widest rent gap, producing some forms of social 
reconfiguration in targeted neighbourhoods, and even diverting social welfare from the 
spaces that most need it, as a way to ‘cleanse’ them and secure the work of the urban 
capitalist system of accumulation. Section 2.5 concludes and summarises the chapter, 
establishing questions, research objectives and a hypothesis.  
2.2. Creative destruction and peri-centre 
2.2.1. Creative destruction in primary circuits of capital 
As David Harvey (2001) argues, the need for capital accumulation has created specific 
spatial structures in the city throughout its historical development. However, expansive 
capitalism also tends to destroy its own physical, social and political structures, seeking 
to renew an infrastructural basis for further processes of accumulation, embracing 
increasingly larger scales. In probably one of their most famous paragraphs, Marx and 
Engels claimed 
The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionising the instruments of 
production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of 
society. Conservation of the old modes of production in unaltered form, was, on the 
contrary, the first condition of existence for all earlier industrial classes. Constant 
revolutionising of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, 
everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones. 
All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and 
opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. 
All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to 
face with sober senses his real conditions of life, and his relations with his kind. The need 
                                                 
1 Policy is understood here always in its broadest sense, comprising state-designed plans of action seeking 
to guide decisions and achieve rational outcomes; more specifically, as “any national, regional, local, or 
institutional project, program, law, regulation, or rule” (Schmeer, 1999: 7). According to Hardoy (1975a: 
84), policy is “a general line of action that seeks to utilise in the best way possible the resources available 
for a certain society for the fulfilment of certain goals” which respond to the interests of the dominant 
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of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the entire 
surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connexions 
everywhere. (Marx and Engels, 1970: 34-5) 
Much inspired by these ideas, Schumpeter synthesised capitalism as a ‘process of 
creative destruction’ (1976). He claimed that capitalism is a history of revolutions, 
impossible to observe but in their historical development. Capitalism revolutionises its 
economic structures from ‘within’, incessantly creating a new one and destroying the 
old one. Economic agents, namely capitalists, destroy and replace their fixed capital, 
means of production, physical and social infrastructures, according to the pace of the 
new technological advance, in order to remain competitive. This is precisely the force 
that sustains the city as a machine of production and competition (Batty, 2007a). The 
capitalists’ search for competition embraces 
the new commodity, the new technology, the new source of supply, the new type of 
organisation […] competition which commands a decisive cost or quality advantage and 
which strikes not at the margins of the profits and the outputs of the existing firms but at 
their foundations and their very lives. (Schumpeter, 1976: 84) 
Although initially Schumpeter observed this tendency to self-destruction as a fate that 
would lead capitalism to its inevitable and definitive exhaustion for its tendency to 
entropy – i.e. collapse of its future room to manoeuvre, as Biel (2006) concludes after 
analysing capitalism under a thermodynamic perspective – the fact is that capitalism has 
been so far able “to adapt and mutate, to evolve new forms of industrial organization 
which are hostile only to an established order which is in constant transition anyway.” 
(Batty, 2007b: 2)  
Through every structural crisis
2 of over accumulation, processes of creative destruction 
have been essential for disinvestment, devaluation and destruction of formerly invested 
capital, readjusting its organic composition - i.e. the proportion between labour power 
and means of production, basically the capacity of labour to produce value (Marx, 1995) 
                                                 
2 Crisis is so decisive a concept that the Dictionary of Human Geography (Johnston et al., 2000: 123-5) 
devotes three pages to define it essentially as “an interruption in the reproduction of economic, cultural, 
social and/or political life.” Crises are core to the historical-materialist interpretation of development, 
being outcomes of the dialectic nature of opposed principles of societal organisation, patent in the 
transitions between historical modes of production (implying an interruption in the accumulation process; 
see Harvey 2006a).  43 
– and recalibrating the rate of profit (upwards), in ways to establish opportunities for 
new rounds of investment. Classical forms of creative destruction have been, for 
instance, driving down the price of labour through mass unemployment, destroying 
value invested in fixed capital until production is idled or wars, because they imply 
subsequent economic reconstruction (Smith, 2000a).  
Crises occur when “flows of capital do not expand the basis for the production of 
surplus value” (Harvey, 1985: 102), forcing the rationalisation of an unbalanced system 
of production, exchange, distribution and consumption, and financial and state 
institutional structures. Cyclical crises of over-accumulation produced within the 
primary circuits of capital (i.e. the productive sectors)
3 are generated by overproduction 
of commodities, falling rates of profit (in pricing terms), surplus capital which manifest 
itself as idle capacity lacking opportunities for investment and surplus labour, and/or 
rising rate of exploitation of labour power. 
As a general rule, major crises drive capitalists to switch from the primary circuits and 
invest into the secondary circuits, in forms of fixed capital and, more specifically, built 
environment and urban space, or even in the tertiary circuits (Fyfe and Kenny, 2005). 
This is known as ‘capital switching’. Epitome of this are the over-invested property 
markets in times of pre-crisis
4. It is important to stress that these flows of investment 
have nothing to do with real needs of people (for housing, open spaces, amenities, etc.) 
but of capital reproduction and expansion. Capital switching is what Marx (1973, 
Notebook VI) defined as periodical devaluations of fixed capital, which provided one of 
the immanent means in capitalist production to check the fall of the rate of profit and 
accelerate accumulation of capital-value through the creation of new capital. 
                                                 
3 Primary circuit of capital is production, secondary is the built environment and tertiary is investment in 
science/technology seeking to increase labour productivity and guarantee its cooperation. Capital 
regularly shifts from one to the others as a way to resolve crises of over-accumulation. Within the first 
circuit, Harvey differentiates fixed capital enclosed within the production process from fixed capital that 
works as “physical framework for production”, the city and its infrastructures being essential parts of the 
latter (Harvey, 1985). 
4 The sub-prime mortgage financial crisis in the US and its devastating worldwide consequences for low-
income, elder and ethnic minority people are the most recent example (Strauss, 2009). 44 
Nonetheless, in contrast with other more volatile economic sectors, urban space is an 
efficient form of capital fixation, allowing the processes of accumulation to work within 
certain levels of stability. This has been defined as ‘geographies of accumulation’ 
(Carlos, 2008; Harvey, 2001, 2006a). City space avoids or slows down the capitalist 
tendency to crises of over-accumulation. Being a commodity, a wealth generator and a 
mechanism of securitisation of surplus value, urban space is created, transformed, 
destroyed and expanded as long as periods of accumulation are developed. In turn, 
when excess of accumulation arise, urban space responds with stability in profit rates 
(e.g. the constant rent produced by a residential building).  
However, cities can – as a last resource – be destroyed in order to clear space for new 
accumulation in a next round. The organisation and re-organisation of city space is thus 
not only an expression of the globally-induced crises of capital accumulation, but a 
device for managing them locally (Harvey, 1973).  
Capitalist production is inherently anarchic. The collective interest of capitalists lies in a 
balance between production and consumption, but the rationality of capitalist competition 
and technological development makes such a balanced expansion of the economy almost 
impossible to achieve. The result is crisis of overproduction [which] may be displaced in 
the first instance by the artful use of the credit system, but only for a time. There may yet 
be a further displacement […] through the manipulation of geography and space: the 
spatial fixes of imperialism and the reorganisation of the built-environment. (Katznelson, 
1993: 110) 
Nonetheless, the capitalist creation of space has plenty of contradictions. Created spatial 
structures, or geographies of accumulation, act as barriers for further processes of 
accumulation, since they are fixed and immovable. These stumbling blocks need to be 
necessarily destroyed as otherwise capital invested in the built environment would be 
immobilised for long periods of time, being illiquid, entailing high transaction costs 
upon sale, needing security and not being easily divisible. In general, the inflexibility of 
the city space resists frequent modification and this makes the urban commodity very 
sensitive to devaluation, especially compared with machinery and other forms of fixed 
capital (Weber, 2002).  
Urban space never changes as fast as the pace of economic development demands; it 
usually becomes an impediment for the fast transforming capitalist structures, because 45 
the built environment is fixed, it is a resource system of use values embedded in a 
physical landscape which can be utilised for production, exchange and consumption. Or, 
as Rachel Weber adds, the “accumulation process experiences uncomfortable friction 
when capital (ie “value in motion”) is trapped in steel beams and concrete.” (2002: 519) 
The built environment “is especially long lived, difficult to alter, spatially immobile and 
often absorbent of large lumpy investment.” The city space is resistant to revolutionary 
change, but at some point, investment in the built environment becomes definitively 
unproductive. The exchange value
5 set into urban space must therefore, anyhow, be 
written down, diminished or even totally lost (Harvey, 1985: 105). However, the 
devaluation of capital set on built environment does not necessarily destroy its use value 
(across its ‘useful life’
6) but can be used as ‘devalued capital’ for as long as it helps to 
re-establish the base for a new further period of accumulation. The exchange value 
locked up in the built environment can be recovered only by fully using the built 
material over its lifetime (amortisation time), though it cannot be easily altered so it 
fixes only certain level of productivity over the mentioned time (e.g. a limited ground 
rent produced by a plot, for the ‘quality’ of the structure built on it). However, if new 
and more productive fixed capital is produced, the old fixed capital devalues even faster 
and deeper and so it must be transferred into different circuits of capital (Ibid). 
One of the deepest and most pervasive cases of global-scale creative destruction 
generated by capital switching was the de-industrialisation of great part of the industrial 
cities in advanced capitalist nations, namely UK and the Midwest of USA, since the 
early 1970s and for over a decade afterwards (Hall, 1999). Post-Fordist flexible 
production techniques replaced industrial structures and infrastructures developed under 
the Fordist
7 regime, while once vibrant industrial regions were emptied and replaced 
with new landscapes that offered maximum economic advantage for the new functions 
required in the new global economic order (Mitchell, 1998; Sassen, 1998). These 
                                                 
5 ‘Exchange value’ is understood here as a value of a commodity, determined solely by the market and 
defined in monetary terms, i.e. price, thus unrelated with the inherent utility of the asset, or use value 
(Marx, 1973). The dissociation between the two types of values and the subordination of the latter under 
the former is a central condition of capitalism. 
6 Expected period of time during which a depreciating asset will be productive. 
7 See Appendix 1-Glossary for definition.  46 
processes considerably affected the abovementioned inner cities. A radical contradiction 
between fixed, immobile geographies of accumulation and the need of redirecting 
capital into different spheres of flexible production and expanded accumulation was 
being experienced across the world.  
However, cities are not only geographies of accumulation but also geographies of social 
reproduction (Castells, 1985b), fields of relations among social agents, interrelated with 
the dominant mode of organisation of the economy and the spatial organisation of 
society (Carlos, 2008; Katznelson, 1993). The human dimensions implicit in the 
destruction and replacement of many formerly industrial inner cities of the first world 
entailed serious sociological consequences. Workers were deeply affected by these 
radical infrastructural changes, let alone built facilities for education, health, social 
services and amusement that got outmoded or simply disappeared from their 
neighbourhoods in a few years, due to lack of investment and maintenance. This 
happened because inner cities economies were based on manufacturing production that 
was departing from those places. Previous social institutions, labour codes, laws and 
social welfare apparatuses (modes of regulation
8, in fact) would be reset too in the 
following years, to be replaced with the new rules of laissez faire accumulation.
  
Furthermore, as the literature indicates, the effects of this creative destruction associated 
with post-Fordist de-industrialisation might have been experienced not only in 
developed but also in developing nations. However, in the latter, it may have entailed 
different forms and intensities, with widely different consequences. The following two 
sub-sections address these issues. 
2.2.2. Social effects of creative destruction in inner cities of the UK and 
USA 
In the early 1970s, world Fordism reached a final state of entropy and a final implosion 
of its own contradictions, which were: a) high inflation rates, b) extreme dependence on 
state regulations and bureaucracy, c) inability to cope with the mass consumption model 
                                                 
8 See Appendix 1-Glossary for definition. 47 
and the complex social demand and unionised organisation which had been produced 
(Gertler, 2000a). The decline of Fordism implied that  
[g]overnments broke the social contract between capital and labour that had supported 
decades of industrial peace and productivity, provided good wages for the securely 
employed and defended Keynesian mass consumption. The cultural paradigm of 
modernity, based on progress, planning and a belief that basic social security could be 
guaranteed, was shaken by new expressions – as well as fears – of fragmentation. (Zukin, 
2006: 113) 
Probably the most distinct spatial effect of the crisis of the early 1970s was the 
economic decline in the inner areas of the main cities of highly industrialised regions 
like UK and the Midwest of USA. In industrialised countries, massive suburbanisation 
was experienced since the end of World War II and this considerably emptied formerly 
dense, white and middle-class inner city areas (Parker, 2004). The latter turned into 
spaces occupied by lower-income population and, in the case of USA, by black or 
Latino communities (Ford and Griffin, 1979). Nonetheless, it would be from the 
recessive late 1960s that former central technical functions that supported the whole 
Fordist economy would become also suburbanised, the manufacturing economy 
transformed into service economy, and corporate and governmental headquarters would 
become recentralised in different CBDs. For the new functions needed, spatial 
proximity was crucial for managing the uncertainties of the contemporary fast financial 
market (Ritzer, 2000; Smith, 2005b). These factors much contributed to the emptying of 
the formerly vibrant industry-related residential agglomerations in the inner city.  
The problem could not be more structural for Peter Hall (1981, 1999) for whom, after 
his extensive analysis of UK cities, this post industrial inner city crisis comprised three 
levels: 
1.  A relation between structural change, at national and international scales, and 
the local economies, which affected the international, national and regional 
performance and capacities of industrial production. Large corporations took 
many or all of their functions away from inner cities, thus breaking the 
entrepreneurial milieu represented by these spaces for economic innovation and 
competition with other locations.  48 
2.  A mismatch between unemployment and unfilled job vacancies, which existed 
in the inner city side by side. Issues of education, skills, retraining, distance and 
accessibility affected altogether the local levels of employment.  
3.  A subtle line that separated the formal from the informal economy was 
reinforced, for different groups of the urban population, as well as the ways in 
which individuals moved from one sector to the other.  
Although Hall’s position might be considered technological-determinist (Lee, 2000; 
Lees et al., 2007), it leads to quite clear sociological implications: as a result of de-
industrialisation, inner cities in the UK experienced de-population, economic 
restructuring, property abandonment, higher unemployment, fragmented families, 
political disenfranchisement, crime, and desolate and urban landscape deterioration, all 
of it especially suffered by the people who stayed there (Grogan and Proscio, 2000).  
W. J. Wilson reached similar conclusions in the USA, where most of the former inner-
city industries left to relocate in new peripheral enclaves, slowly generating out-
migration of the middle-class urban professionals and the formally employed, better 
skilled working-class or ‘working class aristocracy’
9 towards the suburbs, where new 
and old jobs were being located. In consequence, the continuous migration of the more 
skilled workers gradually emptied the inner city, and soon a ‘spatial mismatch’ occurred 
when there was an unbalanced relation between a remaining poorly skilled local 
population and the few job opportunities available. From then on, job, joblessness and 
class would become core factors in a constant trend of inner city decline. 
Neighbourhoods worsened, expelling continually the remaining people who could 
afford to out-migrate (Wilson, 1987).  
Seen systemically, the phenomenon is self-reinforcing, a ‘positive feedback’ that affects 
the stability of inner city communities that formerly depended to a large extent on the 
viability of social institutions in their neighbourhoods – which provided mainstream 
role models and reinforced mainstream values related to employment, education and 
household structure – and the proximity to stable families. According to Wilson (1996), 
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the underclass remains in the inner city yet without the truly stabilising mechanisms 
represented by the middle and working classes.  
Hall (1981) agrees with this latter point. Post-industrial inner city space became 
structured by ‘traps’, or vicious circles of poor jobs and poor housing. Spatial decay was 
mainly produced by four causes: a) technological employment trap, whereby new 
technology allied to new economic organisations destroys the remaining people’s jobs 
and reduces their possibilities for finding new ones; b) housing trap, whereby they 
remain in rent-controlled private tenancies or in local authority housing, afraid to 
sacrifice their security and unable to move to seek jobs that might well be available for 
them elsewhere; c) poverty trap, which considerably worsens this situation, whereby if 
they get better jobs they will lose more in taxation and benefits than they stand to gain. 
But the fourth variable seems to be even more important in this vicious circle: d) 
collective deprivation, a local common perception of loss of opportunities, which is 
materialised in the physical deterioration of dwellings, factories, shops, streets and a 
lack of opportunities in jobs, housing, and education. Underlying all of these there is a 
feeling that the whole area is ‘going downhill’ and those who are most able or energetic 
are just leaving the neighbourhood. 
2.2.3. De-industrialisation in Latin American peri-centres too? 
Large scale creative destruction can occur either in the global north or south, in 
independent or dependent
10 economies (Castells, 1985a). Structurally speaking, in times 
of crisis, spatial reconfigurations take place in global economic centres but soon they 
spread towards global peripheral regions (Sassen, 1996, 2003). A question that arises is 
whether, as a consequence of the global downturn of Fordism, analogous processes of 
de-industrialisation occurred in Latin American cities and, if so, what form they took 
and how they affected inner city areas (peri-centres in Chile), especially given the 
period of intense import-substitution industrialisation (ISI) that had been previously 
experienced by many Latin American countries. 
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There is no specific research in Latin America focused on inner city decay of a 
comparable quality and level of specificity to those in the UK or USA. A possible 
reason can be that in contemporary Latin American cities, cases of widespread urban 
deprivation are the norm rather than the exception and can be not only associated to 
specific inner city territory but also suburban areas. However, the literature about Latin 
American cities observes in general that processes of both national industrialisation and 
de-industrialisation occurred, and they might have been factors of inner cities rise and 
decline in the biggest urban centres during the middle decades of the 20
th century. Yet 
the evidence is not conclusive and even some authors tend to disagree in some 
important aspects.  
For instance, Bromley & Jones (1996) argue that processes of post-Fordist de-
industrialisation in Latin American cities are considerably less relevant for these cities 
than those which took place in the industrialised world. Observing the inner city of 
Quito, Ecuador, they do not find evidence of industrial agglomeration integrated to 
residential neighbourhoods, neither do they identify state-led or self-help built 
environments in the peri-centre. Jones & Varley (1994) in turn analyse Puebla, Mexico, 
concluding that the Latin American inner city should be rather understood as a 
distinctive, ‘colonial’ historical centre inhabited by informal workers and handcrafters. 
Again, no relation of dependence between inner city and industrial sector exists there
11. 
These authors conclude that urban policies for these areas should focus on cultural-
based, conservationist strategies for urban heritage recovery. When conceptualising 
their models of Latin American inner cities, they also give limited relevance to the 
processes of import-substitution industrialisation that took place in Latin America 
during great part of the 20
th century. 
Similarly, based on studies of Mexican cities, Griffin & Ford (1980) and Ford (1996, 
1999) agree with the supposed almost inexistence of decaying industrial enclaves, 
observing instead the inner city as a combined zone between ‘maturity’ and ‘accretion’ 
crossed by axes of ‘disamenity’ and land squatters, being the latter spaces of deprivation 
and lack of positive externalities.  
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Peter M. Ward (2001) tends to accept more the relevance of import-substitution 
industrialisation in the production of a peri-central ring in Latin American cities, seeing 
it nonetheless as essentially irregular, self-help, precarious spaces instead of being 
produced by formal housing. Therefore, the author stresses that Latin American cities’ 
post-Fordist processes of decay are essentially dissimilar to cases in UK or USA, with 
different demography, considerably lower rates of de-population, relative stable and 
vibrant – though precarious – spatial economies, and, after one or two decades of 
decline, lack of inward reinvestment and absence of strong public policy (as it happened 
in cities of the global North). These three factors make Latin America inner city 
devitalisation a case of ‘different kind’, because  
[i]f their demography is fundamentally different, so, too, is the relationship between the 
macroeconomy and its impact upon urban structure. Latin American inner cities have not 
experienced the same cycle of industrial investment and disinvestment that many of their 
advanced-city counterparts have, which […] frequently offered the earliest locations for 
industrial manufacturing. For major Latin American cities industrial development was 
largely engendered by post-1950s ECLA[C] orthodoxy of import-substituting 
industrialization (ISI). These production and assembly manufacturing plants developed in 
areas which were at the (then) periphery of the city, forming industrial parks and 
corridors. Subsequently these industrial zones have been engulfed by continued urban 
growth. However, they have not usually been subject to systematic disinvestment, except 
where growing environmental awareness has demanded the relocation of particularly 
noxious or dangerous enterprises. (Ward, 1993: 1145) 
In general, all these authors observe a Latin American inner city not sufficiently 
industrialised – or just too recently industrialised (after the 1950s)
12 during too limited 
periods – for consolidating complex and durable working class milieus. Thus, their 
conclusion is that relevant cases of creative destruction generated by capital switching 
during the onset of the phase of import-substitution industrialisation might not have 
taken place in the main centres of the subcontinent. In general they observe neither 
considerable demographic de-population nor de-industrialisation or urban decay, but 
instead very vibrant central areas.  
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However, it is very possible that in Latin America the number and type of case studies 
lead to quite different conclusions. Observing urban centres mainly from the South 
American southern cone, and without attempting to establish comparisons between 
developed and developing societies, other authors have found considerably relevant 
evidence of inner city industrialisation during the 20
th century. Whether these processes 
are comparable in kind or degree with those in the global north, is not relevant for them. 
For instance, Bähr & Riesco (1981) and Bähr & Mertins (1993) observed Santiago de 
Chile’s peri-central inner city (see Figure 2.1) as a ‘mixed zone’ of low-middle class, 
where industrial and commercial functions are key elements that help to create 
residential neighbourhoods and micro property markets. What they observe is an inner 
city built essentially during a long-lasting import-substitution industrialisation period
13. 
  [We corroborated] impressively that the basic dimensions of housing localisation in 
Latin American agglomerations are similar to the models proposed for industrial cities. 
[…] The mixed zone residential-commercial-industrial [Zone 2 in Figure 2.1] comprises 
an ample gamut of residential types and qualities. It is possible to find here 
simultaneously new apartment buildings and old mansions in good state of conservation, 
together with multi-occupied dilapidated buildings. Furthermore, very old adobe-made 
houses coexist near old working class dwellings (i.e. little houses and conventillos
14). 
However, in Santiago these are not compact areas, nor is there a neatly observable fall in 
the social gradient outwards the mixed zone with subsequent rise [towards the suburbs] 
similar to other Latin American cities. […] In parallel to the industrialisation [of the city], 
between 1930 and 1940, a clear sectoral expansion from the city centre was developed, 
especially toward the south (San Miguel comuna
15). A similar, yet less intense situation 
took place to the north. In contrast, southwest and northwest sectors were left 
undeveloped for longer, so that a marginal, less valuable zone is located closer to the core 
there. In both cases, the quality of land played an important role. To the southeast, the 
land is valuable for its agricultural productivity and closeness to the market. To the 
northwest instead, the land is swampy, unsuitable for inhabitation (Bähr and Riesco, 1981: 
32-42; my translation from the original in Spanish). 
 
 
                                                 
13 The year Bähr & Riesco published is significant, because it is the critical moment when Santiago 
started to experience the socio-spatial effects of neoliberal policies. 
14 See Appendix 1-Glosary for definition. 
15 This is examined in CHAPTER 3. 53 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Bähr & Riesco’s internal functional-spatial model of Santiago, 1981 
Source: Bähr & Riesco (1981) 
Their conclusion is that inner city or peri-centre in Latin America results of a match 
between high levels of local employment concentrated in the industrial rings of the city, 
and a massive concentration of low- and medium-skilled workers and their families 
(working class and petty bourgeoisie) between the CBD and the expanding and more 
mixed peripheries. Hence the Latin American peri-centre corresponds to a ‘transition 
zone’ similar to that in the School of Chicago sectoral models’
16 (Bettin, 1982; Burgess, 
1972; Harris and Ullman, 2005; Johnston, 2000b) expressed in an amalgam of rooming 
house, residential deterioration, industries (or formerly industrial areas in the case of de-
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translated into urban allocation by Alonso, 1972) have been highly influential in contemporaneous urban 
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industrialised enclaves), slums – settled by recent immigrants – and improved areas of 
blue-collar workers, who escaped from the slums but who need to live near sources of 
work.  
This definition has inspired subsequent descriptions of inner city in Latin America. For 
instance, Arriagada & Simioni (2000, 2001), Ortiz & Morales (2002), Arriagada (2005), 
Bähr & Borsdorf (2005) and López (2005) outline descriptive, statistically-based 
approaches, defining the inner city as a territory (in the case of Santiago, a group of at 
least nine comunas)  surrounding the metropolitan core which show several similar 
features of complex industrial past, mixed areas of state-built and self-help built 
residential areas, and that have experienced relatively contemporaneous trends of de-
industrialisation from the 1970s or 1980s.  
Additional evidence in favour of the existence of an industrial past in the peri-centre is 
given by Katzman, who from a sociological perspective relates inner city with a mixture 
between ‘traditional working class’ and ‘migrant’ neighbourhoods of the mid 20
th 
century. These were spaces of relative poverty but where general ways of life associated 
to a culture of work have been long-lasting. Katzman’s perspective is clear: the 
predominant socio-economic structure in the largest metropolises, given in a certain 
historical moment, produce the main features of the neighbourhoods that are created 
during that time (Katzman, 2003a, b). From that point, he stresses the differences of the 
already traditional peri-central spaces with the newest, ‘post-neoliberal policies’ and 
rapidly expanding peripheral low-income enclaves or poblaciones of the ‘new poverty’ 
(see CHAPTER 3). Differences could not be more marked: the migrants’ neighbourhoods 
were formed after massive pre- and post-Second War migrations of rural population in 
search of formal and informal jobs in the cities (e.g. males were more involved in 
circuits of industrial jobs or construction, whilst females were closer to employment in 
domestic services), and the working class neighbourhoods were more deeply involved 
in the productive spheres of the national process of industrialisation. The result was 
mixed  
class consciousness rooted in the labour experience and strengthened through the 
sociability of the neighbourhood. Several factors contributed to this strength. First, the 
stability of this insertion into a same working sphere, whereas the size of the [working] 
establishments was homogeneous. Second, relevant utopias that reinforced the 55 
importance of work towards a new, socially richer, more equal and integrated society. 
Third, the experience of labour and social conquests through collective struggle. Fourth, 
the membership to strong labour organisations. Fifth, the hope in progress mobilised by 
the industrial dynamic. Attitudes and values that emerged from that labour experience 
contributed to the formation of patterns that regulated the coexistence in the working 
class neighbourhoods, as well as the residents’ sociability and the participation in the 
communal institutions fed those attitudes and values back. (Katzman, 2007: 192-3; my 
translation from the original in Spanish) 
Although Katzman (2003a, b, 2007) and Bähr & Riesco (1981) confirm the production 
of ‘industrialised’ inner-cities in Latin American countries that had relatively long 
periods of import-substitution industrialisation, in general the authors reviewed here 
interpret the effects of ISI on inner cities quite differently. After a disparity of 
conclusions, a first question that emerges is if such ‘representative Latin American inner’ 
city, somehow claimed by Griffin & Ford (1980), Ford (1996, 1999), Bromley & Jones 
(1996), Jones & Varley (1994) and Ward (1993, 2001) really exists, or there are instead 
different types of inner city depending on every national economic trajectory, roles 
exerted by states, private sectors and social movements. And if so, probably each case 
ought to be verified one by one. However, a second question, closely related to the 
former, refers to the implications that the processes of state-commanded economic 
liberalisation exerted in Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s, namely neoliberal de-
industrialisation, had taken place in a peri-centre like Santiago’s.  
Yet still a third question remains. This is related to a different type of creative 
destruction which embraces almost integrally the secondary circuit of capital and is 
experienced in the peri-centre at neighbourhood scale, were there an industrial past or 
not. The question is about the neoliberal forms of inner city urban renewal, and if those 
are also forms of creative destruction. The following section develops this point. 
2.2.4. Switching into the secondary circuit of capital 
At the final stages of Fordism, cities’ economies were transformed from being 
supported by primary circuits of capital (industrialisation) into being largely determined 
by secondary ones. Lefebvre (2003) called this ‘Urban Revolution’. This metaphor 
denotes a major epochal shift, from a modern period of economic growth based on 56 
industrialisation, into a post-modern period in which the urban commodity became 
central for capitalist accumulation (Merrifield, 2002). From then on, urban rent and 
urban space would not only be a condition for production (e.g. hosting manufactures) 
but elements for production itself, subject to exploitation and hence accumulated 
without intervention of the primary circuits of capital. In short, with capital switch into 
secondary circuits, land rent, instead of profit extracted from labour exploitation would 
be exacerbated as a profitable commodity per se (Harvey, 1989b).  
However, as explained at the beginning of the chapter, due to the technical innovations 
which constantly improve the potential efficiency of city space, a piece of land or 
building becomes, in the mid- or long-term, an old structure unsuitable for more 
profitable uses. Hence capital’s restless search for profits requires constant renewal 
through forces that simultaneously open space for the new and devalue the old 
structures and, if neighbouring territories are rezoned, buildings or entire 
neighbourhoods might become unsuited to those ‘new’ environments (Weber, 2002) 
and hence need to be replaced.  
The contradiction between the urban space as a ‘commodity in tension’, hard to be 
replaced, and the urgent need of profit and liquidity by capitalists – made possible by 
the whole set of rules, regulations, and institutions that are established by the state, just 
for enhancing liquidity by homogenising and standardising those assets
17 – is precisely 
what makes urban renewal a critical issue for the economy of the capitalist cities 
(Gotham, 2006).  
Therefore market-oriented or state-led revitalisation, regeneration and renewal emerge 
as highly profitable forms of recovering the capacities of the built environment to 
accumulate capital. Whilst within the primary circuit, revenues derive from the capacity 
to create surplus from labour exploitation and the fixed capital set on space, within the 
second one, profit rests exclusively on the surplus extracted from land rent, this rent 
being accumulated monopolistically by the capitalist class (Ward, 2008). 
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However, surplus within the secondary circuit is not an ‘idle’ product (as when natural 
land is commodified) but produced by the capitalist mode of regulation which enhances 
it through infrastructures and regulations demanded by the capital. And it would be in 
low income areas, like the inner city areas of relatively industrialised cities like Santiago, 
where the contradiction between the capitalist class seeking accumulation of the land 
rent, and the working class that has historically helped its production, reaches its highest 
dialectical levels. The latter is my interpretation of what Smith (1986, 1996b) calls the 
‘Urban Frontier’ (not the property market ‘hotspots’ of the city, but the spaces where 
the urban renewal expands) and reflects precisely the politically contradictory nature of 
ground rent in the urban peri-centre, as the following section examines. 
2.3. Within the secondary circuit of capital: class-monopoly 
rent and rent gap exploitation 
2.3.1. Brief definition of ground rent in capitalism 
In capitalism, land is increasingly commodified, but always in a process of being shaped, 
reshaped, and challenged by the spatial practices of various groups and individuals 
whose identities and actions undermine the comparatively more homogeneous pre-
capitalist city (Katznelson, 1993)
18. Rent is consequently the rationing device for the 
commodification of land, required by all its inhabitants for multiple uses. And, given 
that rent is derived from a title to land (i.e. landed property), this title can change hands 
infrequently but decisively, just like a pure financial asset (Harvey, 1989b).  
Land rent can be understood as the future payment for a plot of land but, differently 
from other commodities, rent in its natural state costs nothing to be produced to its 
owner. In fact, in words of Marx, rent only comes to exist when commodified and 
appropriated by a parasitic landowning bourgeoisie (Marx, 1995). Notwithstanding that 
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its value is explained by classical theorists as produced by physical characteristics, in 
Marx’s categories, rent starts with the social transformation of nature. In fact, 
differential rents can be produced by differences in land productivity. A first form is 
Differential (ground) Rent I, explained by Marx as the surplus generated by the social 
work performed in a piece of land with better productivity (or centrality, or 
connectivity). Then, due to the intensity of the capital invested on land and the capacity 
of the capitalist class to technically transform the natural properties of land (or space) 
Differential Rent II emerges. Both types of rent are to be accumulated at the end of the 
day by a landlord, or the land-owning class (Borisov et al., 1965; Marx, 1995).  
However, in the city, the natural characteristics of land are less important, whilst the 
social agency produced around it by the needs and interests that the city agglomerates 
are far more crucial. For instance, with rent levels established by human-produced 
scarcity, the power exerted by landowners can be decisive in the determination of a 
level of rent, since it allows them to hold back this resource, creating artificial scarcity, 
until they receive a positive return above all the differential rents (Barnes, 2000). This is 
basically class-monopoly rent, and is further developed below. 
The differential rents in the city are artificially created. According to classical 
interpretations (e.g. Von Thünen’s model), land rent is determined by the distance of a 
land plot to a central market place (Garrocho, 2003). In Ricardo’s model, it is produced 
by the productivity of a piece of land in comparison to a totally unproductive plot. 
Alonso’s model of urban location follows Von Thünen’s logic, but it replaces ground 
productivity with social agents’ purchasing power, yet maintaining the distance to the 
centre as rent-generator mechanism (Alonso, 1972). Yet in the city, the creation of 
differential rent is far more complicated, and more factors intervene, such as distance to 
the different centres in the city, building regulations, density permitted, advantages in 
infrastructure nearby, and in general, everything that generates externalities in the urban 
space.  
Contemporary Marxism has reinterpreted Marxian classical categories of rent and 
contextualised them in the contemporary capitalist city (Harvey, 1974, 1989b). From 
these categories, the social nature of rent can be explained as follows:  59 
a)  Although the general definition of rent conceives it as payment from a user for 
utilising a natural scarce productive resource owned by somebody else, in the 
case of ‘urban’ rent, the process is far more complicated. Urban rent is neither a 
naturally produced resource nor naturally scarce. Instead, it is human-produced 
and artificially scarce.  
b)  Rather than being an efficient rationing device for organising land and its related 
resources for meeting the productive needs of a society (as it is defined by 
classical definitions, more applicable in isotropic spaces), rent in urbanised 
spaces is produced by a social group, acting as a class and aiming at 
incrementing its price without producing anything for it. 
c)  The city is a space where power relations matter. The urban ground rent is 
shaped by the interests of the land owners acting together as a class in order to 
raise the rate of return when there is not enough scarcity
19. This is a particular 
form of ground rent, seldom stressed by classical or neoclassical authors, and 
that usually largely exceeds differential land rents. Urban rent as ‘class-
monopoly rent’ is based on the interests of the owning bourgeoisie who on the 
one hand intervene in political and institutional arrangements and influence the 
urban land market seeking to obtain a better rate of return, and on the other 
generate extra surplus because they own a scarce commodity, which is the well-
located city space and/or building, rented or sold in the market at much higher 
price than its real cost of production (Borisov et al., 1965). 
d)  This class power is exercised in order to reduce the uncertainty of land-use 
competition, and takes place through governmental regulation (planning 
controls, provision of infrastructure, subsidies, or even political corruption), 
giving the speculator or developer reasonable expectations over the long run. 
State institutions and regulations, a ‘superstructure’ made by the ruling class, 
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pursue the maintenance of this existing organisation intact, while allowing 
growth and accumulation, avoiding cyclical crises and controlling social 
discontent. This process rests, essentially, upon the nature of liberalism, and its 
ideological, economic and political principle of private freedom, regulated by 
the exertion of class power (Jessop, 2002). This aspect will be further developed 
in section 2.4. 
e)  Rent in an ascendant way, percolates upwards but not downwards; it transfers 
money from low or middle income groups to the dominant bourgeoisie, 
transiting from differential into monopoly rent, ending finally in financial 
spheres. If, as Marx (1995) noted, during the industrial revolution, money was 
transferred from a productive bourgeoisie to a landlord-class (this applied to the 
period of mass industrialisation in the world during the 20
th century too) after the 
abovementioned ‘urban revolution’ in the second half of the 20
th century 
(Lefebvre, 2003), the ground rent started to be extracted from the rented land or 
building, rather than from productive processes.  
f)  The modern mechanisms of class-monopoly rent need to operate in constrained 
markets (with the aim of generating scarcity), these being one of the main 
producers of urban spatial fragmentation. The exploitation of rent needs to be 
produced in segmented niches, usually spatially constrained sub-markets, for the 
purpose of assuring enough scarcity within them. Building regulations are vital 
for this (for instance, through guidelines that limit the small-budget construction) 
so certain geographical areas are aimed at certain income groups whilst the 
social access to those areas is constrained insofar as land and property prices 
increase. The impact on the price of housing results in large sectors of society 
“finding barriers to operate in the market in so far as their ‘need of housing’ is 
not paralleled by a payment capacity that guarantees [enough] levels of 
accumulation to the producers of this commodity” (Jaramillo, 1981: 21; my 
translation from the original in Spanish). 
g)  Class-monopoly rent in the city is a reified mechanism; it responds to the 
necessity of creating money without producing value. This responds to the rules 
of the financial market, where the primary circuit of capital is radically moved 61 
into the second one – speculative and land rent-based – always under the 
condition that the urban realm offers better rate of return rates than the financial 
or commercial market. Otherwise, capital is sent back to productive spheres 
again. This is thus a plausible explanation for the process of massive 
reinvestment and renewal in formerly dilapidated areas, as seen in the following 
sections. 
2.3.2. Rent gap: a mechanism of creative destruction 
Largely based on systematic observations of urban ground rent variations, Neil Smith 
proposed for the first time in 1979 that the ‘back to the city’ movement and the 
revitalising inner city areas in North America could in fact be explained less by the 
cultural preference of a ‘returning’ suburban bourgeoisie and more by the existence of 
an increased potential ground rent and a lowered ground rent in those areas. This 
considerably augmented the potential rate of profit, provoking a rise in the demand for 
development in the inner city space (Smith, 1979).  
In fact Smith was providing an explanatory model for both inner city decline and 
‘regeneration’, a definition also highly congruent with the theses of inner city decay due 
to de-industrialisation (Hall, 1981; Wilson, 1987, 1996) with one sole difference: the 
rent gap is integrally set within the logic of circulation of capital within the secondary 
circuit. According to Smith’s hypothesis, it was the monopolised urban rent which 
produced – in conjunction with the fixity of the capital invested in land (the initial 
construction and its successive improvements) and its long turnover period – the cycles 
of devaluation and decline experienced in the inner city. So, landowners’ class-
monopoly control of space  
prevent the sale of land for development [whilst] the fixity of investments forces new 
development to take place at other, often less advantageous, locations, and prevents 
redevelopment from occurring until invested capital has lived out its economic life [and] 
the long turnover period of capital invested in the built environment can discourage 
investment as long as other sectors of the economy with shorter turnover periods remain 
profitable. The early industrial city presented just such a barrier by the later part of the 
nineteenth century, eventually prompting suburban development rather than development 
in situ. (Smith, 1979: 541) 62 
The fading industrial inner city was thus an effect of the movement of capital to the 
suburbs where higher returns were comparatively more attractive. Thus, a combination 
of concerted disinvestment by investors from the inner city, due to its high risk and low 
rates of return, triggered a long period of deterioration and lack of new capital in these 
areas. After decades of sustained suburbanisation, a valley in the ground rent curve 
deepened in the inner city due to a continued lack of productive capital local investment 
(Ibid).  
After a certain time, a rent gap appears. This gap is the disparity between the 
‘capitalised ground rent’ (CGR, rent attracted by a piece of land), devalued by the 
current dilapidated use of land, and a ‘potential ground rent’ (PGR), increased by the 
new improvements in the surrounding area (Smith, 2000b). CGR is  
the actual quantity of ground rent that is appropriated by the landowner, given the present 
land use. In the case of rental housing where the landlord produces a service on land he or 
she owns, the production and ownership functions are combined and ground rent becomes 
even more of an intangible category though nevertheless a real presence; the landlord’s 
capitalized ground rent returns mainly in the form of house rent paid by the tenants. In the 
case of owner occupancy, ground rent is capitalized when the building is sold and 
therefore appears as part of the sale price. Thus, sale price = house value + capitalized 
ground rent.  
Potential ground rent [means that u]nder its present land use, a site or neighborhood is 
able to capitalize a certain quantity of ground rent. For reasons of location, usually, such 
an area may be able to capitalize higher quantities of ground rent under a different land 
use. Potential ground rent is the amount that could be capitalized under the land’s 
“highest and best use.” This concept is particularly important in explaining gentrification. 
(Smith, 1979: 543) 
So, PGR implies the ‘highest and best use’, or at least higher and better use given the 
central location of the inner city space (Smith, 1996a). However, its realisation can 
come exclusively from the development that involves an intensity of fixed capital 
investment designed to accommodate this potential use. Therefore, actual ground rent 
will equal potential land rent as the full resources of the site are redeveloped.  63 
Theoretically, both CGR
20  and PGR start at the same level when a plot is first 
developed (see Figure 2.2). However, since surrounding urban development conditions 
change over time, allowing ‘better’ and ‘higher’ possible uses, the value of the buildings 
fixed to the site constitute a stumbling block to those possibilities. The building has 
come to no longer correspond to the changed context, given that urban development 
pushes up a site’s potential land rent to a certain level correlated to a greater intensity of 
capital investment and/or a ‘higher’ type of use. Hence, the rent gap constitutes an 
economic pressure for a site which has become increasingly inadequate to its ‘highest 
and best’ use (Smith, 1979). Improvements to the plot would become obsolete and 
capitalised land rent would decline. Eventually, an economic pressure emerges, 
impelling the site towards redevelopment with higher intensity and type of use (Clark, 
1995; Hammel, 1999).  
Central to the rent gap is the notion of ‘spatial fix’. Although additional building 
investment and/or upward shifts in use are possible, the original investment tends to 
lock the site into a determined range of intensity and type of use during the life of the 
building. It is due to the large size of building investments, the durability of the built 
stock, and the interest of investors to harvest returns that instantaneous and continuous 
adaptations in the urban space economy are not experienced in every case. Instead of 
constant equilibrium in the space economy through instantaneous responses to every 
potential land rent, there is a “nightmare reality of chaos in the built environment 
resembling a frenetic game of musical chairs” (Clark, 1995: 1491).  
2.3.3. The cycle of valorisation-devaluation: a specific form of spatial 
creative destruction 
As epitome of the monopoly control of rent, Smith’s five-stage model of decline 
describes how the rent gap is produced in a given spatial and temporal context, so it 
                                                 
20  Particularly important for the analysis of rent gap is the following: whereas the value of land is 
appropriated in economic transactions as ground rent (hence the concept of ‘rent’ gap), the building value 
(BV) must be conceptually separated from land value, even if the actual selling price of a plot usually 
incorporates in a single amount the value of the building and the land. This point will be recalled in 
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results from a complex pattern of infrastructural investment, disinvestment and 
reinvestment, that allows that large rent gap areas (when other conditions are fulfilled) 
can be widened and closed through gentrification (Smith, 1987). But this is a “rather 
schematic attempt to explain the historical decline of inner-city neighborhoods in terms 
of the institutions, actors, and economic forces involved.” (Smith, 1979: 543-5) Without 
entering into quantitative explanations, the model accounts for the causes and effects of 
the variations of CGR in an urban area. This scheme comprises the following stages:  
a)  New construction and first cycle of use: House prices reflect the value of the 
structure and improvements plus the ground rent. The house value would be 
only slightly diminished with use, while CGR increases due to surrounding 
urban development.  
b)  Landlordism and homeownership: In view of the gradual and inevitable 
devaluation of their buildings, homeowners and landlords tend to de-invest, 
producing a decline in the quality of the building, a considerable decrease in the 
CGR and an expanding effect of lowering rents in the rest of properties in the 
neighbourhood.  
c)  Blockbusting and blow-out: Real-estate agents tend to accelerate building 
devaluation exploiting racist (or classist) outlooks of decadence among 
homeowners
21. Blow-out is the outwards spreading of slums from the inner city 
in order to amplify the rent gap “and the consequent squeezing of still healthy 
outer neighborhoods against secure upper-middle-class residential enclaves 
lying further out.” (Smith, 1996b: 66) When the neighbourhood is mainly a 
renting urban market, the creation of rent gap also comprises attempts to sapping 
existing local infrastructure seeking to artificially decrease CGR in the area of 
interest, deepening artificially the gap between an even more devalued land and 
its market price, improving the potential profit for the owner in case of future 
regeneration (Parker, 2004; Smith, 1987). 
                                                 
21 In North American cases, fear-provoking white owners with the imminence of new black or Latino 
residents, just to get hold of their properties at lower prices and resell them at higher prices precisely to 
black or Latino newcomers. 65 
d)  Redlining: Financial institutions that could operate in the neighbourhood 
declare these areas financially not viable, further hampering access to funds for 
maintenance and repair by local people. Aalbers has observed that in redlined 
urban areas there is an observable increased presence of ethnic minorities or 
socially excluded groups (Aalbers, 2006).  
e)  Abandonment: Progressively, properties are abandoned, even sound ones, as 
they stop being profitable. The tightening of municipal requirements and 
ordinances and costs of insurance play key roles in this process. Finally, the 
neighbourhood is deteriorated to the extent that each of the properties can be 
bought for a song. This is the time when gentrification becomes a real possibility 
(Darling, 2005). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2. Model of inner city ground rent valuation/devaluation  
Source: Clark (1995) 
As Eric Clark (1995: 1497) stresses, the tension between actual and potential ground 
rents is far from being “clinically clean of ties to power in social contexts nor of ties to 
the imagery of agents.” In fact, it is the opposite. For the appropriation of the rent gap, 
the state and private owners and investors have specific roles. The former creates the 66 
economic, legal, and administrative framework; the latter responds to its private 
interests over land rent accumulation. But the artificial creation of rent gap by 
diminishing the quality of life of an environment is inherent to the previous phases of 
every process of gentrification (Smith, 1996b). Obviously, this devaluation has plenty 
of social connotations. 
Hammel (1999: 1291) observes that potential ground rent (PGR) is produced by factors 
that work at the scale of the entire city (i.e. the logic of rent distribution in the 
metropolis, the location within the metropolitan area, development of infrastructure and 
land use policies), whereas in contrast the CGR is constructed at neighbourhood scale, 
since  
the perception of an impoverished neighbourhood prevents large amounts of capital from 
being applied to the land [and t]he surrounding uses make high levels of development 
infeasible, and the property continues to languish. […] factors at the neighbourhood scale 
constrain the capitalised land rent to a lower level. 
In fact, what Hammel does is to broaden Smith’s definition of CGR, zooming out the 
focus from the single plot toward the whole neighbourhood or even larger scale. The 
appraisal of a piece land is constructed always by observing the conditions of its 
surrounding environment. Only from this point, it is possible to firmly argue that 
capitalised land rent is in fact socially produced, and that an existing social milieu could 
devalue the CGR in a neighbourhood.  
2.3.4. Criticising and justifying the rent gap theory 
The rent gap theory has been largely debated during the 1980s and 1990s for its 
supposed rejection of individual and social agency as factors that determine 
neighbourhood redevelopment (Duncan and Ley, 1982). Several authors have argued 
that real factors of gentrification, instead of rent gap, are the specific, unpredictable 
agency of developers (Bourassa, 1990, 1993) and newcomers. This debate engages with 
the essential definition of gentrification and its causes.  67 
From the so-called consumption-side, some scholars have stressed that gentrification is 
mainly a demographic change of middle-class identity. They also claim that best 
explanations of gentrification in inner city neighbourhoods are the gentrifiers’ 
postmodern lifestyles, a break with the stereotypical patriarchal household predominant 
in the middle-class suburbs and left-wing political preferences and tolerance with sexual 
diversity (to be found in the gentrifying inner city and not in the middle-class traditional 
suburbs), a ‘superior’ sense of aesthetic, and a general antiestablishment middle-class 
rejection of suburban life styles. All these elements have been considered as necessary 
conditions for gentrification (Bondi, 1991; Bridge, 1994; Ley, 1994, 2003; Rose, 1984). 
Other aspects considered have been the concentrations of highly specialised jobs in the 
central areas which attract these new emerging postmodern classes (Hamnett, 1991; Ley 
and Hiebert, 2003; Slater, 2006). And even more recent approaches have stressed that 
the cultural practices of gentrifiers – and not the process of ground rent appropriation – 
are the main class-implication in gentrification (Bridge, 2001). Probably, the common 
denominator in this ample gamut of approaches is that inner city change is due to a 
highly heterogeneous and unpredictable group of actors. Therefore, these must be 
researched in their cultural aspects rather than being conceived as structurally 
determined economic agents in search for economic profit. 
But gentrification has proven to be much more than cultural change and demographic 
replacement. ‘Social displacement’ is also a crucial necessary condition for it (Shaw, 
2005, 2008). Clark further stresses the root causes of gentrification quintessentially as 
commodification of space, polarised power relations in the city and the dominant vision 
of the ‘vagrant sovereigns’, i.e. developers, all elements highly intertwined with ground 
rent policy-led variations-accumulation and its effect in the neighbourhoods (Clark, 
2005). Hence, to assimilate (and criticise) the rent gap as solely economic superstructure 
determining the location of gentrification – as implied by Ley (1987), for instance – 
might be a misinterpretation of the rent gap theory (Lees et al., 2007). Nevertheless, 
little by little, the debate about gentrification has tended to reach a synthesis between 
the two antipodes of consumption-based and production-based (rent gap), since they are 
not mutually exclusive and in fact constitute only partial explanations of a whole 
phenomenon (Hamnett, 1991; Lees, 2000). Furthermore, precisely thanks to this debate, 
theorists of rent gap have nurtured their initially purely economic-based determinism 
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public sector officials, real estate agents and/or newcomers as factors for deciding 
where urban renewal is to be allocated, and even to examine some ‘revanchist’ practices 
(Smith, 1996a, b), as will be discussed in sub-section 2.4.3.  
But above all, the adoption for the present research of the production-based theory has 
three main reasons. First, in Santiago, real processes of differentiated upper-income 
groups socially reshaping the inner city areas are very rare events, whereas class-
monopoly rent appropriation has been experienced during the entire modern history of 
the city (as will be illustrated in CHAPTER 3). In fact, consumption-based approaches 
have considerably rested on evidence mostly from North American or European cases, 
but might be rather exogenous to realities like Latin America.  
The second reason arises from the observed historical nature of the process of peri-
central decline and renewal in Santiago. As Smith (1996c: 1202) argues, “[t]o explain 
the microgeography of gentrification in particular places at particular times [and based 
on individual choices by developers or gentrifiers] will take a lot of detailed empirical 
and historical research”, risking gentrification and renewal to become chaotic, 
unpredictable phenomena (Clark, 2005). This thesis therefore aims at searching for, to a 
feasible extent, historical regularities instead of discrete and particular events.  
Third, it has been proposed that the rent gap theory seems to be more applicable in 
deeply liberalised capitalist urban economies where combinations of factors such as 
active urban developers and pro-gentrification public regulations act more decisively 
(Millard-Ball, 2000) than in less liberalised, more regulated contexts of the world. 
Therefore, after 17 years of iron-fist imposed neoliberalisation and almost 20 years of 
subsequent development of a market-based model of urban development, Santiago 
might be a good example of rent gap appropriation. 
2.3.5. Why does rent gap trigger urban renewal? 
The rent gap theory is probably the most convincing explanation of why peri-central 
areas decline and redevelop, in liberalised contexts and where urban space is integrally 
commodified within the second circuit of capital. Citing Smith’s own words, inner city 69 
renewal could be “a back to the city movement all right, but of capital rather than 
people.” (1979: 547) 
Up to here it seems relatively clear that neighbourhood decline is due to human agency. 
The five-stage scheme proposed in sub-section 2.3.3 suggests who some of these social 
agents are and the forces they react to and help to create. The underlying mechanism 
that works in the peri-centre is the depreciation and devaluation of capital invested in 
the neighbourhood, a depreciation that produces the objective economic conditions that 
make capital revaluation  a rational market response. Gentrification occurs therefore 
when the rent gap is wide enough for developers to purchase land cheaply, pay the 
builders’ costs and profit from rehabilitation, pay interest on mortgage and construction 
loans, and sell the end product at a price that leaves satisfactory revenue to the 
developer. The whole or a large portion of ground rent is then accumulated whereas the 
neighbourhood has been ‘recycled’, beginning a new cycle of use (Smith, 1996a). 
Once the rent gap is wide enough, redevelopment, renewal or simply reinvestment 
might be initiated. This certainly contradicts the theses of gentrification as produced by 
individual consumers’ preferences rather than produced by this sort of collective social 
action of market agents that radically transforms the context in an inner city area. All 
the consumers’ preferences would be ineffective if the traditionally absent sources of 
financing did not reappear, or furthermore, if the state did not commit to provide other 
forms of subsidy or stimulus to private market revitalisation, by  
assembling properties at fair market value and returning them to developers at the lower 
assessed price [and accomplishing and bearing] the costs of the last stages of capital 
devaluation, thereby ensuring that developers could reap the high returns (Smith, 1979: 
546).  
Therefore, a wide open rent gap is a necessary though probably not sufficient condition 
for urban renewal, with the public sector’s intervention as an important factor, e.g. when 
the land has already been developed, an intricate pattern of property rights exists and it 
is difficult for the developers to put together sufficient land and properties to make 
involvement worthwhile. The fragmented structure of property ownership makes the 
occupier developer, who might be an inefficient operator in the construction industry, 70 
into an appropriate vehicle for recycling devalued neighbourhoods. However, when 
renewal implies much broader scales, the role of small scale firms seems unsound.  
The rent gap expands. Eventually, given favourable conditions and interested agents, 
future annual land rents associated with redevelopment come into view on the time 
horizon and grow from negligible to considerable. The site is ‘doomed’ to higher and 
better uses housed in more intensive capital investment appropriate to those uses. The rent 
gap closes as the value of the current building approaches zero, no longer constituting a 
force of inertia for land-use change or a hindrance to the realisation of potential land rent. 
The force of the rent gap is already history during the years just prior to redevelopment. 
(Clark, 1995: 1496) 
All in all, it is still necessary to address the social issues implicit in every process of 
urban renewal, commanded either by private developers or the local- or metropolitan- 
state acting as main promoter, especially if the areas to renew are inhabited by low-
income, though consolidated social communities where the structure of property has 
been historically fragmented. At this point, it is convenient to quote the prophetic words 
of Engels regarding the transformation and beautification of the Victorian cities’ 
working class quarters and 
particularly in those which are centrally situated, quite apart from whether this is done 
from considerations of public health and for beautifying the town, or owing to the 
demand for big centrally situated business premises, or owing to traffic requirements, 
such as the laying down of railways, streets, etc. No matter how different the reasons may 
be, the result is everywhere the same: the scandalous alleys and lanes disappear to the 
accompaniment of lavish self-praise from the bourgeoisie on account of this tremendous 
success (Engels, 1995). 
As Engels envisaged a hundred and fifty years ago, inner city redevelopment is not 
purely dependent on injections of capital in areas of increased rent gap but on market 
analysts and property surveyors, besides speculation, luck, political influences and, over 
all, class resistance, configuring altogether complex social systems of spatial 
transformation (Brenner and Theodore, 2002). Nonetheless, probably what is more 
decisive amidst the current globally widespread neoliberal forms of inner city 
redevelopment (Atkinson and Bridge, 2005; Smith, 2002) is the active intervention of 
the state, seeking to create the economic conditions and processes for assuring 71 
reinvestment in disinvested inner city areas, and make them so alluring for investors
22 
(Hackworth and Smith, 2001; Smith and DeFilippis, 1999) and useful for enhancing 
urban competitiveness and image promotion of the metropolis (Bernd and Helms, 2003).  
Moreover, as Harvey (2005) has recently claimed, neoliberalism, paradoxically based 
on the discourse of state-free markets, finds its major contradiction when an elite of 
state technocrats exerts intensive power towards the liberalisation of the space. 
Friendly-faced entrepreneurialism seeks to restock the profitability of the outmoded 
former industrial areas, developing newer, more adaptive mechanisms to make the built 
environment more flexible and attractive for the investment criteria of the flowing 
property market capital. However, inevitably, in areas of large rent gap, local people can 
interfere in the circuits of capital and even provoke unnecessary switches into primary 
or tertiary circuits, or even make the desired investors depart (Harvey, 1985). Hence the 
other side of the coin of entrepreneurial urbanism are equally refined but more 
aggressive forms of neoliberal governance, that seek to discipline a social space and 
even cleanse it of potential sources of class-related conflicts (Smith, 1996b). This point 
is explained in the following section. 
2.4. Urban entrepreneurialism as state-led urban renewal 
2.4.1. Entrepreneurial urbanism 
Concomitant to neoliberalisation since almost thirty years ago, entrepreneurialism 
replaces fading managerial Keynesian state-roles with local speculative governance 
(Harvey, 1989a; Mitchell, 1998), seeking to revive the competitive position of urban 
economies, especially through the liberalisation of private enterprises and a sort of 
advanced commodification of the social networks and infrastructures, i.e. community-
support systems, schools and churches, and so on (Atkinson and Bridge, 2005; Leitner, 
1990; MacLeod, 2002). Entrepreneurial governments play highly supportive and/or 
                                                 
22 From a North-Atlantic perspective, Hackworth & Smith (2001) define the present time (after the late-
1990s crisis) as a ‘third stage’ in gentrification evolution, that consists of real estate markets heavily 
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direct roles in the creation of new enterprises, preserving and increasing labour, 
providing infrastructure, sites, tax lures, and cultural and social attractions (Shaw, 2005).  
However, a different feature of the entrepreneurial state, from earlier periods, is its 
willingness to assume financial risks without properly guaranteed returns (Zukin, 2006). 
New local roles are directed to negotiating with the finance capital for offering specific 
local attractions, not the urban whole, in order to make these constrained spaces 
competitive and its economies tied to global circuits of exchange (Vigar et al., 2005). 
The dialectic global/local finds one of its major expressions through urban 
entrepreneurialism. Five main features of entrepreneurialism are:  
a)  Notions of public-private partnership seek to attract external sources of funding 
such as new direct investments or new sources of employment. Therefore, if 
ideas for redevelopment originate from the private sector they should be 
enhanced by business-friendly environments set by local and state governments 
(Mitchell, 1998). At any rate entrepreneurial urbanism does not mean less but 
more active state engaged in real estate business, as well as more open 
involvement of business elites and other groups of interests in strategic spheres 
of the state (Ward, 2003).  
b)  Contradicting the managerial rationale of planning and coordination implicit in 
the Fordist-Keynesian mode of regulation, the entrepreneurial public sector 
needs to be speculative in stages of design and execution. Financial dangers 
come from speculation whilst political dangers are inherent to unequal 
prioritisation and distribution of resources. Since the state-backed infrastructure 
reduces costs and risks to private interests, those back-ups make the private 
investment more volatile. Entrepreneurial urban investments simply cannot 
predict exactly which endeavour will succeed and which not, in a global context 
which is considerably unstable and hazardous. Another consequence is social 
concern in the adjacent territories and residential communities, when speculation 
with land and rapid changes in land prices take place. But the entrepreneurial 
resource distribution diminishes the local provision for the underprivileged, 
because mobile private capital needs the maximum investment for itself as a 
way to assure better local comparative advantages (Harvey, 1989a). Therefore, 73 
entrepreneurialism sets a zero-sum game of public-private investment, deeply 
easing the increase in capital circulation and revenue competition (Peck, 2005). 
c)  Entrepreneurialism is based on advances in transportation and communications 
and the gradual speeding up in the overcoming of regional and global spatial 
barriers, namely ‘space-time compression’ (Harvey, 1990). As places have been 
drawn into a web of global exchange, governments have therefore turned to 
local initiatives to avoid urban decline and annihilation of their economies, 
privileging investments in certain spatial nodes, such as state-backed large urban 
projects (Biderman et al., 2006; Lungo, 2002; Lungo and Smolka, 2005), urban 
waterfronts, major urban festivals, events and ‘glocal’ infrastructural and 
technological development, in spite of needed funding for social development in 
the most deprived areas. Entrepreneurialism mechanically supposes there would 
be a trickle down into the latter. 
d)  The concentration of investment in strategic local areas secures the city’s 
position within national and international circuits of exchange and investment 
but at the cost of bypassing their adjacent territories (Harvey, 1989a: 16; Vigar 
et al., 2005), this being one of the main features of the neoliberal ‘splintering 
urbanism’ (Coutard, 2008; Graham and Marvin, 2001). However, as defined in 
sub-section 2.3.1.c, the concentration of investment in well-delimited spaces 
also responds to the need of landed capitalism to secure its monopoly forms of 
accumulation, assuring enough scarcity of renovated space as a way to keep it at 
its maximum exchange value. Hence, the largest rent gap areas (often close to 
the urban core) are the object of reinvestment while others – with narrower rent 
gaps and hence riskier for reinvestment – are left waiting for future operations 
(Niedt, 2006).  
e)  According to Peck & Tickel (2002), the entrepreneurial normalisation of a 
‘growth first’ approach has made social investment and distribution antagonistic 
to the anticompetitive common good. Entrepreneurialism bans and replaces 
collective, non market-based forms of social organisation developed for instance 
by means of working-class mobilisation, whereas the “shifting role of the state 
from provider of social support for lower-income populations to supplier of 74 
business services and amenities for middle- and upper-class urbanites” diverts 
public funding from untargeted, non-competitive areas (Wacquant, 2008: 199). 
Instead, market-driven logics are taken as normal societal and economic 
behaviour, such as choice, social competition for resource allocation, aggressive 
economic competition between urban areas (including the punishment of non-
competitive zones or economic sectors). Hence a de-politicised and de-
ideologised society becomes vital for assuring localised growth.  
2.4.2. The created entrepreneurial space 
The latter observation is because entrepreneurialism is quintessentially privatist
23. 
According to Squires (1996), entrepreneurial cities must work closer to private interests 
in order to establish more comparative advantages in an increasingly competitive 
economic climate. To reinvigorate downtowns implies more jobs, more intensively used 
public space, more money earned and spent by local residents, new property and income 
increasing local reserves, and new wealth that supposedly trickles down throughout the 
rest of the city. Public policies are thus directed to private interests, whilst policies in 
favour of empowering or increasing consumption by existing local communities are 
explicitly rejected.  
The privatist city imposes a sole concept of city and cityness: a fashionable urban 
cosmopolitanism, as a pillar for policies of public space development, imposed over 
old-fashioned attitudes towards social difference (Vigar et al., 2005). The construction 
and imposition of a simplistic but unified conceptualisation of a ‘nice’ city is crucial for 
the creation of the neoliberal ideal of a consumer society. And this simplistic discourse 
is easy to reproduce and sell (Flusty, 2001). 
For example, the creation of attractive places for ‘creative classes’ fulfils the need of 
having a unified urban meaning whilst promoting concentrated redevelopment. Much 
popularised by Richard Florida as a postmodern reinterpretation of Jane Jacobs’ (1967, 
1970) heterogeneity and healthy urbanity, entrepreneurial urbanism seeks to produce 
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highly active spaces, commodified amalgams of cultural environments, artistic new 
colours, ‘new ideas’, ‘bohemian effects’, mixed with business creativity. According to 
Florida, the creative class has the power to revitalise entire city centres or even regions 
by engaging in renewed productive cycles, innovation capacity and – probably more 
important in sociological terms – openness to different kinds of people and ideas, 
configuring a type of post-modern, a-class type of tolerance (Florida, 2002a). In sum, a 
new middle-class society that becomes the driving force for a new economy based on a 
new economic asset: creativity. Society thus marches to be stratified in two classes: the 
‘creative haves’ and the ‘creative have-nots’. For the new dominant actors, 
resemblances of exciting inner cities environments, reproduced and cleaned by 
postmodern architecture and urbanism, are good urban environments to be lived and 
consumed (Peck, 2005).  
However, from the perspective of the ‘creative have-nots’, entrepreneurial spaces might 
well resemble what Lefebvre (1991) once called ‘abstract spaces’
24, in which users and 
behaviours ought to be either domesticated or evicted (Atkinson, 2003a). For McCann 
(1999), abstract spatiality presumes the existence of a spatial economy which valorises 
only certain human relations in particular spaces of control and consensus (shops, cafes, 
cinemas); spaces supposed to be trouble-free, quiet areas for the reproduction of 
commodified relationships. The combination of consumption, entertainment and 
popular culture promotes a privatised sense of city life as an attempt to look like 
traditional streets but avoiding dangerous aspects of diversity. Several codes of 
behaviour, prohibitions and morphological design contribute to avoid not only the poor 
or the undesirable, but even to castigate the non-consumers. And if the abstract space is 
to be imposed in the inner city as resemblance of traditional landscape, this is done as a-
historical spatiality, especially when the local history is related to racial, ethnic or any 
kind of exclusionary struggle between dominant forces and those marginalised.  
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This point acquires special importance in the plans of regeneration in inner city areas, 
where a main goal is the homogenisation of the urban environment through false-
reconstituted fashionable historical images, or environments made for excitement and 
ecstasy, reinforcing the city’s recreational capacity through the so-called 
‘disneylandisation’, or rampant trivialisation of the city (Burgers, 2000).  
All this construction is essentially contradictory. Whilst emphasising multi-functional 
heterogeneity, tolerance and creativity, the entrepreneurial space concentrates more 
homogeneity based on globalised and standardised images of modernity, whilst 
producing residual fragmentation and marginalisation. The urban space is thus 
transformed into a collection of ghettos where some individuals are integrated and 
submitted to artificial constraints and others are isolated and marginalised. The only 
way for inhabitants to prosper is to assimilate. However, this inherent contradictory 
nature of the imposed abstract space might produce frustration and, in extreme cases, 
sudden and massive social upsurge. If the latter is to happen, it must be domesticated 
too (Atkinson, 2003a, b). 
2.4.3. A case of entrepreneurial urban management: the ‘Barcelona 
Model’ 
An appropriate example of urban entrepreneurialism may be the urban transformation of 
Barcelona, from the early 1980s onwards (as part of post-Franco political transition), 
and especially after the Olympics held in 1992. This is because urban planning and 
management associated to the ‘Barcelona Model’ migrated from a pre-1992 small-scale, 
participative model of urbanism to a top-down, rent-seeking system of urban 
interventions (Capel, 2007).  
In the early 1990s, and partially due to a favourable post-recessionary economic context, 
Barcelona became an “efficient, clean and cultured city” (Monclús, 2003: 2), less a 
particular phenomenon and more a case of exportable international urbanism, given it 
demonstrated combining successfully small-scale projects and large scale strategic 
interventions. The ‘wannabe’ character of medium-sized Barcelona became greatly 
attractive for other cities’ strategic plans that sought to similarly improve their images in 77 
the global market
25. Moreover, the entrepreneurial and technical knowledge of the 
Barcelona Model was exported to Latin America by the Ibero-American Centre for 
Strategic Urban Development (CIDEU) as strategic partner and technical consultant for 
local governments, Santiago de Chile included (Steinberg, 2001). 
Nonetheless, the Barcelona Model has been in fact an adaptive process over the last 
three decades. An initial approach was set in the 1980s when, according to Capel (2006), 
the goals of the plan were modest – it aimed at regenerating the most decayed zones 
only, due to the limited financial capacity of the state and local private stakeholders – 
and the scale of its projects was small. In ideological terms, the premise was to produce 
a small-scale urbanism, opposed to the principles of large-scale, a-historical Modern 
Planning, reinvigorating public spaces and promoting a compact city instead of an 
expanded one. The Plan was in fact a ‘No-Plan’ – some even consider Barcelona’s was 
not a ‘model’ either (Bohigas, 2005) – but a number of relatively successful, well 
designed architectural and emblematic urban interventions.  
However, along with the 1992 Olympics, the scale of resources and ambitiousness of 
the aims for Barcelona’s redevelopment increased. The overarching goal changed. From 
then on, it would be to set up a new image of the city that combined its historical 
heritage, an attractive international business centre and a reinvigorated infrastructure for 
fashionable cultural production. Numbers of strategic projects arose: marketing and 
‘rebranding’ of the city (e.g. the motto ‘Barcelona look smart!’ that comprised 
restoration of several traditional facades), private-public investment in the Olympic 
Area (with 2,000 new residential units produced; in fact, a brand-new residential 
neighbourhood), the reshaping of the city’s six-kilometre waterfront aimed at business 
and leisure activities, cultural centres, museums, Expos, and so on, all of which had to 
be designed with the best international architecture (Monclús, 2000). Moreover, a 
radical restructuring of the city’s road system and the implementation of ‘areas of new 
centrality’ were financed. As Monclús (2003) argues, Catalonian planners, from 
regulators of urban growth, turned to be its main promoters. Then came the 2002 
Strategic Plan, for which  
                                                 
25 For instance, by the late 1990s, several British middle-sized cities reshaped their images as cultural 
centres and magnets for attracting capital following the case of Barcelona (Wintour and Thorpe, 1999). 78 
[c]ompany organisations, unions and other representative institutions and agents of civil 
society have been involved in its preparation. This Planning strategy includes a series of 
social, economic and territorial objectives: transportation infrastructures, rehabilitation of 
the old town, reclaiming land from the sea to make new beaches, etc. To date all of these 
strategies have been successful and have had a very important impact. There can be little 
doubt that Barcelona [from then on was] a more ‘competitive’ city, well prepared to 
defend its positioning in the European urban network. Furthermore this strategy [was] 
ongoing: the next event – the Forum of Cultures planned for 2004 – [could] be also seen 
in this perspective. (Monclús, 2000: 61) 
But the supposed benefits of the large scale interventions and entrepreneurial style of 
the model of development were soon put on trial by many actors. To build the Forum 
implied an unprecedented high scale of public resources, so the budget for many 
programmes of social development, social housing, urban security, etc. had to be 
reduced and those services diminished (Capel, 2006). Furthermore, the spaces of 
democratic citizen participation, opened during the 1980s, became depoliticised and 
residents’ capacity of decision and intervention in planning issues became relatively 
irrelevant (Blakeley, 2005; Capel, 2005). Thus redevelopments in residential and 
industrial areas lacked proper accountability, and they turned to respond more to 
developers’ rent-seeking premises than to a real plan or project for regeneration.  
Precisely due to the unregulated building activity, there has been recently an oversupply 
of residential and office units in the Barcelona’s market. There has also been a bias 
towards the production of upper-middle class residences, generating evident effects of 
social displacement in areas of previous concentration of low-income residents and/or 
immigrants (Tabakman, 2001). According to Capel, social unrest and demonstrations 
have increased in renewing neighbourhoods. Conversely, the available space for 
manufacturing activities decreased. From the late 1990s on, the industrial activity had 
no other chance but to out-migrate to the periphery, contributing to a sort of American-
style expansion of the city’s metropolitan area (Capel, 2007). By the mid 2000s, 
Barcelona was no longer a dense city, but a new CBD in a larger global metropolitan 
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2.4.4. Cleansing and disciplining the ‘others’ 
Seen through a political-economic lens, the previous case seems to prove that the 
entrepreneurial imposition of urban re-imaging is not an end in itself, but the means, 
among others, to another end: rent gap accumulation (Hubbard, 2004). However, as 
some recent conflicts in the renewing neighbourhoods of Barcelona show, the social and 
spatial effects of the highly localised, fragmentary entrepreneurial urbanism might be 
contested by adjacent low-income local communities that see the stability of their 
neighbourhoods or chances to remain in the place threatened by exorbitant increases in 
rents or land taxes, if the surrounding land of a large urban project is to be overvalued. 
Or it might happen that, due to its motivation rooted in the rent gap profit, urban 
renewal comes not where it is socially needed but where it is financially needed (Shaw, 
2005). Urban entrepreneurialism being a highly speculative business environment, and 
financial capital set on urban renewal so volatile, any counter-reaction must be 
disciplined too, while interdictory urbanism and authoritarian state practices impose 
their entrepreneurial economic rules (Flusty, 2001). For its own social risk-aversion, the 
entrepreneurial urban space becomes a city of physical proximity but institutional 
rupture where islands of relative affluence need to secure themselves amidst seas of 
spreading decay (MacLeod and Ward, 2002), be this decay real or imagined as 
justification for future ‘regeneration’ (Gilbert, 2007; see below). 
Since entrepreneurial projects need to bypass their inelegant surrounding territories, 
low-income inhabitants must not be visible. Therefore, strategies of entrepreneurial 
regeneration are generally based on zero-tolerance policies
26, forms of invigilation of 
some awkward surrounding areas, and eviction from the new central places (Bernd and 
Helms, 2003). Physical and societal forms of discipline are present in several forms of 
architectural design, CCTV (Van Criekingen et al., 2006), private security and a range 
of legal impositions, as a way to inculcate acceptable patterns of behaviour in 
accordance with the imposed new commerce and new aesthetics. This can be 
understood as reclaiming public spaces for the groups who possess economic value as 
                                                 
26 Policies based on the core idea of punishing even insignificant forms of disorder or public misconduct 
(drinking in public, begging, vandalism, graffiti, etc.). In western societies, where the state is the 
legitimated monopoliser of power, this idea drives legal frameworks and police behaviour to prevent such 
actions through the prior removal of undesirable people from certain areas (Bernd and Helms, 2003). 80 
producers and/or consumers, virtually excluding the others
27. In general, this tendency 
to control and towards social rejection has come to be called ‘revanchism’
28.  
Entrepreneurial discourses of urban regeneration have emphasised the concerns about 
personal safety and fear of crime as fundamental issues to be addressed by urban 
redevelopment projects (Flusty, 2001), attempting to construct new suitable and safe 
urban realms, based on “principles of social mixing, sustainability, connectivity, higher 
densities, walkability, and high-quality streetscapes” (Coaffee, 2005: 448). The new 
urban space promoted implies the establishment of “a new morality by referring to the 
‘good community’ and it thereby attempts to engineer behaviour and social norms” 
(Bernd and Helms, 2003: 1848). Thus, behavioural restrictions are reified as ‘normal’ 
by the middle class society, as the price to pay for security (Coaffee, 2005).  
Atkinson (2003a, b) argues that the artificial spatial boundaries between redevelopment 
and decay and the ruled behaviours imposed by entrepreneurialism over the space of 
renewal obscure the real social implications of inner city decline, which are political and 
economic. Entrepreneurialism simplifies the social and economic chains that lie behind 
working-class neighbourhoods and stigmatises the local population with 
insubordination when they do not respond to the macro-economic revivals affecting 
them. What entrepreneurialism does is then to install a prophetic and dystopian image 
of urban malaise in the inner city, or the imposition at any cost of the idea about the 
                                                 
27 But evictions are not only constrained to social-spatial reconfigurations in inner city space. They also 
happen in academic realms. Some authors have recently observed trends of de-politicisation and eviction 
of critical theoretical perspectives from gentrification studies (Slater, 2006; Slater et al., 2004; Watt, 
2008), displacement of the working-class’ perspective from studies on neighbourhood change (Allen, 
2008) and even criminal prosecution of gentrification researchers (Smith, 2008). 
28  Or the triumph of a dominant entrepreneurial urbanism in which the state has to exert power for 
cleansing from the city what the Keynesian state had produced previously (Smith, 1996a, 1996b, 1996d, 
1998, 1999), not only in terms of socio-spatial distribution but even by destroying the welfare system and 
social benefits developed (Baeten, 2002). From a privatist rationale, revanchism means blaming the 
dispossessed for the economic losses to the public treasury generated in the past (Keith and Rogers, 1991), 
a ‘compassion fatigue’ and erosion of public sympathy for the dispossessed. Revanchism does not simply 
make the poor invisible but it penalises them in defence of the victorious’ privileges. Widespread anti-
homeless policies have been epitome of revanchism (DeVerteuil, 2006). Although it has been considered 
too radical a hypothesis not applicable in every context (Slater, 2003; Uitermark and Duyvendak, 2008), 
the fact is that revanchist institutional practices have been observed in many cases from Europe and the 
USA (Atkinson, 2003a, b; Bernd and Helms, 2003; Hubbard, 2004; MacLeod, 2002; Niedt, 2006; Smith, 
1998; Van Criekingen et al., 2006) and even in South America (Swanson, 2007). 81 
superiority of some forms of middle-class lifestyle, over the working-class 
environments, even if the latter, as many case-studies reveal, generate more benefits to 
the ‘segregated’ inhabitants of the low-income inner city neighbourhoods than the 
supposed more beneficial mixed-communities (Lees, 2008; Lees and Ley, 2008; Wyly 
and Hammel, 2008).  
The spaces targeted for reinvestment are hence depicted as part of broad areas of intense 
poverty and decay. This is a way to justify policies of gentrification based on the 
appearance of diversity and ‘social mixes’, but sustained instead by processes of 
deliberate (or even involuntary) displacement or exclusion of the poorer (Shaw, 2008). 
This has been largely observed in British cases (Atkinson, 2000; Lees, 2008) and also in 
Spain (Díaz, 2008; Sargatal, 2000). 
The political manipulation of social/urban deprivation is channelled precisely toward 
describing a reality of deficiency as justification of renovation and market-led growth. 
The main attempt might be to impose an agenda of easy ‘regeneration’ without (or with 
very little) social accountability (Wyly and Hammel, 2008), and to create a consensus 
around the idea that working-class inner cities must be rehabilitated, renovated or 
replaced anyway, escaping from closer public scrutiny. The rhetorical impetus of urban 
renewal depends on a movement away from a depressed present without necessarily 
portraying too detailed a picture of the destination those policies are moving to (Keith 
and Rogers, 1991).  
This idea is shared by Alan Gilbert, who has recently observed the return of the word 
‘slum’ into the language of developmental policies, as well as a too-heavy emphasis on 
disease, crime and difficulties associated with slum life. He claims that this is the kind 
of fears that already encourage the rich to move to their gated communities or, in this 
case, accelerate the destruction of yet perfectly liveable neighbourhoods. This political 
attitude is based first on an advanced desire for homogenised ‘healthy’ places and 
second on the fact that in cities where the general quality of housing gradually 
improves, areas that do not change at the same pace are condemned to be labelled as 
‘slums’, because of their relative neglect to change (Gilbert, 2007), even if they are in 
good condition. But 82 
[w]hat makes the word ‘slum’ [even more] dangerous is the series of negative 
associations that the term conjures up, the false hopes that a campaign against slums 
raises and the mischief that unscrupulous politicians, developers and planners may do 
with the term. […] I am complaining about resuscitating an old, never euphemistic, 
stereotype; one that was long ago denounced as dangerous and yet has now resurfaced in 
the policy arena
29 (Gilbert, 2007: 701). 
Rachel Weber (2002) uses the concept of ‘urban blight’ to refer to a similar 
phenomenon. Blighting is necessary for identifying and targeting, through quasi-
scientific methods, the most interesting areas for private redevelopment, using 
biological or medical metaphors referred to ‘cancers’ or ‘ulcers’. Blighting is, therefore, 
a primary justification (or a facilitator) for creative destruction. Furthermore, with the 
laudable purpose of ‘healthy’ cities, the moral implications of blight blur the boundaries 
between private and public responsibility since destruction becomes a prioritised goal at 
any cost, and these depictions can be expanded even towards areas which are only 
‘potentially’ decayed.  
Obsolescence has become a neoliberal alibi for creative destruction, and therefore an 
important component in contemporary processes of spatialized capital accumulation. […] 
Obsolescence poses a greater threat to exchange values than to use values, whereas blight 
threatens both. An obsolete building, eg one that has overly high ceilings, is not 
physically unusable but rather cannot be used as profitably as one with lower ceilings and 
modern heating systems. (Weber, 2002: 526-532) 
Always operating on the surface of appearances, entrepreneurialism refers to recycling, 
upgrading, and renaissance as antonym to blight. Even gentrification in some ways has 
become a nice world, symbol of social progress, equity and social justice in moribund 
spaces (Slater, 2006). Nevertheless  
[t]he language of revitalization, recycling, upgrading and renaissance suggest that 
affected neighborhoods were somehow devitalized or culturally moribund prior to 
gentrification. While this is sometimes the case, it is often also true that very vital 
working-class communities are culturally devitalized through gentrification as the new 
middle class scorns the streets in favor of the dining room and bedroom. (Smith, 1996b: 
35) 
                                                 
29  Gilbert is not only criticising entrepreneurial policymakers and planners but also researchers that, 
according to him, are too biased at observing the worldwide proliferation of slums as pure effect of 
neoliberalism, e.g. Mike Davis (2004). 83 
The political rhetoric behind blighting might imply precisely the opposite to the 
declared social aims of entrepreneurialism, which are trickle down, jobs increased, and 
the social benefits of mixture – in an intended reconstruction of community which 
comes rarely along with gentrification (Colenutt, 1991; Lees, 2008; Lees and Ley, 2008; 
Lees et al., 2007). Instead, policies of blighting, when they target low-income 
neighbourhoods, might prevent the accumulation of ground rent by local homeowners, 
reproducing in turn forms of large-scale class-monopoly accumulation. Therefore 
blighting policies aim at producing dispossession of probably the most important 
economic asset of low-income homeowners: their ground rent (Harvey, 2006a).  
2.5. Chapter conclusions: research questions, objectives and a 
hypothesis 
The present chapter has outlined an explicative model of inner city areas in a context of 
capitalism, integrating both the causes of their historical decay and the current logic of 
their market-led urban redevelopment. Inner city decay and renewal are seen here as 
time-connected phenomena, stages of the continuous creative destruction of capital that 
switches from primary into secondary circuits and vice versa. In the first case, inner city 
decay is a result of the departure of invested fixed capital from industrial sectors during 
post-Fordism, a process that had considerable political, social and economic effects in 
inner cities worldwide.  
In the second case, inner city renewal is the effect of the return to the inner city of the 
always-expanding capital, now purely set into the second circuit of capital, entailing the 
deliberate acceleration of the devaluation of the building value (BV) as a form of 
lowering capitalised ground rent (CGR) and increasing potential ground rent (PGR) in 
an urban area. Nonetheless, if the rent gap created is to be accumulated by private 
developers, different forms of state policies are required for protecting the unequal 
concentration of private capital in targeted neighbourhoods. Therefore, keeping a rather 
aggressive blighting stance regarding the surrounding territories and their generally 
lower-income inhabitants might contribute to accelerating their real decay if this stance 
is materialised in policies of real devaluation. In sum, although entrepreneurial 84 
urbanism is not a sufficient condition for rent gap accumulation, it is a very necessary 
condition for it.  
From this theoretical standpoint, the present thesis examines the following hypothesis. 
For the case of Santiago de Chile, the expansion of private urban renewal 
from the centre toward the peri-centre, between 1990 and 2005, is based on a 
second wave of creative destruction, promoted by an entrepreneurial state 
seeking, as part of a broader policy of urban redevelopment, to increase the 
existing rent-gap which is therefore captured by large scale property 
developers. 
Although the theories of rent gap and entrepreneurialism outlined above have been 
induced by their authors from cases of the global north, they are interpreted here as 
structural logic of capital expansion and accumulation with general applicability. This 
thesis is in fact an attempt to analyse critically the structural logic of capitalist 
accumulation in the urban space of Santiago. Assuming that neoliberalism exports its 
forms of accumulation from the global centre to the periphery, rent gap and 
entrepreneurialism, seen as factors of creative destruction, could possibly apply in 
Santiago in very specific, though different forms. Yet it is precisely in the need to 
resolve this dialectic between structural theory and temporal and geographical 
specificity where the logic of analytical inference addressed in CHAPTER 1 appears. And 
it is precisely in the uncertain relation between theory and this peripheral context where 
the research questions and objectives of this thesis take form. Table 2.1 presents the 
research questions, and the general and specific objectives of this research.  
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Research 
Questions 
General Objectives  Specific Objectives 
1. Is the current 
process of urban 
renewal in Santiago 
part of a historical 
continuum of 
creative 
destruction? 
 
1. To analyse 
comprehensively the 
historical production of 
the peri-centre (inner 
city) of Santiago during 
the 20th century 
1.1. To observe and analyse economic, policy and social 
factors of historical configuration of the peri-central space 
of Santiago during the 20th century until 1973 
1.2. To collect historical information about the urban 
production of PAC comuna and its surrounding territory 
during the 20th century 
1.3. To analyse demographic, socio-economic and urban 
changes in the peri-centre of Santiago, produced since 
the neoliberalisation of the country started in 1973 
2. How wide is the 
rent gap in the peri-
centre and what are 
its effects in the 
space of Santiago  
2. To verify and 
visualise the existence 
of rent gap in PAC and 
its surrounding 
comunas, from 1990 to 
2005 (*) 
2.1. To visualise capitalised ground rent (CGR) and 
building values (BV)in PAC between 1990 and 2005, 
comparing it with its peri-central neighbouring comunas 
San Miguel and Cerrillos  
2.2.To estimate potential ground rent (PGR) generated 
by Master Plan regulation in PAC comuna 
3. What are the 
main policies and 
agents of rent gap 
enlargement and 
accumulation in 
Santiago and how 
do they operate in 
PAC? 
 
3. To observe policies 
for potential ground 
rent (PGR) increase 
and capitalised ground 
rent (CGR) devaluation 
being applied in PAC, 
from 1990 to 2005 
3.1. To asses entrepreneurial logics in the state and 
market actors and their different approaches to PAC  
3.2. To identify central- and local-state policies which 
increase the potential ground rent (PGR), analysing its 
technical mechanisms and social effects in PAC 
3.3. To identify central- and local-state policies which 
reduce the capitalised ground rent (CGR), analysing its 
technical mechanisms and social effects in PAC 
(*) The period of analysis between 1990 and 2005 is justified because the current policies for peri-central 
redevelopment are produced during this time, as seen in section 1.4 
Table 2.1. Research questions and objectives 
 
As seen in the table, Research Questions 2 and 3 focus on the potential observation of a 
rent gap in Santiago and the applicability of the conceptual definition of 
entrepreneurialism as an institutional mechanism of valuation and devaluation exerted 
by the state in the peri-centre. In consequence, General Objectives 2 and 3 aim at 
illustrating quantitatively and comparatively the variations of capitalised ground rent in 
a broad area composed by Pedro Aguirre Cerda and its neighbouring San Miguel and 
Cerrillos comunas. Also, since it is theoretically assumed that potential ground rent is to 
a great extern produced by changes in building regulations contained in local master 
plans (see CHAPTER 5), the analysis of PGR is focused exclusively on PAC, because this 86 
analysis is based on an exhaustive quantitative examination of the comuna’s existing 
and proposed different building guidelines. In contrast, the analysis of the 
entrepreneurial logics of regulation contained in local and national policies is conducted 
qualitatively. Interviewees’ discourses are used as research evidence. 
Question 1 addresses in turn the applicability of the proposed historical model of 
creative destruction in the context of Santiago’s peri-centre, especially regarding the 
extent to which Fordist-type geographies of accumulation and post-Fordist-type capital 
switching might have taken place there, as an effect of neoliberalisation. In consequence, 
General Objective 1 aims at collecting and analysing economic, policy and social 
factors of historical and current configuration of Santiago’s peri-centre in general, and 
Pedro Aguirre Cerda comuna  in specific. In fact, as the hypothesis proposes, peri-
central renewal can be seen as part of a continuum of capitalist spatial creative 
destruction. But as Schumpeter (1976) claimed, it is only through history that the 
analysis of creative destruction makes sense. This is precisely the rationale that informs 
the examination of the historical working-class roots of Santiago’s peri-centre in the 
following chapter. 87 
CHAPTER 3. Historical creative destruction in the peri-
centre of Santiago 
3.1. Introduction 
The present chapter aims at understanding the current condition and relevance of 
Santiago’s peri-central space from an analysis of the historical economic and social 
forces that contributed to produce it. The chapter also aims at filling the gaps left by 
definitions of Latin American inner city reviewed in CHAPTER  2, some of which 
understand the peri-centre as produced by pre-modern processes of urbanisation. In 
contrast, this thesis argues that the intense processes of industrialisation and 
modernisation that took place during the mid 20
th century in Chile led to the production 
of the peri-central space in Santiago. 
Sections 3.2 to 3.5 delineate four forces deployed that contributed to the development of 
the peri-centre, namely: a) import-substitution industrialisation, which led to the 
concentration of productive and infrastructural investment, articulated several industry-
based urban environments in the then Santiago’s fringes (currently peri-centre) and 
enlarged social consumption to unprecedented levels; b) historical class-monopoly 
forms of land rent exploitation (see sub-section 2.3.1, page 57) that produced socio-
spatial segregation and helped to corner the poor to live in irregular settlements in the 
city fringes; c) increasingly sophisticated state apparatuses that delivered low-income – 
yet quantitatively and sometimes qualitatively insufficient – housing; and d) since these 
three factors together were not enough for resolving the growing demand for shelter, a 
highly mobilised urban social movement
1 that until 1973 produced a number of self 
organised squatter enclaves (campamentos)
2 , later  consolidated as low-income 
residential enclaves (poblaciones), located in the interstices of the inner city.  
                                                 
1  Whilst ‘urban movements’ pursue short-term specific demands, ‘urban social movements’ pursue 
structural, long-term revolutionary change seeking to improve the class position of workers in relation to 
the bourgeoisie (Castells, 1985a, 1997). Although achieving limited results, the Chilean organised urban 
social movements were important factors of class struggle, from the 1960s to the 1980s.  
2 For more complete definitions of terms written in italics and acronyms, see Appendix 1-Glossary. 88 
The content of this chapter is based on literature review, fieldwork observation and 
interviews. The temporal analysis of events is recursive: every section has its own time-
line. Although issues of import-substitution industrialisation, to be addressed in section 
3.2, are not treated from a spatial point of view, they constitute the basis for the 
subsequent sections’ more geographical analyses. Section 3.3 analyses the highly 
speculative rental market which took place in Santiago until the late 1950s. This was a 
historical form of class-monopoly ground rent accumulation that worsened the situation 
of the homeless and cornered the grassroots to undertake the more radical solution of 
squatting. Section 3.4 focuses instead on the configuration of a state apparatus that 
sought to produce enough affordable housing located in generally cheap land and 
control the urban sprawl, but that was overcome by the growingly organised and 
radicalised social demand for shelter during the 1960s and until 1973. The latter is 
examined in section 3.5, revealing how, more than transitory squatter settlements, 
campamentos  and state-built poblaciones together articulated a permanent working-
class identity (later partially destroyed by the dictatorship) and specific spatiality 
currently observable in the peri-centre. 
Nonetheless, while the ISI was the general context for the production of the peri-centre, 
this thesis proposes that the neoliberalisation of the national economy, imposed by the 
military dictatorship from 1975 onwards, led to a process of creative destruction in 
Santiago’s inner city. Section 3.6 observes how, until the 1980s, the radical 
downgrading of the peri-central manufacturing enclaves, the housing apparatus and the 
social mobilisation generated deep economic and socio-demographic effects. Section 
3.7 concludes the chapter, claiming basically that the current process of inner city 
creative destruction is not new, but the continuation of cycles of class-led, ground rent 
exploitation that have taken place during the 20
th century.  
3.2. Import-substitution industrialisation and the peri-centre 
By the late 19
th century, Chile started a process of slow-motion industrialisation 
especially concentrated in Santiago. In 1906 there were around 1,100 industrial 
establishments in the city, over 40% of the national productive capacity (Cataldo, 1985). 
This proto-capitalism, highly dependent on imported means of production (machinery 89 
and means of capital circulation) was structurally incapable of creating surplus, to 
engender an urban working class with enough class consciousness, hence revolutionary 
power (although the nitrate workers in the North of the country can be considered as an 
important political force during the early 20
th century) or to prevent that a reserve army 
of underclass grew excluded in the outskirts of the city (Salazar, 2003).  
Chile, and Santiago in specific, had profited from the world monopoly production of 
nitrates since the 1880s. By the early 20
th century, the city had received considerable 
investment in public works and started to compete with (and soon overcome) 
Valparaíso as the national most important centre. Santiago’s population was around 
300,000 inhabitants in 1900 (it had doubled in thirty years). Meanwhile new mechanical 
means of transport and the search for more suburban lifestyles by the bourgeoisie were 
expanding the city beyond its historical limits.  
Nonetheless, with the Great Depression, the national model of growth based on 
commodity exports fell apart. In the 1930s, prices of imported assets increased, many 
industries closed and the exported commodities decreased, leading to high 
unemployment in the mining centres, thus accelerating migration of the unemployed to 
Santiago. The League of Nations estimated that in terms of exports and imports, Chile 
was leading the list of the most affected countries by the crisis in the world (Palma, 
1984). This would create the first conditions that led to a period of import-substitution 
industrialisation in the city. 
3.2.1. The first impulse and its effects on Santiago, late 1930s-1952 
By 1935, Chile’s manufacturing sector had recovered, due to a state policy of economic 
reactivation, based on the emission of supplementary circulating assets (Marfán, 1984: 
89), fiscal underpinning of productive sectors, the almost total disappearance of 
imported assets and especially the cheap workforce available (Palma, 1984: 75-82). 
From then on it was clear that only the state had the capacity to manage capital and 
obtain external credit and necessary technology (Moulian, 1997: 83). By 1939, the 90 
Popular Front
3 and its powerful Corporation for Productive Development (Corporación 
de Fomento de la Producción, CORFO) had monopolised almost all the productive 
sectors and macroeconomic policies, installing and financing new industrial 
infrastructure, also improving technical and entrepreneurial capacities (Ffrench-Davis, 
2004) concentrated in the outskirts of the South and North of Santiago. The foreign 
private capital was keen to switch from the commercial sector into this recently 
vigorous industrial activity. Since Pedro Aguirre Cerda’s Popular Front government, 
and for 35 years, seven Chilean governments would use several protectionist 
instruments in order to make the internal market grow, including price control on basic 
goods, subsidies, loans to diverse productive and service activities, and control of 
currency exchange rates (Frank, 1976; see also Appendix 3).  
Contradicting traditional explanations about the Chilean ISI, Salazar and Pinto (1999a, c) 
argue that this process was more private-led than state led, because it relied to a larger 
extent on domestic industrial capacity established during previous proto-capitalist 
periods of slower development. Although ISI used the disruption of the international 
market, generated by the Great Depression and the Second World War, to restrict 
imports and create conditions for domestic production, the Chilean ISI may have had 
relatively more autonomy regarding international economic guidelines than many other 
Latin American countries, because of the political stability of the successive 
governments that sustained the period. These authors conclude that the Chilean process 
of ISI was, in many senses, a case of ‘vernacular developmentalism’ close to Fordism in 
the promotion of national industrialisation, and Keynesianism, in the increase of internal 
demand that kept the system working.  
The dominant role of the state can be explained by the additional revenues collected 
through taxes on the mining sector, mainly copper, that remained as the only exporting 
activity as a consequence of World War II. The state channelled these funds through 
CORFO, which was in charge of the economic planning and financing of the 
industrialisation process. This agency favoured the expansion of textile, metal, ceramics, 
chemical and building material manufacturing industries and basic infrastructure such as 
coal, electricity, roads, etc. (Dickenson, 1996). From 1940 to the end of World War II, 
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the Chilean industrial sector grew at an annual rate of 6.1% (double the national rate of 
growth during the same period). Meanwhile, the share of manufacturing in GDP grew 
from 16.7% to 23.7% between 1940 and 1950 (Salazar and Pinto, 1999c). Santiago was 
where the largest domestic market, demand and state bureaucracy were already 
concentrated. This reinforced the flow of public investment and the concentration of 
most of the national manufacture in this city.  
 
Figure 3.1. Industrial 
zones according to 
the 1960 Greater 
Santiago Master Plan 
(PRIS) 
Source: own 
elaboration based on 
Ponce de León (1996) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 shows the industrial zones defined by the 1960 Greater Santiago Master Plan 
(this plan will be analysed in sub-section 3.4.3), and how most of the different types of 
manufacturing enclaves, that had been developed during the previous decades, were 
mostly concentrated in what today is the Urban Renewal Subsidy Area (URSA). Large 92 
scale heavy industry concentrated in San Joaquín-Macul, Cerrillos, Maipú and Renca 
comunas  (yellow zones in the figure). Small scale light manufacture mixed with 
residential uses was concentrated in San Miguel, La Cisterna, Estación Central, Quinta 
Normal, Independencia, Recoleta comunas and intensively in the south-eastern quarter 
of Santiago-Centre (green zones in the figure). The map also shows where already 
existing industrial zones would not be allowed anymore from 1960 onwards (red zones 
in the figure). In a nutshell, the industry had been ‘entrenched’ in the peri-centre of a 
fast expanding city.  
This agglomeration of manufacturing activities in today’s peri-centre was also 
transforming the city’s demographic structure. In the late 1930s, the growth of 
Santiago’s population accelerated basically due to immigrations produced by the 
growing and nationally centralised urban economy. By 1935, the city had 750,000 
inhabitants; in 1940, around 1.3 million; in 1952, around 1.8 million (De Ramón, 2000).  
Since its first stage, the Chilean import-substitution industrialisation was supported by 
an invigorated state bureaucracy and infrastructural public investment, but also 
succeeded in reinforcing democracy by expanding electoral participation, strengthening 
social movements and state-citizens alliances. With the exception of the ban of the 
Communist Party by the government between 1948 and 1958, parties of the left 
generally gained power during ISI, peaking from 37% of the national votes in 1970, to 
44% of the votes in the election for parliament held in early 1973, during the socialist 
Popular Unity three-year government (Meller, 2000). During ISI, the state also became 
more tolerant of the labour unions, political activity, and respected freedom of speech. 
Workers organisations abandoned momentarily the ‘social revolution’ as an immediate 
goal and it is not surprising that many people came to see the state as an anti-oligarchic 
actor, or even as the first step toward a working class revolution (Canihuante-Toro, 
1999).  
However, this developmentalist model would not be stable in the long run. The 
expanding Chilean ISI clashed with the post-Second World War international 
restrictions to the acquisition of foreign currency, machinery and intermediate goods. A 
mismatch between an already increased domestic purchasing power and a bottle neck in 
production was evident, increasingly generating more internal inflation. By the early 93 
1950s, the local mode of regulation was reaching its limits and a period of ‘hard’ 
substitution industrialisation would start (Salazar and Pinto, 1999a).  
3.2.2. The years of difficult industrialisation, 1952-1964 
In 1952, the first national economic expansive cycle led by CORFO had lost momentum. 
The decade of ‘easy’ substitution industrialisation was over. From 1953 to 1957, 
average annual economic growth dropped to 0.7% (down from 3% during the previous 
decade). Therefore in 1952 and 1953 several expansionist policies and salary increases 
were applied, although an expansion of productive capacity took another two more 
years. But exports decreased and the populist national government of Ibáñez
4, against 
its own initial goals, had to severely reduce the monetary supply. Later, Alessandri’s 
liberal government (1958-1964) underpinned the private internal productive capacity of 
manoeuvre by a series of fiscal incentives (Ffrench-Davis, 2004) but eliminating also 
the existing barriers to importing machinery and other capital goods, with the exception 
of oil, iron and steel. This tended to restore the country’s historical levels of dependence 
on the global North, regarding manufactured commodities and technology (Salazar and 
Pinto, 1999c). 
The Chilean system was increasingly reliant on an urban industrial workforce. But, as 
Ffrench-Davis argues (2004), protectionism led to a modernisation without real 
competition, technological innovation, entrepreneurial capacities or improved 
workforce productivity. The virtuous circle of the previous ‘easy’ stage became vicious 
when industrialisation started to be constrained within the very small scale of the 
Chilean internal market, promoting a monopolist and petitioning mentality among 
entrepreneurs. Working as a safety valve for recurrent externally-determined slumps, 
state policies increased domestic demand via raising salaries through state-subsidies to 
private capital. This reveals the particular convergence between the interests of the 
dominating and dominated classes in Chile during this phase, and their common 
reliance on the state. 
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Instead of facing increases in costs of production with lower profits, or marginal 
revenues originated in improvements in productivity or management (as real 
modernisation), the Chilean industrial capitalists just increased assets’ prices based on 
its historical class-kinship with the political elite that dominated a hypertrophied state 
apparatus, as well as with bankers and other financial capitalists (Zeitlin and Ratcliff, 
1988).  
As will be seen in sections 3.3 and 3.4, the fast industrial development experienced 
from the 1930s in Santiago was not paralleled by a consistent social housing policy. 
Whilst the industrialising period attracted a number of migrants to Santiago (in 1960, 
Santiago had grown to 2.5 million), this city’s space was less prepared to provide basic 
shelter for them. At the time, many realised that Chile’s was not a problem of over-
urbanisation but – inversely – of sub-industrialisation (in the way defined by Quijano, 
1967, 1968), an asymmetry between national productive capacity and a largely unmet 
social need for shelter and urban space (Chateau and Pozo, 1987). 
3.2.3. Reformism and social-mobilisation, 1964-1973 
Facing increasing social demands but incapable of resolving the growing contradictions 
of this mode of regulation, from the mid-1960s, the Chilean state would insist in 
following the same logic of high subsidisation of the productive sectors but applying 
now refined social regulations, as deep as the economic ones. The national 
developmental discourse gradually abandoned the liberal developmentalism of CORFO, 
adopting instead the ECLAC approach that advocated a sort of combination between 
Keynesianism and Marxist structuralism. According to Raposo et al. (2005), past 
industrial engineering was giving place to social engineering, and concepts such as 
‘sociology of development’, ‘strategic planning’, ‘urban planning’, ‘popular promotion’ 
emerged. Four core strategies took place from 1964: agrarian reform, copper 
nationalisation, educational reform, and income redistributive policies, being half 
invented by the normative thinking of ECLAC, half an outcome of the emerging social 
demands which unrolled from the 1930s (see also Hopenhayn, 1995).
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From 1964 to 1973, Frei’s and Allende’s governments converged in going against the 
increasingly liberal IMF recommendations, insisting more in subsidising the domestic 
demand and less in promoting a more specialised and technologically autonomous 
manufacture. Notwithstanding their radical differences, one common denominator of 
these two governments (one Christian Democratic and the other Marxist-inspired 
Socialist) was that they assumed that the more popular demands grew, the more internal 
industrial production and economic growth there would be. If it had been already 
presumed that high domestic production would absorb excess circulating purchasing 
power, thus stabilising the national economy, from the mid 1960s onwards, the 
improvement of living standards and levels of social consumption for the working-class 
would be seen as economic expansionist mechanisms, an apparent virtuous circle which 
would be oiled by a continuous supply of international currency. The basis of this was 
the budget surplus generated by the recently nationalised copper production. The state 
also played a role as the country’s most important job supplier, using more than 50% of 
the national budget only for salaries of the ministries of Defence, Education and Finance 
(Collier and Sater, 2004).  
The Chilean mode of regulation at this time can be summarised in: a) industrialists and 
workforce converging to put pressure on the state to increase profits via lowering 
taxation and subsidised wage increases, somehow ignoring the effects of inflation; b) 
the democratic political system playing a central role in the slow movement from an 
elitist to a mobilised democracy, as a factor of corporate integration of organised 
interests, and c) social sectors symbolically integrated to, or represented by, the state, 
breaking their historically exclusive dependence on capital (Moulian, 1997).  
When Salvador Allende was elected president (1970-1973), and although 20% of 
population still lived below the poverty line in the country, Chile showed one of the less 
regressive income distributions in the region, with a middle class which was greatly 
developed though concentrated in urban areas. However, the US was boycotting and 
any external help had been already refused to Chile whilst, as usual, the technological 
dependence was a drain on the Chilean Way to Socialism led by the Popular Unity 
(Ffrench-Davis, 2004). As result, from 1972, in a relatively desperate effort to resolve 
the lack of domestic production (also generated by an internal boycott led by the 
conservative parties) the Chilean state attempted to nationalise the whole surplus 96 
produced, including now the manufacturing sector and the already underdeveloped 
privately-owned agriculture through an intensified agrarian reform.  
Yet this time the state did not seek to strategically support private industrialisation (like 
the Popular Front did in the 1930s and early 1940s), but to command the whole process 
of production, substituting the hitherto private entrepreneurial activity through a new 
Basic Plan, or regime of production, based on three branches: Private Area, Mixed Area 
and a state-owned Social Area. This structure sought to include 90% of the total 
corporate assets of the nation. By 1973, the state controlled 80% of the state industrial 
output and around 60% of the GDP (Collier and Sater, 2004). The root of the economic 
programme of the Chilean Way to Socialism was, however, essentially capitalist, highly 
reliant on the industrialised economies, especially the US, for the importation of 
technical means of industrial production, just as it had historically been (Salazar, 2003). 
Furthermore, the resources extracted from the copper mining were not infinite, thus this 
half-revolutionary project – aborted by military intervention in 1973 – was to a great 
extent unable to cope with its programme of social redistribution.  
According to Moulian (1997), the popular movement never configured an alternative 
project of state construction, but remained disciplined and subordinated to continuous 
subsidisation. Neither was the Chilean Way to Socialism a project led by the working-
class, but by leftwing political elites that made use of civil society as a proxy for 
changing the structures of development. Not really participative and much closer to a 
system of patronage of a class by another, the Popular Unity implied the state to lose 
power quota for resolving the historical Gordian knot of economic growth and better 
economic distribution. This point is important, because the hypertrophied state became 
more vulnerable to the volatility of the masses (e.g. land seizures that momentarily 
challenged the traditionally segregated urban structure of Santiago; see Brain et al., 
2007) and ultimately, to the military power that seized control in 1973. Nonetheless, as 
seen below, the urgent need for shelter experienced by the growing masses of homeless 
in Santiago had long-dated historical causes. 97 
3.3. Peri-central deprivation: a class related problem 
3.3.1. A long history of urban misery 
In Santiago at the beginning of the 20
th century, the living conditions in the spaces of 
the poor were pauperising: lack of hygiene, communicable diseases, high rates of 
alcoholism and other social problems (Romero, 2007). And probably one of the worst 
situations was in the city’s western and southern fringes. The territory surrounding the 
already polluted Zanjón de la Aguada (see Figure 3.8, page 106) hosted the most 
populated, less valorised quarters because of their longer distance to the centre and their 
deficient water supply for agricultural uses (De Ramón, 1985, 2000). 
From 1907 to 1960, more than 960,000 people migrated to Santiago, especially between 
1930 and 1950. In 1940, in Santiago-Centre comuna alone there were 600,000 
inhabitants, distributed in 3,065 ha. However, 47.6% of the comuna residential space 
was considered insalubrious, mostly made of multi-occupied dwellings abandoned by 
their previous occupiers (conventillos). An intense process of filtering was taking place 
in the previously bourgeois central city, and probably the worst problem was the rate of 
overcrowding, reaching 3.4 persons per room (Espinoza, 1988). In Santiago alone there 
were 4,000 conventillos that hosted from 300,000 to 350,000 people. Eighty percent of 
these cases were declared ‘absolutely unhealthy’ by the national Ministry of Health, but 
they hosted roughly 40% of the population of Santiago in that time (Alexander, 1949). 
The 1940 census showed a national deficit of approximately 300,000 dwellings in a 
country of only five million inhabitants. The census also estimated that between 1938 
and 1944, the annual average deficit in housing was 57%, whilst only 7,300 dwellings 
per year had been built. It was necessary to build 12,800 per year only to keep up with 
the pace of population growth. As consequence, illegal land seizures were at their 
highest level in the 1950s.  
In Santiago in 1952, 75,000 people lived in shanty settlements (callampas) and another 
60,000 in precarious, multi-occupied properties (conventillos). That year, the numbers 
of people living in precarious conditions represented 15.5% of the city’s population. By 98 
1959, 60% of the poor lived in conventillos whilst only 26.1% of Santiaguinos lived in 
adequate dwellings, and the number of people living in callampas represented 13.8% of 
the city’s population. The homeless population in shanty areas was growing, as Table 
3.1 illustrates
5.  
 
Comuna (*)  Location   1952  1959  % variation 
Quinta Normal  Periphery (currently peri-centre)  1,119  4,316  385.7 
Las Condes  Barrio Alto (Centre-East zone)  1,296  3,926  302.9 
Renca  Periphery (currently peri-centre)  591  1,820  308.0 
Puente Alto  Sub-urban (currently periphery)  426  1,180  277.0 
Santiago-Centre Core  3,250  7,642  235.1 
San Miguel  Peri-centre  4,001  8,203  205.0 
Conchalí  Suburban (currently peri-centre)  1,600  2,683  167.7 
Ñuñoa  Barrio Alto 2,169  2,405  110.9 
La Florida  Sub-urban (currently periphery)  169  55  -307.3 
La Cisterna  Suburban  1,106  87  -1271.3 
Barrancas (Pudahuel)  Suburban (currently periphery)  323  -  - 
Providencia  Barrio Alto  452 -  - 
Total/Average     16,502  32,317  195.8 
(*) See Figure 3.1, page 91, for location of these areas 
Table 3.1. Number of households living in callampas in 1952 and 19596 
Source: own elaboration based on Espinoza (1988: 247) 
Furthermore, the comunas  with more callampas were also those of more intense 
expansion. Yet, as seen in Table 3.1, the situation was much worse in today’s inner city 
comunas such as Santiago-Centre, San Miguel, Renca and Quinta Normal, as the 
number of shanty enclaves in distant suburban comunas like La Florida and La Cisterna 
in fact decreased, probably due to migration to more central areas. And the situation 
would worsen more in the following years. A decade later, in 1968, there would be 
around 100,000 dwellings in callampas, which housed around 500,000 inhabitants, one 
fifth of the city’s population (De Ramón, 2000).  
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3.3.2. Segregation, socio-spatial cleansing and the law 
Since the 1880s, the poor had been hidden under the cosmetic spatiality of the central 
city, built by an affluent society, enriched by the emerging economy based on the 
exploitation of nitrates. In the 20
th century, for the new middle- and upper class’ 
modernising ways of life, the pauperised image of the poor had also to be banned from 
the city centre. The discriminating planning rationale, continuously established by 
ordinances since mayor Vicuña Mackena in the 19
th century, considerably contributed 
to this (Espinoza, 1988; Rodríguez, 1995). Yet as the city expanded, land valorised in 
the fringes and their occupants were expelled, no matter how long the poor and 
excluded had lived there, even centuries. In fact, important public resources were 
invested in discouraging underclass agglomerations and socially ‘improving’ central or 
peripheral land. 
The spaces of the poor splintered amidst the middle-income geographical areas of 
expansion, especially southward. These were sorts of urban-rural interface, marginalised 
from the rest of the city, out of its official administrative boundaries, in a sort of no-
man’s land (De Ramón, 1978). They had unpaved streets, with no water or sewage 
system. Dwellings were of poor quality, usually below street level, as the mud for their 
adobe walls was extracted from the same site, subject to frequent flooding during the 
winter (León-Echaíz, 1975).  
More than ideological or purely symbolic class differentiation, the highly segregated 
city soon implied a material threat to the stability of the bourgeoisie and the 
modernising city (Jelin, 2004). The poor were neglected but were felt as too close a 
menace: poverty explosively appeared in cases of emergencies, especially epidemics. 
Every now and then, there was a massive presence of the working class in the centre of 
the Chilean cities, even though this presence was banned by the ruling elite (Romero, 
2007). Also, although there were different motivations for marching and demonstrating 
discomfort and riots, a common demand was the miserable quality of accommodation, 
and the artificially elevated rent prices.  
But the violent demonstrations of April 1957 in several cities of the country were 
different. Although they started as a reaction against the IMF-recommended policies of 
salary cuts and were militarily repressed, soon they contributed to create a context for 
more radical homeless mobilisation in Santiago. 1957 marks the beginning of a fifteen-100 
year period of land seizures by organised homeless known as campamentos, as will be 
illustrated in section 3.5. Repression against these movements was usually cruel though, 
since the military power defined these occasions as ‘states of war’ (Milos, 2007).  
3.3.3. Legitimised land and property speculation 
Since the late 19
th century, the land-owning bourgeoisie had understood that the 
growing demand by migrants and the poor was quite profitable and could be easily 
supplied with minimum efforts (Espinoza, 1988). Properties were usually rented at 
considerably high prices but the renting system was not subject to laws until 1925, and 
before 1940 landlords had no obligations to provide services for tenants. At the 
beginning of the century, prices of a single rental room were 30% of the salary of a 
skilled urban worker and 60% of an unskilled one (Meller, 2000). However, in spite of 
their bad conditions and high rents, these minimal accommodations were rapidly 
occupied. At the beginning of the 20
th century, the owner of a conventillo could double 
its initial capital in one single year (Romero, 2007). Or if landowners did not capitalise 
very high ground rents, at least they had a constant idle surplus assured by milking 
renters’ budgets (De Ramón, 2000).  
The biggest land owners were mainly oligarchic, kin of the Chilean ruling class. They 
increased their capitalised ground rents by the positive externalities generated by public 
infrastructure (i.e. new rail connections
7 ) and urban extensions authorised by 
municipalities (Zeitlin and Ratcliff, 1988). They also obtained political gains as they 
appropriated the electoral cards of renters that could not afford to pay, thus creating 
political strongholds in many low-income districts (Romero, 2007). From the 19
th 
century there were also legal vacuums that allowed land and property speculation at 
unprecedented levels. The Law of Autonomous Comunas passed in 1891 improved 
police and sanitary regulations in the recently created 195 municipalities in the country 
(Gurovich, 2000), also separating in several different administrations the peripheral 
space of Santiago. Nevertheless, in a context of generalised political corruption, local 
governments for the first time would have attributions over both urban and rural space. 
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It was not surprise then that from 1891 to 1925, vested interests from affluent 
landowners, or even pressures exerted by mayors – who usually were proprietors of vast 
land extensions – would promote land speculation. These politicians used the 
developments in infrastructure funded by the state for their own benefit, thus expanding 
radically the cities in only twenty years (Walter, 2005).  
Renting  conventillos was highly lucrative; it worked by exploiting the use-value of 
urban land and peripheral rural plots, transforming it into pure exchange-value. And 
most of the speculative practices developed were illegal, e.g. selling the same plot to 
different buyers through operations that came to be named ‘ghost subdivisions’ 
(Alvarez, 2007); fraud caused by the non-payment of land taxes by the seller, even if 
he/she demanded that money to the buyers; the selling of mortgaged land without the 
consent of the renter, and so on (Espinoza, 1988).  
Until the 1940s, the housing sector would be dominated by the bad practices of the 
rental market. While urban speculation was being largely denounced by political leaders 
of the left
8, no government could go against the right to private property sanctioned by 
the National Constitutional Act, and firmly defended by the conservative sectors. 
Furthermore, whenever facing imminent attempts of state regulation, speculative 
landowners accelerated their activity. Probably the best example of this was the first 
comprehensive version of the National Law of Planning and Construction (LGUC) and 
its tight regulations on urban expansion. Since it was passed in 1931, but was only 
operative from 1936 (Gurovich, 2000), the five-years gap without legislation 
accelerated speculation, fragmentation of the peripheral land and development of the 
rural land with complicity of the affected municipalities (Alvarez, 2007). A second case 
of accelerated speculation was quite similar. Karl Brunner’s Santiago Master-Plan was 
the first serious attempt to create comprehensive metropolitan spatial regulation, 
integrating physical, functional, cultural and aesthetic dimensions (Cáceres, 1996). 
However, again there was a gap between the draft master plan presented in 1934 and its 
approval in 1939 (Parrochia, 1996a). This second temporal mismatch accentuated 
sprawl precisely in the areas to be restricted by the plan. The monopolisation of land 
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rent and the class alliance between private and political interests could not be observed 
more neatly.  
It can be confidently affirmed that if something started the production of the peri-central 
space in Santiago, it was a form of class struggle never seen before in the city: the 
conflict between a renting working class and a landowner bourgeoisie who monopolised 
the ground rent produced by the city. However, what the bourgeoisie was really doing 
through these speculative practices was to block the much needed social consumption of 
the modernising-industrialising society, and to stretch the housing crisis to its extremes. 
This forced the state to intervene, always within the capitalist logic, in order to produce 
a fairer distribution of the ground rent. It would be within these social-political 
boundaries that the Chilean state would develop its technical urban and housing 
apparatuses and capacities of spatial regulation, as seen in the next section. 
3.4. Creating state regulation 
By the 1950s, the housing deficit and chaotic urban sprawl threatened the stability of 
industrialising Santiago. Thus during this decade more decisive policies would come 
from three different public sectors. The first one, exclusively economic, would aim at 
expanding the building sector via indirect subsidies; the second one would configure a 
powerful state apparatus of social housing production, namely the Housing Corporation 
(Corporación de Vivienda,  CORVI); the third one, conceived from the Ministry of 
Public Works, set up a planning system that sought to stabilise the urban and regional 
structure of the city. Yet these three policies proved limitedly successful at reducing the 
deficit and controlling the sprawl, and sometimes contradicted each others’ goals. From 
1967, two subsequent shorter-term policies would be safety valves for the increasing 
social pressure on housing allocation: a programme of ‘site and services’ and a 
programme of definitive reduction of the deficit based on high public expenditure. 
Despite these five policies being either deeply reconfigured or ended by the military 
Junta in 1973, they contributed to creating important material conditions for what most 
of the peri-central residential space is today. 103 
3.4.1. Public subsidisation of the housing market 
In 1959, the conservative government of Alessandri, firmly advised by the already 
powerful National Association of Building Firms (founded in 1951) expanded an 
existing subsidiary scheme with a key bill named Decreto con Fuerza de Ley 2 (DFL2 
hereafter; see Hidalgo, 2000), mobilising the entire state and private entrepreneurial 
capacity, within the framework of an economy the central objective of which sought to 
strengthen the Chilean bourgeoisie. Regulated by the guidelines of the National Law of 
Planning and Construction (LGUC), the DFL2 policy targeted ‘low-income dwellings’, 
which were defined as any unit built with less than 140 m
2 (Kusnetzoff, 1975). 
Basically, the DFL2 law was an anti-recessionary measure. As a counter-cyclical 
rationale, it sought to redirect accumulated revenue into social welfare as a way to keep 
the pace of circulation of capital within its secondary circuit. The DFL2 law offered tax 
exemptions of up to twenty years to dwellings built with an area below 140 m
2. A 
system of savings and loan associations, created in 1960, helped to provide credit and 
stimulate construction for the emerging middle classes, and workers’ pension funds 
were used as sources of low-interest, long term loans for the formally employed 
working class (Collins and Lear, 1995: 150). This resulted in the creation of the 
National Savings and Loan System, which favoured the production of dwellings for 
middle- and upper-income people, especially during the depressive economic cycle 
experienced in the early 1960s, propelling capitalists to invest in properties as a 
countermeasure against unemployment. Even luxury resorts could benefit by this 
legislation (Kusnetzoff, 1975).  
However, although DFL2 considerably increased production to around 30,000 units per 
year – up from the 6,000 units per year produced between 1943 and 1958 (Rojas, 2001) 
– it proved inadequate for facing the needs of a majority which was not able to 
participate in this market (Kusnetzoff, 1990). Popular sectors benefited proportionately 
less than higher-income groups because the model was based on a collective regime of 
saving management. Whilst the policy was financed by a 5% tax on the profits of 
private companies and another 5% contribution of all workers’ benefits coming from 
social security agencies, housing loans were allocated on the basis of the receivers’ 
ability to repay mortgages. This implied that middle-income households were in a batter 104 
position to gain access to the subsidised homes than low-income households. However, 
the latter’s contributions to the social security funds paradoxically subsidised the 
middle-income strata
9 (Gilbert, 1993).  
After a few years of DFL2 application, two elements became clear: first, that the 
subsidy to the housing sector was central for economic recovery in a time of crisis; 
second, that this form of expanding housing supply was incorrectly distributed. Hence, 
more direct, better targeted state action was needed for supplying shelter for the poor. 
3.4.2. Gradual configuration of a state housing apparatus 
3.4.2.1. The centralised scheme of CORVI, 1953-1975 
With the precedent of the Popular Housing Fund created in 1936, Ibañez's government 
(1952-1958) created the Housing Corporation (CORVI) in 1953, in convergence with 
the agenda propelled by the National Association of Building Firms and the National 
Housing Plan launched the subsequent year by the Ministry of Public Works 
(Kusnetzoff, 1975). CORVI absorbed the existing housing institutions, acquiring 
several new responsibilities, such as a system of construction managed directly by the 
state, also incorporating new systems of mass prefabrication (Alvarez, 2007).  
CORVI considerably boosted the construction of public housing, by receiving from 
1959 onwards an increased budget through the system of public/private shared 5% 
contribution explained in sub-section 3.4.1. Between 1959 and 1964, CORVI was 
involved in the production of 58% of all new dwellings in Chile, one fifth of those in 
Santiago alone (Gilbert, 1993) – during the 1960s, public investment only in housing 
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category of ‘affordable dwellings’, including private holiday houses in the coast and mountains 
(Astaburuaga, 2005).  105 
and urban infrastructure was around 40% and 50% of the total of investment in the 
country (Pavez, 2006) – thus considerably developing several spaces, currently labelled 
as peri-central, as was seen in Figure 3.2.  
CORVI’s technical and political attributions were all-embracing, making possible that 
broad arrays of working-class households received public housing for the first time. 
However, these efforts proved incapable of supplying all the new dwellings required by 
the massively urbanising population (Rojas, 2001). The policy was not entirely well 
targeted and had regulatory inconsistencies. For instance, building standards were 
predefined by national regulation but prices of material and workforce were market-
determined. This considerably increased construction costs but CORVI could not 
compromise those standards, hence the units’ price increased. And again, the most 
affluent groups from the middle class were the most benefited, due to the distributional 
inconsistencies that came from the DFL2 bill and the existing high inflation during the 
1950s and 1960s since CORVI barely charged interests on its loans. Consequently, the 
Popular Housing Fund soon became decapitalised (Gilbert, 1993). 
Although CORVI had legal compulsory purchase powers, it could not fully apply them 
on the many dilapidated inner city areas. Many plots hosted multi-occupied decrepit 
properties (conventillos) that could not be easily evicted, because past experiences had 
taught that the number of potential evicted would be higher than those CORVI was able 
to relocate. A second problem related to expropriations was that, for the magnitude of 
the operations needed, sites to be purchased could not be smaller than 30 hectares, but 
given the higher land prices in the inner city, CORVI therefore turned to operate 
preferentially in the periphery (this is currently peri-centre though) near industrial areas 
(Pavez, 2006), considerably contributing to Santiago’s sprawl.  
One of the most important estates built by CORVI in the 1950s was población Miguel 
Dávila, to the south of current PAC comuna, covering 66 hectares with a total of 2,238 
dwellings based on an array of detached houses combined with three-storey blocks, 
housing around 12,000 people. In the following decade, as part of a national plan for 
eviction, much larger scale poblaciones  Lo Valledor Norte, San Gregorio and José   
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Figure 3.2. Location 
of estates built by 
Housing Corporation 
(CORVI) and 
Corporation for 
Urban Improvement 
(CORMU), 1953-
197310 
Source: own 
elaboration based on 
Hidalgo (2005) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
María Caro were initiated, the latter in a vast territory currently shared by PAC and Lo 
Espejo comunas, in the middle of the peri-centre, as figures 3.2 and 3.3 show (Hidalgo, 
2005). 
                                                 
10 For definition of CORMU, see sub-section 3.4.4. 107 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3. Poblaciones in PAC comuna 
Source: photography taken by the author 
3.4.2.2. The birth of the Ministry of Housing and Planning (MINVU) 
Frei’s government (1964-1970) modernised the institutional apparatus, creating in 1965 
the Ministry of Housing and Planning (Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo, MINVU), 
Low-density residential area in José María Caro población 
One-storey building in Caro población  Open space in Dávila 
CORVI blocks in Dávila población 108 
a new body that would centralise twenty four public agencies responsible for an ample 
gamut of issues related to the production and distribution of housing services, dependent 
up to then on eight different Ministries. From then on MINVU’s potential clientele 
would be two thirds of the Chilean households whilst the ministry would be the most 
important client for the private construction sector (Frankenhoff, 1973). 
MINVU absorbed the Housing Corporation (CORVI) as one of its four semi-
autonomous agencies, also aiming to comprehensively articulate the urban development 
policies that had hitherto run in parallel to housing. This ministry’s goals were basically 
two: first, to reduce the national housing shortage estimated at 420,000 dwellings in 
1965, for an estimated national population of 8.7 million (INE-CEPAL, 2005); second, 
to articulate housing production with the policies of income redistribution and popular 
participation that characterised the Christian Democratic government of between 1964 
and 1970 (Kusnetzoff, 1987). However, MINVU assumed that without an alliance with 
the private sector it would be unable to reduce the housing shortage. This was because, 
as the private sector of constructors and developers claimed, it had been traditionally 
difficult for them to acquire land, so the state had the mission to correct that deficiency 
(Raposo and Valencia, 2004). From this point on, it was clear that the Chilean approach 
to social housing would be, as it had usually been, an attempt to stimulate the private 
construction industry through a flow of resources supplemented by the saving efforts of 
low-income households and collected through the Popular Savings Plan, but that would 
be administered and finally accumulated by a small and close group of firms 
(Kusnetzoff, 1975). The intervention of the National Association of Building Firms in 
this configuration was so evident that the first MINVU minister was an important 
member of the private federation. 
Frei’s government confidently self-imposed a goal of producing 360,000 dwellings 
during its six-year administrative period, of which 60% would be destined to low-
income sectors. The Popular Saving Plan captured savings from middle- and upper-
middle income households and redirected them into mortgage-backed loans for home 
purchase. However, while the indexation of loans and payments helped the system to 
operate in the inflationary environment, this public-private system was incapable of 
filling the rapidly growing housing needs estimated at over 40,000 units per year (Rojas, 
2001), 45% of which should be built by the private sector (Castells, 1974; Kusnetzoff, 109 
1987). Building was too slow and most poor households were unable to pay even for the 
smallest dwellings, e.g. in 1966, 45% lived within the range of 0.4 to 1.5 sueldos vitales, 
or minimum monthly salaries
11 (Kusnetzoff, 1975). On the other hand, the revenues 
demanded by the private building sector (over-relying on state incentives, as any other 
private productive sector; see section 3.2) were high, due to its productive inefficiency, 
its general reliance on non-qualified workforce and its historical class speculative 
tendencies. Here lies the core breach of Frei’s housing programme: the attempt to 
improve housing distribution without altering the bases of the productive structure. In 
consequence, the country produced only 240,000 units during this six-year presidential 
period (see Figure 3.5). Therefore, a complementary policy had to be adopted in order 
to cope with the growing housing shortage: Operación Sitio. 
3.4.2.3. Operation Site (Operación Sitio), 1966-1970 
By 1967, Frei’s housing plan had to be dramatically reconfigured. Assisted by the US-
funded Alliance for Progress, the Operación Sitio programme provided ‘site and 
services’ while the occupants had to work in groups to build their own homes, and the 
serviced plots of 160 m
2 could be paid in instalments. Although the government had to 
replace the word ‘dwelling’ by the neologism ‘housing solution’, this programme 
created high expectations. About 63,000 households applied nationally during the first 
week, and near 75,000 solutions were allocated in Santiago alone under the total 
programme until 1970 (Gilbert, 1993). Even though initially small 30 m
2 built units 
were delivered with the plots, soon MINVU could only afford serviced land plots (with 
electrical and water supply through standpipes, but not drainage) and later the ministry 
delivered only demarcated plots. As shown in Figure 3.4, the location of these 
programmes followed a relatively ‘peripheral’ pattern, yet also with some important 
interventions in inner city comunas such as today’s Lo Espejo, San Ramón, Lo Prado, 
Independencia and Recoleta. 
 
                                                 
11 According to Garcés (2002), one sueldo vital in 1966 was roughly equivalent to 90 US$ dollars of 1998. 
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Figure 3.4. 
Location of 
Operación Sitio 
projects and 
campamentos in 
Santiago in 1979 
Source: own 
elaboration based on 
Hidalgo (2005) 
 
 
 
 
 
Deep social and ecological effects were produced by this plan. Factors such as excessive 
transportation times and costs, inadequacy of services, high socio-spatial segregation, 
labour costs implied in the self-help construction, and the deferment of present costs to 
the future through the Popular Saving Plan deferred mortgage payments, made 
Operación Sitio programme highly unsustainable (Kusnetzoff, 1975). Additional legal 
problems related to land expropriation and serious budget restrictions of MINVU, 
imposed by the national economic policy, limited the acquisition of possible sites. And 
the historical speculative tradition of the landowning bourgeoisie, which had been 
relatively ‘sleeping’ during the early 1960s, woke up again. In peripheral, inexpensive 
rural land, hitherto prohibited for development by the Greater Santiago Master Plan 
(PRIS), landowners allowed illegal land seizures as a way to push MINVU to negotiate 
with them but at increased ‘urban’ land prices. All these elements created unrest amidst 111 
households which had already applied to the programme but were waiting too long to be 
allocated (Espinoza, 1988). 
3.4.2.4. Housing as a right: the Chilean Way to Socialism 
By 1970, socialist Allende rejected the previous self-help housing scheme, based on the 
widespread unpopularity of Operación Sitio in its latest years. In turn, this 
government’s ambitious Emergency Housing Plan rested upon two basic ideas: first, a 
free-market housing system cannot meet Chilean people’s needs; second, housing is a 
right for the people. In consequence, the Popular Unity housing programme sought four 
main objectives: a) to generate high levels of employment via enlarging the construction 
sector, b) to fully utilise the installed capacity and state apparatus already produced, c) 
to boost construction-related industries, and d) to satisfy the working class hence widen 
the government’s political support (Kusnetzoff, 1975). By the end of 1971, the Popular 
Unity produced statistical evidence of the almost complete fulfilment of its quantitative 
goals, with more than 73,000 dwellings ‘initiated’ by the public sector, a production 
volume that doubles Frei's highest one (Chateau and Pozo, 1987), being also the highest 
figure produced by the public sector in Chile up to then.  
This period put the government housing apparatus and its financial capacity to the test. 
The lack of resources prevented this policy from making a significant change to the 
bleak situation of popular housing, and, even though the number of housing units started 
reached a historic record, actual delivery of finished dwellings (an average of just over 
9,000 per year) was much lower. Many projects remained incomplete for lack of 
building materials or financing, and were completed only years later by the dictatorship 
(Rojas, 2001), due to the extreme economic tension generated by a fierce opposition and 
its control over building firms and building-related industries.  
By 1972 and 1973, the Popular Unity government did not show the same capacity for 
dealing with budgetary and logistical issues, neither with the political confrontation that 
propelled the building sector, more specifically, the National Association of Building 
Firms, to conspire against the goals of housing production. Therefore, the number of 
dwellings initiated was reduced to 35,000 each year (Kusnetzoff, 1987). 112 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5. State- and Privately-built dwellings initiated per year in Chile, 1959-1985 
Source: Kusnetzoff (1990: 58) 
In late 1972, the government had no other option but to provide ‘site and services’ and 
squatter-upgrading programmes. Thus in these final two years of democracy, numbers 
of still homeless people realised that the solution was not within the administrative 
boundaries of the state anymore, but by enlarging the number of campamentos in the 
city. Miguel Lawner, chair of the Corporation for Urban Improvement (CORMU) 
during the Popular Unity government, recalls the material contradictions experienced by 
this government’s housing apparatus, and how this contradiction was increasingly 
driving to a socially self-help built urban space. 
[T]he people, who are not fools, learned quickly that the best way to get priority for a 
house was to go and seize a plot, even if they had no need. In 1972, despite the efforts we 
made, the demand had doubled. Then we had a long session of two or three days and 
designed a programme which was called ‘New Lines of Action’, much influenced by a 
meeting we had with leaders of La Victoria población
12, the Housing Commission of the 
Communist Party and me. The pobladores
13 told us: “look, our own children went to 
participate in the seizure of Lo Valledor and they have already a house; but we fools, we 
are here since 1957 and we have never accomplished anything without hard struggling. 
                                                 
12 CHAPTER 6 considerably focuses on this población. 
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Our houses have never had official support; we have only achieved by ourselves having 
water, light, a little bit of street surface… then why there are no Lines of Action for us, to 
support the upgrading of our miserable callampas?” (Interviewed on 22 May 2007) 
3.4.3. The 1960 Greater Santiago Master Plan (PRIS) 
However, since twelve years earlier, the 1960 Greater Santiago Master Plan (PRIS) was 
being an unprecedented, technically complex attempt of state control over the territorial 
growth of Santiago. For the first time a centralised planning system sought to control 
urban sprawl (to be absorbed through planned multinuclear satellite agglomerations), 
the construction of new roads, the development of manufacturing agglomerations, 
supply networks and sewage systems (Ponce de León, 1996).  
Firmly rooted in a technocratic, a-politicised regional planning discipline (Parrochia, 
1996c), the Plan defined three ways of urban growth for Santiago: by central and peri-
central rehabilitation and renewal, by extension and filling unused peripheral areas, and 
by satellite agglomeration. Clearly, the main goal of PRIS was to keep Santiago’s 
expansion inside a well delimited inner urban area of 27,000 hectares within the 
Américo Vespucio beltway (see figure 3.6). The activities and densities to be deployed 
inside were predefined by a inter-comuna by-law and several specific local master plans. 
This inner area had an allowed maximum density of 144 people per hectare (to be 
potentially increased up to 220 through projects of urban densification). Surrounding 
the urban area, a suburban buffer of an additional 17,000 hectares sought to include 
farm plots and semi-rural residential uses, with a minimum plot size of 5,000 m
2 and 
maximum allowed density of 10 people per hectare. A further rural area was destined to 
agricultural use, with minimum plot size of 15 hectares. All in all, the projected capacity 
of Santiago metropolis was close to 5 million
14 (Fernández, 1991; Parrochia, 1996b). 
The innovations and complexity implied in this plan were unprecedented in Chile. 
According to Pavez (2006), the Plan was based on independent inter-comuna urban 
areas, everyone responding to geographical identity, separated by a hierarchical system 
of several types of open spaces. The hitherto deficient existing radial road structure was 
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upgraded into a radial-concentric network, covering the regional and inter-comuna 
spaces (see Figure 3.5), namely: i) Greater Santiago Access Ways; ii) three concentric 
beltways: external (Américo Vespucio), intermediate (Dorsal) and inner (Anillo 
Intermedio; see Figure 3.6); iii) Complementary Radial Ways: between 30 and 60 
metres wide; iv) Park Ways: between 60 and 100 metres wide, generally connecting two 
or more parks; v) Tourist Ways. A new Norte-Sur Motorway cut Santiago-Centre, 
seeking to facilitate the access of trucks to the city (this way is the current eastern 
perimeter of PAC), and an east-west road would connect the comunas along Mapocho 
river, namely the current Costanera-Norte Motorway. The plan also aimed at 
encouraging pedestrian displacement in Santiago’s CBD (see also Parrochia, 1996b).  
The planned, today consolidated, three concentric rings shaped the current peri-central 
area of the city. However, secondary comuna functional agglomerations were also 
planned, six of which were attached to Américo Vespucio metropolitan beltway. These 
sub-centres were connected to consolidated suburban local areas.  
Industrial zoning was integrated into the city structure, avoiding air pollution generated 
by the topographic characteristics of Santiago’s basin, and setting industrial clusters 
alongside the main access roads to the metropolis, triggering the creation of industrial 
corridors in the peri-centre (see Figure 3.1). From 1951 to 1958, 40% of industries had 
been chaotically located in the periphery. The PRIS attempted to reorganise these, also 
planning to bring half of the national industries to be located in Santiago, 50% of which 
would be in the central and peri-central areas. The plan also classified the industrial 
activity in: i) Dangerous Industrial Zones: to be located in the rural area under 
permission of the respective organisation, with 300 metres surrounding buffers; ii) 
Inter-comuna Industrial Zones: exclusively for manufacturing uses with 1,500 m
2 
minimum plots; iii) Heavy Industrial Mixed Zone: mainly to resolve already 
agglomerated industrial concentrations, allowed to be within residential areas, but 
functioning restricted between 7 AM and 7 PM; and iv) Non-nuisance Industrial Mixed 
Zone: allowing up to 40% of the comuna space to micro-zones of inoffensive activities 
to be zoned by local master plans. Figure 3.1 showed how the latter two categories were 
zoned mainly in the peri-centre.  
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Figure 3.6. 1960 Greater Santiago Master Plan (PRIS) 
Source: Ponce De León (1996) 
As this plan aimed to limit urban sprawl by inducing pre-defined sectors to sprout, the 
inner city was zoned with specific industrial and residential functions and higher 
residential densities through a central ‘remodelling zone’ seeking to renew derelict areas. 116 
The plan did not establish legal definitions about housing, but it regulated standards of 
land subdivision and of suburban residential space. The PRIS also defined heights for 
the state social housing and self-help buildings (Ponce de León, 1996). Its goals for 
inner city densification proved largely successful in the early 1970s, when the 
metropolitan gross urban density started to increase from 90 up to 100 people per 
hectare, due to CORMU’s action (Fernández, 1991).  
3.4.4. Peri-centre on the agenda: the Corporation for Urban 
Improvement (CORMU), 1965-1975 
In a highly regulated context by PRIS, CORMU came to be a key relational entity 
between policies of urban development and housing, service and infrastructure 
provision in the inner city. CORMU sought to coordinate public and private investment 
in the central and peri-central area, aiming at triggering positive incremental impacts 
through projects allocated in strategic areas (see Figure 3.2, page 106). Its main goal 
was to re-create urban structure through the production of urban public spaces, 
integrated road networks, brand new neighbourhoods characterised by socio-economic 
integration, in accordance with local master plans. Yet CORMU’s budget was limited. 
By 1968, it represented 5.6% of the total national expenditure in housing and public 
works, compared with CORVI’s 42.3% (Raposo and Valencia, 2004).  
Initially, CORMU targeted middle- and upper-income groups. What epitomises this 
initial approach was Remodelación San Borja (RSB) project, located on the border of 
the metropolitan core, developed between 1969 and 1973. RSB’s main objective was to 
renew deteriorated quarters and to promote increasing densification in the central area 
through medium- and high-storey blocks. The project was located in an area of 13,5 
hectares, comprising 28 towers of 20 and 22 floors, with a size of residential units of 70 
m
2, plus additional lower blocks, for a total of 14,416 inhabitants. Its projected density 
was 1,100 inhabitants per ha. RSB was aimed at middle-income residents (Gámez, 
2006). 
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Figure 3.7. Views of CORMU’s 
Remodelación San Borja (RSB) and Villa 
San Luis estates 
 
a) Siege to RSB blocks during the military 
coup in September 1973; b) current image 
of RSB to the north; c) Villa San Luis during 
its construction. Sources: a) Rama (1974); b) 
photography taken by the author; c) Lawner 
(2007) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
However, from 1970 onwards, the Popular Unity’s Emergency Housing Plan 
transformed CORMU’s purpose. From being an operator of derelict inner city urban 
renewal, it turned into a much more comprehensive state agency of socio-spatial 
segregation reduction. Thus it was not surprising that CORMU would become from 
1971 to 1973 an ideological centre for massive projects of socially-based inner city 
reconfiguration (Raposo and Valencia, 2004). By 1972, nearly 7,000 dwellings were 
built in clearly peri-central locations, close to the evicted capamentos  as a way to 
preserve the original location of the beneficiaries (Hidalgo, 2005). 
a 
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The project Villa San Luis in the affluent Las Condes comuna is an example of this 
second phase. Initially conceived as a large urban project for 50,000 middle-income 
inhabitants, it was downgraded in 1970 to be a estate of 1,038 flats, grouped in several 
four- and five-storey blocks. It was built between 1971 and 1972, and sought to 
evict/relocate pobladores of the area
15 (Lawner, 2007). 
CORMU also developed a plan with short, medium and long term stages for providing 
amenities in the worse-serviced inner city areas, such as parks, open spaces, popular 
resorts, recreational centres, some of which would to be developed for tourism. The 
agency also purchased land for creating a reserve for the future construction of national, 
metropolitan and urban parks, maintaining nurseries to supply parks in the future. 
Studies and projects towards the conservation and restoration of “historic, national and 
typical” places and buildings were also developed (Gámez, 2006: 13-5).  
Nonetheless, CORMU had limited resources and large scale urban land expropriation 
was not really feasible because the National Constitution protected private property. 
Therefore the allocation of CORMU projects was rather based on the random 
acquisition of available peri-central interstitial plots.  
CORMU was officially closed in 1976, but its role as urban/social reformer of the inner 
city came to an end earlier, as soon as the military Junta took office in 1973. However, 
CORMU’s oeuvre, more than purely built environment, gave shape and epitomised an 
ideological project of socio-political transformation, deeply rooted in hypotheses of 
modernisation and de-marginalisation embedded with architectural modernism. 
Through CORMU, a close relation between architecture, urban design and politics was 
seen as key mechanism for social emancipation. CORMU proved that, despite the 
economic and social limitations of the early 1970s, state-led peri-central regeneration 
was feasible.  
3.4.5. Regulatory limitations of the state-based model 
Until 1973, Chile improved its housing and planning apparatus, which nevertheless 
showed crucial limitations to meet the growing social demand for shelter. The 1960 
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Greater Santiago Master Plan proved not very effective in controlling urban sprawl and 
protecting the peri-urban agricultural land, which were regularly violated either by 
campamentos, landowner speculation or state-led social housing allocation. The 
Ministry of Housing and Planning (MINVU) was the factor that most contributed to 
urban sprawl from 1965 onwards, occupying land reserved for open spaces previously 
acquired by the Ministry of Public Works before 1964 (Petermann, 2006). The PRIS 
was meant to be operated by a centralised metropolitan government but in fact this had 
not existed ever since (Ward, 1996). Moreover, in 1963, a reform ended the obligatory 
dependence of inter-comuna plans on the macro- and micro-regional schemes defined 
by the PRIS, destabilising even more the metropolitan planning system (Gurovich, 
2000). 
The constant state subsidisation of the private housing building sector and its scale-
economies and submarkets sought to reactivate the internal economy by using a large 
part of the national budget, but most of the highly promoted ‘social’ subsidies (or tax 
exemptions) ended in the hands of middle- and upper-income sectors. An example of 
this is the poorly targeted DFL2 policy which is still in force at the time of writing. In 
general, the state lacked a continuous flow of resources to implement its housing plans, 
so that programmes suffered discontinuities in the acquisition of land, designs, and 
meeting minimum standards. The state did not break the constraints imposed by the 
market, so land and construction costs continued to increase. Nevertheless, it is 
important to note that from 1964 to 1973, 400,000 dwellings were produced (100,000 
units more than what was built by the dictatorship between 1974 and 1983), 62.5% of 
which were built by the public sector, plus thousands of additional serviced sites. Most 
of these accomplishments are still of good quality, located in what today is peri-centre, 
as figures 3.2 and 3.4 show.  
But all in all, the more the state supplied completed dwellings or serviced land, the more 
a social, desperate demand grew and threatened the political and spatial stability of the 
city. From this mismatch, the urban social movements of Santiago would emerge and 
decisively transform the structure of the city, as examined next. 120 
3.5. Social production of the peri-centre: campamentos and 
poblaciones, 1957-1973 
By 1967, it was clear that if the limitations of Operación Sitio programme continued, 
this would be a decisive factor in the electoral triumph of the Popular Unity in the 
forthcoming national elections of 1970 (Kusnetzoff, 1975). Thus, after initial attempts 
at repressing campamentos (Castells, 1974), Christian Democratic Frei’s government in 
1969, as an electoral machine, broke its own previous restrictions and rapidly permitted 
the development of peripheral land (Alvarez, 2007). Within a year, massive, strongly 
organised squatter movements would be unleashed. As the electoral year drew near, the 
population living in Santiago’s campamentos grew to 300,000. According to Castells 
(1974), four additional factors were at the basis of this form of land occupation: a) an 
important fraction of the proletariat immersed in crisis, little satisfied in terms of 
services and suffering from their marginal allocation; b) unemployment, anomie and 
lack of participation in the economic system; c) increasing levels of agency of local 
communities through Neighbourhood Committees
16, Housewives Committees, and 
other organisations; and d) competition among centre and left political parties for 
engaging with the pobladores movement.  
But the pobladores movement was far from being solely a social reaction to the state 
supplying incapacity. Instead, it was a mobilised “nuclei of a vast territorial network of 
territorially based organisations” (Castells, 1974: 243) that sought to pressure the 
central government and parliament for the fulfilment of their housing needs. They also 
threatened the bourgeoisie that could see the masses of the poor much closer than ever, 
breaking the historical spatial polarisation of the city discussed earlier. Although at the 
beginning they were officially banned, waves of land seizures and campamentos were a 
safety valve for the incapacity of the state to supply enough shelter, being gradually 
allowed by the state apparatuses until the coup d’état in 1973. However, the 
phenomenon was in fact a gradual construction of an identity which was not only an 
axis for the self-help residential construction of the working class, but also spread all 
over the popular space, beyond the boundaries of the campamentos, and gave meaning 
                                                 
16 According to Klaarhamer (1989) and Vanderschueren (1973), Neighbourhood Committees were a form 
of order imposition from the state to the apparently chaotic social configuration of the urban movements.  121 
to the historical process of urban emancipation that has crystallised in the peri-centre up 
to the present. The material and cultural conditions of this spatial production are 
outlined next. 
3.5.1. Birth and development of a working-class space 
The roots of the campamentos  as marginalised working-class environments are 
historical, but their high levels of organisation come from a rather successful social 
institution created in the early 1950s, namely the Homeless Committees, integrated by 
residents of callampas, conventillos, and other marginal locations. These institutions 
demanded the provision of ‘site and services’, loans and technical assistance for self-
help construction, always operating within legal-institutional frameworks. However, 
due to the lack of official response, sporadic land seizures started in 1953 (Espinoza, 
1988), and within ten years, there would be 32 campamentos  in Santiago, housing 
13,765 households, 10,994 of which were concentrated in the southern San Miguel and 
La Cisterna peri-central comunas alone. Land seizures stopped in 1964 due to the high 
expectative generated by Frei’s ‘Revolution in Freedom’ but restarted in 1967 after the 
failure of its housing plan and were repressed by the government for about two years. 
Probably the best known early case in Santiago is población La Victoria (founded in 
1957), due to its high levels of organisation, stability and consolidation (De Ramón, 
2000).  
From 1969 to 1973, when the risk of police repression was practically inexistent, the 
number of successful land invasions in Santiago increased from six between 1964 and 
1966, to 35 in 1969, to 103 in 1970 (Klaarhamer, 1989), with some governmental 
support in several of them. In 1971 another 172 appeared. Between 1967 and 1972, 
around 54,710 households had access to urban land through this means, 10% of 
Santiago’s total population. In 1972, MINVU censed 275 campamentos  completely 
surrounding the city, where 456,500 people lived, occupying a total of 2,700 hectares, 
barely 10% of the metropolitan area, with an average density of 170 people per hectare. 
By 1973, the number increased; there were around 500,000 people living in 
campamentos (De Ramón, 2000). During this period pobladores started invading the 
best service areas of the city in the eastern Barrio Alto (this was seen in Figure 3.4), 122 
looking for the advantages of a level of social integration never seen in the past (Brain 
et al., 2007). 
Their levels of mobilisation and effective organisation were largely based on the power 
of a complex and organised working class in the country, which by the 1960s and due to 
the highly subsidised industrial development in the main cities, was similar in terms of 
the social power exerted on the whole society, to that of the French, Italian and Japanese 
working classes a decade earlier (Zeitlin and Ratcliff, 1988). This contradicted the 
widespread assumptions of the Theory of Marginality (Quijano, 1967, 1968)
17: the 
Chilean pobladores movement did not host economic ‘informality’ but hosted many of 
the ‘formal’ workers that were the basis of the capitalist relations of urban production 
and national accumulation (Castells, 1974, 1985a, 1997)
18. At the time, the evidence 
showed that: first, most rural migrants came to Santiago as allegados
19 but  not 
inhabiting campamentos (as erroneously established by the abovementioned theory); 
pobladores were instead highly adapted to the urban life. Second, insofar as the national 
economic capacity was unable to cope with the growing demand for shelter and the 
housing deficit was also affecting non proletarian social groups, more and more middle-
income strata become part of these demanding social groups. The pobladores 
movement was thence socio-economically heterogeneous. Third, campamentos housed 
a higher proportion of workers in formal heavy industry and construction and even petty 
bourgeoisie, than the average for Greater Santiago (Castells, 1974), hence their 
contribution to the process of capitalist accumulation was higher than supposed (Kay, 
1991).  
How did these masses build their space in the city? This form of social mobilisation was 
fundamentally urban and much less industrial. If labour unions were not preponderant in 
                                                 
17   According to Vanderschueren (1973: 264), Theory of Marginality was an attempt of cultural 
domination by the ruling class over the grassroots, as an “intention to remove the basic foundation of 
Marxism theory” from the working-class world, and replace it by a less politicised notion of social 
inclusion and integration. See more about Marginality Theory in Appendix 1-Glossary.  
18 J. Perlman arrived at similar conclusion after analysing Rio de Janeiro’s favelas in the 1960s. Recently, 
these residential spaces have become more socially heterogeneous but still highly stigmatised (Perlman, 
2004, 2006). 
19 Allegado is a person or household who inhabits in someone else’s house or backyard patio, usually kin 
to the homeowner, as temporary solution for their lack of dwelling. See Appendix 1-Glossary for more 
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their world, tertiary and informal workers, neighbourhood organisations, professionals, 
women indeed were. And, maybe most importantly, the scenario for this conflict was 
the residential space, the streets and avenues, the parks of Santiago surrounding the core.  
3.5.2. Development of a popular identity 
However, what makes the pobladores movement unique is their triangular relation with 
state power and territory. As the movement acquired unprecedented political legitimacy 
and proved effective means of access to land, dwellings and services for the masses, it 
marked the transition from classic class-related issues of work and unionisation to 
emerging issues of urban space and everyday life. The later was a broader category with 
more diffuse boundaries than the former, but nevertheless more inclusive upwards and 
downwards in the social scale (Romero, 1987). But 
we can by no means speak of a ‘movement’ of pobladores, unified around a programme 
and an organization; it was not, for instance, like the labour movement, which in Chile 
was unified and organized in the [National Workers Union], in spite of political divisions 
within the working class. (Castells, 1985a: 201) 
The movement was instead a collection of singular phenomena. Each campamento was 
organised upon the political leadership that promoted and founded it. Unity among 
pobladores and around a central movement was inexistent, except at the moment of 
national political crisis from 1972 to September 1973, when they became a political 
resource for neutralising the opposition to the socialist government as it attempted to 
asphyxiate the national economy. Instead of being instruments for people’s unity, 
pobladores became amplifiers of political fragmentation (Jones, 1994). 
In fact, it was possible to observe then a number of polarised motivations and 
communal agendas that come from the macro-structural affiliation to political parties, to 
the very pragmatic diversity in the occupational structure of the poblaciones and the 
different individual preferences regarding everyday life. The identity of the popular 
sectors was much more defined as a complex, changing and conflicting phenomenon. 
Yet it had a common denominator: a strong unified idea, an operative class-identity of 
‘homeless’ that gave coherence to their demands, and that had been built from the early 
20
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So the popular identity rested on three elements: first, the ideological construction of the 
poblador as a ‘marginal’. This image had been constructed by the elite, the mass media 
and the state mechanisms of education set historically by the Chilean ruling elite from 
its economic dominance and sense of moral superiority (Piña, 1987). The identity of the 
popular sectors was constructed in one way or another from the image of them built by 
the bourgeoisie. Second, a political reason: the leftwing intellectual and political elite 
aimed at engaging with the popular sectors as a way to modify, orientate and co-opt 
them for electoral support. Third, the pobladores’ own everyday experience as socially 
and territorially excluded popular actors was a powerful agent for creating identity 
(Romero, 1987, 2007).  
Therefore the historical experience of pobladores in Santiago was not guided by a 
charismatic leader, but arose at the existence of a proletarian class as a subject, from the 
1960s consciously integrated in a sort of populist
20 pact with the state (Raposo et al., 
2005). Thus by the final stages of the Popular Unity government, there was no 
differentiation between state, social actors, and political system. Social actors were 
constituted through the state, and inversely, the state was defined by a policy of social 
mobilisation and inclusion, as the experience related by the ex chair of the Corporation 
for Urban Improvement (CORMU), Miguel Lawner, quoted in the previous section, 
reveals.  
Artistic creation was also channelled as a driver for invigorating pobladores’ 
consciousness and ‘exporting’ their experience and organisational levels to other forms 
of class struggle. As Finn (2006b: 17) observes for the pioneering La Victoria población: 
Free concerts and plays, sporting events, and community pageants were part of everyday 
life. Artists from around the country came to celebrate and promote the social and cultural 
hope of Chile’s working classes, of which La Victoria was emblematic. [...] The streets of 
La Victoria [were] the stage from which residents both talked back to state power and 
crafted their own meaning of community with the cultural and material resources at hand. 
[...] Victorianos shared their experiential knowledge with other fledgling grassroots 
organizations, and they helped in the planning of several other successful tomas. [...] 
                                                 
20 Populism is understood here as the use of particular socioeconomic advantages for incorporating the 
popular sectors into a system of domination; hence, it is antithetic to popular. The latter aims autonomic 
working class agency whilst the former weakens it (Moulian, 1997). See Appendix 1-Glossary for further 
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Residents were realizing the power of community action and the capacity of people’s 
organizations to create institutional change. They were positioning themselves as makers 
rather than victims of history, and transforming conditions of oppression into resources 
for crafting critical consciousness, collective identity, and political power.  
Being founded as campamento in 1957, in 1960, La Victoria housed around 18,000 
residents, 48 neighbourhood block committees, 40 mothers’ centres, a weekly 
newspaper, and numerous theatre, dance, and musical groups (Ibid). But no matter how 
heterogeneous the experience was and how fragmentary the popular identity could have 
been among the nearly 300 campamentos across Santiago, this identity has certainly 
persisted among residents and grassroots leaders of many of the peri-central 
poblaciones.  
3.5.3. Social organisation of the everyday life in campamentos 
As Castells noted, campamentos were less motivated by a sense of historical revolution 
and more by a strong sense of everyday life. In fact he observed three types of 
consciousness that structured life in campamentos:  
a)  the political, which used the campamento as a launching platform for the 
revolutionary struggle,  
b)  the collective, whose goals depended on the success of the población as a 
community through the collective effort of all its residents, allied to (but also 
supported by) government’s initiatives, and  
c)  the  individual, focused upon the satisfaction of every household’s demands 
through its participation in the life of the población (Castells, 1985a).  
While the first one is structurally-determined, the latter two are clearly within the sphere 
of people’s agency developed more freely. Once a campamento was established, the 
individual level soon acquired more importance than the collective one. The goals 
assumed by every household prevailed over political reasons and strategies of 
collectivisation, transforming urban life into something far more individualistic. In 
many cases, there was a deep gap between the militant leaders of the campamentos and 
the majority of residents. Whilst the former sought a revolutionary political line, for the 126 
latter, the struggle was about access to land, dwellings, services, and the final 
configuration of an average neighbourhood (Klaarhamer, 1989). Also, from the popular 
life of poblaciones emerged several traditional gender contradictions between the 
political and domestic roles of women. In fact, the female pobladora was a subject 
seriously constrained in terms of political participation or social leadership. Women 
were seen either as potential political leaders or housewives, but not both. The domestic 
space also reflected this, since in many campamentos,  
[m]ost houses […] tried to enclose a piece of land, to mark a front yard as a semi-public 
space, while refusing space for common yards. The shack itself was divided between the 
main room, where the man could receive visits, and the kitchen-toilet, the private domain 
of woman. Only the more enlightened leadership tried to make some space available for 
public use, but this practice led to spatial segregation: the shacks of the leaders tended to 
be concentrated towards the centre of the campamento, close to the shack used for public 
purposes. The discrepancy between the level of involvement and consciousness thus 
became expressed in the spatial organization of the settlement. Individualism was even 
more pronounced when the residents were called to decide upon the design of their own 
houses. While asking for architectural diversity (three types of houses were built to fit the 
different sizes of families), they emphasized the desire for a standard design, utterly 
rejecting high-rise buildings. They also asked for the individual connection of each house 
to the water and electricity supply, restated the convenience of individual yards, and 
specified that the conventional domestic equipment, including television sets and 
individual electric appliances, would have to have enough room in the new houses. 
(Castells, 1985a: 203). 
Although it seems clear that peri-central poblaciones in their origin were not a sort of 
micro-society at the margins of the general social organisation, there are several 
elements that until today singularise them as conspicuous and autonomous responses to 
everyday problems, obviously contextualised in their specific realities, material lacks 
and means. According to Castells (1974) and Espinoza (1988), the following 
characteristics were regular in campamentos: 
a)  Justice, vigilance and discipline: a survivalist mechanism organised for facing 
police repression and potential evictions, for night guard and control of drunks 
and intruders. Later, this would become a self sufficient system of prevention of 
delinquency and internal conflict resolution. Although this power laid on the 
moral authority of the leaders or a directive apparatus, it rarely became a power 
force manipulated by the interest of these groups, being much more often a 127 
legitimate and unbiased expression of popular rules that defended values 
considered indispensable for communal survival and punishing societal 
misconducts, such as poor assembly participation, domestic misbehaviour and 
alcoholism. However, the exercise of justice was generally non-repressive, and 
the strongest penalty was the expulsion from the campamento. 
b)  Work and unemployment: In early stages of poblaciones, unemployment rates 
were higher due to the people’s need to defend the land and build their space. 
Unemployment was usually solved through three instances: first, Committees of 
Unemployment helped workers to search for jobs; second, the directive 
management of every campamento  provided remunerated internal jobs as 
watchmen, cleaners, etc.; third, workers brigades were employed in the building 
of houses, operating as construction firms; fourth, women’s committees were 
formed to prepare food for the watchmen, operate health clinics and ensure that 
the internal rules regarding alcohol consumption were enforced. 
c)  Political-administrative dimension: Analogous to the existing Neighbourhood 
Committees, every campamento’s level of independence regarding the state 
varied depending on its level of internal political consciousness. Although health 
care, education and basic infrastructure were issues generally provided by the 
state, the lack of political state support during the dictatorship (1973-1990) made 
that aspects like education and basic service provision became the focus of much 
collective work, as a way to face the shortage and cooptation existing during this 
time.  
3.6. Peri-centre: a synthesis of regulation and social upsurge 
From 1953 to 1973, the Chilean state progressively organised an apparatus for spatial 
planning, building sector subsidisation and social housing production (including 
CORMU, an specialised office aimed at peri-central urban renewal). In spite of its 
evident achievements, this relatively integrated apparatus showed several structural 
limitations for the lack of resources and gigantic housing shortage, generated by the 128 
asynchrony between a limited national productive capacity and a politically elevated 
social demand.  
This asynchrony soon found a safety valve: the urban social movements that seized land 
and self-produced campamentos in order to solve the housing shortage. Although urban 
land seizures had existed since 1953, from 1967 onwards its number would seriously 
increase in Santiago to the extent that there would be campamentos across the whole 
Greater Santiago Metropolitan Area. Yet these enclaves would be more than transitory 
residential spaces. They led to a more permanent pobladores’ identity and collective 
forms of social organisation.  
As the next section examines, the military dictatorship (1973-1990) transformed the 
hitherto complex state apparatus into a market-led mechanism of housing and urban 
production. Most campamentos were also attacked (and many of the residents evicted) 
by the state, yet the pobladores’ world in many ways subsisted and crystallised in what 
today constitutes the peri-centre.  
3.7. Neoliberalism in Santiago, 1973 onwards 
The internal contradictions of the ‘import-substitution’ mode of regulation led to the 
major political crisis of 1973. The Popular Unity coalition suffered internal strains as 
the most leftist sectors demanded faster routes to social transformation. International 
economic boycotts led by the U.S. suffocated the Chilean economy, and opposition 
media campaigns, conservative-led workers strikes and food shortages artificially 
created by speculators fuelled further internal chaos. The military coup
21 of September 
11
th broke almost five decades of democratic life and started 17 years of political 
repression with economic liberalisation in the country (May, 2008; Valdés, 1995). The 
dictatorship’s monetarist experiment was based on the idea, inspired on the School of 
Chicago’s axioms, that a contraction of the money supply would be effective to 
counteract inflation and normalise the economy (Frank, 1976). Main aspects to target by 
                                                 
21 Led by General Augusto Pinochet, hitherto considered as ‘reformist’ and loyal to the UP government 
(Rojas, 1973). 129 
the neoliberal dictatorial regime were the health care system, pensions and education 
(Paley, 2004). Yet, in more specifically ‘urban’ terms, neoliberalisation was the basis 
for a state policy of de-industrialisation, deregulation of the urban sprawl and housing 
production, reinforcement of urban spatial segregation through a specific policy, roll 
back of central state administrative functions (giving regulatory responsibilities to 
municipalities without transferring capacities proportionally) and, more crucially, 
material and cultural fragmentation of the working-class poblaciones. These factors had 
considerable impact on Santiago’s peri-centre, as examined next. 
3.7.1. Peri-central de-industrialisation  
Revealing the internal contradiction of the neoliberal theory that advocates free market 
but relies on state-power shock (Klein, 2007), state mediation was decisive for iron-fist 
applied creative destruction of the productive sectors. From 1975, the economic 
reconfiguration of the country aimed primarily at dismantling the institutional apparatus 
and productive capacity established during the previous economic and political period 
of industrialisation. This aimed at refocusing the country’s production based on a 
rationale of international ‘comparative advantages’ (Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb, 
2002; Ricardo, 1971) seeking to remove as many barriers as possible to international 
trade, the liberalisation of the domestic capital markets and openness to external 
financial markets (Gatica, 1989).  
The consequence was a considerable drop in the share of manufacturing in GDP from 
26.3% in 1960 to 21.6% in 1980, and a fall in manufacturing jobs from 40.7% of the 
national total in 1960 to 16.5% in 1979. The historically important role of manufacture 
meant that the monetarist experiment in Chile would have deep social consequences. In 
the first year of the dictatorship, prices of basic consumer goods rose between 400% and 
500% (whilst wages increased only 67% in average), whereas unemployment rose to 
between 20% and 25% in the whole country (Frank, 1976), mostly due to the loss of 
manufacturing jobs. Since manufacture was located mainly in Santiago, the decline of 
the sector affected considerably the spatial distribution of this activity in the 
metropolitan region. The following table summarises the impact of de-industrialisation 
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Whilst during the government of the Popular Unity, between 40% and 50% of the 
workforce in campamentos belonged to the industrial proletariat (Castells, 1974), during 
the dictatorship, this number had decreased to 20%, whereas workers in the most 
representative  poblaciones were self-employed (35%) or part of the service sector 
(42%). The latter usually implied precarious and informal jobs in the occupational 
structure of the changing economy. Similarly, the level of unemployment in 
campamentos increased from around 18% in 1971, to 35% in 1984 (Klaarhamer, 1989). 
Further substantial changes in the labour market include the dismantling of the legal 
protection to minimum wages set in the previous period, which caused major effects on 
the national labour structure and culminated with a new Labour Code passed in 1979. 
The latter was inspired by criteria of labour market flexibility and liberalisation, and its 
basic provisions have remained in force ever since (De Mattos, 2000). 
 
      1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982 
1 GDP              
   Developing Countries 
(1974=100) 
100.0 102.0 110.2  118.4  126.5 130.6 136.7  136.7 - 
   Latin America (1974=100)  100.0  100.0  107.0  112.0  117.0  126.0  133.0  127.0  - 
   Chile  (1974=100)  100.0 74.5  79.0  85.7  93.7  101.1 107.3  110.1 86.3 
   Chile: Share of Manuf. GDP   25.1  21.5  22.0  21.7  22.0  21.9  21.6  20.9  19.3 
2 Employment              
   Developing Countries 
(1974=100) 
100.0 105.3 113.7  118.9  123.2 126.3 128.4  -  - 
   Latin America (1974=100)  100.0  106.4  109.6  112.8  116.0  119.1  121.3  -  - 
   Chile  (1974=100)  100.0  90.6 83.9  83.4  83.3 82.4 79.0  76.6 63.5 
   Chile: Share of  
Manuf. Employment (%) 
-  17.2 17.0  16.7  16.3 16.5 16.1  15.8 12.7 
3  Number of Bankruptcies              
   Total  28 80 131 224 311  344  415 431  810 
   Manufacturing  9  22 32  62  78 78 82  101  150 
Table 3.2. De-industrialisation indicators for the Chilean manufacturing sector, 1974-1982 
Source: Gatica (1989) 
The hard years of restructuring were followed by a phase of fast national economic 
growth with average annual rates of 6.6% between 1984 and 1989, and 7.4% between 
1990 and 1998. This was also accompanied by a significant increase in total national 
employment. Between 1986 and 1996, more than 1,400,000 jobs were created, as the 
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Figure 3.8. Empty industrial sites in current Santiago’s southern peri-centre  
a) and b) Yarur industry in PAC northern area, definitively abandoned in 1991; c) former industrial plots 
used as warehouse in San Joaquín comuna; d) Zanjón de la Aguada and its bordering abandoned 
industrial plots. Source: photography taken by the author 
total unemployment rate was reduced from 10.4% in 1986 to 5.4% in 1996 (De Mattos, 
2000). However, whilst at the end of the dictatorship the economy of the country saw a 
period of general recovery, the negative effects of the restructuring were felt more 
intensively in the peri-centre of Santiago. A few years after the military coup, every 
peri-central industrial district saw a number of factories closed and their land being 
reconverted into residual uses (mainly warehouses or parking lots). After the national 
a b
c
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manufacturing industrial production had partially recovered by the mid 1980s, a number 
of industries closed or migrated to newer, more advantageous, and dynamic peripheral 
industrial clusters, leaving brownfield areas behind and considerably affecting the 
surrounding neighbourhoods through cycles that have taken place up to the present (see 
CHAPTER 4 for further analysis on this). An effect was a dramatic devaluation and 
‘informalisation’ (Kruijt et al., 2002) of the local workforce in the peri-centre, 
increasing levels of unemployment with consequences for the pauperisation of working 
class households (Chateau and Pozo, 1987; Gatica, 1989). Another example of 
destruction, in fact the continuation of a previous process of decay, was the definitive 
dismantling of the ‘iron belt’ which connected the industrial enclaves surrounding the 
core of Santiago (Thomson and Angerstein, 1997). At the end of the 1970s this circular 
train stopped functioning, leaving up to the present around 1,800 hectares of state-
owned derelict brownfield land
22 that would strongly hinder future possible projects of 
renewal (Rojas, 2004).  
3.7.2. Radical liberalisation of the urban space 
Due to the dismantling of the manufacturing sector and the relatively easy flow of 
international credit in the 1970s, the financial sector saw a big opportunity to invest the 
now formerly industrial idle capital into the property market, because the latter offered 
better rates of return. Key regulatory changes were the abolition of taxes on 
underdeveloped land plots in 1976, lower taxes on land transactions, liquidation of 
CORVI’s reserves of urban land, delivery of property land titles to more than 100,000 
households in Santiago (peri-central residents that had once benefited by the Operación 
Sitio programme but now faced new tax bills) and the eviction of residents from illegal 
campamentos in areas of highest land value (Sabatini and Arenas, 2000). Moreover, 
cadastral property values were reduced in 1975 as a way to face an imminent recession, 
but were not adjusted to market levels during the military regime (Collins and Lear, 
1995), creating an artificially lowered tax environment for the real estate market. 
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However, on top of the abovementioned changes, the capital shift into real estate was 
stimulated by the 1979 repeal of the metropolitan urban perimeter. Based on the 
assumption that this was the cause of the artificial increase in land prices in the already 
declining inner city (due to high levels of demand leading to artificially high land prices) 
the now dominant rationale inspired by neoclassical economics sought the abolition of 
this perimeter as a way of expanding the supply. Theoretically, this should have reduced 
land prices in the inner city, thus making its regeneration comparatively more attractive 
than sprawling development (Massone, 1996). In 1979, 100,000 hectares of agricultural 
land, 2.5 times the size of Santiago at the time, switched from rural-low density to urban 
use through a special law passed in 1979
23 (Poduje, 2006). This law also implied the 
elimination of most of the restrictions to urban expansion contained in the 1960 
metropolitan plan. From then on, the size of the city would be determined only by the 
competing profitability between urban and rural land uses.  
However, if in the past, relentless urban sprawl had been a problem with many causes 
(for instance, the production of CORVI and MINVU considerably expanded the city, as 
examined in section 3.4) this new type of urban growth was more chaotic and caused far 
more urban, environmental and social externalities given the minimal restrictions to 
development, e.g. infrastructure, soil or water flood assessment, networks, amenities 
and so on (Massone, 1996).  
If the free market was imposed as the supposedly most efficient spatial regulatory 
mechanism, its market failures were ignored (i.e. lack of homogeneity, since unlike any 
other market, every piece of land is unique; lack of transparency; uneven concurrence of 
market agents; and extremely high negative externalities; see Daher, 1991). What 
happened was that land prices in the expanding upper-class neighbourhoods did not 
decrease, but grew up to 100% annually until 1981, whilst growth rates in the low-
income peripheries were only slightly lower. However, the overall outcome was the 
increase in the cost of inner city land for low-income housing (Collins and Lear, 1995): 
the ‘social’ city was being expanded in search of low-price land with considerable lack 
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of infrastructure. The city’s total urbanised area therefore grew up from 29,500 hectares 
in 1970 to over 46,000 in 1992
24 (Ferrando, 2008).  
But the chaotic environmental effects of the 1979 policy were so evident, that only 6 
years later a new ‘adjusted urban policy’ was passed, which at least in its discourse 
would reassess a reintegrated urban perimeter every ten years and apply stricter controls 
to its expansion. Yet none of those new regulations were actually fulfilled (Trivelli, 
2006). At the same time, the central and peri-central space of Santiago became derelict 
since the market preferred the much profitable peripheral expansion than inner city 
redevelopment (CED, 1990). As will be seen in CHAPTER 4, the deterioration of built 
environment conditions in the metropolitan core peaked precisely between the 1970s 
and 1980s (Arriagada et al., 2007), and many actions for its reinvigoration were started 
precisely after this period. In sum, whilst the first goal of the neoliberal urban policy – 
to control land prices – was not met, the second one – to invigorate a capital switch into 
the building sector – was a resounding success, even at the high cost of expanding the 
city without any rational criteria. In sum, the peri-centre became comparatively less 
attractive for the privately-led market of urban development, whilst its local economic 
base had been dismantled. 
3.7.3. A free-market housing sector? 
A third necessary condition for securing the switch of formerly industrial idle capital 
into landed circuits of capital was the dismantling of the existing state-built social 
housing apparatus that, among other goals, had targeted the peri-centre as a feasible 
space for urban densification. This dismantling took place from 1975 onwards, and the 
alleged goal was to improve the production of housing via setting up a laissez faire 
market with open access of private realtors and developers. However, the Chilean policy 
rather than reflecting a clear choice of free market, was characterised by hesitation, 
policy contradictions and incremental choices, as a result of the military’s effort to deal 
with its two contradicting overarching goals: radical laissez faire economic growth 
                                                 
24 Some authors argue that between 1979 and 1990 the pace of urban expansion was in fact reduced 
(Galetovic and Jordan, 2006; Petermann, 2006). Whilst quantitatively these authors are right, they 
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versus political and social stabilisation (Kurtz, 1999). Hence surprisingly conflicting 
with the neoliberal orthodoxy that recommended a purely free market with no state 
intervention, the dictatorship continued the sort of tradition of subsidising social 
housing, yet in a market-led way with privatised, much more competitive financial 
systems involved (Gilbert, 2002; Richards, 1995). The regime reinforced the role of the 
central state in the subsidisation of formal ‘solutions’ and its localisation, even at the 
risk of conflicting with policy directives from the World Bank, Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB) and USAID
25.  
Although this new system would have been impossible to accomplish without the whole 
institutional and economic infrastructure that had been developed during the previous 
democratic era, it implied high doses of creative destruction. The Housing Corporation 
(CORVI) was partially dismantled and transferred to the newly created Housing and 
Development Service (Servicio de Vivienda y Urbanización, SERVIU). The 
Corporation for Urban Improvement (CORMU) and all its legal and technical 
attributions aimed at inner city revitalisation disappeared. Both offices were closed 
down in 1976 (Wolff, 2003). The state also stopped subsidising building firms, as it had 
been so far, redirecting subsidies to households instead. In this vein, SERVIU became a 
voucher-provider for families listed according to a ranking system. Beneficiaries would 
be selected according to objective indicators like household size and demonstrated saving 
capacity (Gilbert, 2004). By providing well-targeted subsidies for increasing the 
demand, while introducing financial and social security reforms, the rationale was that 
private agents would stabilise the market in a few years
26.  
However, this privatised housing system took time to take off and it started to reduce the 
housing shortage only from the mid 1990s on, under an elected democratic regime. What 
happened during the 1970s and first half of the 1980s was that the poorest people were 
usually disqualified because unemployed heads of household, often living as allegados, 
                                                 
25 For instance, the IDB strongly advised that Chile should provide ‘sites and services’ as a way to reduce 
the growing deficit, but MINVU insisted to build finished dwellings (shortly after, only first-stage wet-
core units). The military rulers associated self-help construction with callampas and campamentos, hence 
political radicalism (Sugranyes, 2006). 
26 This privatised distributional rationale remained untouched up to 2000, being gradually replaced by the 
more collective distributional rationales of the Fondo Solidario de Vivienda programme. This issue is 
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were unable to save the required minimum to qualify. Between 1979 and 1981 the 
poorest third of the country received less than 24% of these assigned resources for 
housing, while the middle third captured 64% of them. Furthermore, from 1980 to 1982 
over 90% of the vouchers went to the 40% highest-income population. Just after the 
recession of 1983, the government granted a 13% subsidy on the sale of 14,000 high-
priced homes that the private sector was not being able to sell by its own. Chileans in the 
highest 10% income bracket captured 67% of the total housing subsidies granted in 
Santiago in that year, while in 1985, 53% of households shared space with additional 
families, and 41% had 3 or more people per bedroom. By 1990, only in Santiago 
180,000 households lived as allegados, 60% of whom were among the poorest 40% 
(Collins and Lear, 1995). The historical class-biased inequalities of the housing system 
in Santiago were more alive than ever under the new Chilean policy set up in the 1970s.  
If before 1973 people could as a last resort participate in land seizures and 
campamentos, under military rule such choice became too risky. But any help for the 
lowest-income sectors of the population had been already eliminated. The System of 
Savings and Loan Institutions collapsed in 1977 following banking deregulation. In 
1980 the pension system that previously offered low-interest, long-term loans to 
workers (see sub-section 3.4.1, page 103), was almost entirely privatised, whilst private 
lenders prioritised more speculative investments than low-income housing projects. 
Mortgage rates dramatically increased so that more people than ever were unable to 
enter the housing market without government aid (Collins and Lear, 1995). The 
existing housing state apparatus had been dismantled and replaced by a highly 
speculative one. 
As a response to the again rapidly growing housing deficit, Chile threw off the balance 
between quality and quantity, choosing the latter as an alternative (Gilbert, 2004). Even 
though quantitatively the model set up in Chile is a rather unique successful case in 
Latin America that in the long run kept in check the housing shortage in the country 
(Torres, 2008a), seen from the present, the policy seems to have been highly unsuccessful 
in qualitative terms, given the small size of units produced (currently, an average of 32 
m
2), the poor quality of the dwellings provided and, more crucially, the grave 
deficiencies of urban services and amenities in the new peripheral poblaciones (whilst 137 
the hollowing-out peri-centre remained far better serviced and connected) (Rodríguez 
and Sugranyes, 2006b).  
The housing production under neoliberalism accentuated the already existing levels of 
socio-spatial segregation in most Chilean cities, especially Santiago, a cumulative effect 
that would explode in the mid 1990s in several riots and unrest. It also much contributed 
to the expansion of the city and the reproduction of extremely pauperised peripheries, 
plenty of social housing without enough services and amenities (Rodríguez and 
Sugranyes, 2006a; Rodriguez and Winchester, 2001). This affected not only the fringes 
but poor housing estates began to appear in the remaining worst serviced areas of the 
peri-centre. In these enclaves, a collective feeling of stigmatisation and humiliation was 
taking hold, worsened by alienation and anomy
27 (Márquez, 2006).  
There was reluctance by developers to use proactive urban development measures, and 
the need to increase the number of dwellings produced with a given budgetary 
allocation led to reticence in incorporating mitigating urban measures. Since in reality 
no laissez faire existed but a market protected by a continuous flow of state subsidies, 
the capacity of construction or design innovation was reduced. Developers became also 
uncompetitive and projects became speculative, because “large and homogeneous 
concentrations of projects [were located in] zones of urban expansion, where the firms 
that won the bids already owned available land.” (Sugranyes, 2006: 39) The real 
business was to capture land value increases (via rural land annexation), making people 
pay for the land using the state subsidies. In fact, it has been estimated that from 60% to 
100% of the social housing subsidies since then have been directed to pay increases in 
land prices (Smolka and Sabatini, 2000). What the dictatorship installed was a system of 
rapid capitalisation via land rent private accumulation, resulting in uncontrollable urban 
expansion and a gradual decline in the quality of the product delivered. 
Another key form of accelerating capital switching into real estate was to set up 
considerable tax exemptions for private realtors and builders. Laws in 1975 and 1987
28 
                                                 
27 The image of a deprived and stigmatised peripheral space is a powerful reason that the residents of 
Pedro Aguirre Cerda had for struggling against their potential displacement from the peri-centre. This 
point is core in the analysis of CHAPTER 6. 
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gradually established a reduction of 65% VAT for the building sector and all real estate 
operations. These reforms were enthusiastically supported by the National Association 
of Building Firms. The main goal of this legislation was, as the government claimed, to 
promote the activation of a market of social housing construction (Luna, 2006).  
Recent analysts have illustrated how the law of 1987 was a poorly targeted policy. 
Unlike other countries such as Colombia, Argentina or Spain where legal tax reductions 
to the building sector are established on a progressive basis oriented to promote low-
income housing construction (Vásquez et al., 2005), the Chilean tax exemption was for 
all ‘affordable’ dwelling
29. Thus the benefit covered from small and poorly executed 
dwellings to upper-income residences and holiday second properties, and even 
properties used with productive purposes disguised as residential dwellings (Herman, 
2007b, 2008a). As the VAT reduction is fixed for all units, recent analysers have 
detected that exemptions to upper-income properties can be 14 times bigger than to the 
lowest-income ones. By 2005, the VAT reduction to builders and developers reached a 
total of around US $ 290 million annually, around 75% of the total fund spent by the 
Ministry of Housing and Planning (MINVU) for subsidising social and ‘affordable’ 
housing (vivienda económica) or the equivalent to more than 16,000 new affordable 
dwellings priced in 500 UF, built every year (Astaburuaga, 2005).  
According to the National Association of Building Firms, this VAT reduction helps 
boost the market and contain prices of low- and middle-income sectors, as otherwise 
market products might become unaffordable. For the last 35 years, one of the main roles 
of this association has been lobbying the state institutions, both executive and legislative 
powers, whereas its lobbying power has not decreased whatsoever from dictatorial to 
democratic times (Ruiz and Zambra, 2008). Evidence on this is revealed by Diputado 
(MP) Álvaro Escobar, a member of the Parliament’s Housing and Urban Development 
Committee, who recalls his own experience on how the Association’s forms of lobbying 
and pressuring the parliament are rampant. 
                                                 
29 Since the DFL2 Law of 1959, affordable dwellings are those under 140 m
2 (see sub-section 3.4.1). The 
term ‘affordable’ is paradoxical, given that most of this housing is unaffordable by important social 
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There is a project that hasn’t being possible to pass in the Parliament, which is the 
elimination of the devolution of the 65% of these firms’ VAT. This benefit was 
implemented at some historical moment to boost building activity […] Yet the 
inconsistency between the position of some Concertación
30 MPs regarding tax issues and 
their claim for adjustments towards a more equitable income redistribution don’t fit well 
with their position at the time of eliminating this [abovementioned 65%] exemption. 
[Furthermore] the first thing I received in the Housing and Urban Development 
Committee, starting our first session in 2006 [… was] a yearbook from the Association of 
Building Firms, put by somebody on our oval table… OK, we all drink Coca Cola and 
Nescafe when we are in these meetings, with no shame. But when you, as a member of 
the national legislative power, receive an Association’s yearbook… Excuse me? I would 
have preferred to have received the list of the pending issues left from the previous 
legislative period [2002-2006] which we obviously received later… but we had a 
yearbook from them on everyone’s place […] I remember one of us said, quite timidly, 
trying to not to be too touchy: Is it normal to receive this kind of material here in the 
national Congress? I’m telling you: in the Congress we have defenders of the Association 
of Building Firms, and that’s a fact. (Interviewed on 5 April 2007) 
3.7.4. Reinforcing socio-spatial segregation and polarisation 
The military regime also fiercely fought against campamentos, especially evicting 
pobladores from the eastern upper-income comunas. If in the past CORVI had moved 
campamentos  from hazardous land sites and transferred their inhabitants into new 
estates (Aguirre and Rabi, 1998), under Pinochet’s rules, relocation would be done to 
distant, under-serviced peripheries. Although the reason argued was that state social 
policies and projects for these people would work better if they were homogeneously 
located in the city, a more plausible explanation is that these campamentos depreciated 
land in the upper-income areas, reducing the chances for ground rent increase and its 
forms of accumulation (Lawner, 2008) while being also potential nests of political 
violence (Morales and Rojas, 1987). Moreover, once evictions were conducted many 
empty sites were left in those areas, becoming the sites of important developments 
benefiting private investors and the local municipalities (Hidalgo, 2005).  
                                                 
30 Christian-Social Democratic political coalition in government since 1990 onwards. See Appendix 1-
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In 1979 there were 294 campamentos  inhabited by 44,789 households, i.e. around 
223,957 people, living in the upper-class comunas of Las Condes, Santiago and 
Vitacura (see Figure 3.4, page 110). From 1979 to 1986 around 28,500 households, 
some 120,000 people, were removed and relocated to the urban peripheries, especially 
the southern and western ones (Hidalgo, 1999). Preferred locations were Puente Alto, 
La Granja and La Pintana comunas (Kusnetzoff, 1987), some of these areas where low-
income people lived, although many other comunas were also receivers (see Figure 3.9). 
Yet these violent evictions targeted not only irregular campamentos  but also 
consolidated neighbourhoods previously produced by Operación Sitio or even well built 
CORMU estates.  
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An especially crude case of this was Villa San Luis (addressed in sub-section 3.4.4) in 
Las Condes comuna, whose residents received an eviction letter from SERVIU 
followed by the actual eviction a few days later. The luckiest ones were reallocated in 
distant state-built poblaciones
32, but others were simply left out in the middle of 
nowhere, in rural areas. On the night of the eviction,  
around 500 policemen were in charge of removing these people. […] 20 families were 
left in a football field about the Bus Stop N° 37 of Santa Rosa Avenue [to the south], 
eight families were abandoned in some place on the route to San José de Maipo [south-
east suburb], four were left in a landfill near Lo Curro [far east], about 80 other families 
were left in Renca [north]. (Lawner, 2007: 9-10; my translation from original in Spanish)  
Villa San Luis’ residents were replaced by armed forces staff and their families. Since 
1997, the estate was the subject of new-build gentrification and the blocks demolished. 
Currently the site boasts luxury, high-storey buildings (Cociña, 2008). 
Although the prospective of upgrading to better-quality dwellings seemed attractive to 
some pobladores, soon they would experience a series of effects such as weakening of 
their previous social networks and the fragmentation of their so far very vibrant popular 
organisations, ties of community and solidarity, which had taken root in their original 
campamentos or estates. The receiving comunas were inversely poorly serviced and 
gradually more pauperised by the massive entry of these newcomers (Collins and Lear, 
1995). Evictions represented a breakdown in family life, destroying also local business, 
labour and leisure interwoven throughout the years, also pressuring public transport 
systems since they increased the number of people living in the periphery, far from their 
places of work or education (Lawner, 2008). The new poblaciones accentuated the 
already excessive urban land sprawl in the period 1979-1984, reaching an approximate 
figure of 1,200 hectares annually, exacerbating also a series environmental problems 
like loss of natural soil and increase of geophysical hazards (Hidalgo, 1999).  
The alleged reason for evictions was to create socially homogeneous comunas, toward 
which the national social policy would work much more efficiently than toward 
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building socially mixed spaces, because homogeneity would allow the state to target 
public resources exactly to the social sectors with highest needs (Gilbert, 1993, 2002). 
In consequence, a policy of municipalisation was enforced with this aim. However, the 
results in the most deprived spaces were far from those expected by the regime. 
3.7.5. Rolling back, rolling out the (urban) state  
A law in 1981
33 subdivided the metropolis from 16 into 32 comunas. The aim was to 
create units of ‘social homogeneity’ so the government would be able to better target 
public services. Yet from then on, municipalities had to rely primarily on their own tax 
base for resources, with the result that in poorest areas the newly independent 
municipalities had to administer their own poverty, with little or no cross-subsidy from 
the richer ones (Collins and Lear, 1995). The municipal autonomy was also enforced at 
the cost of very often competing, contradicting, or even overlapping between 
jurisdictions. The less affluent municipalities presented less advantages and this created 
a considerable impact in the peri-centre. 
Large and at the moment socially mixed comunas like Las Condes, Ñuñoa, Santiago 
and San Miguel were fragmented into smaller, socially homogeneous spatial units. 
Soon many peri-central newly created municipalities saw themselves with increasing 
rates of social deprivation, and even were receivers of additional evicted households. 
Pedro Aguirre Cerda comuna would start to exist officially in 1991 as a patchwork 
made of the poorly serviced quarters of Santiago, San Miguel and La Cisterna (see 
Appendix 10). By 2001, the difference in per capita municipal budget between the 
richest and poorest boroughs of Santiago was 10 times, while in 1990 it had been seven 
times (Rodriguez and Winchester, 2001). In nine relocated poblaciones built in Puente 
Alto that housed around 13,000 people, there were no schools, a situation similar to La 
Granja, La Pintana and San Bernardo comunas. Regarding public health care, in most of 
the newly created comunas there was one health care centre for every 100,000 people 
(Morales and Rojas, 1987) while the national rate of public health care centres 
(considering doctor surgeries and rural health clinics) was one per nearly 10,000 people 
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in 1986 (INE-CEPAL, 2005; Miranda, 1990). These two data alone reveal the deep 
fragility of the reconfigured socio-spatial structure created by the dictatorship. 
The lack of either regional or metropolitan coordinated government has led to a state of 
competition among these deprived municipalities, especially the peripheral ones, in 
terms of attracting projects or private property investment for improving their local 
infrastructure, but sometimes at a high environmental cost.  
A second form of downscaling took place in the public housing apparatus. The regime 
dissolved the previous state corporations CORVI and CORMU, among others, merging 
them into the Housing and Development Service (SERVIU). The public housing 
corporations were regionalised and the System of Savings and Loan Institutions, the 
centralised public fund for saving and housing credits, was dismantled in 1977. What 
replaced these institutions was a twofold programme aimed at producing: a) ‘basic 
housing’ and b) ‘site and services’ complemented by variable subsidies to ‘completed 
dwellings’. In general, both programmes implied a dramatic reduction of the size and 
quality of the ‘dwelling solutions’ delivered (Kusnetzoff, 1987). In 1975 MINVU’s 
structure was completely reformulated (its current structure comes form that time, the 
longest-lasting in the history of the Chilean housing sector). Functions like 
programming, planning and controlling were transferred to the regional offices (Hidalgo, 
2005; MINVU, 2004). 
3.7.6. The obliteration of the peri-central working-class culture  
Control over the working-class world was exerted by dismantling grassroots’ 
organisations, with many of their leaders taken prisoner and subsequently ‘disappeared’ 
(i.e. illegally executed in secret) or sent on exile, whilst new Neighbourhood Committee 
directors were directly appointed by the executive. This aimed at exerting total control 
over the pobladores. Police and military attack on the spaces of the pobladores took 
place only during specific moments of weakest dictatorial political power, just after the 
coup and during the 1982-1984 political crisis triggered by the national economic 
recession (Lawner, 1984). Many poblaciones still remember people who were or went 144 
missing. La Victoria, one of the most emblematic peri-central poblaciones, located in 
PAC, stores vivid memories of the dictatorship: 
The symbolic power of La Victoria needed to be crushed, the meaning of poblador 
denigrated, and the hope of [the Chilean Way to Socialism] extinguished. Raids, arrests, 
tanks, tear gas, and fear became part of everyday life. Residents of La Victoria were 
among those detained, tortured, “disappeared,” and executed as the military regime 
sought to instill its power over the populace through a systematic campaign of force and 
fear. Residents were routinely subjected to raids and searches. Through these campaigns 
of terror the state sought to tear apart the fabric of community and solidarity that had 
defined La Victoria, and to replace it with distrust, betrayal, and anomie. Many residents 
recall the terrible fear and isolation that overcame them as the power of state violence 
took root. They struggled to give meaning to this context of violence and uncertainty. 
(Finn, 2006b: 18-9) 
In many ways, this situation contributed to the emergence of strategies of material and 
psychological forms of resistance against oppression. During the dictatorship the 
pobladores were also a key social capital for the institutional democratic reconstruction 
led by a political elite (Salazar and Pinto, 1999a). Several forms of communal life were 
developed for distributing food and jobs in times of scarcity, widespread unemployment 
or state police-military attack, to the extent that more than 700 grassroots organisation 
encompassing 120,000 inhabitants were accounted in 1984 only in Santiago (Chateau 
and Pozo, 1987). Another form of resistance was the development of poblaciones’ 
internal democracy, as a way to contest local authorities imposed by the authoritarian 
regime (Finn, 2006a). These strategies worked in the cities and not in the countryside 
due to the conspicuous spatial configuration of these enclaves, namely: proximity, high 
density and their relative ‘ghetto’ characteristics (Skewes, 2006).  
However, a more constant and programmed form of erasure of the working-class culture 
took place during the whole period (Piña, 1987), largely based on an individualist 
economic rationale firmly opposed to the previous historical forms of collectivised 
demands reproduced across campamentos  (Silva, 1991). This was related to the 
constitution of a ‘new poverty’ (Katzman, 2003b; Roberts, 2004; Tironi, 2003), or a 
‘market citizenship’ which is more satisfied with material assets but has lost relevant 
social assets such as organisational capacity and social networks.  145 
The ‘new poverty’ in Chile has been much the product of the neoliberal 
individualisation of the housing system, the spatial configuration created in the new 
state-built  poblaciones, and the radical attempt to commodify the collective life. 
Citizens were being conceived from then on as “‘enterprising’ agents, consumers and 
producers, whose aim [was] to maximize their quality of life as individuals within small 
communities, for example, neighbourhoods, schools, or health clinics, […] 
responsible—through their own individual choices for themselves.” (Schild, 2000: 276) 
But the construction of this new, more materialistic poverty relied on the traditions of 
popular activism that stretched back to the early 1960s, including strong women’s 
organisational experiences and community work, in addition to the practices and 
discourses of popular participation which came to be central in the socialist period, and 
which were preserved and developed further during the dictatorship (Schild, 2000).  
The formalisation and entitlement of the poor should not be disregarded as a form of 
cooptation. In the 1970s, many low-income informal settlements started to be 
regularised and their pobladores turned into debtors. Conversely, those who could not 
afford formal dwellings (or access to public subsidies for it) had to find a solution in the 
interstices of the formal sector, either as allegados or in the rental market (Gilbert, 1993, 
1996), thus separating those who could be part of the system, hence stay in their original 
enclaves, and those who could not, transforming the right to the city into a matter of 
purchasing power. All in all, the neoliberal housing system much contributed to the 
higher levels of urban land entitlement. Currently, in PAC above 70% of the housing 
stock has no debt (SGA-IBERSIS, 2000), which is a high number even for a country 
where its rate of urban home-ownership, around 76%, is high in Latin America 
(MINVU, 2008a). 
But historical events are dialectical. Although on the one hand the issuing of land titles 
in poblaciones might have contributed to feelings of individualisation and dissolution of 
cultural collective senses, on the other it contributed to totally reshape the dimensions of 
the political struggle for the future. As will be seen in chapters 5 to 7, the struggle about 
the Master Plan rezoning in PAC was conducted within strictly legal terms, being a 
matter of homeowners for who the most defended right was not only the use value of 
the land, but also to keep the exchange value of their capitalised land rent. 146 
3.8. Chapter Conclusions 
The present chapter observed how the modernising and industrialising mode of 
regulation developed from the 1930s to 1973 in Chile lay at the basis of the production 
of the current peri-centre of Santiago. This social-economic system had the capacity of 
creating peri-central industrial environments, modelling a technocratic state housing and 
planning apparatus with the capacity of renewing an important part of the dilapidated 
inner city, and creating a working class consciousness that empowered and mobilised 
the unmet social demand for shelter. However, deep class contradictions are observed in 
this history, both in the class exploitative and speculative origins of the land and 
housing markets in the peri-centre until the 1960s, and in the way the bourgeoisie faced 
the emergence of the mobilised poor in the city space. The radical attack on the space of 
the pobladores by the dictatorship (1973-1990) is just another manifestation of this kind 
of class-confrontation.  
Another important aspect to note is the historically limited capacity shown by the 
democratic pre-dictatorship state to control urban speculation and inflation, both factors 
that excessively appreciated urban land and dwellings’ prices. Whereas class 
speculation was a historical continuum, the effects of inflation were more relevant for 
the housing policy by the final phase of the Chilean import-substitution mode of 
regulation. This created a Gordian knot from where the only solution seen as possible 
by the masses was to undertake land seizures, because they found themselves with no 
access to the formal housing system. However, the urban social movements would not 
only occupy the peri-central space and consolidate many of their poblaciones, but also 
generate a permanent popular identity related to this space, which still exists up to the 
present in many poblaciones. This is observed in chapters 6 and 7 as an important social 
asset for political struggle. 
The radical economic liberalisation of Chile was all-embracing and long-lasting. Facing 
the historical contradiction between national economic capacity and housing supply, the 
dictatorship resolved it at the cost of lowering dramatically the quality of the housing 
and space produced, hence configuring a pauperised peripheral space which would 
contrast with the far better socially and infrastructurally consolidated peri-centre. But at 
the same time, the inner city was being de-industrialised and its collective ways of life 147 
dissolved by newer market-based, individualistic forms of urban living. From 1979 on, 
urban sprawl accelerated and a number of new residential and productive units would 
spread to the periphery, connected by new rapid and increasingly privatised 
infrastructure passing through peri-central spaces. ‘New peripheries’ (Dematteis, 1998; 
Monclús, 1998) and ‘expanded metropolisation’ (De Mattos, 2001) are just two of the 
new categories to describe this new ‘geography of opportunities’ that paradoxically 
benefited only the most affluent (Sabatini and Wormald, 2004). 
The economic, social and political effects of the transition from the period of import-
substitution industrialisation to neoliberalism represent a clear stage in the historical 
process of economic-led creative destruction of the inner city of Santiago, and this 
considerably shaped the current peri-central space. Inherited from this process are:  
a)  The high levels of spatial fragmentation of plots, urban density, building heights 
and relatively homogeneous land use in the poblaciones,  created as 
campamentos or by the Operación Sitio programme.  
b)  The high rates of land ownership shown by today’s pobladores, in stark contrast 
with the newer or renovated spaces in the periphery and renewing central areas. 
As CHAPTER 4 analyses, this can be seen as a form of urban consolidation. 
c)  A historically high use value, as a densely occupied and multifunctional 
residential-working space.  
d)  The high levels of participation and mobilisation currently shown by the peri-
central neighbourhoods, even despite their also higher current levels of social 
anomie, crime and drug dealing (compared with their historical past). 
e)  Consciousness about the right to the place politically conquered by class 
mobilisation, and legitimised by the state in two different ways: first, by 
regularisation via the Operación Sitio programme, second, by land titles legally 
issued during the dictatorship.  
Today’s  pobladores exert their right paradoxically in two ways: both as socially 
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landowners concerned with the quality of their properties and their capitalised ground 
rent. This is closely related to the fact that, seen from the residents’ perspective, the 
historical social and economic life of campamentos, although materially precarious, had 
considerable advantages to the re-localised settlements in the periphery built by the 
dictatorship or even subsequent democratic governments (Gilbert, 2007; Rodríguez and 
Sugranyes, 2006a). Aspects like centrality, invigorated social networks, historic and 
symbolic assets could not be simply eliminated with the transit from a type of society to 
another (Skewes, 2006) but still represent important social assets for its current 
pobladores (Schild, 2000). These issues, among others, are the core of the analysis in 
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CHAPTER 4. The current peri-centre and the two 
entrepreneurial strategies for its renewal, 1990-2005 
4.1. Introduction 
As the previous chapter showed, the historical production of Santiago’s peri-centre is 
based on four main ‘forces’, namely import-substitution industrialisation, class-
monopoly ground rent accumulation, urban and housing state apparatuses and urban 
social movements. Most of the space was developed during a period of almost four 
decades of state-led national economic and social modernisation. The present chapter 
completes this picture by dealing with more recent spatial-socio-economic processes. 
Patterns of demographic hollowing out, segregation, uneven development and physical 
decay are observed as effects of the contradiction between a relatively precarious peri-
central urban fabric and the economic liberalisation unleashed since the 1970s and 
continued with more refined state regulation up to the present.  
This chapter also shows that decay and deprivation in Santiago’s inner city are 
concentrated only in particular western and northern peri-central quarters, whilst many 
other peri-central areas (especially in the south) are still well functioning. This fact 
contrasts with a generalised idea, in the public sector, about the peri-centre as a 
generally derelict urban space and subject of the strategies of widespread market-led 
urban renewal that have taken place since 1990. Yet in fact, the idea of reshaping the 
inner city of Santiago is not new. As CHAPTER 3 illustrated, this was an important urban 
development goal in the 1930s and was also a key issue for the 1960 Greater Santiago 
Master Plan (PRIS). More recent strategies for peri-central renewal were the 
Corporation for Urban Improvement (CORMU)’s performance until 1975, and later the 
Plan for renewal of Santiago’s downtown deployed from the late 1970s to the early 
1980s. CORMU’s operation brought back thousands of middle-income residents to live 
in newly built, high-density modern estates, whilst the much more specific strategy 
commanded from Santiago-Centre municipality during the early 1980s targeted the 
revitalisation of the most valued downtown quarters (Bähr and Riesco, 1981; 
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In 1990, when democracy had just returned to the country, the strategy of the Ministry 
of Housing and Planning (MINVU) would both be more comprehensive and place the 
renewal of centre and peri-centre as a response to population losses, not only in 
Santiago but also in the largest cities of the country. This strategy also aimed at 
recovering urban areas of Santiago, especially in the west of Santiago-Centre comuna, 
one of the most damaged areas of the city by the earthquake of 1985. The state’s goal 
was, and still is, to provide affordable housing for middle-income people in improved 
central locations whilst seeking to counteract the negative effects of metropolitan sprawl, 
including inner city’s depopulation (Galilea, 2006a). In the specific case of the peri-
centre, the Urban Renewal Subsidy (URS) and Ciudad-Parque Bicentenario (CPB), a 
large urban project located in the south-western peri-centre, would be driven towards 
these objectives. These public endeavours come from different technical rationales and 
have produced dissimilar outcomes, but, as chapters 5 and 7 will examine, both are 
factors that considerably increase local potential ground rents (PGR) if they act together 
with ad hoc national and local urban regulations. And as will be also outlined in 
CHAPTER 6, both factors were key issues during the struggle for the rezoning of PAC 
local Master Plan, between 2003 and 2005. 
4.2. The current peri-centre of Santiago: an overview 
The present section outlines general characteristics of Santiago’s peri-centre, such as its 
demographic evolution between 1992 and 2002 and the general socio-economic 
characteristics of its population. The conclusion is that the peri-centre is a differentiable 
area within the metropolis, and an urban space which is more consolidated than the 
periphery. It is also demonstrated here that peri-central urban decay concentrates only in 
specific zones. The latter contradicts mainstream discourses about the peri-centre as a 
generally dilapidated area, hence subject to the existing broad scale, laissez faire 
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4.2.1. Uneven demographic growth and peri-central hollowing out 
Following a common pattern of Latin American cities, from late 19
th century to the 
1970s, Santiago's population grew due to rural-urban migration. This growth intensified 
in the mid 20
th century from over 1.2 million in 1940 to more than 3.1 million in 1970 
to almost 5.3 million in 1992, reaching 6.293 million people in 2002 (INE, 2002), 
around 36% of the national population, 10 percent points higher than in 1950. The latter 
reveals the intense process of urban development that took place during the second half 
of the 20
th century. In this period, Santiago increased its urban primacy from 2.4 to 2.9 
between 1950 and 1990 (Villa and Rodríguez, 1996). Despite in the last two decades 
Santiago’s demographic growth has tended to stabilise around a 1.3 % per year with 
almost inexistent rural-urban immigration (Trivelli, 2000), the city continues to expand 
at around 1,500 hectares a year (Ortiz and Escolano, 2005). It seems evident that the 
low demographic growth cannot explain this fast territorial expansion, but more crucial 
factors are a widespread low-density housing market that profits from ground rent 
increases in recently urbanised peripheral land, and a process of inner city hollowing out 
which took place from mid 1970s (Sabatini, 2000). In sum, low density residential 
expansion and internal centrifugal migrations are the two main causes for the physical 
expansion of Santiago.  
Between 1940 and 1992, whilst the metropolis grew from 952,000 to 4.7 million, 
Santiago-Centre  comuna’s  population levelled off from 444,000 to 230,000 people 
(Ortiz and Morales, 2002). Figure 4.1 shows how from the 1960s the growth of Greater 
Santiago’s population speeded up in parallel with continuous losses in the metropolitan 
core. The demographic weight of the inner city therefore decreased. In 1970, 42% of the 
city’s population lived in the centre and its ten surrounding peri-central comunas, but in 
1992 these spaces hosted only 26% of the total. Conversely, increases in peripheral 
Maipú, San Bernardo, Puente Alto, La Florida and Peñalolén reached 400% for the 
same period, hosting 68% of Santiago’s regional population by the year 2002 (Fischer 
et al., 2003). Furthermore, almost 50% of the dwellings built in Santiago between 1990 
and 1998 were concentrated in Las Condes, Santiago-Centre, Puente Alto and Maipú, 
and 90% only in the 15 predominantly peripheral comunas. In practically all peri-central 
areas instead, almost no new dwellings were built for this period (López, 2004).  152 
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Figure 4.2 shows in a different way how the most peripheral districts (including those of 
the eastern affluent Barrio Alto) have intensively increased their population as the inner 153 
city census districts
1 experienced the greatest losses. In Santiago-Centre comuna, only 
four of its 29 census districts show minor growth, and nine are stable or slightly lose 
population, being also the districts of more concentrated urban renewal yet not the only 
ones where the market of urban renewal has been operating. Further major losses are 
appreciable in practically all the districts inside the URSA, showing marked or very 
marked rates of de-population (even down to -50%) between 1992 and 2002 censuses.  
 
Figure 4.2. Santiago 
population growth in 
census districts, 
percent variations, 
1992 – 2002 
Source: own 
elaboration based on 
INE (1992, 2002) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1  Census districts are spatial units used for census purposes, smaller than comunas. Santiago-Centre 
comprises 29 districts, PAC comprises eight, San Miguel comprises seven, and Cerrillos comprises four 
(INE, 2002). 154 
The specific case of Pedro Aguirre Cerda (PAC) comuna  is interesting because its 
western neighbourhoods (predominantly self-help buildings and more overcrowded) are 
losing more population than the eastern ones. In Cerrillos, due to the recent intense 
agglomeration of low-income social housing especially into its northern districts these 
show slightly positive rates, whilst the rest show very negative indices. Out of the peri-
centre, even the relatively affluent Ñuñoa comuna  shows considerable losses in its 
southern districts.  
Within the three comunas of the south western peri-centre (see Appendix 2), there is 
only one district (apart from Cerrillos) that shows inter-census gains: El Llano 
neighbourhood, in San Miguel. With high probability, this is a positive effect of the 
intense concentration of subsidised new-build renewal that has taken place since 1992 
that contrasts with the rest of the districts in the comuna, in which the URS has not 
overturned their demographic negative trends.  
In more recent peri-central hotspots such as Bellavista (in Recoleta comuna), Lo Ovalle 
and Salesianos (in southern San Miguel comuna) and Estación Central comuna 
(Arriagada et al., 2007), processes of ‘renewal without repopulation’ are similar to those 
observed in Santiago-Centre. In general, there seems to be an increase in the number of 
new units produced there with no considerably improvement in their demographic 
losses, as will be analysed in section 4.3 below. However, seen at local scale, these 
demographic losses are very complex phenomena. The following characteristics are 
identified as their most plausible causes:  
1.  Out-migrants from the peri-centre are mostly young low-income households that 
move to the periphery. People look for public-subsidised social ‘housing 
solutions’ or affordable dwellings built by the private market instead of central 
or peri-central urban renewal flats, because the latter are comparatively more 
expensive. This is substantiated by the fact that young households with several 
children are usually out of the waiting lists of the Ministry of Housing and 
Planning (MINVU) for Urban Renewal Subsidy (Cadiz, 2007). The peripheral 
housing is affordable precisely because of the lower land values in the fringes, 
yet locations are usually disadvantaged and have fewer amenities.  155 
2.  Out-migrations are motivated by new families’ aspirations to independency, but 
also by the incapacity of the peri-central smaller plots (and its usually 
dilapidated houses) to host dwelling expansion. Current existing public 
programmes for in situ rehabilitation and dwelling extension (e.g. Fondo 
Solidario de Vivienda, see CHAPTER 7) have not worked well especially in the 
southern peri-centre. Half of this is the result of tight national building 
regulations; the other half is due to municipal agency. CHAPTER 7 centres the 
analysis on this. 
3.  In numbers of cases, migrants return to the peri-centre to live in overcrowded 
but better located dwellings, giving up the higher distance costs experienced in 
the periphery. The rate of allegados
2 and residential overcrowding are higher in 
the peri-centre. The final part of this section illustrates this point.  
4.2.2. Socio-Economic Group (SEG) in Santiago and the peri-centre 
Breaking with traditional patterns of sectoral socio-economic distribution (Bähr and 
Riesco, 1981; Griffin and Ford, 1980), in the last 20 years or so, several peripheral low-
income districts have been showing a broader range of different Socio-Economic 
Groups (SEG)
 3 (Castro and López, 2005), as shown in Figure 4.3-A. Sabatini et al. 
(2001) claim this might reveal a reduction in the traditional (high) scale of segregation 
in Santiago, hence the emergence of more integrated peripheral social spaces
4. What 
seems clear is that urban sprawl in Santiago has been more and more associated with 
numbers of differentiated spatial units connected by new rapid (and increasingly 
                                                 
2 Allegado  is a person or household who inhabits in someone else’s house or backyard patio. See 
Appendix 1-Glossary for further definition. 
3  SEG is a statistical classification used for market research in Chile that groups population in five 
categories, based on two variables: 1) level of education of the head of the household, and 2) tenancy of 
assets (from a maximum of ten). From higher to lower, GSE groups are: ABC1, C2, C3, D and E. They 
are usually associated to ranges of income level, having also great correspondence with socio-spatial 
distribution in Chilean cities. ABC1 corresponds to the top 11.3% of Greater Santiago’s population, C2 is 
20.1%, C3 is 25.3%, D is 34.5% and E is 8.5% (ADIMARK, 2000, 2004).  
4 This conclusion has been contested by Ortiz and Escolano (2005), because it might be mechanically 
associating ‘proximity’ with ‘social integration’. 156 
privatised) infrastructure. A new pattern of development locates upper- or middle-
income households in traditionally rural and/or low-income spaces and distributes trade 
and/or service centres, and new industrial clusters across the whole city. Examples of 
this are La Florida, Ñuñoa, Peñalolén, Huechuraba and Lo Barnechea comunas, which 
in 15 years have considerably increased their average income of households and land 
values. Their closeness to the traditional upper-income comunas of the eastern Barrio 
Alto is a possible explanation for these increases (Fischer et al., 2003). An opposite 
example is Puente Alto comuna, which between 1992 and 2002 doubled its population 
from roughly 250,000 to 500,000 whilst reducing its average household’s income 
roughly from US $ 1,300 to US $ 1,000 a month, due to the concentration of lowest-
income social housing there.  
Figure 4.3-B shows these percentage variations, from the index of SEG contained in the 
1992 and 2002 census data. The Barrio Alto is the most static macro zone of the city in 
terms of socio-economic variations, because it has been traditionally relatively affluent, 
whilst the most peripheral districts of the North and South reach even 120%, of increase 
in their socio-economic indices. This means they have jumped in average upward in two 
or more SEG levels, only in ten years. In contrast, as seen in CHAPTER 3, historically, 
most of the peri-central areas have been middle-low-income and low-income 
neighbourhood since their creation. Figure 4.3-A shows the predominance of the two 
lowest indices of socioeconomic-group in three large peri-central and peripheral zones 
in the north, south-west and south of the metropolis. The figure also shows a clear 
concentration of low-income population in Pedro Aguirre Cerda (PAC) and Cerrillos 
comunas (the large site of the former airport does not count, since it has no residents), 
whilst San Miguel presents relatively higher socio-economic levels.  
In terms of percentage variation of SEG
5  between 1992 and 2002, the peri-centre   
has comparatively been more static than the periphery, and kept its traditionally low 
income population. In fact, it is very likely that the shifts in socio-economic indices 
(between 25% and 45%) that, as Figure 4.3-B shows, occur in large sections of the peri- 
 
                                                 
5 Census population data (INE, 1992, 2002) includes an index of socio economic group (from 1 to 5) 
which can be assimilated to Socio-Economic Group (SEG). See Appendix 2 for additional analysis of 
SEG by macro-zones in Greater Santiago. 157 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3. Socio-Economic Group (SEG) in Santiago, by census district, 1992-2002 
Source: own elaboration based on INE (1992, 2002) 158 
centre are due to an increase in the general SEG and household income in the country 
and city (INE, 2006). Most of the still non-renovated peri-central districts have not 
shown analogous reduction in the scale of segregation but instead they also maintain 
their historical levels of social homogeneity. This means: no new or very few upper-
income residents are coming to live in these areas, no new middle-class estates have 
been built either. In contrast, San Miguel, and part of Recoleta and Independencia 
comunas reveal the relatively higher average income level of their population.  
Both figures show quite well the particularly segregated structure of Santiago. The 
concentration of the well-off in the centre-east cone is visible, whilst the lowest socio-
economic groups are far more concentrated in the north, west and southern macro areas. 
Also, some upper-income enclaves are distributed in districts in San Miguel, Recoleta 
and Quinta Normal comunas, possibly as result of gradual gentrification due to high 
density renovation subsidised by URS.  
At any rate, Santiago’s geographical structure seems to be reflecting two parallel forms 
of growth: one based on geographical micro-scales of diverse social proximity (in the 
fringes and selected renewing inner city areas), the other composed by large areas of 
similar social conditions, similar to the functional large-sectors models used to describe 
urban forms in the 1980s (Bähr and Riesco, 1981; Griffin and Ford, 1980), analysed in 
CHAPTER 2. The latter is especially appreciable in Figure 4.3-A, in vast zones of the 
peri-centre. This spatial distribution in homogeneous ‘macro-zones’ can be seen in more 
detail in Appendix 2. 
4.2.3. Aging population or neighbourhood consolidation? 
The current Santiago’s peri-centre is usually associated with higher concentrations of 
aging population. In the public discourse, this is seen as a sign of urban decay especially 
when this happen in former industrial neighbourhoods, self-help built or state-built 
poblaciones. It has also already been observed in sub-section 4.2.1 that younger families 
with children leave the peri-centre and their aging kinsmen to move to peripheral 
locations (some eventually return, however).  159 
Yet, when analysed at census district level, the situation becomes less clear. Figure 4.4-
A shows how aging population does not concentrate in the whole peri-central area but 
paradoxically it agglomerates intensively in certain districts, precisely those under 
recent and intense processes of urban renewal, like Recoleta and visibly San Miguel
6. 
Furthermore, in the last decade, relatively aging and affluent people have tended to 
concentrate in the most traditional neighbourhoods of the eastern well-off Barrio Alto.  
The districts in PAC comuna, although not among the ‘youngest’ in the metropolis, 
surprisingly show much younger average composition than most of the rest in the 
metropolis. The same happens in Cerrillos, San Joaquín and especially Lo Espejo. The 
cause of this relatively younger-than-expected average population might be again the 
higher number of young allegados households with children, that remain or return to the 
peri-centre. But even if there were relatively more aging population in peri-central 
neighbourhoods  like PAC’s, this concentration would not necessarily imply decay. 
When considered together with the concentration of properties where loans have been 
fully repaid (Figure 4.4-B) and the rate of local residents born in the same comuna 
(shares of native population, Figure 4.4-C), they might be showing altogether higher 
levels of consolidation of many of those neighbourhoods. This is a relevant point that 
deserves deeper analysis. 
Districts with high share of residents that have fully repaid their housing loans are 
clearly visible in PAC and Lo Espejo comunas, as well as in important parts of Recoleta, 
Independencia, Renca, Quinta Normal, Estación Central and San Joaquín comunas, all 
of them peri-central. As Figure 4.4-C shows, shares of native population currently living 
in the same comuna are also higher in the western half of PAC, seen in Figure 4.5 
(essentially the lowest-income) and the entire Lo Espejo comuna, and again, Recoleta, 
Independencia, Renca, Estación Central, and the south of Santiago-Centre comuna. All 
of them reaching similarly more than 40% of native residents by the year 2002. In stark 
contrast, many peripheral districts and a broad area of Santiago-Centre present the 
lowest levels of native population, and higher concentrations of population still in debt 
(Figure 4.4-B), because these areas host more recently built accommodation.  
                                                 
6  Although this research does not aim at explaining this phenomenon, a possible cause is given by 
Arriagada et al. (2007), who note the high number of aging, single households who buy new units inside 
the Urban Renewal Subsidy Area (URSA).  160 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4. Three factors of urban consolidation, 2002 
Source: own elaboration based on census data (INE, 2002)  
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the analysis below shows, these factors, among others, have largely justified the central-
state policies of peri-central revitalisation and large urban projects and municipal 
strategies of local urban renewal. Informants from the Ministry of Housing and 
Planning (MINVU) and other central government bodies generally regard the peri-
centre as a decayed space with lowered quality of life, with deficient conditions of 
housing and infrastructural development. Eduardo Bresciani, Head of MINVU Urban 
Policy Division defines peri-centre as 
damaged areas, where poverty is concentrated, where there is no prospect of development. 
[…] Today they have no chance: their dynamics are neither the periphery of the highways, 
the malls, the housing [production], nor the dynamic of the metropolitan centre which is 
active, always accessible. And obviously they are not the centre-east [macro-zone]. 
Therefore [the peri-centre] is a ring […] of deterioration in employment, in terms of 
urban development, infrastructure, in social terms, social conflicts, crime, demographic 
aspects. Loss of population, ageing but also impoverishment. Lack of employment, lack 
of services, everything. So there the commercial activities do not come, the Urban 
Renewal does not happen, or it has occurred very slowly. The only alternative to this of 
people is moving out, but towards the fringes. (Interviewed on 12 April 2007) 
This diagnosis might be suitable for many peri-central areas in deteriorating social and 
physical condition, or for abandoned industrial zones. With nuances, this diagnosis is 
shared by 12 of 15 governmental informants interviewed. Sergio Galilea, CEO of 
Ciudad-Parque Bicentenario project
8 refers more specifically to the corridor between 
PAC and Cerrillos comunas, which is precisely the limit between Ciudad-Parque 
Bicentenario (CPB)
9 project and its eastern neighbouring areas:  
[If] you travel by General Velázquez Motorway that has all these poblaciones aside
10 … 
you find that everything is basically the same. This is an area of Santiago where nothing 
has happened. But nothing has happened in this city where a lot has happened! For better, 
for worse, for more or less… but a lot has happened. (Interviewed on 10 April 2007) 
 
                                                                                                                                               
Aguirre Cerda. The number of crime reports referring to the peri-centre, not only PAC, is astoundingly 
high.  
8 No longer in charge since 2008. 
9 Analysed in section 4.4. 
10 He is referring to La Victoria and José María Caro poblaciones. 163 
 
 
Figure 4.6. Spatial 
analysis of urban 
decay in the peri-
centre  
Source: own 
elaboration based 
on census data 
INE (2002) and 
SEREX (2006)11 
 
 
 
 
 
However, the peri-centre not only contains deprivation but also, as it has been observed 
in CHAPTER 3, several vital communities and rich everyday life attached to local 
neighbourhoods. Although cases of decay and deprivation do happen in the peri-centre 
(as complex phenomena with several implications for development policies), they are 
not homogenously distributed but concentrated in very specific areas. In short, some 
peri-central neighbourhoods do much better than others. As an example, Figure 4.6 
illustrates a spatial analysis which shows an index of urban decay constructed from the 
following factors: 1) rates of population losses, 2) average age of resident population, 3) 
deteriorating land uses (dilapidated or abandoned industrial sites) and 4) residential 
overcrowding (number of households per dwelling), for every census district. Although 
                                                 
11 Brown areas show concentration of physical decay. Arc View - Spatial Analyst module was used for 
the analysis. Search radius: 1 km. Density Analysis Type: Kernel.  164 
these four factors are far from covering the extended gamut of variables involved in 
neighbourhood decay, they give an indication of deprivation and also are amongst the 
usually most referred factors of urban decay in the inner city.  
Figure 4.6 shows that decay concentrates in the borders of the central comuna, in some 
spots with more intensity in its southern and western quarters
12, where large scale 
derelict industrial sites (usually sub-utilised as warehouses or parking lots) are 
concentrated, although with smaller-scale industrial production still operating. In 
Santiago-Centre, Quinta Normal, Recoleta and Independencia comunas there are up to 
20% of dilapidated and overcrowded dwellings. Similarly but with less intensity, urban 
decay is concentrated in San Joaquin’s formerly industrial space and Maipú. With lesser 
intensity,  comunas  like Conchalí, Cerrillos and Macul reflect some levels of urban 
decay in specific dilapidated areas.  
On the other hand, in much of PAC, Cerrillos, San Miguel and Estación Central 
comunas, let alone Lo Espejo, La Cisterna, San Ramón and La Granja, there are not 
visible areas of concentrated decay, even though these are spaces densely inhabited, 
with very fragmented properties and small and multi-occupied dwellings, plus the 
structural incapacity of these dwellings to house extended households (see analysis of 
the causes of this are seen in CHAPTER 7). When confronted with this evidence in an 
interview, MINVU minister’s advisor Camilo Arriagada accepted the limitations of the 
official discourse, reaffirming the need for more detailed analysis in the peri-centre: 
Indeed, many [peri-central residents] come back to live with their relatives, because many 
[good] things happen there. It is true that for analysing the reality [of the peri-centre] 
there are actually things that are not being observed. It would be interesting to [establish] 
a micro sociology of these spaces, to reflect that they do exist, and that there are more 
than structural processes occurring there. […In term of the deficiencies of the current 
policy for keeping population in the peri-centre] these sectors have an internal reality of 
subdivision, a reality of urban market, a demographic reality, that make them inoperable 
by the state and yet inoperable by the market. And to some extent, the vision from the 
public policy is also a bit short-sighted. If you see the consultancy developed for 
Santiago’s Inner Ring
13   [project], you see a diagnosis of opportunities for urban 
                                                 
12 This was also observed by Bähr & Riesco (1981); see CHAPTER 2. 
13 MINVU (2003). See also analysis below. 165 
connectivity, for centrality, for public space, but you can’t read something absolutely 
evident, which is [the question of what is going to happen with] the 80% of homeowners 
living there. And then you have the 9x18 [metres] plots. […] This is rarely included by 
the urban policy analysis, the academia or the property development sector. The team 
from MINVU that worked in the Inner Ring project developed the issue of urban space, 
but did not envisage the chances of retaining population or re-location of dwellings. 
(Interviewed on 16 April 2007) 
Mr. Arriagada reveals two points. First, in many ways, broad areas of Santiago’s inner 
city are not really advanced in terms of decay; instead, they might still be in a relatively 
good physical and social condition. The peri-centre seems to be a complex phenomenon, 
where real and ‘policy-imagined’ problems might be coexisting. A description by Ward 
(2001: 4) about the good and bad conditions coexisting in the archetypical Latin 
American inner city is perfectly suitable for describing these areas of Santiago:  
[a]ll urban services are installed, streets are paved, dwellings are brick built and 
‘consolidated’ to differing degrees forming a highly heterogeneous mix of housing levels, 
styles and living arrangements. Tenure patterns are similarly mixed: original later arrival 
owner-occupiers, renters, ‘sharers’ (usually close kinsmen); land uses are mixed 
comprising residential, smaller scale commercial and services enterprises; public and 
private utilities and spaces, etc.  
The revealed second point is even more policy-related, and this is connected with the 
evident mismatch between the concentration of urban decay, shown in Figure 4.6, and 
the concentration of new units built with urban renewal subsidy, shown in Figure 4.9 
below. Both phenomena, decay and renewal, seem spatially disconnected. Thus a 
question arises: has the public policy for inner city revitalisation really tackled the most 
decayed peri-central areas and/or the spaces with more needs? As seen below and in 
CHAPTER 5, the urban renewal policy has succeeded only in the areas of widest rent gap, 
but not in the zones where possibly more urgent regeneration is needed.  
4.3. Santiago’s strategy of central and peri-central urban 
renewal  
As response to Santiago’s allegedly widespread central and peri-central urban 
deterioration, since 1990 the Chilean state set up a strategy for urban renewal. Five 166 
years before, CORDESAN, a municipal-private entrepreneurial corporation had been 
created and this would successfully usher the urban renewal market in Santiago-Centre 
comuna. However, in 1991 a subsidy of urban renewal came from the central 
government seeking to expand this embryonic market toward nine peri-central comunas. 
Since then, this approach has generated uneven results in Santiago. This section 
examines the main stages of the public strategy of urban renewal, its institutional actors, 
planning instruments, and the main market and demographic outcomes produced. 
4.3.1. The Santiago-Centre municipal scheme: an example to follow, 
from 1985 onwards 
The present strategy of peri-central urban and demographic recovery was first   
launched by Santiago-Centre municipality
14 involving the creation of the public-private 
Corporation for Development of Santiago (Corporación para el Desarrollo de Santiago, 
CORDESAN) in 1985. This was a relatively unique case in Latin America of 
concentration of sectoral state powers in one institution at local level (Luque and Smith, 
2007). This institution would succeed at implementing a first model for renovation 
through two highly subsidised new-build residential projects, targeted for middle-low-
income households in some relatively decayed neighbourhoods of the core. With the 
years, CORDESAN would be empowered with additional several legal attributions, also 
elaborating from 1990 onwards a complex strategic plan of reinvigoration of the image 
of the comuna as an emerging global centre, a friendly place for international market 
functions. As seen in CHAPTER 2, The role of the Ibero-American Centre for Strategic 
Urban Development (CIDEU) as strategic partner and technical consultant of the 
municipality was vital (Steinberg, 2001). At any rate, the success of Santiago-Centre in 
its own programme of renewal would be a landmark to imitate in future operations in 
peri-central comunas like San Miguel, Quinta Normal, Recoleta and in general those 
that more recently have attracted successfully property investment to their areas (Devia, 
2003). Initial CORDESAN’s aims were very straightforward:  
                                                 
14 In terms of its budget and financial stability, this municipality is the most powerful in the country. Its 
annual budget is around US $ 110 millions.  167 
a)  Organising, promoting, planning, coordinating and executing projects for the 
local urban, economic and social development, through actions of design, 
remodelling, renewal, rehabilitation, reconstruction, building, greening, and 
reducing the pollution, prevention of urban deterioration and architectural 
heritage conservation in Santiago-Centre comuna. 
b)  Elaborating studies, research and experimental plans aimed at boosting the 
comuna’s development. 
c)  Linking developers, financiers and the municipality, evaluating the actions 
developed. 
d)  Financing and giving technical consultancy to other institutions for research in 
urban renewal topics. 
CORDESAN defined a strategic plan for Santiago-Centre’s urban and demographic 
recovery, considering three main actions: first, to lobby the central government
15 for 
friendlier building regulations to the renewal via transforming the National Law of 
Planning and Construction (LGUC) and a previous special subsidy (that would lead in 
few years to the implementation of the URS); second, to gather possible buyers of the 
new units, landlords interested in selling plots, and possible interested developers; third, 
to develop a friendly business environment in Santiago-Centre via local- and central-
state investments in improving local infrastructure. After an initial stage (1992-1994), 
an adjustment phase (1995-1996) that implied considerably relaxing the building 
regulations contained in Santiago-Centre Master Plan, and a phase of consolidation 
(1997 onwards), the renewal of Santiago-Centre can be considered as a highly 
successful case of high density redevelopment (Valenzuela, 2003). Thenceforth, 
between 1990 and 2000, Santiago-Centre municipality increased ten times its share in 
the construction of new housing in the metropolis, jumping from a 1.1% of the units and 
                                                 
15 In 1987, this institution published a very convincing study to prove that the cost of allocating a single 
new resident in the periphery (considering new networks, amenities and roads to provide) ascended to 
nearly US $ 6,500, whilst the cost of allocating the same person in the centre was barely above US $ 360 
(Valenzuela, 2003). 168 
1.16% square metres built in the Greater Santiago in 1989, to 13.8% of the units and 11% 
of the square metres offered in the metropolis in 2001 (Rojas, 2004).  
In 1998 CORDESAN started to lose its leading role in the process of renewal because 
the market had been already launched. Yet the corporation keeps up to now its original 
institutional composition, gathering a broad array of private and public institutions’ 
representatives, being chaired by Santiago-Centre mayor and composed by four of the 
largest national banks, three NGOs, five public and private universities, three private 
public services suppliers, five union associations (including the National Association of 
Building Firms) and two housing cooperatives (Valenzuela, 2003).  
At any rate, the relatively high presence of private firms’ representatives in the 
corporation makes explicit its entrepreneurial goals. From the beginning, CORDESAN 
gave high priority to a little regulated local property market as an indisputable condition 
for boosting the so far timid activity of urban renewal. But also CORDESAN’s 
experience had a multiplier effect. Not only the subsidised market of urban renewal 
trickled down to several neighbouring comunas, but also its entrepreneurial logic – i.e. 
municipal-private type of management, relative freedom of action in terms of redefining 
its own goals, and its high capacity for lobbying the central and regional offices of 
MINVU for ad hoc urban regulations and subsidies – have been emulated (some 
interviewees even claimed ‘copycatted’) by almost every peri-central municipal 
apparatus, with uneven results though (Devia, 2003).  
However, if from the beginning the internal composition of CORDESAN covered a 
broad array of institutions, it did not include as members any citizen representative. 
Despite the fact that Santiago-Centre municipality and CORDESAN had launched three 
citizen ‘municipal conventions’ (Valenzuela, 2003) seeking to gather local people’s 
impressions about the process (with some effectiveness at regulating ex-post some 
imperfect local guidelines in certain over-dense districts) some researchers have 
estimated that the quality of the participation in the whole process of new-build 
redevelopment has been rather poor. Regulatory changes for protecting environmentally 
or architecturally valuable areas were done only after long periods of destructive 
renewal had taken place (Ibid)  169 
At any rate, what CORDESAN’s experience made clear is that Santiago’s model of 
urban renewal could not have been accomplished without municipal active intervention 
in underpinning the market (let alone central-state supply of subsidies for the purchase 
of new units). Levels of citizen participation had been limited to stages of consultation 
only, but there has not been active residents participation in the management of the 
programme. This idea seems also to have been learnt well by the peri-central 
municipalities like PAC, as will be seen in CHAPTER 6. 
4.3.2. Central-state response: the Urban Renewal Subsidy (URS), 1991-
onwards 
In 1987 the military Junta passed the ‘Urban Renewal’ Law
16 (Gobierno de Chile, 1987). 
For the first time in history, a law targeted a number of decayed urban areas within 
Greater Santiago’s inner city to be renovated, rehabilitated or remodelled. In total, 
around 3,550 hectares were zoned (about 8% of the consolidated space of Santiago 
metropolis), spread especially in the western and centre-southern quarters of the comuna 
(Hildalgo and Zunino, 1992). This law not only circumscribed a central and peri-central 
space to renovate, but also fixed from 15 to 20 years the tax appraisal value of the 
properties within the area. In cases of subdivision, the land tax to pay would be split 
among the number of new properties created. In appearance, this was enough incentive 
for boosting a market-led redeveloping activity but in reality this failed to happen.  
Therefore only one year later, an additional Urban Renewal Subsidy (URS) was legally 
created
17. In 1991, this new instrument started to operate in the abovementioned areas. 
The URS was aimed at indirectly underpinning a private market of high density, new-
build renewal. The core instrument was a direct, non-refundable subsidy granted by the 
Housing and Development Service (SERVIU) to individual or collective applicants to 
help them to finance the purchase or construction of a new ‘affordable dwelling’ (i.e. 
with a built area of under 140 m
2). This subsidy aimed and still aims at complementing 
                                                 
16 Law N° 18,595. 
17 Through Decree N° 95, included as Title 3 in the regulations of the General Unified Subsidy System 
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individual applicants’ purchasing power for two types of dwellings: those priced up to 
1,000 UF
18 and those up to 2,000 UF, with either minimum required previous savings of 
100 UF and 200 UF respectively (Arriagada et al., 2007).  
The URS was initially applied only in specific central and peri-central zones, but soon it 
started to be applied in other 9 peri-central comunas as requested by those 
municipalities to the regional office of the Ministry of Housing and Planning 
(MINVU)
19. From the central state perspective, the goal was to capture a relevant part 
of the synergic property development being concentrated in the periphery, around 
100,000 units per year, in the 1990s (Rojas, 2004). Hence a broad Urban Renewal 
Subsidy Area (URSA) was integrated to the Santiago Metropolitan Plan of 1994, 
including entirely Santiago-Centre and partially Independencia, Renca, Recoleta, San 
Joaquín, San Miguel, Pedro Aguirre Cerda, Cerrillos y Estación Central comunas. Later 
in 1999 URSA expanded to fully cover San Miguel, and in the following years some 
more peripheral zones were added in San Bernardo, Talagante, Melipilla, Buin y Colina 
comunas (Contreras, 2005). By 2005, the central URSA alone covered nearly 8,620 
hectares, including the recently added area of the former Cerrillos airport, the future 
Ciudad-Parque Bicentenario, as will be analysed in section 4.4. Nevertheless, if the 
URS has been effective at invigorating the property market in some inner city areas, its 
impact in terms of demographic recovery has been considerably more modest. 
4.3.3. Urban and demographic effects of the URS in the peri-centre 
At an overall scale, this policy has been less effective at repopulating within the URSA 
than MINVU expected during the initial years of the subsidy. Between 1992 and 2002, 
the ten comunas covered by the URSA experienced depopulation at an average of   
-9.1%, while the 34 metropolitan comunas of Santiago increased their populations at an 
                                                 
18 The Unidad de Fomento (UF) is a unit of account automatically adjusted to inflation. By 2009, it 
corresponds to US$ 37.5. See Appendix 1-Glossary. 
19 URSA enlargements requested by municipalities can be approved by MINVU based on the following 
information provided: photographs of the areas and a cadastral plan considering land use, quality of the 
edification, population, open spaces and road structure. Zones added to URSA are usually delimited by 
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average of 13.7%, and the five fastest growing peripheral comunas saw an average 
increase of 51.4% (INE, 1992, 2002).  
There may be four possible reasons for this. First, it can be observed that the power of 
demographic recovery associated with the URS has been limited only to the most 
fashionable central and peri-central neighbourhoods. For instance, as observed in sub-
section 4.2.1, the 13 most renovated districts of Santiago-Centre municipality (from a 
total of 29) show population increases between 1992 and 2002, at an average rate of 
6.7%, half the metropolitan average. Second, as Rodriguez (2007) claims, many of 
those in-movers actually come from the same municipality and thus do not represent 
real repopulation. Third, the subsidy attracts a series of related uses (e.g. workshops, 
offices, logistic centres, educational centres, parking lots, etc; see Rojas, 2004) that 
occupy space but reduce the rate of repopulation in the renewing are.  
Fourth, the fixed 200 UF bonus per unit propels developers to produce mainly small 
units (currently as small as 20 m
2 studio-flats) that attract only small households, which 
also tend to leave these flats as soon as their households expand. There has also been a 
general reduction of the average size of Chilean households that might impact in the 
families coming to live in the centre and peri-centre. Within the URSA, single-people 
households increased from 27,000 in 1992 (12% of the total comuna population) to 
41,000 in 2002 (19%), whilst nuclear families decreased from 94,000 to 74,000 during 
the same period (INE, 1992, 2002). 
But the design of the URS programme had much to do with the reduction, especially 
when the form of selection of the beneficiaries is considered. Prioritised households are 
generally those with higher saving capacity (better ranked). And households with higher 
purchasing power are usually those with fewer children. As a result, the new residents 
attracted by URS are usually middle-class young professionals, single- or few-
members-families with cultural attraction for a modern urban image, workers who 
appreciate the METRO as a source of connectivity and work in the service sector, and 
increasingly private university students
20. The common denominator of these actors is 
                                                 
20 Since 2000, local urban regulations in República neighbourhood in Santiago-Centre have been radically 
rezoned according to a private-public entrepreneurial plan, which aimed at concentrating several 
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that they create a housing demand of lower demographic density. But although the URS 
has failed to attract high numbers to the core, the policy might have helped to restrict 
the speed of the peripheral sprawl in Santiago from the 1990s onwards, as Arriagada et 
al. claim (2007). 
Within URSA, unit average prices rose up to a peak of around 1,300 UF in 2005
21. 
According to MINVU, this is due to both land appreciation and the growing 
sophistication of the products delivered. In general, price increases have been more 
dynamic in the peri-centre than the central area. Inversely, the average size of the built 
area was gradually reduced to a current 65 m
2 per unit. Both factors also contribute to 
the concentration of smaller households within URSA. However, currently built blocks 
are comparatively higher and denser than the average in Santiago. Most provide 
underground parking lots, entrance hall and administration services, and they are not too 
dissimilar in quality to luxury apartment blocks in the affluent Barrio Alto. Although 
sizes of the flats are comparatively smaller than similar products in more affluent 
comunas, aspects of interior design and shared facilities, security and vigilance, 
accessibility and cultural environment are factors usually used as attractors for relatively 
affluent residents (Ibid). 
4.3.4. The URS and the property market in the peri-centre 
The URS is practically the only instrument in the Chilean housing policy defined from a 
spatial perspective of locating housing stock inside a delimited urban area. Subsidised 
urban units prices range here from 800 UF – double the price of an average social 
dwelling – up to 2000 UF (Sugranyes, 2006). URS ranking system of application is 
similar to the Chilean unified subsidy system, with the sole difference, as mentioned 
above, that an applicant’s shorter saving time improves his/her ranking. However, 
shorter times of saving are generally associated to better-off households, so both unit 
                                                                                                                                               
oriented to middle-class students (Arribas and Manzi, 2005; Munizaga, 2005). This topic might lead to 
further research in ‘studentification’, in the way defined by Darren Smith (2005a).  
21 By the same year, similar units were priced at around 2,600 UF in Providencia comuna and 2,980 UF in 
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prices and saving time clearly represent a class difference between URS and the rest of 
the subsidised housing products in Santiago.  
According to MINVU’s analysts, the effects of URS on the urban renewal market of the 
city are three: first, the local markets in most (not all) the comunas covered by URSA 
have increased their sales of residential units compared to the rest of Greater Santiago 
Metropolitan Area (GSMA, 34 comunas), especially from 2002 onwards (see Table 4.1). 
Second, the speed of sales in these comunas is also higher than the metropolitan average, 
especially during the short periods 1995-1996 and 2004-2005. Third, it has been 
observed that the subsidy has also attracted non-subsidised developments, priced over 
2,000 UF, into the URSA (Arriagada et al., 2007).  
Yet a fourth effect on the market, not discussed by these analysts, is an observed 
tendency to land speculation by developers. This essentially operates in two ways. First, 
for a long time, many plots have been acquired in advance by developers seeking to 
fully capitalise on the ground rent increased by the externalities generated by public 
investment or rezoning. In fact, the number of properties owned by developers largely 
exceeds the number of properties actually developed by them. The former assets are 
thus reserve-land waiting for future processes of market reinvigoration and PGR 
increase. According to Alberto Gurovich, a Chilean scholar from University of Chile 
who has long studied the processes of historical land accumulation in Santiago: 
You have to remember the case of Paz-Froimovich firm
22, a case which I’ve been 
studying for a while. They operate by accumulating capital, buying land plots in declined 
zones, whose land value has diminished. They have been storing these pieces in a 
portfolio during 15 years, just waiting for the moment when the conditions change. 
(Interviewed on 4 April 2007) 
Professor Gurovich touches the speculative modus operandi based on the accumulation 
of land for future operations. Effectively, the model of peri-central urban development 
in Santiago makes perfectly possible the creation of land banks and the subsequent 
modification of local regulations, as a way to radically increase their building capacities. 
In fact, the mechanisms of expansion of urban areas in the largest Chilean cities operate 
in this way (Sabatini, 2000). Yet, in the case of the peri-centre, what Professor Gurovich 
                                                 
22 One of the oldest and most important developers of urban renewal in Santiago-Centre comuna.  174 
calls ‘portfolio’ is, in fact, simply a form of potential ground rent accumulation. From 
the latter point, processes of abandonment exerted by these new owners have been also 
evidenced in the centre and peri-centre. This is confirmed by Ana Devia, MINVU 
sociologist who has witnessed how the performance of these market operators expand 
the frontiers of the URSA.  
Around 1998, I remember when we were working in Independencia comuna, trying to set 
up there this model [similar to CORDESAN’s], we showed a plot to the owner of Paz-
Froimovich. It had been a supermarket and before a factory. We showed it to him on 
Thursday. The following Monday this guy had bought the plot already. Then they placed 
all their logos in the plot’s fences, and in a few days three or four other developers came 
and bought sites nearby. (Interviewed on 18 May 2007) 
The interviewee did not know for how long that plot in Independencia comuna 
remained undeveloped. However, the effects of the market of urban renewal in the local 
space of PAC were a key issue to ask local interviewees. Gloria Rodriguez, a grassroots 
leader from PAC, recalled the dilapidating action performed by developers take place 
half a kilometre away from her neighbourhood, La Victoria población. As she sees it, 
what happens in San Miguel is close to the fifth stage of ‘abandonment’ considered in 
Smith’s rent gap model, seen in CHAPTER 2. 
Developers have a strategy. They can buy, say, two houses. At once. And they keep them 
abandoned. Then the people start to see what is happening with this, they wonder why all 
this dump. [Developers] have done this in other places, in San Miguel for example. This 
is just the way they started building those huge things they produce nowadays. Thus, with 
that abandonment, the neighbourhood becomes a dangerous place, a brownfield area, 
with people selling and taking drugs, drinking. At this point, it is simpler for them to 
[cleanse and] build their big things. (Interviewed on 11 April 2007)  
A fifth characteristic of the model of urban renewal in Santiago is the unstable nature of 
capital invested in these spaces, which can be observed between 1997 and 2001 during 
the so-called Asian Crisis that visibly contracted the national economy (see Figure 4.7). 
Figure 4.8 shows the impact that this contraction had in slowing down the market of 
urban renewal in Santiago-Centre and San Miguel comunas. However, the price of 
properties remained stable during this period. The paradox of demand decrease without 
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 Figure 4.7. Annual change in Gross Domestic Product in Chile, 1980-2005 
Source: World Economic Outlook Database (IMF, 2008) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 4.8. Built square metres for residential use in PAC, Santiago-Centre, San Miguel and 
Cerrillos, 1990-2005 
Source: Observatorio Urbano (MINVU, 2008c) 
price decrease can be explained by the very nature of Santiago’s peri-central urban 
development: a semi-monopoly (of property firms) that controls land supply acting only 
through constrained sub-market niches.  176 
During the five-year crisis, a possible situation could have been that – given that the 
demand for new properties was really shortened by generally reduced access to bank 
credit – more affordable apartments were sold in different peri-central areas as a way to 
keep the construction market working in the area. But nothing of this happened in 
reality. Instead, San Miguel sub-niche was almost paralysed and those capitals fled 
(very probably to other more secure economic sectors). The corollary seems clear: 
disinvestment occurs less due to lack of demand and more due to the lack of a 
guaranteed rate of return. The financial capital invested in peri-central renewal is highly 
volatile and speculative. In contrast, during the same years of crisis in neighbouring 
Cerrillos comuna, which has hosted so far mainly government-assisted social housing 
but not middle-class flats subsidised with URS, the variations produced along the crisis 
were irrelevant. Figure 4.8 partially substantiates this, showing that the production of 
housing in Cerrillos, initiated in 1996, would not be interrupted by the Asian crisis, 
unlike the previous case of San Miguel. Nevertheless, when the national and regional 
economies recovered around 2002, the flows of capital returned to the urban renewal of 
San Miguel comuna.  
A subsequent effect of the Asian Crisis was that financial institutions withdrew support 
to many small scale companies operating in the area. In fact, the whole market of urban 
renewal in the GSMA – composed before the crisis by a wide range of large and small 
building companies, able to operate at a broad array of scales of production – was 
reduced to fewer agents, certainly those with a larger capital base, production scale and 
financial funding capacity. Eduardo Bresciani, Head of MINVU Urban Policy Division, 
explains: 
Although this is an issue we haven’t studied well, I can tell you that as result of the 1998 
crisis, there was a purge in the property market. What happened is that all those firms that 
were in reality a couple of guys working together, all died. In fact, the Association of 
Building Firms told us that some of their members even disappeared in those times. But 
what also disappeared was the whole idea that everything was possible. There was a sort 
of learning in regard to the fluxes of capital, and about the ebbs and flows of the property 
market, which are inevitable. You know there are cycles. But these fellows [in those years] 
thought there weren’t cycles, they thought we were in China and so they believed that we 
would have 25 years of uninterrupted growth at a rate of 7%. Well, this is madness, 
though I can only say this afterwards. But they were emulating Singapore and other 
Asian countries which showed limitless periods of growth and that had not reached their 177 
limit so far. [So we learnt the lesson in Chile,] now we know that in the current period of 
growth, we have chances only until 2012 or 2011
23. This is why many developers know 
that if they don’t start to build now, the risk is high. The one who starts building in 2 
years time takes the risk of stepping into the market in a much slower period. 
(Interviewed on 12 April 2007; emphases added) 
The survivors grew in scale; they made themselves bigger. And they also became more 
cautious but more aggressive at the same time, in the production of their projects. The 
main lesson was that the scale of the buildings had to be as high as possible. Scale does 
matters in Santiago’s peri-centre. The aftermath was a considerably rise in the average 
size of buildings built via URS, but more importantly, that up to now in URSA are 
operating no more than 6 large and medium-sized developers producing residential 
blocks of similar scale, density and architectural style. Pablo Contrucci, former 
CORDESAN chief executive (1990 to 1998) confirms how URS market led to the 
current oligopoly.  
[F]inally the biggest fishes survived. […] Yet an oligopoly has been conformed here; 
currently there might be six firms [operating in Santiago-Centre]. They are neither the 
largest nor the smallest [in the country], but they are sui generis entrepreneurs. Paz-
Froimovich [the most emblematic developers of Santiago-Centre] are especial because, at 
the risk of you call me racist, they are Jewish, they don’t associate with anyone but 
Jewish, and they have had a wonderful, brilliant talent for filling this specific niche where 
the traditional Chilean entrepreneur has no role to play. And they haven’t let it go. 
Thenceforth the rest of [peri-central] developers have followed similar logic. […] I 
believe in diversity nonetheless. I don’t think urban renewal should mean a state project, 
let alone [CPB] Cerrillos which is a unique case. Neither do I think Paz-Froimovich 
should be the only one [operating in the URS market]. The problem is that scale benefits 
the bigger developers, and the local guideline does it too. (Interviewed on 16 April 2007) 
The regulatory implications at the end of the quotation refer to the larger benefits these 
firms receive from the government if new-build developments are higher and denser and 
the volume of the investment is bigger (this issue is core in CHAPTER 7), let alone the 
extremely profitable tax exemptions existing in the Chilean regulation (analysed in sub-
                                                 
23  Mr. Bresciani could have been foreseeing a too tardy capitalist global crisis. The current global 
recession have reached the Chilean economy and many of the largest real estate projects in Santiago have 
been stopped. In 2008, sales of new properties in Santiago-Centre were reduced to a 50% 
(Kouyoumdjian, 2008). By 2009, the rate of unemployment in Santiago is above 10%. CPB project is 
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section 3.7.3, page 134). And this oligopoly has the effect that the market depends 
greatly on these few operators’ criteria.  
In general, the Chilean building regulations and Santiago’s peri-central local master 
plans create a highly unequal situation with zones of high density development (allowed 
by national and local regulations) and zones of little or even no development (restricted 
by different tighter local codes). In fact, the National Law of Planning and Construction 
(LGUC) allows increments up to 50% of the Plot Area Ratio if several plots are 
transformed into a larger one (CHAPTER 5 addresses again this point). Therefore it can 
be argued that the more permissive the norm is with developments on larger sites, the 
larger would be the scale of developers that will operate there, leading in consequence 
to a smaller number of developers with enough capacity of undertaking the risks of 
these operations. The connection between local regulation and the oligopolic 
characteristic of the URS is crucial, and this is further analysed in CHAPTER 7.  
The chain comprised from the purchase of land, plot merge (a process which is 
important for amplifying the scale of the new building because of the setback regulation 
and the abovementioned 50% extra Plot Area Ratio given for site-enlargement), 
construction, marketing, application to the subsidy and sales, is absorbed by these 
operators. Rent gap closures within URSA are in fact controlled by a limited group of 
agents. Past CEO of CORDESAN, Pablo Contrucci gives further evidence about the 
regulatory mechanism that underpins this oligopoly: 
This [model] is in favour of the big projects. Absolutely. One big project is much more 
profitable than two small ones. This is because in Chile, the public sector has historically 
fought against plot subdivisions. Municipalities see them as something negative and 
irrecoverable. It is easy to subdivide, but it is harder to sum up. In fact, you [as a 
developer] pay taxes when making a subdivision but not when merging plots. Thus there 
is a tendency in this system to search for not reducing plots. Therefore all the comunas try 
to improve their social status through manipulating the minimum plot size in their master 
plans.  
EL: But this is a mechanism of expulsion… 
Absolutely, absolutely… It has always been so. But a paradox occurs. Whilst the biggest 
plots are promoted, the market produces units increasingly smaller. The only thing is that 
social housing is not permitted, but the average socio-economic level decreases anyway 179 
within URSA. [Thus the system] does not achieve the political objective promoted by the 
municipalities, which is to maintain [or increase] the social standard of their population. 
(Interviewed on14 April 2007)  
This highly experienced technician accepts that the oligopolic urban renewal market of 
Santiago has tended to considerably reduce the built area of the units produced but he 
does not explain why. My explanation to this is a probable structural feature of the 
private housing market in this city, which can be explained as follows.  
Unit sizes are reduced as a way to keep the rate of profit relatively stable without 
increasing unit prices. Developers claim this is the effect of the increased land values in 
the peri-centre. However, the analysis of land prices to be seen in CHAPTER 5 shows that, 
with the sole exception of Pedro Aguirre Cerda comuna, it has been largely the subsidy 
of urban renewal applied from 1990 which has triggered a general increase in the land 
value of the peri-centre. In addition, it has already been observed the way these 
operators accumulate peri-central land beforehand the land appreciates.  
In a nutshell, although the public subsidy for urban renewal remains fixed at 200 UF per 
unit, the built area of the units tends to decrease whilst their prices remain stable. It 
seems clear the subsidy of urban renewal has tended to be accumulated by this small 
number of developers operating within the space of URSA. 
4.3.5. Roles of local planning and municipal management in the model 
Although central URSA currently covers around 8,500 hectares, only some specific 
zones within have been redeveloped. Moreover, the disparity of results between the 
comunas of the core and the peri-centre is still high. Table 4.1 shows precisely how the 
metropolitan core leads by far the rest of nine comunas with URS in terms of number of 
units allocated. By 2005, whilst Santiago-Centre concentrates almost 77% of the units 
built, its closer competitor (San Miguel) did only a mere 6.5 %. In general, only a minor 
part of the space covered by URSA had been redeveloped, and it clearly seems there is 
still much land for renew. 
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Figure 4.9. 
Density analysis 
of residential 
units built 
between 1991 and 
2001 
Source: Own 
elaboration based 
on SEREX (2006)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
   1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  TOTAL  % 
SANTIAGO-
CENTRE 
1,087  2,790  3,527  1,599  2,186  1,198  1,449  1,746  3,408  5,551  8,330  32,871  76.51 
SAN MIGUEL  284  371  152  40  70  66  97  246  441  478  554  2,799  6.52 
QUINTA 
NORMAL 
7  202  131  133  33  137  124  317  412  211  469  2,176  5.06 
RECOLETA  1  21  27  12  112  178  95  165  215  600  702  2,128  4.95 
INDEPENDEN
CIA 
23  198  18  79  4  0  0  136  80  382  556  1,476  3.44 
ESTACIÓN 
CENTRAL 
80  92  102  98  46  46  34  186  217  88  61  1,050  2.44 
SAN 
JOAQUÍN  
22  28  98  3  4  8  10  3  7  4  96  283  0.66 
PAC  0  41  0  18  76  40  4  0  0  0  0  179  0.42 
TOTAL  1,504  3,743  4,055  1,982  2,531  1,673  1,813  2,799  4,780  7,314  10,768  42,962  100 
Table 4.1. New units sold at 2,000 UF or below per municipality (1995-2005) 
Source: Arriagada et al. (2007: 33) 181 
The same can be seen in the density analysis
24 of Figure 4.9. There are three highly 
renovated neighbourhoods of Santiago-Centre plus a visible ‘arm’ towards the Southern 
El Llano in San Miguel, along the Gran Avenida Avenue. These four concentrations 
emerge for the comparatively better advantages offered by these areas
25. Since the graph 
in Figure 4.9 is only based on data until 2001, the more recently emerging Quinta 
Normal, Recoleta, Independencia and Estación Central comunas are not well visible yet, 
though their more recent increases can be seen in Table 4.1. However, the figure 
provides enough evidence to show how the urban renewal market has concentrated in 
the ‘trendiest’ historical areas, usually the best consolidated and with best amenities in 
the metropolis
26, but not in the areas of more decay shown in Figure 4.6.  
The reason for this uneven development is the strategy of allowing the market inside 
URSA to ‘decide’ the best locations in areas generally with already existing 
infrastructure and services, most of it built by the state long ago. Yet these locations do 
not necessarily coincide with the requirements of a comuna  in terms of its social-
economic needs of development. This can be noted by comparing density analyses of 
urban decay and new developments, in Figures 4.5 and 4.8 respectively. Neither can this 
model of localisation foresee potential urban impacts that might impede or ease further 
urban redevelopment. In short, the urban renewal market barely internalises its created 
externalities (Arriagada et al., 2007).  
The latter point is crucially linked with the relation of URS with the local planning 
regulations. Local master plans became strategic devices at the time of coordinating the 
                                                 
24 An index of density considers number of units built (building x storeys) during the period, processed 
using Spatial Analyst module, cell size: 50 m, search radius: 1 km. Density Analysis Type: Kernel. 
Buildings within URSA should be considered almost exclusively built using Urban Renewal Subsidy. In 
contrast, the periphery (excluding the eastern Barrio Alto) concentrates the rest of existing state housing 
subsidies.  
25 In these specific zones the URS has been openly successful because of prior existing conditions: a) 
excellent connectivity, b) educational centres nearby, c) already established residential environments, d) 
amenities, infrastructure and commercial centres, e) identity of rising middle-class attached to the 
neighbourhood (Arriagada et al., 2007).  
26 Conversely, the market has ‘decided’ where not to develop new projects. Usual causes for this are: a) 
critic social conditions (slummy areas), b) dynamic but non-residential areas, c) highly fragmented sites 
(and property schemes) that difficult potential plot merges. Also, traditional poblaciones produced by 
previous state social housing programmes like CORVI or CORMU, or via land squatter, represent 
locations less preferable by URS developers (Arriagada et al., 2007). 182 
localisation and intensity of the developments. These planning instruments shape and 
target sub-units or relatively homogenous neighbourhoods, and they serve to protect, 
empower and regulate the developmental processes triggered by the URS (Ibid). 
Since 1990, practically all local governments within URSA, with technical support from 
the Ministry of Housing and Planning (MINVU), have attempted to redraft their local 
urban guidelines seeking to incrementing the potential ground rent implicit in those 
regulations and so attract (or intensify already existing) urban renewal into their 
territories (MINVU, 2008a). In San Miguel comuna, a new Master Plan started to 
operate in 1988 (Municipalidad de San Miguel, 2005) and then experienced several 
reforms along the years. This helped to set up a good context for renewal, similarly to 
Santiago-Centre’s Master Plan, which between 1989 and 2006 received 29 amendments 
(Contreras, 2005). More recent cases of this are San Miguel and Recoleta comunas, 
which have experienced similarly deep processes of rezoning in order to enable the 
URS to operate.  
But it would be in 1993 when the most radical changes were implemented in Santiago-
Centre. The local urban guidelines from then on would restrict land uses such as 
warehouses and minor industrial enclaves
27 to be placed only in sites larger than 2,000 
m
2. The aim of this policy, as demanded by developers and CORDESAN, should be 
clearly to cleanse the space for future housing operations in the zones identified as more 
able to host high-density renewal. Parallel changes in the local Master Plan aimed at 
considerably increasing the allowed height (hence the building capacity) of the new 
edifications, duplicating the allowed Plot Area Ratio in practically all the local zones. In 
zones of no more than 2- or 3-storey buildings permitted, the new allowed blocks 
surpassed easily 10 and in some parts 15-storey heights (Contreras, 2005).  
In general, original residents complained to the municipality for the massively 
destructive effects in the local urban image and patrimony buildings, as well as the 
‘shadow-effects’ produced in their properties, let alone the loss of privacy they suffered 
for being surrounded by high-storey blocks. Yet the municipality started to exert major 
control through its local regulation only after the process of intense renewal was well 
                                                 
27 A fragmented concentration of small industrial sites has been a historical crucial ‘problem’ that existed 
and still exists in most of the western and southern quarters of the comuna. 183 
advanced (Devia, 2003). Santiago-Centre local Master Plan was reshaped in order to 
reduce the allowed heights in certain sub-zones of the comuna. In 1996, in a broad 
residential zones, the height of street façades was reduced to 9 metres (volumes behind 
could be up to 20 metres height). In 1999, this guideline was changed again to 12 
metres.  
Nevertheless, wherever Santiago-Centre municipality tightened the norm in a zone, it 
amplified the allowed Plot Area Ratio in others. What this municipality, CORDESAN 
and MINVU have produced is a zero-sum system within this broad zone of fixed 
subsidy, where any local change in a master plan produces a trickledown into 
neighbouring, less controlled areas. This has been a continuous tendency. Since the late 
1990s, private developers have jumped from the most regulated into the less regulated 
areas within URSA. This trickledown has been the cause of the relatively recent 
expansion of the urban renewal towards adjacent Recoleta, Independencia and Quinta 
Normal comunas, also seeking to ‘colonise’ hitherto undeveloped areas of still wide rent 
gap. This fact was also accepted by former CORDESAN chair, Mr. Contrucci. 
Observing this logic, PAC municipal apparatus has envisaged that the renewal activity 
from San Miguel might similarly step into its local territory. Therefore, this was the 
central motivation for its process of local Master Plan reconfiguration, conducted 
between 2003 and 2005, as chapters 5 and 6 will examine. 
4.3.6. What makes the URS so interesting to municipalities? 
Although the URS programme has not impacted positively in the demographic recovery 
of Santiago’s inner city, it has produced other beneficial effects at local level such as: a) 
triggering localised scale-economies, agglomerations of amenities and commercial uses, 
b) increasing municipal revenues for building permits, c) increases in taxes for garbage 
collection and d) generally upgrading the socio-economic status of the comunas.  
However, at any rate the URS programme does not imply increases in municipal land 
taxation. This comes from the particular structure of land taxation in the country, where 
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the Internal Revenue Service (Servicio de Impuestos Internos, SII), which applies a 
sophisticated system of progressive taxation over differential values but that is far from 
constituting an efficient system of value capture, since the determination of cadastral 
values is relatively slow to keep the pace of land appreciation due to infrastructural 
improvement (Smolka and Amborski, 2003). Nonetheless, there is a national fund with 
a centralised redistributive scheme, the Municipal Shared Found that collects 60% of 
the land taxes from every comuna  and  redistributes it to the several municipalities 
according to specific social rankings (SUBDERE, 2008). In general, the autonomy of 
budget that a Chilean low-income municipality can develop is relatively low, depending 
considerably to the municipal shared fund, being unable to develop alternative sources 
of revenue.  
If it is also considered that almost 80% of the properties in Chile are exempted by law 
DFL2 to be land-taxed (and every new dwelling built via URS is exempted), the URS 
and the property market created cannot be considered as potential sources of direct 
municipal revenue. Neither can the fixed and homogeneous Chilean system of land 
taxation potentially work as differential mechanism of urban regulation, creating for 
instance differential tax schemes in order to promote acceleration or de-acceleration of 
the urban renewal in targeted areas, as suggested by Arenas (2005). Thus, whilst the 
possible benefits that the URS programme brings to a municipality are multiple, URS 
do not increase its budget via land taxation of new units priced under 2,000 UF. 
4.3.7. Summing up 
All in all, whilst the public efforts to redevelop the centre and peri-centre since 1991 
have unevenly concentrated new-build high-density redevelopments only in the areas 
that concentrate better amenities and denser transport networks, a parallel strategy for 
large scale renewal has been deployed by central MINVU from late 1990s. Probably 
what best epitomises this strategy is Ciudad-Parque Bicentenario project (CPB 
hereafter), “the largest initiative of urban restructuring since the foundation of Santiago” 
(Gobierno de Chile, No Date: 3), an intervention that would considerably generate 
potential effects in both PAC and Cerrillos comunas, two local spaces which have been 185 
among the most excluded from the circuits of urban renewal. CPB project is discussed 
next. 
4.4. The Ciudad-Parque Bicentenario (CPB) project 
CPB is a 253.4 hectares project in the heart of the south western peri-centre, in the site 
of the former Cerrillos airport. It emerged in 2001 after a number of similar public-
private initiatives for large scale urban revitalisation in the country. The best known are 
Ribera Norte in southern Concepción (Zunino, 2005) and the Inner Ring of Santiago
28 
(MINVU, 2003), yet numbers of smaller scale projects have been running in the main 
Chilean cities. Unlike the relatively downgraded Santiago Inner Ring project, Ciudad-
Parque Bicentenario (CPB) is meaningful for the potential effects it would have in the 
future urban development of the metropolis, and especially in the south western peri-
centre. The sole existence of the project might at the long term radically transform the 
land valuation of its surrounding areas and will generate travels by its more than 75,000 
new inhabitants from there toward other areas of the city, especially the centre and 
centre-east zone or Barrio Alto.  
4.4.1. Main characteristics of the Project 
According to the chief executive officer of CPB, there are eight reasons why CPB is 
strategic for the city, and make it an achievable and potentially successful project: 1) its 
centrality and accessibility, better than any other similar or smaller development in the 
expanding periphery of Santiago; 2) it aims at social mixing through a combination of 
different residential densities, typologies and prices that would shape the residential 
space; 3) its 75-hectares Central Park
29 open to the city
30, and a sensible use of public 
                                                 
28 Initially launched in 2001 as a comprehensive intervention aimed at cleansing and renewing the so-
called ‘Iron Belt’ of Santiago, a vast derelict industrial zone which coincides with the zone of peri-central 
decay identified in Figure 4.6. The Ring comprised high- and mid-density new housing, commercial uses 
and a number of emblematic projects, but it has recently been downgraded only to particular interventions 
such as the transformation of Zanjón de la Aguada canal into a thematic park (Allard and Rosas, 2007). 
See Appendix 1-Glossary for more description. 
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spaces within CPB; 4) a considerable quota of affordable and social housing to be 
demanded to developers; 5) active design regulations towards greener environments; 6) 
a strategic public and private alliance whereby firms might be able to bid for developing 
the several sub-zones through residence, commercial activities and several amenities; 7) 
Cerrillos municipality and the Chilean Air Force are strategic partners; 8) around 15 
thousand families should be attracted to reside in this place through the provision of 
subsidised housing via URS (Galilea, 2006b).  
CPB and its surrounding area in the south western peri-centre can be seen in Figure 4.9. 
From its beginning, the project was meant to produce a relatively high (for Santiago’s 
standards) urban density of 150 people/hectare, which results in some 15,000 dwellings 
with prices that ranged from 800 UF to 3,000 UF in 2005 (Asociación Portal 
Bicentenario, 2005) but that were reduced to a range between 600 and 2,500 UF in 2007, 
as an attempt to change some previous ‘elitist conceptions’ in the plan, as Mr. Galilea 
explained in an interview given to me. The targeted population was from then clearly 
middle and middle-low income sectors, or C2 and C3 Socio-Economic Groups (SEG). 
CPB has considerable relevance at metropolitan and local level. At a macro scale, the 
project enlarges the URSA toward the south west and, as MINVU claims, proposes an 
innovative form of housing development and emerges as a symbolic element of urban 
reconfiguration in a hitherto decayed peri-central area (Tala, 2003a, b). At the local 
scale, it attempts to rethink the ‘concept’ of Cerrillos comuna, creating a hitherto 
inexistent metropolitan centre for the area and several additional uses of commerce, 
amenities, education and cultural activities, also promoting the improvement of Camino 
a Melipilla A as main north-south access to the enclave
31  (Asociación  Portal 
Bicentenario, 2005).  
                                                                                                                                               
30 Although some scholars revealed the negative effects of the elimination of this ‘wind corridor’ and the 
consequent erasure of the building restrictions to high-density building beyond CPB, for the airport’s 
approaching zone (Romero and Vásquez, 2005). Further legal criticism has emerged for the apparent 
illegality in transferring a public good (the site of the airport) to the private sector for its development 
(Herman, 2006; Saleh, 2006) 
31 Additional accesses are: Departamental Motorway at the north, General Velázquez at the east, which 
separates CPB with PAC and Lo Espejo comunas, and Lo Ovalle road at the south. The latter crosses the 
middle of PAC to the north-east and was considered in PAC master plan rezoning as opportunity for 
radically increasing urban density along the axis (see Figure 5.7-B, next chapter). 187 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.10. Ciudad-Parque Bicentenario (CPB) General Master Plan with surrounding poblaciones 
Three emblematic poblaciones in PAC and Lo Espejo delimit CPB to the east. Source: own elaboration 
based on Asociación Portal Bicentenario (2005: 8) 188 
The public sector investment for this project is of the order of US$ 36 million with an 
estimated private contribution of US$ 975 million aimed at the construction of malls, 
facilities, educational centres, health, recreation and residence for the 75,000 
newcomers. CPB implies a new model of urban management. An ad hoc apparatus was 
created independently from the state and municipal administration, seeking to: a) 
formulate a comprehensive project-plan and also a marketing plan; b) design a 
programme of buildings and infrastructure and defining adequate fiscal and regulatory 
instruments, and c) formulate a financing plan (cash flow)
32.  
Two  types of regulations operate in CPB: general national regulations and specific 
guidelines that also run independently to other planning instruments of the city. A 
complete Master Plan has been in preparation since the international competition for 
ideas in 2001, and several modifications have been added (including the last reduction 
of its central park from 75 to the current 50 hectares, in 2008).  
4.4.2. Ciudad-Parque Bicentenario as generator of ground rent 
In the literature, there seems to be consensus that Large Urban Projects (LUP) 
considerably appreciate land, yet it is by no means clear the real amount of this 
appreciation, the forms of its redistribution and whom they benefit, both in social and 
territorial terms (Biderman et al., 2006; Lungo, 2002; Lungo and Smolka, 2005). 
Increases in land rent in surrounding borders are at the centre of the discussion. Yet at 
this point, Eduardo Bresciani, from MINVU’s Urban Policy Division, disagrees with 
the view that CPB might generate automatic switches in the surrounding areas.  
[I]nsofar as CPB has available sites, it’s going to be really hard that additional 
developments in neighbouring areas start, because those developers would feel they are 
competing in disadvantage, out of the hotspot, without the security and guarantees the 
state provides within CPB. (Interviewed on 12 April 2007) 
At any rate, to predict quantitatively land price increases in the surrounding area of CPB 
might be currently speculative. Nevertheless, as the analysis of capitalised ground rent 
                                                 
32 In managerial terms, this project is similar to London Docklands (Colenutt, 1991). 189 
conducted in CHAPTER 5 reveals, Ciudad-Parque Bicentenario does generate increases 
in the broad southern area next to the project. Another aspect is the attempted ‘social 
mix’ that, according to CPB’s chair, the project will produce. Although the CPB 
authority confidently claims this case of new-build ‘social mixing’ reduces traditional 
patterns of socio-spatial segregation in Santiago and is not a case of gentrification (since 
there are not pre-existent low-income population in the place), recent research 
(Davidson and Lees, 2005; Lees, 2008; Lees and Ley, 2008) observe that new-build, 
‘socially mixed’, large scale developments like CPB subsequently generate considerable 
impact (land appreciation, tax increases, and a form of indirect exclusionary 
displacement for the place becomes unaffordable for older residents) in surrounding 
areas.  
Lungo & Smolka (2005) not only agree with the potential gentrifying power that 
projects like CPB might have, but also connect this point with what was seen in 
CHAPTER 2, which is the need (by the state) to secure certain socio-economic 
environment for the development. Furthermore, they claim the public sector is incapable 
to make the source of this potential increased value transparent, given that public 
inattention emerges from the need to hide the role of public management in facilitating 
the private sector’s capture of the land value increment in general and eventually some 
public resources used to develop the construction project itself. Their analysis of several 
cases of large urban projects reveals  
[w]hen land value increments are created, they are usually distributed in the immediate 
project area or nearby. This principle is based on the need to finance a specific project 
within the area, to offset certain negative impacts, or to implement actions such as 
relocating precarious housing sited on the land or its surroundings that may detract from 
the image of the new project. Given the socioeconomic conditions found in [most] Latin 
American [cities], it is not hard to see that the preferred use of the captured value is to 
earmark it for projects of a social nature in other parts of the city, such as housing 
complexes. In fact a significant part of the generated land value increment results exactly 
from the removal of negative externalities produced by the presence of low-income 
families in the area.  190 
4.4.3. Aspects of political participation in Ciudad-Parque Bicentenario 
Large urban projects generally exclude social participation in decision making about 
individual elements of what is expected or supposed to be part of an integrated urban 
project, as is normally provided for in a city’s master plan or land use plan (Ibid). 
Zunino (2006) reveals the extent to which, in CPB, there has been high intervention by 
large scale private developers over the office created within MINVU’s apparatus. Yet, 
on the other hand, this office operates autonomously from Cerrillos municipality and the 
local communities that inhabit the surrounding areas. Whilst on the top of CPB’s 
hierarchical pyramid there is a Directorate presided by the Intendente (Head of the 
Regional Government of Santiago) and constituted by several ministers or their 
representatives, Zunino observes how all these actors accept that the project ‘belongs’ to 
MINVU. CPB is, in reality, a new form of urban planning and design with much more 
direct intervention from the public sphere yet bypassing many local-level attributions 
(Lungo, 2002), let alone a high level of exclusion regarding neighbouring municipal 
administrations. In the case of PAC, its Municipal Director of Construction Gilda 
García confirmed, in interview given to me, the low level of participation of PAC local 
authority in the CPB Directorate. She also criticised the lack of pedestrian connectivity 
between the project and PAC – something that might have been solved with more 
participation of PAC municipal apparatus. The lack of connectivity with PAC was 
actually confirmed by the CPB CEO, Mr. Galilea, and it can be seen in Figure 4.10.  
In general, CPB managers have shown no significant interaction with the surrounding 
communities or municipalities in a meaningful way or with neighbourhood associations 
performing roles in the decision-making process. Almost with no exception, grassroots 
could only articulate their views about the project based on media reports, but also their 
understanding remained restricted to very general notions about the project
33. Although 
Cerrillos mayor is part of the CPB directorate and there are instances of communication 
between municipal officers and MINVU, the municipal intervention has been identified 
as marginal. In open contrast, the participation by private firms in CPB directorate has 
been decisive for the state in order to test ex-ante the possible land use configuration 
                                                 
33  Although during my fieldwork in 2007, CPB was a controversial issue for practically all the 
interviewees, including municipal officials, their levels of information about the project were usually 
superficial and had barely improved since 2005.  191 
and densities to place in CPB. Opinions given by these top developers matter, and final 
decisions are generally transmitted based on economic rationales superimposed to other 
territorial or social considerations. Furthermore, in general, there has been institutional 
mechanisms of exclusion and ‘secretism’ to non-private participants (Zunino, 2006).  
4.4.4. The perspective from the private sector 
According to the National Association of Building Firms, the infrastructural provision 
placed by the state in Ciudad-Parque Bicentenario benefits essentially the largest scale 
operators in the city, only a handful of firms. Whilst small and medium scale developers 
advocate through the Association for public subsidisation without further public 
intervention, the largest scale firms seem to be clearly accepting the much more 
entrepreneurial role of the state and its investments in this macro scale project, that one 
the one hand literally drive public resources to hitherto undeveloped areas, and on the 
other secure the large scale private sector at any potential financial instability. When 
Manuel Posada, CEO of one of the largest building firms in Chile, was questioned by 
me about the too limited number of firms called by the MINVU to operate in CPB. 
Then he claimed that “just the best ones” should be included, clearly referring to those 
with enough financial capacity to ensure continuity to the project. Yet Alexandra 
Peterman, officer and consultant of the conservative National Association of Building 
Firms’ Research Centre differs at this point: 
Cerrillos’ project means the state develops a project, it defines it, it establishes how this is 
going to be, then it calls for bids and sell the plots, but the state has already established 
everything that’s going to be done: the price of dwellings, the heights of the buildings. 
[…Yet] the state should never have a role of developer. […] It should be only the 
regulator that puts the rules and so forth, but it’s not good that it takes the risk in a project 
because it is going to define which types of people they want here, according to a certain 
[socioeconomic] group. But what would happen if nobody demands those dwellings? The 
state is assuming a risk which us, as society, we are all assuming. That risk must be 
assumed by the building firms. […]  
EL: Yes but, from the perspective of the market, this project takes place in these 
‘awkward’ zones where nothing happens, ‘dodgy’ areas where developers do not operate. 
Población La Victoria is very close to it. Moreover, in 16, 17 years under the strategy of 
urban renewal subsidy, nothing has happened in Cerrillos. 192 
You are right! My opinion is that the state should anyway spend resources and invest 
precisely where the market cannot operate, like large open spaces. And by the way, in 
Cerrillos the state is building those 70 or more hectares of park, which is wonderful. That 
is the extent to which the state must intervene. Now, who should pay all of that? That 
open space and all of that should be paid by Santiago, not by the central state and the rest 
of the [country’s] regions. (Interviewed on 27 April 2007) 
Despite the apparent internal contradiction in this informant’s discourse, that on the one 
hand advocates for state infrastructural provision but on the other to the extent of not 
interfering in how the revenues are going to be accumulated by the private actors (i.e. in 
the highly entrepreneurialised scheme deployed in CPB project), Mrs. Peterman reveals 
the existing contradiction of scales among private actors operating in the market of peri-
central renewal. All in all, the linkage between the Association of Building Firms and 
the largest developers in the peri-centre is considerable. Both defend the need of 
maintaining state direct and indirect subsidies through infrastructure and rezoning. 
Differences might arise though in their opinion about the extent to which the state 
should intervene in designing the intervention and redirecting the revenues. 
4.4.5. Ciudad-Parque Bicentenario: a summary 
What CPB implies for the south western peri-centre are: a) a structure of public 
management with high levels of inclusion of large scale private actors but excluding 
municipal and communal actors, b) a Master Plan and urban design, constantly reshaped 
to its current form and functions, which is barely known by the people living in the 
surrounding area, c) in the long term, imminent appreciation of ground rent in the whole 
south-western peri-central zone (currently difficult to estimate), d) potential high 
pressure on the already existing road system and service networks to host the 75,000 
new inhabitants in the area and e) a 50 hectares Central Park open to the public, but 
without pedestrian connectivity to either PAC or Lo Espejo comunas. 193 
4.5. Chapter conclusions 
Population losses, demographic ageing, de-industrialisation, higher concentration of 
brownfield plots, deteriorated physical and functional structures, and higher 
concentration of allegados are clear characteristics of most inner city areas of Santiago. 
Yet the peri-centre is complex and considerably heterogeneous. It is also composed of 
very active neighbourhoods inhabited by senior residents, most of them homeowners. 
As CHAPTER 3 examined, the higher rates of owner-occupation among Chilean urban 
residents are an effect of the intense policy of titling that took place during the 
liberalisation of the country, initiated from the mid 1970s. Although in low income 
areas, fully repaid housing loans might be associated to older and often dilapidated 
dwellings, a low number of people in debt and long-time residents might also be a sign 
of, or a condition that leads to, more consolidated neighbourhoods, where homeowners 
know each other and where collective organisation seems more feasible. This may be 
important for issues like public space improvement, crime prevention and organisation 
of their own local homeless’ associations. All these factors were allegedly defended by 
the grassroots of Pedro Aguirre Cerda during their struggle with the municipality for the 
control of the redrafting of the local PAC Master Plan, as examined in CHAPTER 6.  
The public-private strategy for peri-central ‘regeneration’ via urban renewal has been 
performed since 1990 through a broad area of localised subsidisation. Central state and 
active municipal management have been key aspects like rezoning and marketing. The 
policy has shown positive quantitative results in certain municipalities, in number of 
units built but not in population attracted. The most developed areas have been usually 
the previously most consolidated ones, but not the neighbourhoods that currently show 
the lowest social and physical indices, and thus, those that may need more active public 
intervention in their recovery.  
But the mismatch between the actually deprived spaces and those that concentrate 
reinvestment should not be surprising in Santiago. From the beginning the strategy of 
peri-central urban renewal aimed, overall, at economically reinvigorating the inner city, 
boosting the property market of redevelopment and letting the firms operate and select 
their best locations freely. Seen from the current time, repopulation might have been 
only a secondary or even tertiary goal in MINVU’s policy, let alone the inexistence of a 194 
comprehensive protection of urban heritage, which has been to a great extent destroyed 
by the large scale urban renewal. But whenever and wherever changes of regulations 
have aimed at constraining the regulation (under heritage-protectionist schemes, as 
happened in Santiago-Centre in 1998), developers respond by jumping into zones of 
more flexible regulation, even in adjacent, less regulated comunas.  
Some particular characteristics of the model of urban renewal in Santiago’s peri-centre 
must be stressed. Although to be built, these blocks need enlarged sites (via plot 
merging), the average built area of the flats sold has tended to decrease whilst prices 
have remained unchanged. This can be seen as a way to maximise the accumulation of 
ground rent increases, and to absorb the public subsidy of 200 UF.  
The size reduction of residential flats helps to produce deep social reconfigurations in 
the renewing neighbourhoods, not in terms of social replacement of low-income 
households by higher-income dwellers, but decisively at producing highly temporary 
residences that become unsuitable when the natural growth of households occurs. Yet it 
is also visible the speculative nature of the capital invested in urban renewal, and its 
volatility in cases of recession. The latter reinforces the point that financial capital is a 
main driving force in Santiago’s peri-central renewal.  
On the other hand, the property market agents determine specifically where to invest 
and where not to, hence where land can valorise and thenceforth the capitalised ground 
rent could actually increase, and where it could not. This depends on the strategic 
rationale exerted by the few large scale developers operating in the market of urban 
renewal. The public strategy inherent to URSA is to create the general conditions for 
allowing this to happen.  
It was shown that urban renewal developers acquire land sooner than when it valorises, 
therefore they are able to capitalise the highest rent minus the (lower) price of the land 
paid to the original homeowner. To keep this land undeveloped for long time, as 
reserve-land for future operations, can be really profitable in future contexts of enlarged 
potential ground rents due to positive externalities agglomerated in its surrounding area 
and/or transformed building regulations.  195 
In turn, for traditional owner-occupiers, the capitalised ground rent is the price they 
would receive for their plots in an eventual sale, usually at a time when the land has not 
been fully valorised, or it has only started to valorise. The price to be paid is 
comparatively low, but as far as the urban renewal market enters into a determined 
quarter, this value can increase up to a certain extent. CHAPTER 5 precisely examines 
these variations of ground rent. 
After the Asian crisis in 1998, the URS market consisted of a limited number of firms 
(around six in the central area) that monopolised the several economic chains involved 
in the renewal of a specific area (acting as landlords, realtors, constructors, financiers, 
etc.). This is important, since while in one peri-central space the rent gap has been 
largely capitalised by these agents since the early 1990s, in another adjacent space this 
is not happening at all. Furthermore, the rent appropriated through high-density 
redevelopment is accumulated by this reduced number of operators. Speculation with 
idle land and increases in the price of the units (or inversely, reduction of the quality of 
the products keeping the same price) seem regular practices within URSA. 
The municipal/private agency named CORDESAN, in operation since 1985, was 
successful at implementing the goals for urban renewal in Santiago-Centre. To a large 
extent, this agency fulfilled the five main features of urban entrepreneurialism (see sub-
section 2.4) namely: i) attracting new sources of funding (both central-state and private); 
ii) bypassing traditional managerial roles and adopting a speculative stance; iii) 
coupling a local strategy of urban renewal with a ‘global’ strategy of placing Santiago 
as a financial centre; iv) concentrating investment and infrastructure in certain 
predefined zones, and v) prioritising a growth-first agenda of renewal, were the most 
important goal was assuring enough profits (i.e. accumulation of the ground rent) to 
developers.  
The more recent added strategy of large scale urban projects epitomised by CPB has 
implied a more active involvement of MINVU in the management and facilitation of a 
public-owned site for private, large-scale redevelopment. The goals and state operation 
of this large urban project seems even closer to entrepreneurialism, given that CPB is to 
a large extent conceived physically and functionally disconnected from its surrounding 
area, whereas its public-private structure of management is little participative with 196 
respect to the affected municipalities and local residents. This configures a case where 
the forms of entrepreneurialism and the Chilean reality also match clearly.  
The Ciudad-Parque Bicentenario project should be considered as an external force in 
the redevelopment of PAC and the rest of its surrounding territory. Thus, what ought to 
be analysed are the effects this project and the Urban Renewal Subsidy have had in 
terms of capitalised ground rent variation, and potential ground rent enlargement in this 
part of the peri-centre of Santiago, an issue that CHAPTER 5 explores.  197 
CHAPTER 5. Rent gap evolution in Pedro Aguirre 
Cerda comuna and its surrounding areas, 1990-2005 
5.1. Introduction 
As defined in CHAPTER 2, rent gap is a disparity between capitalised ground rent (CGR) 
and potential ground rent (PGR) produced in certain urban areas. This disparity, at its 
highest level, triggers spatial restructuring, because it represents, in a context of 
liberalised urban market, a maximum profit to be accumulated by property developers. 
Necessary conditions for widening the rent gap are a devaluation of the fixed capital set 
on space (as a form of creative destruction) and increases in potential ground rent. The 
latter is produced when the ‘highest and best use’ possible in that location makes the 
existing buildings as inadequate compared with other, much more profitable uses. The 
devaluation takes place when no landlord invests capital, or no local government 
commits public funds in maintaining outmoded built stock
1. This creates an expanding, 
long lasting wave of material decadence across the area that triggers an eventual process 
of renewal. Although hinted at the previous chapter, the present chapter focuses 
specifically on this dialectic between valuation and devaluation. The analysis 
substantiates the appearance of a rent gap in Santiago’s Pedro Aguirre Cerda (PAC) and 
its two neighbouring comunas: San Miguel and Cerrillos, at the east and west of PAC 
respectively, from 1990 to 2005. The structure of the chapter is as follows.  
Section 5.2 defines a method of analysis of capitalised ground rent (CGR), building 
value (BV) and Potential Ground Rent (PGR). CGR is estimated from historical records 
of land prices available from 1990 to 2005, whilst PGR is calculated from the building 
capacity contained in local building guidelines. Section 5.3 focuses, at the level of the 
metropolis, on the evolution of the CGR in PAC, San Miguel and Cerrillos, comparing 
their values with comunas at the north and south. This comparison is relevant, because 
whilst San Miguel and Cerrillos present dynamic CGR variations that might reveal that 
ground rent accumulation had been under way in those territories, as was anticipated in 
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establishes, deliberate urban deterioration is inherent to urban renewal. 198 
the previous chapter, PAC shows low and static levels of capitalised ground rent whilst 
‘offering’ a still latent potential ground rent to be accumulated. Thus, PAC comuna 
shows the largest and more embryonic rent gap. In terms of methodology, three north-
south longitudinal ‘transects’, or sections, help to observe and compare the variations of 
CGR in these comunas.  
Section 5.4 focuses on building regulations in local master plans as crucial instruments 
of rent gap enlargement. The analysis estimates plausible levels of Potential Ground 
Rent (PGR) in four comuna zones of Pedro Aguirre Cerda (PAC), in the hypothetical 
case that the building guidelines contained in the attempted First Draft Master Plan
2, 
developed by the municipality between 2003 and 2005, were applied. These levels of 
PGR are compared with the much lower PGR contained in the hitherto existing 
municipal urban regulation. Were the new guidelines been applied in 2005, among other 
effects, they would have almost doubled the PGR in the comuna and produced a clear 
attraction to large scale developers into these four zones.  
By 2005, grassroots activists in PAC produced a counter-proposal draft which in 
practice would have barely maintained the levels of potential ground rent in most of the 
neighbourhoods. Although the political aspects of the struggle around the redrafting of 
the Master Plan will be examined in CHAPTER  6, Section 5.5 analyses this factor 
quantitatively. The section also focuses on the definitive Master Plan produced later by 
the technical consultants hired by the municipality, that to a large extent included the 
grassroots’ technical perspectives. Both versions are compared in terms of the potential 
ground rent (PGR) produced. However, this definitive version was rejected by the 
political head of the municipality, precisely because it made unfeasible large scale urban 
renewal in most areas of PAC, constraining PGR increments only to a single area 
towards the north east of the comuna.  
In sum, and in terms of potential ground rent, this chapter examines four different levels 
of PGR, determined by: a) the current building regulation in PAC, b) the municipality’s 
‘First Draft’, c) the community’s ‘Alternative Draft’, and d) the ‘Final Draft’ developed 
by the consultancy firm. 
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5.2. A proposed method for rent gap analysis 
5.2.1. Observing Capitalised Ground Rent (CGR) and Building Value 
(BV)  
In order to analyse the variations of CGR and BV in Santiago’s peri-centre (San Miguel, 
Cerrillos and PAC comunas) between 1990 and 2005, a method of ‘transects’, or 
longitudinal north-south sections is used. These transects aim at illustrating the 
variations of capitalised ground rent across the southern metropolitan space, helping to 
correlate areas of CGR increases with the areas of urban renewal detected in the 
previous chapter. The analysis also serves to confirm where the large scale housing 
market has yet not operated and the CGR remains at a low level. The three transects are 
drawn from the city’s historic centre (Plaza de Armas square) near Santiago’s 
downtown and projected southbound in parallel to the main transport corridors of the 
three comunas under analysis: Pedro Aguirre Cerda, San Miguel and Cerrillos, also 
covering southern peri-central and peripheral comunas of the Greater Santiago 
Metropolitan Area (GSMA; see Figure 5.1). 
The data used for showing these values is the ‘Santiago Property Market Bulletin’ 
produced quarterly by Trivelli Consultants during this period (Trivelli, 2005, 2007). 
This data is one of the only two land market indices available for the city, and 
comprises 305 sub-zones
3, covering the 34 municipalities of GSMA. Transect 1 covers 
20 sub-zones, Transect 2 covers 12 sub-zones, whilst Transect 3 covers 14 sub-zones. 
Values shown are expressed in UF/m
2, so they are automatically adjusted to inflation
4.  
Trivelli’s data gives an estimation of the rent that property owners expect to get from 
their properties in the market. Every piece of land offered in Santiago, advertised in the 
traditional El Mercurio national newspaper, is recorded by this firm (the usual way to 
advertise is through this newspaper). The index considers factors such as: a) price, b) 
                                                 
3 Relatively homogeneous areas of the metropolis defined by Trivelli, very similar in size to INE Census 
Districts. 
4 See Appendix 1-Glossary for definition of UF. 200 
property size, and c) location. The method avoids duplicated offers advertised during 
several weeks.  
However, the data certainly does not reflect an exact capitalised rent, due to some of its 
methodological limitations. First, the values shown are only averages within sub-zones 
whose size in the peri-centre is 125 hectares on average (for instance, within a sub-zone, 
different types of properties could reflect quite different prices). Second, values of 
buildings and land are considered together as a whole. Third, repetitions of ‘null’ values 
over time in certain sub-zones mean there has not been supply there during the quarter 
recorded or that internal property trades have not been advertised in the newspaper (this 
happens often in the micro-scale formal and informal property markets of Santiago’s 
poblaciones). When the ‘null’ value is repeated over time, during several years, it could 
be assumed that there is a low exchange rate for the land in that sub-zone, impossible to 
determine numerically by this means. However, null values do not necessarily mean that 
the ground rent has been devalued to zero due to high demolition costs or other causes.  
Although this data does not fully reflect the real value of capitalised ground rent, it 
depicts the structure of plot or land prices with some clarity, and how this structure 
changes in time (Trivelli, 2005). Therefore, this data is indicative – not totally accurate 
though – of the average capitalised rent in a determined metropolitan area, depicting the 
general metropolitan situation with some clarity. 
Nonetheless, in sub-zones where Trivelli’s values are consistently null (this happens 
especially in PAC comuna), the cadastral values obtained from the Internal Revenue 
Service (Servicio de Impuestos Internos, SII) database
5 help to calculate a CGR. This 
data also has a higher level of disaggregation, at the level of individual blocks. However, 
since these data are constructed for tax purposes, they usually underestimate (although 
sometimes overestimate) building values. Moreover, it only shows a static situation for 
the year 2003 (as SII disclosed this data only for that year). 
                                                 
5 In the appraisal of buildings the following factors are considered: the quality and the material of its 
architectural structure, some technical specifications, age, building costs and location in the municipality 
and in respect to the nearest market centres (SII, 2006). 201 
5.2.2. Estimation of Potential Ground Rent (PGR) 
The analysis of Potential Ground Rent (PGR) is conducted in PAC comuna  only, 
because this analysis is based on an estimation from the different guidelines enshrined 
in the existing and proposed versions of its Master Plan. The analysis also implied a 
considerable volume of information that could not be gathered in the rest of comunas, 
given the inherent limitations of this PhD research (see CHAPTER 1).  
This methodological approach is justified in cities of relatively accelerated growth and 
liberalised urban regulations like Santiago, where the permitted building capacity in an 
area can be quickly realised by developers within a decade or so, therefore fully 
capitalising the PGR. The estimation of PGR is produced according to the following 
formula:  
PGR = (NBP – LV – BC) / P 
Where NBP is New Building Price, or the market price of the total number of units 
permitted by local urban guidelines on the plot, according to the building capacity 
contained in the local guideline; LV is Land Value paid by the developer to the property 
owner at its current price; and BC are Building Costs, or the sum of demolition costs, 
realtor operations, building permit taxes and all other costs involved in the production of 
the new building. Finally, P is the plot area, measured in square metres (m
2).  
The building capacity is calculated from the Setback Plane (rasante) which is 70° in 
Santiago, Front yard Line (antejardín), Building Density, and especially Plot Area Ratio 
(constructibilidad), that increases – as an incentive to large scale developers – from 30% 
to 50% when several plots are merged into a larger one, according to current legislation 
(Gobierno de Chile, 2007b; Wurman and Torrent, 2006).  
For the calculation of NBP, it is assumed a full development of the Plot Area Ratio 
augmented with an additional 30% (according to the incentive mentioned above), an 
average built area of residential apartments of 65 m
2 + 10% for shared areas (total 71.5 
m
2), according to the evaluation of URS by Arriagada et al. (2007), and an average 202 
market price per residential unit of around 1,300 UF
6 according to prices advertised in 
the media
7. It is assumed that the average building cost is 12 UF/m
2 plus 30% additional 
soft costs
8 and building permits (which is in fact a high percentage of additional costs). 
Land Value to pay for a plot in PAC, according to the highest scores observed in the 
analysis of Transect 3 (see Figure 5.2) should not exceed 4 UF/m
2. Yet all these 
calculations are in reality a matter of developers’ expertise, as building and extra costs 
can be both lowered by experienced firms who make their building processes more 
efficient. Accordingly, these values deliberately represent a rather conservative 
estimation based on low expected revenues, and they most likely fall below the 
profitability levels of real estate developers
9.  
5.3. Capitalised Ground Rent and Building Value in the 
south-west peri-centre of Santiago 
The following analysis is based on the three main transects, starting from the city’s 
historic centre, and cutting across the spaces of 1) San Miguel, 2) Cerrillos and 3) Pedro 
Aguirre Cerda (see Figure 5.1). The goal here is to compare, in time and space, the 
variations of CGR and BV for the years 1990, 1995, 2000 and 2005 across these three 
areas. As explained above, the estimation of PGR is more specific (calculated from 
building guidelines contained in the local Master Plan), and will be conducted only for 
PAC, in section 5.4. 
                                                 
6 US$ 47,500 approx. 
7 www.portalinmobiliario.com, one of the most utilised websites for advertising properties in Chile. 
8  In construction industry, soft costs are items not considered as direct construction costs, including 
architecture, engineering, legal fees, financing and other pre- and post-building expenses. 
9 My approach to estimate PGR differences with two classical methods, namely Clark’s (1988), that 
deduces PGR from algorithms related to historical changes of population and houses sold during long 
historical periods (1860-1985), and Badcock’s (1989), that supposes PGR from the market prices of 
serviced vacant sites. This difference is justified here both in the need to pay attention to the roles of 
national and local urban regulations in the production of the ‘best and highest land use’ (see CHAPTER 2), 
and because historical land value records for Santiago are extremely limited in time. 203 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1. Transects for Rent Gap analysis and Trivelli sub-zones 
Source: own elaboration  
Figure 5.2. Capitalised Ground Rent variations (1990, 1995, 2000 and 2005) 
Source: own elaboration based on Trivelli (2005) 5.3.1. Tr
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More radically, San Miguel comuna shows a marked variation of capitalised ground 
rent of around six to ten UF/m
2 during the period. With high probability, this 
appreciation is an effect of the 200-UF subsidy on its local property market. San Miguel 
has been fully covered by URSA since 1991 and, since then, leading by far the 10 peri-
central comunas that benefited from this housing subsidy (see Table 4.1, page 180). 
Until 1992, San Miguel’s property market was relatively stagnant, despite the fact that 
its two fashionable bourgeois neighbourhoods, namely El Llano Subercaseaux and Lo 
Ovalle, had been connected to the Metro underground network since 1978. In general, 
this form of urban transport was an important factor of attraction of building 
development in Santiago, but in the case of San Miguel, it did not prove sufficient to 
trigger its local property market until the URSA was set up and thus San Miguel’s local 
property market received a boost (Trivelli, 2007). And, since the average price of the 
new properties built in San Miguel has been between 1,200 and 1,300 UF per unit 
during the period 1995 and 2005 (Arriagada et al., 2007: 15), the public subsidy of 200 
UF was visibly a leverage, a potent signal for this market and its operators. 
Transect 1 shows that ground rents tend to decrease in the southern municipalities of La 
Cisterna and El Bosque. This is produced by the lower accessibility of these more 
peripheral territories. These spaces, located outside of URSA, show different socio-
economic status compared with San Miguel or Santiago-Centre (see sub-section 4.2.2, 
page 155 for socio-economic indices; see also Appendix 2), whilst the presence of state-
assisted social housing projects there, ranging from middle to lower income, create a 
very different market environment. Being closer to the periphery, plot prices in El 
Bosque and La Cisterna are considerably lower than in the inner city, due to their 
highest distance to Santiago’s CBD. However, in even farther San Bernardo comuna, 
average ground rents rise up again from 2 UF/m
2 in 1990 to 8 UF/m
2 in 2005, due to the 
existence of an additional smaller URSA located in its local centre, in a similar manner 
to Santiago-Centre, but at smaller scale.  
Across this transect, cadastral building values (shown in red line) are uneven. In 
downtown, they usually exceed the boundaries of the figure because these are office 
skyscrapers, far more expensive than the highest property prices considered by Trivelli 
in those zones. Further, in the peri-centre, since the data is an average at block level, the 
building value shows where there has been high density urban renewal and where there 206 
has not, or where there are still vacant plots or even where some areas might be 
experiencing devaluation, up to 2003. This is also visible in San Bernardo for the 
abovementioned reason (i.e. construction in urban renewal due to URSA). At any rate, 
the cadastral values reflect a disparity among comunas across Transect 1: the average in 
Santiago-Centre is 12.14 UF/m
2; in San Miguel, 2.12 UF/m
2; in La Cisterna, 1.53; in El 
Bosque, 1.04 UF/m
2; and in San Bernardo, 0.84 UF/m
2. 
Assuming there once was a large rent gap in San Miguel (although the data available 
cannot fully corroborate this assumption) this has been intensively capitalised after 
fifteen years of relatively successful large scale property market. As Transect 1 shows, 
since 1995 the capitalised ground rent in this comuna has tended to remain roughly 
between 6 and 12 UF/m
2. However, these values could still rise moderately given the 
general metropolitan tendency for ground rents to increase due to urban infrastructure 
invests.  
The rent gap might well be near closure in San Miguel, as relatively inexpensive 
available plots in good locations become exhausted. Thus a slowdown in this local real 
estate market niche might be expected in the near future. However, as observed above, 
in URSA, when a neighbourhood becomes saturated or when urban guidelines become 
more restrictive in a certain zone, property firms leave and move into other 
neighbourhoods whose rent gaps are still wide. Therefore, the eventual closure in San 
Miguel’s rent gap creates potential opportunities for some areas of PAC to be opened as 
a new market niche, in so far as large-scale developers could capitalize a considerably 
higher ground rent there. Section 5.4 gives an estimation of this potential ground rent, 
produced by local urban regulations, in Pedro Aguirre Cerda. 
5.3.2. Transect 2: Cerrillos comuna 
Transect 2 in Figure 5.2 also shows the impact of the subsidised urban renewal market 
on the ground rent in Santiago-Centre municipality. Near downtown, ground rents 
increased from almost 8 UF/m
2 to 25 UF/m
2 between 1990 and 1995; they decrease 
towards the south of the comuna. The transect also shows the more recent urban 
renewal market niche in Estación Central comuna as one of the latest and most intense 207 
cases of urban renewal in the metropolis, where ground rent has increased by 400% in 
these districts, from 2 UF/m
2 to 8 UF/m
2, during the period.  
By contrast, the hikes in Cerrillos’ ground rent starts only in 2000. In part, this is due to 
the higher availability of large scale industrial plots, now usable for redevelopment. 
Many of those plots were abandoned or underused following the general process of 
peri-central de-industrialisation since the 1970s, as examined in CHAPTER 3. More 
recently, the industrial function was further discouraged by the 1994 Santiago 
Metropolitan Master Plan (PRMS
10, which instead allows concentrations of heavy 
industry in the northern fringes of the city). This context opened the door to the gradual 
reconfiguration of Cerrillos as a residential place, but only if the necessary incentives 
are provided, i.e. the construction of Ciudad-Parque Bicentenario (CPB) and the 
extension of URSA toward this area.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4. Views of Transect 2 
a) General Velázquez Motorway. b-c) Views of the site of Ciudad-Parque Bicentenario. Source: 
photography taken by the author 
                                                 
10 Different to 1960 PRIS; see sub-section 3.4.3. 
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Transect 2 clearly shows how the vast pieces of land in the south of CPB, still not 
permitted for development in 2005, considerably increased its valuation since 2000, due 
to the imminent legal elimination of land use restrictions related to the airport 
functions
11. In 2000, ground rents in Cerrillos increased, even exceeded, 5 UF/m
2, as 
effect of an increased demand produced by all these changes. This confirms the high 
impact that the large-scale CPB project could have on potential rents in its other 
surrounding areas, especially PAC, over the middle- or long-term.  
5.3.3. Transect 3: PAC comuna 
Transect 3 in Figure 5.2 shows again the rapid land appreciation in Santiago-Centre 
downtown, with a decrease and an increase again towards the south, though with lower 
intensity. However, in general, the further to the south, the lower ground rents are 
because, the southern quarters of Santiago-Centre have been traditionally undervalued 
by this city’s property market.  
However, in the case of Pedro Aguirre Cerda (PAC), there is a clear contrast with the 
previous two cases. PAC comuna has experienced neither similar processes of urban 
renewal nor increased average land rent levels like Santiago-Centre, San Miguel or 
Cerrillos, even though 60% of its territory is contained within the Urban Renewal 
Subsidy Area, while it is also one step away from Ciudad Parque Bicentenario. In the 
north of PAC, former industrial plots have been abandoned since the 1980s, generating 
negative effects on their environments, ground rent depreciation and physical barriers 
that stop the ‘waves’ of urban renewal spreading from the northern Santiago-Centre 
comuna (SGA-IBERSIS, 2000).  
The rent gap in PAC is more clearly in evidence than in the previous two cases. It is a 
broad region which has not detonated processes of urban renewal or initiated substantial 
increases in ground rent. The four Trivelli sub-zones in PAC consistently show null 
values between 1990 and 2005 (this means that no market exchanges have been 
recorded). PAC so far is the only territory in Transect 3 that has not experienced 
                                                 
11 The legal change of land use from rural to urban was approved in February 2006. 209 
noticeable ground rent increases associated with urban development or redevelopment, 
notwithstanding, in general terms, that the potential ground rent in its local territory 
(regardless of how high it is) may be still fully capitalised in an eventual process of 
renewal.  
Yet the null values recorded in PAC do not mean that this is a static property market, 
but that the scale of the transactions in PAC may be too small, so that they are not 
‘visible’ through the instrument used by Trivelli. In fact, it may be not too speculative to 
claim a parallel existence of urban economies within peri-central areas, like many PAC 
poblaciones. During fieldwork for this research, it was observed in several places in 
PAC how the organised community cooperates in the process of buying and selling 
properties, aiding in the selection of potential buyers. Also, there is neighbourhood 
solidarity when repair or rebuilding of damaged homes is needed. Claudina Núñez, an 
important grassroots leader who lives in La Victoria población, explains:  
There is always demand for housing here. The logic that works here is that when 
someone wants to leave, neighbours from the whole block will look for the buyer. 
Everybody helps to search. It is a natural mechanism here. It will not be easy for an alien 
person from outside to come and live here. (Interviewed on 31 March 2007) 
Nevertheless, the too near property markets of San Miguel and Cerrillos means that part 
of PAC residential space has recently attracted the interest of developers who for a 
while have been acquiring inexpensive land, especially across the borders of General 
Velázquez Avenue in PAC’s western limit, and Departamental Avenue (see Figure 5.7). 
Several PAC residents interviewed confirmed this, and some even said that there have 
been, more than once, conflicts between the community and prospectors (see Figure 6.4 
in CHAPTER 6 for evidence of this).  
Although values shown for PAC are null, the cadastral building values observed across 
the municipality (red line in Figure 5.2) may help to calculate a capitalised ground rent 
for Pedro Aguirre Cerda. This data shows more variable indices, reaching 4 UF/m
2 in 
two exceptional points in PAC’s northern and southern areas, a municipal park and a 
community centre respectively. In other places the BV falls below 1 UF/m
2, marking an 
average building value slightly above 1 UF/m
2 across the transect in PAC. This average 
could be considered as a minimum value to be paid to owner-occupiers if these plots 210 
were sold on the market (i.e. CGR-1), yet as a market price, this value may also increase 
to 2 UF/m
2, in the event that demand for renewal in these areas goes up. 
As Transect 1 also shows, the CGR increases again in southern municipalities of Lo 
Espejo and the western area of San Bernardo, the latter territory being peripherally 
located and still offering non-developed land such that this land will experience 
considerable valuations when it is annexed to the city. In general, a larger-scale property 
market and other social housing subsidies (not urban renewal) operate in these two 
municipalities, with the sole exception of the small URSA on the historical centre of 
San Bernardo, observed in Transect 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.5. Views of Transect 3 
a) Development in Santiago-Centre; 
b) Small callampa in Carlos 
Valdovinos’s border; c) Access to 
André Jarlan Park, in La Feria 
Avenue in PAC; d) GSMA urban 
perimeter in San Bernardo. Source: 
author’s archive 
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Yet were land-owners in Pedro Aguirre Cerda to sell their properties at a price of 2 
UF/m
2, this value would not be sufficient to cover their housing needs. For instance, in 
two of the PAC poblaciones most affected by the proposed new building regulations 
(Neighbourhood Units 15 and 16, see Figure 5.7-B), the size of residential plots is 
between 200 m
2 and 330 m
2. For a plot of 300 m
2, a ground rent of 2 UF/m
2 implies a 
sale price of 600 UF, enough for one household to replace its old property with a new 
apartment no larger than 45 m
2 (worth 800 UF, including the 200 UF subsidy) in a peri-
central municipality similar in status to PAC – Independencia or Quinta Normal for 
instance – or conversely to give a down-payment for an affordable but bigger dwelling 
in some distant peripheral location in the metropolis.  
However, as the 2002 national population census has shown, 20% of PAC residential 
dwellings house two or more households. In cases where several households share a plot, 
600 UF is clearly not enough to satisfy their housing needs. This situation becomes even 
more problematic in plots of 200 m
2 or 160 m
2, normal sizes in población La Victoria, 
located in the ‘heart’ of PAC (see Figure 5.7). A size of 160 m
2 would imply a payment 
of 320 UF, which only means the household (or households) would then have to find 
replacement accommodation in a poorly serviced estate in the periphery. I could 
confirm in fieldwork that many PAC local homeowners are aware of the profitability of 
the potential rent of their plots of land, and also of the impact that its accumulation has 
in the stability of their social systems and ways of life. This point is key and will be 
further considered in CHAPTER 6’s analysis.  
From the existing structural logic of redevelopment, if these rent increases are to occur, 
it would appear necessary to absorb these working class areas within the circuits of the 
real estate market, if not radically and fast (as the central state is attempting in Cerrillos’ 
CPB; see section 4.4), at least through sustained public efforts to allow the opening of 
these key areas of micro-scale urban economy to the market. This is precisely what the 
proposed PAC Master Plan sought to do in 2005. 212 
5.4. The attempt to increase Potential Ground Rent by Master 
Plan in PAC 
As seen in CHAPTER 4, the local Master Plan of Santiago-Centre comuna was amended 
29 times between 1991 and 2005, seeking to adapt the local urban structure to the scale 
of the ongoing urban renewal market. A similar path was followed by San Miguel 
Master Plan. In the case of Pedro Aguirre Cerda (PAC), by the end of the 1990s, it 
seemed clear to its local administration that the existing market of urban renewal could 
not simply step into the comuna, because developers were not attracted by the poor 
prospect of its limited potential ground rent. Hence, from 2003 onwards, the local 
government sought to pass a new Master Plan – up to then, a highly stagnant regulation, 
constituted by parts of three different zones from San Miguel, La Cisterna and Santiago 
comunas (see Figure 5.7-A)
12. This new plan was aimed at: attracting new higher-
income dwellers into some specific residential neighbourhoods (especially in PAC 
north-east); repopulating these targeted areas; bringing amenities and other urban 
activities to these places (attracted by a potentially reinvigorated residential market); 
widening metropolitan and local main roads; and setting more and larger open areas.  
The latter two regulatory changes would imply considerable land expropriations, since 
the state in Chile has compulsory purchase power in cases of public interest, such as 
creating open spaces or widening roads (Gobierno de Chile, 2007a). PAC local 
government claimed that all these reconfigurations were justified by one of the goals of 
the already existing PAC Local Development Plan, which is “to put value into the 
comuna, taking advantage of its strategic location at 15 minutes from the metropolitan 
downtown” (PULSO S.A. Consultores, 2005b: I-62). At first sight, these changes 
looked quite positive, as claimed by the mayor of PAC:  
Urban development has been occurring in San Miguel. Nowadays we have it at just one 
hundred metres away from our comuna. […] That means that at any moment it is going to 
step into our comuna, and I think it is important for this to happen, so we must prepare 
the conditions for the landing of this type of investment, though – I insist – we have got 
very fragmented plots. […] Today we have 90% of homeownership in our comuna. And 
the property is, for that population who today consists of old people (more than 50), their 
                                                 
12 PAC exists as autonomous municipal administration only since 1991. See Appendix 10. 213 
life capital. So it is very hard to ask them to speculate [with that capital] into the real 
estate market, to move out from the comuna, to acquire a different lifestyle. […] They 
don’t accept any transformation; they would suffer if any expropriation goes ahead for a 
planned new avenue, and so on. (Interviewed on 25April 2007) 
It is relevant to see how this actor acknowledged that the existing logic of urban renewal 
in Santiago are: a) speculative b) that they would involve some forms of displacement, 
and c) that they have social and cultural effects akin to gentrification. Nevertheless, he 
stressed the need to promote these changes, understanding, but not justifying, the 
resistance of the local owner-occupiers to them. In short, the structure of the new Master 
Plan, in its First Draft
13, targeted four areas for strategic urban renovation. These are 
analysed in some detail in the following sub-sections. 
5.4.1. Re-zoning in El Carmelo/El Mirador (UR-1) and Villa Centenario/ 
Manuel Rodríguez (UR-2) 
The initial strategy for the new local Master Plan was simple: to radically upgrade the 
zoning to mid and high density in the four quarters of the municipality targeted as 
strategic for urban renewal (coloured in Figure 5.7-B), hence increasing as much as 
possible the potential ground rent in most of these areas. As it was alleged by the 
municipality, the new plan would benefit owner-occupiers that, from then onwards, 
would be able to sell their plots at higher prices. PAC municipality had hired an external 
consultancy firm, namely PULSO, to play as the technical counterpart in the preparation 
of the plan. 
Zones UR-1 and UR-2 were to be developed with higher building density by PULSO, as 
the proposed new regulation considerably increased the building capacity permitted 
there (see tables 5.1-A and B). However, while zone UR-1 was intended to concentrate 
services and generate a sort of metropolitan sub-centre in the north-east quarter of the 
municipality,  because this is the closest and best connected to Santiago-Centre 
downtown, UR-2 was clearly zoned for residential renewal with commercial activities 
                                                 
13 In a master plan, the Draft is a key stage, previous to the approval of the plan. Master Plan stages are 
explained in CHAPTER 6. 214 
and several connections toward the intensively renewing neighbourhood of San Miguel, 
namely El Llano Subercaseaux.  
Tables 5.1A and 5.1B show the increases in the building capacity permitted in the 
proposal. It also shows how density and Plot Area Ratio permitted are visibly upgraded 
in these zones. Once approved, these changes would have clearly opened the door to 
building density similar to that in San Miguel, permitting average heights of around 18 
storeys. Moreover, existing lower-intensity typologies were devitalised through harder 
guidelines regarding Maximum Building Length for terraced house and Minimum Plot 
Size, as Table 5.1-B shows. The potential ground rent was switching to a more than 
interesting prospect for urban redevelopment.  
Zone UR-1 is composed by former and large scale (many derelict) industrial plots and 
residential areas. As Figure 5.8 shows, the property market has been operating modestly 
in this space, reaching only one transaction at a level close to 6 UF/m
2, with an average 
value closer to 2 UF/m
2 for the period. Only in the years 1992, 1997 and 1999 there 
were no registered market operations in this zone. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.6. Views of UR-1 Zone 
Source: author’s archive 
Industrial site in El Carmelo  El Mirador 215 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.7-A. Structure of 
PAC existing zoning  
Source: own elaboration based 
on SIDICO (2003) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.7-B. Structure of 
PAC First Draft Master Plan 
Source: PULSO Consultores 
(2005a) 
 
   
PAC Existing Guidelines    PAC Guidelines First Draft 
Guideline  PAC1 - neighbourhood scale 
(corresponds to UR-2, UR3, 
UR 4 and ensanche in First 
Draft) 
PAC1 - comuna scale 
(corresponds to UR-2, UR3, 
UR 4 and ensanche in First 
Draft) 
PAC2 (partially 
corresponds to 
UR-2 in the 2005 
proposal) 
PAC-3 
(corresponds to 
UR-1 in the 
2005 proposal) 
  Guideline 
UR-1 & UR-2 
Metropolitan amenities  
UR-1 & UR-2 
Residential densification 
Ensanche 
corridors  UR3 & UR4 
Max Density Allowed 
(People/Hectare) 300  300  300  300 
  Max Density Allowed 
(People/Hectare) 700  700  -  - 
Min. Plot Size (m2) 120  400  120  200    Min. Plot Size (m2) 500  500  120  120 
Max Site Coverage (%)  80  80  80  80 
 
Max Site Coverage (%)  80 (0-1 floors), 40 further  80 (0-1 floors), 40 further  80  80 
Max Plot Area Ratio (X * plot size)  1.2 1.6  1.5  1.5    Max Plot Area Ratio (X * plot size)  2.5 2.5  2  1.2 
 Permitted Building Typology  *  *  *  *     Permitted Building Typology  *  *  *  * 
Max building length in terrace type 
- % of Plot Length   80  80  80  80 
  Max building length in terrace type 
- % of Plot Length   60  60  -  - 
Max Building Height for detached 
blocks (metres)  **  **  **  ** 
  Max Building Height for detached 
blocks (metres)  No Limit  No Limit  No Limit  No Limit 
Estimated Potential Ground Rent 
(UF/m2) ***  5.2  8.2   7.5  7.5 
  Estimated Potential Ground 
Rent (UF/m2) ***  15.1   15.1  11.3   5.2  
* Detached, Semi-detached, Terraced house (no change in new guidelines)    * Detached, Semi-detached, Terraced house (no change in new guidelines) 
** In accordance with setback plane and building separation distance established by national regulation (Gobierno de Chile, 2007)    ** In accordance with setback plane and building separation distance established by national regulation (Gobierno de Chile, 2007) 
*** See Appendix 9 for detailed calculation of PGR    *** See Appendix 9 for detailed calculation of PGR 
Table 5.1-A. PAC existing building guidelines and PGR  
Source: Own elaboration based on SIDICO (2003) 
  Table 5.1-B. PAC First Draft building guidelines and PGR 
Source: PULSO (2005a) 216 
Zone UR-1 shows the general tendency of most of the north-eastern PAC quarters, 
which are the most consolidated and in general have a lower incidence of low-income 
enclaves. These neighbourhoods are the closest to the metropolitan downtown, highly 
connected to accessible motorways. The rates of household occupancy (number of 
people per house) are relatively lower than the rest of the comuna, ranging from 2.3 to 
3.7 people per dwelling in its main neighbourhoods (SGA-IBERSIS, 2000). This is 
possibly due to the slightly higher income level of the population here.  
As seen in Table 5.1-A, districts in Zone UR-1 reach a current PGR of around 7.5 
UF/m
2. Nonetheless, were the proposed regulations to be passed, the potential ground 
rent in plots would increase to 15 UF/m
2 or even more. Evidently, potential profits are 
on the verge of rising, from a rather irrelevant value to a more than interesting prospect 
for urban redevelopment, if developers decided to operate in this area. Figure 5.8 below 
shows these values. 
Something quite similar happens in Zone UR-2, located towards the west of the 
metropolitan Norte-Sur Motorway, the closest area to San Miguel’s El Llano and its 
facilities (see Figure 5.7). This zone also hosts the best quality, middle-class houses 
built in PAC, mainly during the 1960s, and plots urbanised under the state-led ‘site and 
services’ programme named Operación Sitio, during the same decade, which promoted 
working-class housing in serviced plots and self-help housing (see CHAPTER 3, also 
Appendix 1-Glossary). The particularity of these neighbourhoods is that they host very 
large plots, usually sized between 200 m
2 to 330 m
2, with an average of 260 m
2, very 
similar in size to the plots that have been renovated in San Miguel (SGA-IBERSIS, 
2000). The average density of people per dwelling is between 3 and 3.5, similar to those 
in zone UR-1, and considerably lower than the rest of the comuna. All these features 
certainly make Zone UR-2 also quite attractive for a potentially rapid renewal. 
As Table 5.1-A shows, Zone UR-2 is currently affected by two types of building-
capacity regulations contained in the existing Master Plan, namely ‘neighbourhood-
scale’ and ‘comuna-scale’. The first one is oriented to residential use, built at small 
scale, with a Plot Area Ratio of 1.2 that currently generates a PGR of around 5 UF/m
2. 
The second one is more flexible, permitting higher and denser construction, with a Plot 217 
PGR produced by First Draft 
PGR produced by existing 
regulations 
Average Cadastral Value 
2003 in the zone 
CGR estimated, 1990-2005 
CGR Tendency line 
Area Ratio of 1.6, thus a current PGR of around 8 UF/m
2. However, with the projected 
new guidelines shown in Table 5.1-B, both switch into a fixed Plot Area Ratio of 2.1, 
producing a homogeneous potential ground rent of 15 UF/m
2, or even higher. Figure 5.8 
shows the current and projected potential ground rent in these two zones (dark and light 
grey respectively), compared with the levels of capitalised ground rent accumulated 
during the fifteen-year period
14, due to the relatively existing small-scale property 
market which has been recorded in these neighbourhoods (blue line). Average cadastral 
values for the zones are shown in yellow.  
 
Figure 5.8. Capitalised 
Ground Rent (CGR) 
variations in UR-1 and 
UR-2, 1990-200515  
Source: Own elaboration 
based on Trivelli (2005) and 
SII (2003) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 With the exception of the years 2003 and 2004, for which data were not available. 
15 Data for years 2003 and 2004 was not available. 218 
Table 5.1-B also shows that, for these two areas, the proposed maximum building length 
was reduced from 80% to 60% of the plot’s length. This change goes potentially against 
small scale projects of densification, which depend on the maximisation of the site 
coverage. This point was politically sensitive during the struggle between the 
community and the municipality, and will be analysed in greater detail in CHAPTER 7. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.9. Views of UR-2 Zone 
Source: author’s archive 
5.4.2. Re-zoning in poblaciones La Victoria (UR-3), and El Esfuerzo 
(UR-4) 
As shown in Figure 5.10, ground rent is relatively static in zones UR-3, namely the 
emblematic población La Victoria (Finn, 2006a, b), and UR-4, namely población El 
Esfuerzo, probably the most deprived neighbourhood in PAC. In La Victoria, in 1997 
there was only one transaction registered, marking a value near 3 UF/m
2. Nevertheless, 
as it has already been mentioned earlier, there is an internal local property market here, 
which does not work via newspaper advertising but through the local community acting 
as a social ‘property agent’. Also in this area, it is usual for the potential buyers to make 
offers to owners, for their properties.  
However, these areas were also heavily targeted for urban renewal by PULSO 
consultants and the municipality but in a different way. Although they kept their 
permitted building capacity (thus the PGR remained at 5.2 UF/m
2, as observed in tables 
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5.1-A and B), the municipal government still estimated that these areas were key for “a 
process of improving residences and neighbourhoods” (PULSO S.A. Consultores, 
2005a: 42-43). For this to happen, a projected new network of roads and squares named 
ensanche (shown in Figure 5.7-B in yellow) was designed to cut across these zones. 
This intervention implied the widening of streets, improvement of pavements, changes 
of direction of traffic flow, merging of different parallel roads and, especially, the 
opening up of large scale ‘renewal squares’.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.10. Capitalised Ground Rent (CGR) variations in UR-3 and UR-4, 1990-200516  
Source: Own elaboration based on Trivelli (2005) and SII (2003) 
 
Two large squares were traced by the proposed First Draft Master Plan, precisely in the 
centres of La Victoria and El Esfuerzo poblaciones, potentially producing 
expropriations such that entire blocks would have to disappear. Although it is true that 
the widening of most of these roads was in accordance with the 1994 Santiago 
Metropolitan Master Plan (PRMS), the fact is that the west-east axis connecting Pedro 
Aguirre Cerda with Ciudad-Parque Bicentenario (see purple circle in Figure 5.7-B) was 
                                                 
16 Data for years 2003 and 2004 not available. 
PGR produced by First Draft 
PGR produced by existing 
regulations 
Average Cadastral Value 
2003 in the zone 
CGR estimated, 1990-2005 
CGR Tendency line 220 
Las Lilas población in El Esfuerzo
Multi-occupied house in La Victoria Ramona Parra Street in La Victoria 
‘Pierre Dubois’ Park in La Victoria
independently added by PAC municipality. The ‘renewal square’ traced in the highly 
consolidated población La Victoria would have totally disrupted the centre of its social 
life and commercial trade. The planned image for these quarters shifted radically from 
the existing one- or two-storey dwellings, to newly built four- or five-storey blocks, as 
the building capacity in the boundaries of these projected axes was upgraded to a PGR 
of more than 11 UF/m
2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.11. Views of La Victoria (UR-3) and El Esfuerzo (UR-4) poblaciones 
Source: photography taken by the author 
However, this proposed ensanche  system, which the local government saw as an 
improvement in the connectivity of PAC, was perceived by local residents as a form of 
muffling traditionally politically ‘troublemaking’ poblaciones  like La Victoria, El 221 
Esfuerzo, Risopatrón, Lo Valledor Norte and José María Caro (see Figure 5.7), visually 
separating them from the rest of the areas scheduled for renewal. The La Victoria 
grassroots leader, Gloria Rodríguez, summarises this appreciation:  
[I]nsofar as they cannot evict us they are going to block us. Their major aim is to evict us 
from here and send us further to the south, to social housing. They have always 
[historically] sent us to the south, I don’t know why
17… I mean the government and its 
policies. […] As they’ll build that stuff [CPB] nearby, they’ll block us just to make us 
invisible, because they suppose here there are only extremists, thieves, drug dealers. Even 
when Cerrillos airport was still operating, there was a huge wall just in front of a slum 
placed there. That is what they want to do with us now. (Interviewed on 11 April 2007) 
The average ground rents in UR-3 and UR-4, shown in Figure 5.10, are barely below 1 
UF/m
2. As noted in the Transect analysis, supposing that this level, or even 2 UF/m
2, 
became a normal price to be paid to homeowners in the hypothetical case that urban 
renewal is triggered in those areas, the high levels of multi-occupancy of dwellings 
would make the potential acquisition of these plots by developers a far more 
complicated issue. The average ratio of people per dwelling in La Victoria is 4.3, and in 
most parts of El Esfuerzo is around four (SGA-IBERSIS, 2000).  
The problem of allegados is crucial in three of the four zones targeted for renewal by 
the municipality. No matter how much the ground rent might realistically increase in the 
hypothetical case that large scale urban renewal starts to operate in PAC, that level 
would be insufficient for meeting the residents’ housing needs. Mario Alvarez, a 
community architect and planner who supported technically PAC grassroots 
communities in their struggle with the municipality between 2003 and 2005, clearly 
addresses this conflict, which is especially problematic in the case of zone UR-2, one of 
the most targeted areas by PAC’s proposed new regulations. His reflections are 
applicable to La Victoria (UR-3) and Las Lilas (UR-4) too: 
You should understand that over 60% of them live in very good conditions. But there is a 
40% who still live in the same shack where they have always lived, with the only 
difference that now there are four families living in one single 80 m
2 house, in relative 
poverty yet in a very good location. Thus any price offered for their 300 m
2, as a way to 
take full advantage of their land, would be very little for a household composed of three, 
                                                 
17 CHAPTER 3 examined this historical process of segregation towards the southern fringes of Santiago. 222 
four or five families. In other words, the only thing they could afford with that money 
would be a first downpayment to cover enough to move towards the back of Renca hill
18. 
(Interviewed on 11 April 2007) 
5.5. PAC grassroots’ Alternative Draft and PULSO’s Final 
Draft Master Plan 
A parallel, independent process of local political participation in PAC, led by local 
leaders, took place since 2005, aimed at generating an alternative communal proposal to 
the official new Master Plan
19. Previously, the most active local leaders had identified 
several aspects of the First Draft municipal plan which, according to them, ought to be 
contested, namely potential expropriations, radical increments of PGR in most of the 
abovementioned four zones, and limitations to small scale housing upgrading. They 
criticised the First Draft prepared by PULSO, the external consultants hired by the 
municipality, in the following terms:  
First, the language of the document was perfectly clear: it established that the central 
objective [of the Master Plan] was to attract investment of real estate firms to the comuna. 
Whilst this objective was identified as ‘progress’, the associative capacity of pobladores 
was undermined and disqualified as ‘the problem to be solved’. The way the plan 
segmented the comuna was an attempt to attract investment via new connections to San 
Miguel (crossing the Norte-Sur Motorway), for attracting buyers who can’t afford to pay 
for flats in El Llano Subercaseaux, convincing them to come to PAC, with a bit of 
marketing. It seems clear that investments in PAC are not meant to be materialised in 
times when we need, but when they want to cleanse us with the force of money (PAC 
Community Leaders, 2005b: 6) 
The goal of the grassroots leaders was thence to produce a counter-proposal to that plan, 
based on their own interpretation of “putting value into the comuna”, which is one of 
the strongest leitmotifs of the Local Development Plan (SGA-IBERSIS, 2000), and also 
the basis for the conceptualisation of the First Draft. At the end of the process, thirteen 
different micro-proposals of urban regulation produced by 19 neighbourhood units were 
assembled together in a single Alternative Draft Master Plan, which despite not having 
                                                 
18 An inexpensive, peripheral and segregated social housing location.  
19 CHAPTER 6 analyses the political aspects of this process. 223 
graphic representation, showed clearly the local people’s perspectives about urban 
development. The firm PULSO, after an initial reluctance to include the grassroots’ 
direct participation in the process, collaborated and partially assisted them in the 
production of their proposal. According to Núñez (2006) and PAC Community Leaders 
(2005b), this communal unified draft was structured as follows: 
a)   Subdivision of the comuna into spatial sub-units. Starting from the four macro-
areas proposed by PULSO, the community expanded this subdivision into 19 
sub-zones. This strategy aimed at matching with the number of existing 
neighbourhoods in Pedro Aguirre Cerda, as a mechanism of closer analysis and 
intervention for every particular micro reality.  
b)   A different local road structure, more adapted to the existing local urban fabric, 
including new open spaces. No new streets should be traced over existing 
residential space, and the initially proposed system of structural squares and 
roads, called ensanche in the First Draft that would connect the centres of La 
Victoria and Las Lilas poblaciones, should be eliminated. The proposal also 
considered the transformation of the overground railway line, which currently 
divides the comuna in two, into an underground Metro-Train line. This would 
free up the existing strip to turn it into a local road and an open space. The goal 
is to connect PAC’s isolated western quarters with the main eastern territory, 
proposing four stations along the line (currently there is only one).  
c)   Definition of small-scale urban renewal zones in the most decayed areas of the 
comuna. Such proposal should run together with a municipal policy that should 
allow: i) the right of dwelling extension; ii) collective applications to public 
funds for rebuilding, extending or upgrading existing dwellings; iii) any form or 
morphology of dwellings; and iv) increase of the maximum building length in 
sites (i.e. the percentage of the plot’s length occupied by a dwelling) up to 80%. 
d)  Zoning proposal of community facilities, services, and a rezoning of industrial 
land use. The location of the municipal new centre should also be reconsidered 
(from its current location in the north-east corner) to a more geometrically 
central position within the comuna. Also, the abandoned large Ochagavía 224 
Hospital  should be re-converted for educational use, or transformed into an 
industrial cluster for micro-entrepreneurs.  
e)  Proposal for open spaces and recreational facilities, comprising community 
parks across the comuna’s space; a pedestrian park parallel to Clotario Blest 
road (converting the existing high-voltage towers into an underground electric 
pipeline); a pedestrian path in Dávila población; to open Manuela Errázuriz 
street. The municipality should consider using part of the municipal budget for 
converting small vacant plots into open spaces, in the most densely populated 
quarters of PAC. 
f)    A global proposal for risk assessment and environmental protection in the 
comuna, especially analysing the effects of petrol stations, transport terminal 
plots, warehouses, gas supply storages, garbage and rubble collection, surfacing 
streets and passages. Also, an assessment of feasibility for a local network of 
storm drainage, and a plan for implementing a sewerage network underneath the 
roads which reach the train line.  
Although the grassroots of PAC could not translate their unified proposal graphically 
into a map, being in fact a list of factors (detailed almost for every Neighbourhood Unit), 
they clearly established building capacities for the 19 sub-zones of the comuna to be 
included in a future local plan. Table 5.2 compares this alternative proposal, in terms of 
the PGR, with the final proposal delivered in 2005 by PULSO
20. PULSO’s second and 
final proposal (see Figure 5.13) is substantially different from the First Draft examined 
in the previous section. As will be explained in CHAPTER 6, the consultants accepted the 
massive participation of PAC grassroots in the preparation of a new draft of the plan, 
and included many of their requirements, yet not all of them. Thus this Final Draft is not 
entirely coincident with the community’s ideas. For instance, Table 5.2 shows how the 
levels of Potential Ground Rent proposed by either party differ considerably, especially 
in the north east of the comuna, in the area surrounding the existing municipal council 
house (Zone ZC-1).  
                                                 
20 This last official version is still awaiting official approval, for reasons to be explained in CHAPTER 6. I 
had to made equivalent the zones of both proposals, in order to compare the different levels of potential 
ground rent implied. 225 
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Figure 5.12. Strategic places in PAC 
grassroots’ Alternative Draft 
a) High voltage line upon Clotario Blest 
Avenue; b) Ochagavía Hospital 
(abandoned); c) brownfield areas 
demanded by the community to be 
converted in open spaces, in San Joaquín 
población, built by the Housing 
Corporation (CORVI); d) train line that 
divides west and east PAC. Photography 
taken by the author 
 
Whilst the community gave in to the proposal for greater building capacity for large-
scale renewal within this small area, the building capacity contained in PULSO’s final 
scheme (which produces a PGR of 23.6 UF/m
2) is still much higher than what PAC 
leaders expected. With less intensity, zones ZC-2 and ZC-3 were zoned with higher 
values than what the community planned for those areas. By and large, PULSO resisted 
reducing their original potential building capacities in the north-east quarter of PAC. 226 
However, in zones ZH-1 and ZH-2, which represent almost 70% of the territory of 
Pedro Aguirre Cerda, the building capacity proposed is considerably more adequate to 
the existing spatial structure, and the levels of potential ground rent produced tend to be 
similar between the local community’s and PULSO’s positions. Also, the final proposal 
developed by PULSO is, in fact, a consolidation of the existing PAC road system, only 
with added changes of direction of traffic flow and the conversion of some local roads 
into metropolitan scale avenues. This point, especially, was seen by the community as 
an achievement because the risk of expropriations was being effectively reduced. As 
Table 5.2 shows, the potential ground rent planned for these areas is not high enough to 
attract redevelopment at a large scale, whilst zones of expropriation practically do not 
exist. Notwithstanding the many differences between PAC grassroots’ guidelines and 
PULSO’s Final Draft
21, this was seen by the local community as a considerable advance 
over the previous situation. 
                                                 
21 Which was given to the author confidentially by PULSO but cannot be divulgated until the plan is 
officially published and approved.  227 
 
 Guideline 
ZC-1 / 
Metropolitan 
infrastructure 
ZC-2 / 
Residential 
densification 
ZC-3 / 
Structural 
Axes - 
Dwellings 
ZH-1 / small 
scale 
services and 
productive 
activities 
ZH-1 / 
residential 
ZH-2 / small 
scale 
services and 
productive 
activities 
ZH-2 / 
residential 
PAC People's Alternative Draft 
Max Density Allowed 
(People/Hectare)  -  700 -  - 500 - 400 
Min. Plot Size (m2)  500  120 300 300 120 200 100 
Max Site Coverage (%)  60  60  60  60  80  60  80 
Max Plot Area Ratio (X * 
plot  size)  2.4  1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.5 
 Permitted Building 
Typology  *  * * * * * * 
Max building length in 
terrace type - % of Plot 
Length    60  80 80 80 80 80 80 
Max Building Height for 
detached blocks 
(storeys)  8  4 3 3 3 2 2 
Estimated Potential 
Ground Rent (UF/m2)  14.4  5.2  5.2  5.2  6.0  5.2  7.5 
PULSO's Final Draft 
Max Density Allowed 
(People/Hectare) 2,000  1,400  -  -  550  -  400 
Min. Plot Size (m2)  500  500 300 400 120 400 100 
Max Site Coverage (%)  80  80  60  80  80  80  80 
Max Plot Area Ratio (X * 
plot  size)  3.6  2.5 1.5 1.4 1.0 1.2 1.8 
 Permitted Building 
Typology  *  * * * * * * 
Max building length in 
terrace type - % of Plot 
Length    60%  80% 80% 80% 80% 80% 80% 
Max Building Height for 
detached blocks 
(storeys)  15 10  4 3 4 2 2 
Estimated Potential 
Ground Rent (UF/m2)  23.6  15.1  7.5  6.7  3.7  5.2  9.8 
* Detached, Semi-detached, Terraced House 
Figure 5.13. Final Draft Master Plan by PULSO, 2005 
Source: PULSO (2005b) 
  Table 5.2. Building guidelines and PGR in PAC people’s Alternative Draft and PULSO’s Final Draft  
Source: own elaboration based on PULSO (2005b) and Alvarez (2005) 
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5.6. Chapter conclusions  
The values observed in the three longitudinal transects, analysed in section 5.3, confirm 
the uneven reality amongst the peri-central south-western comunas of Santiago. The 
territory of San Miguel comuna is by far the first one to be incorporated into the large 
scale circuits of urban renovation in Santiago and where the previously existing rent gap 
has tended to be filled soon after 1990. Cerrillos comuna is a radically different case. 
Despite not being part of the market of urban renewal until recently, it has a 
considerable concentration of social housing in its territory, with increases in capitalised 
ground rents starting in 1997. Cerrillos also experiences visible ground rent valorisation 
since 2000, because this territory is now an open free market for developers of state-
subsidised social and middle-income dwellings that, since that year, seem to have 
started to buy large pieces of land in the south of Ciudad-Parque Bicentenario, due to 
the imminent termination of the building restrictions generated by the airport. 
In general, the ground rent variations experienced after the application of URSA in San 
Miguel, Santiago-Centre, and Estación Central, plus the radical transformations of 
Cerrillos’ airport into Ciudad-Parque Bicentenario, with all the effects that it generates 
in terms of capitalised ground rent (CGR) variation, demonstrate the extent to which 
public policies are key in order to attract the market of urban renewal into the formerly 
industrial and/or working-class related peri-centre, especially in spaces where the 
property market has so far been reluctant to step in.  
In the case of Pedro Aguirre Cerda, a considerable rent gap could be calculated through 
the analysis of Transect 3. The difference between the currently low CGR and the 
relatively high potential ground rent (PGR) seems evident. PAC lies amidst intense 
trends of metropolitan redevelopment. Large scale infrastructural public investment 
surrounds its territory, pushing up its land’s potential intensity of use. However, since 
the agents of urban renewal are actually not capable of materialising these potential 
values through large-scale new buildings because they encounter physical barriers to 
this, i.e. a fragmented structure of very small plots and a restrictive building regulation. 
Therefore, it is the state, especially the municipal administration, which seems best 
placed to make this possible. Given this context, the PGR in Pedro Aguirre Cerda 
comuna  is defined, and from this thesis’ point of view, increased, by the new 229 
regulations proposed by the local government in 2005, surpassing, in broad areas of the 
comuna, the level of 15 UF/m
2.  
The organised PAC Neighbourhood Committees proposed an alternative draft, 
maintaining the PGR in most neighbourhoods roughly at its current level. They defined 
only one specific zone of intense renewal (instead of four) in PAC north-eastern quarter, 
and proposed a road network that produced much fewer expropriations than the ‘official’ 
First Draft. The grassroots’ proposal went even beyond, and addressed several other 
aspects related to local development not considered previously by the authority, e.g. a 
solution to the spatial segregation generated historically by the train line, to convert the 
current high voltage line into an underground conduit, to give use value to the 
unfinished derelict Ochagavía Hospital, several specific environmental issues, and so on.  
PULSO, the consultant for the municipality, redrew its original version according to 
many of these lines, especially reducing its previously planned high building capacities 
in the densest residential areas, but kept room for a considerably enlarged potential 
ground rent in the north-east quarter of PAC. Nonetheless, the local government 
considered this extremely localised potential benefit to large scale developers 
insufficient, rejecting the much less ‘flexible’ counter-proposal that had emerged from 
the interaction between the grassroots and PULSO. Suffice to say that by 2009 the 
approval of the new Master Plan in PAC is stalled.  
Once analysed the technical factors surrounding increases in the rent gap in Pedro 
Aguirre Cerda, and the creation of the conditions for its accumulation, the next chapter 
focuses on the political dimensions of the process. Of particular interest will be the four 
main actors involved: the local community, the professionals that assisted them, the 
municipality, and the consultants hired by the municipality.  230 
CHAPTER 6. The political struggle in the definition of 
Potential Ground Rent in Pedro Aguirre Cerda 
comuna 
6.1. Introduction 
The mechanics of enlargement and eventual accumulation of rent gap in the peri-centre 
of Santiago, analysed so far, reveal how urban renewal tends to be not a ‘natural’ 
process of urban regeneration but one produced via public intervention, whilst an 
important part of the latter are urban guidelines contained in local master plans that 
determine Potential Ground Rent (PGR). However, an issue still not addressed here is to 
what extent the enlargement of the rent gap and its accumulation can be contestable by 
local social forces. In this vein, the present chapter illustrates the struggle among the 
different actors involved in redrafting Pedro Aguirre Cerda’s local Master Plan, between 
2003 and 2005. While CHAPTER 5 was heavily based on quantitative analysis, the 
present chapter draws on qualitative information collected in the field, including 
documents and the main actors’ narratives about the process. 
Matters of social participation are vital in this analysis because, first, in Chile, the 
meanings of citizen participation in local planning established by the national authority 
through its different codes differ considerably, sometimes contradictorily. Second, 
because observing the process from the perspective of the grassroots of PAC, the 
reduction of social participation in the redrafting of the Master Plan could be seen as a 
form of securing increase and accumulation of rent gap whilst avoiding political 
confrontation with the affected population.  
Between April and July 2005, almost all PAC Neighbourhood Units contributed to a 
bottom-up Alternative Draft Master Plan that sought to control the enlargement of the 
rent gap in the comuna. They also forced the local authority’s external technical 
apparatus to reach a compromise and draw a second proposal. In fact, as it has been 
accepted recently by the national authority (MINVU, 2008), Pedro Aguirre Cerda’s is 
one of 11 cases of local people contestation against municipal attempts to master plan 
redrafting that have taken place in recent years in Greater Santiago, ranging from well-231 
off  comunas like Vitacura and La Reina, to low-income ones like Estación Central   
or Lo Espejo (MINVU, 2008a). This indicates that the case of PAC may not be a 
singular, somewhat chaotic
1 case of opportunistic politicisation by the radicalised leftist 
grassroots leaders (as the local and national authority initially claimed it was). In 
contrast, it seems to have been a political struggle against structural factors such as the 
uneven accumulation of ground rent, expropriations and the negative environmental 
effects caused by large scale construction, all of them elements that foster gentrification. 
Four main types of actors (defined in CHAPTER 1 as ‘primary informants’) had direct 
participation in this case: i) the local communities; ii) independent professionals that 
assisted the grassroots; iii) the municipality and iv) the municipality’s external technical 
apparatus, namely the private firm ‘PULSO Consultants’ (PULSO hereafter).  
Broadly speaking, the process followed two major stages: firstly, a top-down First Draft 
developed by PULSO and the municipality that involved considerably limited levels of 
popular participation. The real causes for the lack of more participatory instances are 
still not clear to the actors, with each party involved in the process blaming the others 
for the lack of a better outcome. My interpretative hypothesis for this stage is that the 
local government of Pedro Aguirre Cerda was responding to a managerial-elitist model 
of policy delivery, very functional to the entrepreneurial goals of privately-led large 
scale renewal, with great power concentration in the hands of municipal officials (in the 
way Rivera-Ottenberger, 2008, has observed in other municipalities of Santiago). The 
evidence tends to confirm this. Some responsibility is shared with the regional office of 
the Ministry of Housing and Planning (MINVU) for this exclusion too, as will be seen 
in sub-section 6.2.2. This is because it was the regional authority which separated the 
parallel processes of production of the master plans in Lo Espejo and PAC (two 
neighbouring comunas) instead of unifying them.  
The second stage consisted of a partial control of the process by the grassroots, in 
partial alliance with PULSO but not the municipality, which resulted in the Final Draft 
Master Plan. As analysed in the previous chapter, both stages of the plan implied 
radically different potential ground rents.  
                                                 
1 According to Clark (2005), to claim that gentrification responds to ‘chaotic’ (i.e. unpredictable) social or 
cultural events is in contradiction with structural explanations of gentrification. See sub-section 2.3.4. 232 
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 6.2 illustrates the official definition of 
social participation in urban local planning, and the actual involvement the people was 
allowed to have in PAC, from 2003 to early 2005. Section 6.3 illustrates, in contrast, the 
political capacity of PAC residents to overcome those structural limitations and 
decisively intervene at technical and political levels. More specific factors analysed in 
this section are the political and technical support by external actors that enhanced the 
operative knowledge of PAC community, the means that PAC grassroots could count 
with for their struggle (essentially, independent local mass media) and the evaluation 
PULSO did about the process.  
6.2. An exclusionary approach to local planning 
6.2.1. Legal definitions about social participation in the elaboration of 
local Master Plans 
The levels of participation in the elaboration of comuna  master plans in Chile are 
addressed by the national government in two different ways: first, through technical 
‘recommendations’ to planners and local governments, in order to produce socially 
inclusive and comprehensive plans; second, through ‘laws’ that specifically define when 
and how citizen participation must be addressed by the local authorities. As illustrated 
below, these two ways contradict each other. 
Regarding the recommendations, in 1999 the Ministry of Housing and Planning 
(MINVU) published Circular-55, an instrument that gives general and specific guidance 
to Chilean planners for the elaboration of local master plans (MINVU, 1999). This 
document advocates that citizen participation should be iterative along the process, 
because 
the success of a plan largely lies on the ability of the municipality to receive input from 
those who have the knowledge about the history and lifestyles of the community and its 
ability to achieve coordinated economic investments, both public and private, leading to 
better alternatives for community development and the consolidation towards solidarity in 
their realisation. [… I]t is important to note, though, that the image of a comuna is not 233 
only an expression of will of its municipality and its residents. Since the comuna is part of 
a larger entity [the metropolis], the requirements and expectations generated outside the 
comuna must be necessarily present in the plan. […] But the level of acceptance of a 
Master Plan by a community will be greater if this community understands and shares its 
contents, at least in its main points. Hence, the importance of incorporating information 
and  feedback as key elements in the process, since a periodic evaluation of the 
implementation of the Plan in the comuna will give opportune and appropriate responses 
to the requirements of the territory, preventing inequities that occur in areas of low 
quality of life (MINVU, 1999: 11; emphasis in the original). 
In very general terms, the same document defines that the elaboration of a local master 
plan should transit through the following steps:  
1)  Diagnosis, comprising quantitative and qualitative general approach to the local 
territory, its social and economic base, its natural and built environment, etc.  
2)  Proposals and agreements of long-term development alternatives, based on 
possible forms of growth envisaged.  
3)  Draft, comprising definitions of local macro-zones or homogenous areas, land 
uses and land use intensities assigned.  
4)  Approval of the plan, granted by all the relevant actors of the comuna 
represented by the Local Economic and Social Council, CESCO  (Consejo 
Económico y Social Comunal) and, ultimately, by regional MINVU.  
However, depending on every comuna’s particularities, the general process might 
become more or less iterative, depending on the level of success and capacity of 
agreement the plan generates among the several social and economic actors involved. 
Nevertheless, a strategic accent in social participation is recommended for all the stages, 
it being important that municipalities  
along with collecting the people’s aspirations, and specifying what their vision of ‘city 
project’ is, design appropriate and feasible mechanisms for consultation to reach accurate 
diagnosis and proposals. […] In consequence, and according to the available means, it is 
necessary that the municipality promotes a broad discussion, either through interaction 
with the [local] agencies and institutions that [could give] relevant information to the 
study and/or through interviews and workshops, and provides a schedule that includes 234 
number and type of meetings, and identification of participant informants. […] It is 
important that [social] participation be present at all stages of the process of elaboration 
or redrafting of the instrument, and that a permanent dialogue with the Regional MINVU 
office takes place. (MINVU, 1999: 25) 
However, the indications contained in Circular-55 are only recommendations. By 
contrast, the National Law of Planning and Construction (Ley General de Urbanismo y 
Construcciones, LGUC) is compulsory over the whole Chilean territory. For instance, 
Article 43 of the LGUC states specifically how social participation must be performed 
during the elaboration of a new (or redrafting of an existing) local master plan. Yet, as 
previously noted, the principles established in the LGUC are considerably less 
participative than those proposed by Circular-55. For example, this law states that social 
participation comes only after the Draft Master Plan is prepared. Therefore, before its 
final discussion and eventual approval by the municipal technical apparatus, the local 
council must: 
a)  Inform residents, especially those to be affected by the new plan, about its main 
features and effects, following what is stated in the General By-law of Planning 
and Construction (Ordenanza General de Urbanismo y Construcciones, OGUC) 
(Gobierno de Chile, 2007b: 1-10), whilst 
such information must be delivered, at least, through certified letter to the involved local 
social organisations legally constituted; moreover, through a notice in a media of ample 
diffusion in the municipal territory, the residents must be given that information and the 
availability of free copies of the text in a place indicated. 
b)  Also, according to the Law of Municipalities (Ley Orgánica Constitucional de 
Municipalidades, LOCM) (Gobierno de Chile, 2004), the municipality must 
conduct one or more public hearings in the most affected neighbourhoods in 
order to present the Draft to the community during 30 days, after the public 
hearing(s). However this law does not indicate how many hearings must be 
conducted, so this can be decided unilaterally by the local administration 
(Rajevic, 2001).  
c)  After the presentations, the municipality should call the community and 
constitute the Local Economic and Social Council, CESCO, for a new public 235 
hearing specifically aimed at the master plan. The local government must also 
present a report synthesising the observations from the community received 
hitherto. Further enquiring or observations can be received during 15 days after 
the last public hearing.  
d)  The place for the exhibition of the project, and the venue and time for the public 
hearings, must be advertised over two days
2, during two different weeks, either 
in one of the most popular newspapers of the local territory, through radio 
advertisement or other local mass media.  
e)  From then on, and during 30 days, the local council should analyse the 
community’s observations and decide on their inclusion (or not) in the plan. If 
important changes are to be made in the project, stage b) must be conducted 
again. Once the Draft is approved at local level, it is sent to the regional office of 
the Ministry of Housing and Planning (MINVU), which must analyse and decide 
if the plan is in accordance with the national legislation and the metropolitan or 
inter-municipal master plan
3. This latter process must take a maximum 60 days. 
An aspect largely regarded by most of the technical informants of this study, public 
officers and scholars, is that the levels of social participation contained in the Chilean 
law are quite insufficient for promoting effective participation and avoiding the 
emergence of major conflicts, especially in low-income urban areas like Pedro Aguirre 
Cerda (PAC) comuna. Nelson Morales, Head of the Regional Office of MINVU, 
addressed this point:  
We are currently updating several local master plans [in Santiago], around 28, in which in 
different instances we have identified a series of limitations [related to lack of 
participation]. We are working on a legal project to improve citizen participation in our 
instruments of urban regulation, seeking to go in depth in the role of bottom-up initiatives 
in early stages of master plan rezoning, to open a bit more the current mechanisms. […] 
But  Santiaguinos, Chileans in general, traditionally relate participation as issues 
constrained to basic service delivery, like water and electricity, but nothing more than that. 
                                                 
2 Projects of master plans are usually exhibited in town councils. 
3 In Santiago, this is the Santiago Metropolitan Master Plan (Plan Regulador Metropolitano de Santiago, 
PRMS) in application since 1994 (Carvacho, 1996). 236 
Differently, in La Victoria and all those poblaciones emerged from Operación Sitio [see 
sub-section 3.4.2.3, page 109], the political and social aspects related to master plans are 
much more important for them. (Interviewed on 17 May 2007) 
According to this high commissioner
4, in Chile, participation in local planning is 
culturally associated to a form of obtaining particular gains. However, the people from 
Pedro Aguirre Cerda, and La Victoria población specifically, may be an exception to 
this rule, since, as this chapter seeks to show, the level and consciousness of 
participation developed by them was more embedded in a long-term perspective of local 
development. However, Mr. Morales also gave an official acceptance about the 
insufficient spaces of social participation currently existing in the several processes of 
local planning being developed in Santiago. From this perspective, the decision taken 
initially by the municipal government of PAC that disfranchised social local actors from 
the process may be less an exceptional case, and more a rule.  
Furthermore, a recent report developed by the Faculty of Architecture and Planning, 
University of Chile, released in 2008 to the media (Herman, 2008b; Torres, 2008b), 
claimed the urgent need for modifying the national LGUC in order to include more 
effective mechanisms of citizen participation through all the phases of a local master 
plan, making the whole process more transparent. This is especially due to the one-sided 
influence that private developers usually exert over the public sector
5. As Dr. Hugo 
Romero, an experienced scholar from this university, argues, 
in our country there are two types of social participation. One is rhetorical. We, the 
people, have the feeling we are being consulted and considered. But in practice since that 
participation has no real voice in the representative institutions that take the decisions, it 
is reduced to public hearings, conducted in some municipal assembly hall, where 
technocrats explain – as the initiated ones, using their maximum creativity – to the society 
what we have to accept. […] Nonetheless the second type of participation is what really 
matters, and this is the one which is more incidental in Chile: the lobbying. […] Lobbying 
and communicational strategies imply undoubtedly the search of consensus and the 
generation of arguments […] greatly helped by the mass media; a whole hegemonic 
construction made unilaterally. (Interviewed on 31 March 2007) 
                                                 
4 No longer in charge since 2008. 
5 Sub-section 3.7.3 also addressed this point. 237 
In fact, there was agreement among the 11 scholars interviewed during the fieldwork 
that real citizen participation in the elaboration of local master plans in Chile is 
insufficient. As many of them reckoned, municipalities can even interpret, with a high 
degree of freedom, what the LGUC, the OGUC and the Law of Municipalities define 
about the inclusion of citizens’ criteria in the final results of these processes (Rajevic, 
2001). However, as I observed in the field, higher government levels may also share 
responsibility in promoting a less participatory production of master plans. In the 
specific case of PAC, a decision taken by the regional office of MINVU was to bestow 
the elaboration of PAC and Lo Espejo Master Plans to two different, totally isolated 
external consultants, despite the fact that they are adjacent territories and their plans 
were conducted at the same time between 2003 and 2005. This point is addressed below. 
6.2.2. The isolation of PAC and Lo Espejo Master Plans 
The process of redrafting PAC Master Plan began in late 2003
6. Following current 
legislation, the Regional Office of the Ministry of Housing and Planning (MINVU) 
invited private consultant firms to bid for this project. In that occasion, and as usual, 
two pairs of master plans were offered: PAC was coupled with Curacaví comuna, whilst 
Lo Espejo (PAC’s southern neighbouring comunas, with which it shares población José 
María Caro) was coupled with Til-Til comuna. As Figure 6.1 illustrates, this strategy 
coupled one peri-central and one peripheral comuna in two separate bids. The contracts 
for Pedro Aguirre Cerda and Curacaví comunas were awarded to PULSO Consultants, 
while Lo Espejo and Til-Til were awarded to SEREX (attached to Catholic University). 
Grouping several comunas in one single tender is a regular modus operandi by regional 
offices of MINVU across the country. However, from the beginning the separation of 
PAC and Lo Espejo seemed awkward for PAC key local social actors. Two 
municipalities that share similar problems could have been considered integrally 
together for the elaboration of two integrated local master plans, or one single inter-
                                                 
6 The project’s cost was 80 million Chilean Pesos in total (US$ 143,000 approximately), 95% of which 
came from regional sources and the remaining four millions from PAC municipality. Project Code N° 
20180023-0 in SERPLAC’s 2005 Regional Investment Programme, Government of Chile (SERPLAC, 
2005: 116).  238 
comuna  master plan. Instead, MINVU made both processes run in parallel, with 
virtually no communication between the two technical teams. 
Investigating the real motivations for this separation was not easy during the fieldwork, 
because official interviewers claimed this was a purely technical decision. Yet it was 
clearly admitted off-the-record by several interviewees, from national and regional 
MINVU, that this was a mistake, a lost opportunity for making a new integrated inter-
municipal plan. However, PAC community leaders were far more sceptical. Many of 
them thought the separation of PAC and Lo Espejo was an attempt to divide and 
disenfranchise, in advance, potential reactions from the local people, especially from the 
two ‘conflictive’ poblaciones La Victoria and José María Caro, which also belongs to 
Lo Espejo (see Figure 6.2), and especially since these two neighbourhoods have been 
historically coordinated in previous political mobilisations, especially during the 
military dictatorship (1973-1990). Whether regional MINVU deliberately sought to 
isolate these naturally integrated enclaves or not is a matter of speculation. However, 
the existing evidence confirms this possibility as plausible.  
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6.2.3. PAC municipality’s interpretation of participation in the Master 
Plan 
As established by the national Law of Municipalities (LOCM) it is the local government 
that has to select the best proponent for the elaboration of its Master Plan. PAC mayor 
explained in an interview that the municipality selected PULSO because it proved more 
experienced in spatial and development planning. Furthermore, Beatriz State, PAC 
Municipal Urban Advisor and, legally, the official technical municipal counterpart for 
the plan, claims the intention of PAC local administration was to be as inclusive as 
possible.  
If we didn’t have a clear picture of our municipal territory, agreed with the community, 
how could we agree about the results? […] In fact, PULSO won the tender because they 
included such dimensions [of high levels of participation] and proposed a mechanism that 
seemed efficient to us. In contrast, the rest of the proposals just about met legal 
requirements, which are clearly limited and only consider people’s perceptions once the 
project has been designed. Theoretically speaking, PULSO’s model was fantastic. […] 
However, they [later] said they would work with representative actors only, not with the 
whole community. That seemed fine to us again, until they started to work here. Then we 
realised that the participatory process during the diagnosis would be really bad, because 
they didn’t actually call the people.  
EL: Why do you stress so much the consultants’ responsibility, given that the municipality 
should have led this process? 
No. What happens is that … and that’s were the big mistake is: the municipality is only a 
counterpart, according to the Ministry’s scheme. It is the consultant who has to do the job. 
The municipality is only a facilitator of their duty, and on the other hand we must 
supervise. So, that’s when our conflicts [with PULSO] started, and obviously my reports 
[about them] were very negative. (Interviewed on 25 April 2007) 
This position is not agreed by the regional office of the Ministry of Housing and 
Planning. Elvira Guerrero, regional MINVU Chair for Local Master Plans claims that 
the principal reason for the struggle over the new Master Plan in Pedro Aguirre Cerda 
was precisely the lack of well informed social participation during the initial stages of 
the plan. In her opinion, PAC municipality had a major responsibility over this. 240 
We [regional MINVU] coordinate the channelling of resources, the whole process of 
public tender, we are the technical counterpart, but it is the municipality which has to take 
on the leading role in this process, because it is they who have to say in which direction 
PAC should develop. But they didn’t take on that role, and they let the consultancy firm 
go alone at working with the residents. And finally, the municipality didn’t like the 
outcome. Hence, they haven’t recognised the whole job done. Now they won’t accept it, 
so the situation is at present really complex. We’d have expected more direct involvement 
by municipal officers, but now we’re at a stage in were the job is stalled, unfinished. 
(Interviewed on 10 April 2007) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2. Main Neighbourhood Units in PAC  
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As a report by Núñez (2006) indicates, in mid 2004, PAC’s local community realised 
that PULSO’s initial agenda of participation was insufficient (PULSO S.A. Consultores, 
2005a) and possibly biased to include only specific neighbourhood units, identified ex-
ante by the municipal apparatus as the ’friendliest’ ones. Conversely, the municipality 
probably did not insist enough in inviting leaders from the more combative poblaciones, 
like La Victoria, José María Caro, El Esfuerzo and Nueva Lo Valledor (see Figure 6.2).  
In a report released in August 2005, PULSO accepted their own initial reluctance to be 
more inclusive, clearly justified, as they claimed, by the thorny municipal electoral 
panorama of 2004 and even by the characteristics of PAC residents, such as: 
a) people’s ignorance about what a master plan is and about the process of approval; b) 
the contents of a master plan are highly technical, therefore they should have been 
translated into a simpler language; c) a weak process of participation and information 
because it coincided with the local electoral process; d) the latter tended to politicise any 
activity in the comuna. (PULSO S.A. Consultores, 2005b: A4-1) 
Further to this apparently technical decision, there is evidence to infer that the inclusion 
of PAC people in the preparation of the new Master Plan was not totally transparent. In 
a night chat programme of the La Victoria local TV station (see Figure 6.7), Eduardo 
Vilches, representing Neighbourhood Unit N° 13 ‘Union y Esfuerzo’ (see Figure 6.2), 
claimed that the address of the venue where the hearing to assess PULSO’s First Draft 
would be held, was incorrectly printed in the official invitations they received. In 
consequence, many attendees, as they complained later to him, had been directed into 
non-existent venues. During the same night programme, other leaders that attended 
those hearings (thus they received correct invitations) confirmed that there were not 
enough chairs, while “other essential facilities for professionally conducting the meeting 
were lacking” in those meetings. These should not be taken as irrelevant points. Social 
representatives invited to the programme agreed that those two elements were attempts, 
on the part of the local authority, to demoralise them and exclude them from the 
process
7. However, these elements triggered – in advance – even higher levels of unrest 
among PAC community leaders. This evidence suggests that the municipality, acting 
                                                 
7 Source: Night talk programme in local TV station “Señal 3 La Victoria”. 242 
through PULSO, was able to steer the process, including the selection of community 
representatives.  
6.3. The rough way to produce a bottom-up Alternative Draft: 
reactivating a local history of struggle 
6.3.1. A historical community mobilisation reactivated 
By the end of 2004, PULSO had been working for over a year on the First Draft Master 
Plan, and the rezoning of the comuna had largely taken shape. However, at this time, 
this proposal was unknown to most grassroots representatives. This led to higher levels 
of suspicion regarding the imminence of land expropriations and consequently, 
evictions. Several neighbourhood leaders demanded from the mayor of PAC an official 
response to these fears. Mr. Saavedra, the mayor, in an improvised meeting with these 
representatives held in front of the council house in 18 May 2005
8, gave them 
assurances that, in PAC, there would be “no expropriations whatsoever”. However, 
PAC leaders saw blurriness and inconsistency in Mr. Saavedra’s discourse.  
The reasons for their scepticism lay in the fact that the use of expropriations, as defined 
by the norm contained in the National Law of Planning and Construction (LGUC) is 
warranted in cases of public interest, such as when a new master plan includes a new 
open space, or widening a road. Article 59 of this law states that urban plots may 
become ‘frozen’, from the moment a new master plan is approved, if the plot is 
“affected by declaration of public interest and awaiting public expropriation or 
acquisition proceedings, it will be not permitted to increase the volume of the buildings 
existing at the date of approval of the respective master plan, in the affected part of the 
property in case the expropriation declaratory [partially covers the plot].” (Gobierno de 
Chile, 2007a: 4.1) Conscious of this legislation, Claudina Núñez, social leader from La 
Victoria and at the time Local Councillor in PAC, opines that: 
                                                 
8 Also broadcasted by local TV station La Victoria. 243 
[The municipality] said we [PAC social leaders] were just scaring people, as no plot in 
PAC would be expropriated. But obviously there would be lots of expropriations! They 
were widening streets: 30 de Octubre street would be joined with its parallel, Paseo 
Groher, thenceforth a whole row of houses would disappear, from Galo González street 
to here
9. And in Histórica de Chile Neighbourhood Unit, Club Hípico street was to be 
widened towards the east up to Manuela Errázuriz street. Therefore, two passages were 
also disappearing. Other streets were disappearing too in Villa Sur población. And in San 
Joaquín población, some residential areas were being rezoned to commercial use. That 
meant that those social dwellings would be easily subject to expropriation. Densities 
considerably increased everywhere. All of that was the consultants’ [First] Draft. 
(Interviewed on 31 March 2007) 
The initial statement by the mayor, that there would be no expropriation, had to be soon 
rectified through a municipal statement. The contradiction with the First Draft, that was 
starting to be known by the community, was evident. A crucial meeting was organised 
by the municipality, restricted to no more than 13 community leaders, to present 
publicly the First Draft Master Plan. The meeting was scheduled for 28 May 2005, in 
the facilities of Risopatrón School, located in the south-western corner of PAC. Berta 
Alarcón, social representative from Neighbourhood Unit N° 8-H ‘Nueva Lo Valledor’ 
recalls what happened in that meeting: 
When we knew they would be having a workshop about the Master Plan, aimed for 12 or 
13 people, we spread the word among leaders and we rushed to take possession of the 
place, bringing along residents from all of PAC’s corners. […] The municipality was 
outraged, given that their logic has always been to work by stealth. [But instead, through 
our intervention] this process became much more coordinated. [In subsequent 
opportunities] whenever PULSO was presenting their plan we were present. And what 
happened is that the people usually opposed their ideas. (Interviewed on 11 May 2007) 
The massive attendance to Risopatrón School that evening was broadcast in detail by 
channel 3 TV La Victoria (see Figure 6.3). A social leader from this población recalls 
the conflictive meeting as follows: 
When the first meeting began, everybody was going there, even carrying children. We 
were about three hundred only
10. But when [PULSO] spoke there were thousands of us 
                                                 
9 She refers to the ensanche intervention in the very centre of La Victoria, as seen in the First Draft 
proposal, shown in CHAPTER 5, Figure 5.7-B. 
10 PULSO counted between 500 and 600 attendees that evening (PULSO S.A. Consultores, 2005b).  spea
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identity nor the needs of the community” (Núñez, 2006: 1). As observed in CHAPTER 5, 
the proposed rezoning would intervene heavily in four areas of the comuna (from UR-1 
to UR-4) yet “without a global vision of the territory” (Ibid).  
Nonetheless, the evidence suggests that, at this point, the PAC community was 
unprepared, disorganised and had little technical knowledge to face the authority. But 
soon after the first face-to-face on Risopatrón School had taken place, the leaders from 
La Victoria requested political advice from the head of the Communist Party, and 
technical support from the Chilean Architects Union, a professional NGO called Sur, 
and the private architect Mario Álvarez. These external supporters were instrumental in 
technically enhancing PAC people’s capacities toward the constitution of a collective 
counter-proposal, which would be partially synthesised in PULSO’s final proposal as 
discussed at the end of the previous chapter.  
6.3.2. A politicised movement? 
When I asked Gilda García – Municipal Director of Construction, a highly experienced 
and influential officer within PAC municipal apparatus – why PULSO’s First Draft was 
rejected by the people of PAC, she explains:  
We had an idealistic project that we thought might work well, but when the time of 
citizen participation came, this project was taken quite politically by the people, and they 
dismantled it. […] It was bad luck. […] The firm didn’t have enough experience in the 
issue of citizen participation either, although they had experience in PLADECOs
11. […] 
Yet a PLADECO is quite different from a master plan, because when you ask people to 
‘dream’, that’s quite nice, but when you tell them: ‘look, this road is going to be widened’, 
well, then things become totally different. And La Victoria was considered [by PULSO’s 
first rezoning proposal] as a centre [for intervention]. Since la Victoria doesn’t have a 
single square metre to breathe in, PULSO proposed that there should be a square there, 
but that idea was not accepted by people from La Victoria. And all that PULSO had 
thought for the rest of the areas of PAC didn’t work either, because La Victoria’s people 
resolved to meddle in every assembly where PULSO was attempting to explain what the 
plan was about. […]  
                                                 
11 Local Development Plan. See Appendix 11 for definition. 246 
I think at the stage of citizen participation, when you expect people will take [the spaces 
of participation], you can’t expect they will accept what you believe, or give you the 
answer you want. But this [mistake] was precisely what PULSO fell into. Therefore, 
when you want to transmit an idea to people, you need valid counterparts, someone that 
can understand you and can explain to people in their own language and look after their 
interests; but that wasn’t done here. Instead, the plan was explained in a technical 
language, in a big assembly. But, how can you expect to explain an area is to be 
expropriated in the middle of La Victoria to a group of 500 people? You can’t expect it to 
be a successful workshop! […] People took very badly the issue of expropriations. 
Nobody thought that their houses might be expropriated but they would receive, maybe, 
an apartment [in exchange]. People saw expropriations just as their houses being taken 
away from them.  
EL: but that’s natural, due to the connotation the word ‘expropriation’ has had for a long 
time… 
It’s linked with the idea that you have to leave [the place] and have no right to anything 
[in exchange]. But if you think further, everything is a matter of terminology. Maybe 
PULSO didn’t have the space to explain in greater detail what this process means and 
how it would be. Moreover, maybe the process [of expropriations] would never exist and 
everything will end just as a plan, but there was not such clarifying instance. And there 
was nothing more to do because the issue had already been politicised. Everything 
technical that might be said afterwards would be taken politically. […] Personally, I don’t 
feel responsible for this at all, because I told PULSO that they could not explain these 
points to the people in a large assembly. But a professional, a sociologist working for 
them, told me: ‘madam, please leave this thing to us, the professionals.’  
I’ve been working for 20 years as Director of Construction and I know these people! I’m 
not trying to be pejorative, but if you want to explain something to these people, you have 
to do it three times, you have to expect they will not understand all you want to say the 
first time. Not only people from La Victoria, but everyone, when you address them in a 
technical language. […] 
EL: But trying to be as objective as possible, PAC people’s discourse was quite strong, 
and I don’t think they were ignorant: they were being advised by the Architects Union. 
In that case they were poorly advised! More than anything else, they asked for political 
advice. And I don’t think the Architects Union agrees with this Final Draft we have got 
now. It’s bad. It’s not going to trigger any urban development in our areas.  
EL: What do you understand by urban renewal? 247 
It must be participative, looking for ways to make participation effective. 
EL: What do you understand by participation? 
That people understand and are absolutely in agreement with what is going to be done. 
That they understand that the risks benefit them totally. That they understand this very 
well.  
Mrs. García claims essentially two things: First, that it is relatively improbable that low-
income people can grasp all the implications arising from implementing a master plan, 
given their limited technical preparation. Second, that the grassroots did not have the 
capacity to understand the conceptual difference between a territorial master plan and a 
simple ‘architectural project’. In the way she explained this, a plan implies a certain set 
of potential situations that could be turned into reality or not, whilst a project is the 
representation of a built structure to be materialised. The mistake PAC people 
apparently fell into was the misinterpretation of the First Draft’s structure as a factual 
situation, an imminent process of expropriations, and not a potentiality.  
According to her, a second reason for the failure of the First Draft was that PAC people 
let themselves be involved in a too politicised, negative approach to the plan, closing 
the door to further objective discussions about possible and necessary expropriations, 
even if they had benefited them. The influence of La Victoria was key for leading the 
rest of the grassroots’ reactions, and this situation conspired against the (otherwise) 
normal development of the further instances in the production of the plan. She 
summarises PAC municipality’s official explanation of why the process, at a given 
point, escaped from their hands. 
In fact, most municipal and regional MINVU informants agree with the idea that the 
process of production of the Master Plan in PAC was ‘politicised’, actually meaning the 
unbalanced relation between leaders of La Victoria and the rest of the communal 
representatives, and the involvement of the Chilean Communist Party at some stage of it, 
as a way to destabilise the process (see Figure 6.4). The evidence shows that both 
elements are effective and could be observed during the fieldwork. Yet, according to the 
official interviewees, this destabilisation was supposed to have been conducted through 
the appointment, by the party, of communist professionals, seeking to help communist 248 
local leaders to instrumentalise the rest of PAC grassroots’ reactions. Since this is a 
matter of some speculation, it deserves further treatment.  
Architect Mario Alvarez was directly blamed by the municipality as one of the links 
between the Communist Party and the grassroots of PAC. In an interview given to me, 
he confirms that the grassroots of Pedro Aguirre Cerda could have become, at some 
point, a mere instrument used by the Communist Party to take over the municipal 
government, but at the end of the day, this did not happen. In fact, there was 
disagreement inside the Communist Party regarding this point. 
A meeting was organised in the Victor Jara Cultural Centre, only for communist social 
leaders. Once there, a strange situation happened: a conflict between communists. 
Councillor Araneda
12, a guy with a respectable trajectory because he once was major of 
San Miguel, and a communist, tried to use the master plan struggle as a political-electoral 
juncture, in a more subtle way, for seizing by stealth the municipality’s direction. But 
Claudina Núñez firmly demanded that this process should be opened to the whole PAC 
community. This meant that such information should be released to the public and be 
disseminated. It was a meeting of 20 or 30 people, and […] when the time to vote came, 
Claudina’s proposition won. (Interviewed on 11 April 2007) 
What Mr. Alvarez claims is that there may have been higher levels of autonomy and 
political independence among PAC grassroots than those the public sector is willing to 
accept. Of course there was political influence exerted by the communists, especially 
those from La Victoria, and to a lesser extent from población San Joaquín, over the rest 
of PAC leaders and the people. This influence sought to oppose PULSO’s First Draft 
and take control of the process. In fact, some PAC neighbourhood representatives even 
withdrew from the process of participation (from ‘Villa Numancia’ and ‘Histórica de 
Chile’ neighbourhood units)
 13, arguing that they had been quietened by the radicalised 
mainstream. Nonetheless, all in all, the political influence in PAC grassroots came from 
legitimately elected local representatives, not decisively from the Communist Party 
apparatus. Moreover, it seemed logical to many interviewees that Mrs. Núñez, who was 
                                                 
12 I tried to interview this actor but he was inaccessible. 
13 When I interviewed these representatives, they showed agreement with the First Draft master plan, 
arguing this was much needed a change of social status and opportunity for physical and infrastructural 
improvement in their poblaciones. Yet these were only three leaders, from a total of 16 social 
representatives interviewed. 249 
possibly running for the mayoral elections in 2008, still needed to legitimise herself as 
an effective grassroots political leader with chances to win the next election. She needed 
to prove she was representing the whole PAC community and not only her closest left-
wing supporters from La Victoria. Besides, her high level of technical knowledge 
regarding this specific case has been largely accepted by most PAC grassroots 
informants interviewed, and even by some governmental officials. 
Moreover, the difficult relation between the municipal technical apparatus and 
mobilised local communities should not be exclusively attributed to this single case. 
Much less is it a matter of conflict between the social-democratic party the mayor 
belongs to (the PPD, currently part of Concertación [Concerted Action], the governing 
coalition of the country; see Appendix 1-Glossary) and the Communist Party. The great 
majority of the grassroots interviewed made evident their rejection to the mayor’s and 
his technical officers’ modus operandi. Some even accused certain municipal officials 
(including the mayor) of corruption, bribery and even alliance with PAC local drug 
mafias
14. In many senses, the conflict experienced in the process of rezoning was to 
some extent a climax in an already long process of political/social deterioration that has 
taken place since the mid 1990s. 
  
                                                 
14 Although corroboration of these grave accusations lies beyond this research, it seems that they originate 
in negative personal perceptions of the mayor, reflecting the considerable level of detachment between 
PAC governmental apparatus and the people.  
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As an example of bad practice from the municipality, Figure 6.4 shows an anonymous 
pamphlet that circulated in PAC in early 2005, blaming local leader Claudina Núñez 
and Councillor Araneda for terrorising the local population, especially old people, with 
the threat of expropriations. The pamphlet clearly states there would be no 
expropriations whatsoever. It further accuses Mrs. Núñez and Mr. Araneda of taking 
political advantage of this ploy. Although it is anonymous, La Victoria community 
leaders believe this pamphlet might have been drafted by someone in the municipal 
government, because of the level of information demonstrated and the fact that it 
focuses only on these two actors. 
6.3.3. The resources of the grassroots 
After the event in Risopatrón School had taken place, and led to a technical counter-
proposal, three resources were utilised by the grassroots of PAC to foster citizen 
participation. Firstly, regular workshops initially organised, and later just propelled, by 
La Victoria leaders and PULSO technicians. These helped ordinary people keep up to 
date with the plan aims, and form their own opinion (highly influenced by La Victoria 
leaders, though). A second resource was La Victoria local TV Station ‘Channel 3’ and 
its uninterrupted, though illegal broadcasting
15. In 2005, in at least three long evening 
talk programmes, technical and political topics related to the rezoning were discussed 
(see Figure 6.5). The third resource was the support from the following professional 
external actors: 
1.  SUR Profesionales, one of the most consolidated NGOs in Santiago focusing on 
urban development issues, of social-democratic orientation. Currently it advises 
the central government and MINVU on housing policy issues. The long-dating 
connection between SUR and some community leaders from Pedro Aguirre 
Cerda, especially Claudina Núñez, was vital, since she is a graduate of SUR’s 
Programme in Community Leadership. Other grassroots leaders like Gloria 
                                                 
15 The Chilean law of telecommunications bans independent local TV and radio broadcasting (Villagra, 
2009). A draft new law is being discussed currently in the national Parliament that might allow these 
forms of social broadcasting (Walder, 2009). 252 
Rodríguez and Luz Castillo attended the programme during 2003 and 2005
16. 
Their higher level of preparation, obtained through these studies, is one of the 
causes these three actors were the most influential among grassroots leaders in 
PAC at the time. 
2.  Mario Alvarez, an architect and a planner, and member of the Communist Party. 
This advisor was the most deeply involved during the elaboration of the bottom-
up proposal. Under his guidance, the community’s alternative proposals took 
more concrete shape in a draft text, and he was assisted by his 3
rd year 
undergraduate students from Metropolitan University, School of Architecture. 
The latter were instrumental in guiding the community workshops in almost 
every neighbourhood unit.  
3.  Colegio de Arquitectos de Chile. PAC leaders received initial advice from 
Architect Francesca Clandestino. She first oriented La Victoria leaders about the 
meaning of a master plan, indicating also crucial aspects to solve, such as the 
north-south railway that divides the comuna. 
Ten joint workshops where agreed between PULSO and PAC leaders, to be held 
between June and July 2005. These meetings sought to disseminate and debate the Draft 
Master Plan, and were organised in a much more participatory fashion. They ran in 
parallel with PULSO’s own development of the final version of the plan, and were 
aimed by the consultants at providing the social feedback they lacked in their initial 
attempt. But hitherto, leaders from La Victoria had produced several copies of a CD 
containing PULSO’s First Draft, with additional information provided by Councillor 
Araneda, and distributed the information among the rest of the neighbourhood units. 
With this information in their hands, additional workshops were developed in almost all 
PAC neighbourhood units. In these meetings, everyone interested in participating could 
analyse the consultants’ proposal, supported by professionals and a team of students.  
 
 
                                                 
16 See Appendix 5 for list of interviewees. 253 
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Figure 6.5. Three different night talk programmes in La Victoria TV local station 
b-c) PAC people debating the implications of the rezoning in two opportunities; at the centre of image c)  is 
LV leader Gloria Rodríguez. d-f) Mario Álvarez explaining graphically technical aspects of the rezoning 
related to building regulations. Source: TV local station ‘Señal 3 La Victoria.’ 
In early July 2005 the global proposal was ratified in a communal general assembly by 
PAC residents. This is the one analysed in section 5.4. In late July, the communal 
Alternative Draft was submitted to PULSO, regional MINVU, the municipal 
government and the local councillors, in order to have these community proposals 
considered, before readjusting and approving the plan by the local and national 
authority (PAC Community Leaders, 2005a). 254 
6.3.4. Current status of the plan: stalled! 
PULSO claims they submitted the plan to the municipality and the regional office of the 
Ministry of Housing and Planning (MINVU), containing many of the changes the 
grassroots of PAC introduced. Yet, up to 2009, the municipality has not made the 
outcome of the process available to the public. The plan is currently stalled. These 
actors reckon it is illegal that the municipality of PAC keeps the plan for themselves. 
Moreover, there are financial implications involved: the municipality has not yet 
approved the release of final payments to PULSO.  
Mirta Lagos, a well informed neighbourhood leader from población Ochagavía, gives 
evidence about PAC local administration’s reluctance to release the final outcome of the 
project to final approval: 
The municipality have put so many obstacles for the constitution of CESCO
17… [… F]or 
instance, we were told that a notary had to be provided by the municipality [for legally 
constituting CESCO]. They also demanded a minimum quorum of associated members 
only from legally recognised social organisations, and the 50% plus one must have 
participated in the last election of Neighbourhood Committee’s representatives. Yet [the 
municipality] has never shown us in which law all these things are said. And the problem 
is that they contradict the Neighbourhood Committees Law, which says that resolutions 
[regarding local urban development] can be taken just by simple majority. I’ve requested 
so many times to see the [supposed] rule they’re applying, but I haven’t had any response 
from them. If that’s written somewhere, alright, but if it’s not, there’s no justification [for 
not constituting CESCO so far]. And if we had CESCO constituted, our [Alternative 
Draft] proposal could be much more officially channelled. [This is why I insist] it is 
fundamental to constitute CESCO now.  
EL: This resistance from the municipality to constitute CESCO amazes me. 
[I]t is a fact that they try to weaken the social organisations here. A covert intention, I’d 
say, from the municipality. And in the meantime they are also co-opting people through 
gifts, day travels… a cake for old ladies in mother’s day, free tickets for the municipal 
swimming pool in summer, a circus and so forth. Unfortunately, many social 
organisations are happy with those gifts, and they even consider the mayor to be a good 
guy. […] But people are rather being used for electoral ends. Although mayoral and 
                                                 
17 Local Economic and Social Council. See 6.2.1, c). 255 
council elections are scheduled for late 2008, they already started campaigning through 
this kind of things. (Interviewed on 9 May 2007) 
Mrs. Lagos’ words are in total accordance with the current Neighbourhood Committees 
Law (SUBDERE, 1997)
18, regarding its definitions about participation and decision 
taking. Effectively, PAC municipality might have been breaking the National Law of 
Planning and Construction and the Law of Municipalities, since it has not called for the 
legal constitution of CESCO. Furthermore, as seen in sub-section 6.2.3, there is 
considerable pressure from the central and regional government on PAC municipality to 
release a final resolution regarding the Master Plan. The $76 million Chilean pesos 
invested by regional MINVU are being compromised by this stalled situation. My 
personal impression in the field was that this failed process of rezoning was perceived 
by regional MINVU as a stain, a regretful pitfall, in their self-confessed, generally 
efficient performance in local planning issues. As Javier Wood, largely experienced 
regional MINVU Chair of planning claims: 
I’ve never seen a master plan where all the actors agree. I think master plans are social 
agreements and an opportunity to sit around a table and find an agreement, but everybody 
must yield a bit. […] I’m not fine with this municipality which doesn’t want to release the 
plan. We put much investment in it. […] Nonetheless the final decision belongs to its 
mayor and its local council. In my opinion, it is much better to have a master plan than 
not having it. (Interviewed on 19 March 2007) 
6.3.5. The evaluation of the process by PULSO 
Architect Clara Arditi, both PULSO’s head and the architect in charge of PAC rezoning, 
gives a general evaluation of the process seen from the perspective of the consultants. 
The emphases in the quotation are added by me: 
[La Victoria has] a whole history in the comuna that I much respect but I also think they 
have gone against any possible evolution they might have had in the comuna. […] La 
Victoria is a territory where nobody enters, it is a territory that does not want a change 
and also there is a political issue here. I mean, with all my respect to a woman like 
Claudina and her leaders, who initially were very reactive against this process… because 
                                                 
18 See CHAPTER 3 about this code. 256 
it is understandable: they have been historically ridden over roughshod and suffocated. It 
has been really hard for them to obtain what they achieved, it has been really hard for 
them to obtain a dwelling, a space… well, that has been outcome of a struggle and for 
that reason this place is a vacuum they don’t want to lose. But you enter La Victoria and it 
is, from the point of the urban development, a total failure. We are talking about 
dwellings spontaneously generated with some state support; they might have consolidated 
some spaces but there isn’t a single public space there, passages are tiny, they have null 
connection with the rest of the comuna, they don’t have urban facilities. It is a very 
perverse system that has been somehow also supported by the authorities. There some 
strange things happen. [… B]ecause neither have they managed to generate an integrated 
comuna, which was our goal. It was ultra necessary this integration, otherwise no 
alternative way [to development] is possible and that integration had to be produced by 
generating a social process. Unfortunately, there are forces there that started to oppose 
these changes. Why? Because there is too much suspicion, because [grassroots] think 
external consultants are property developers who will take out their spaces and so they 
will be expropriated. We can understand that.  
But many people remain stuck to those original perceptions and do not establish other 
kind of relations of trust with us, the aliens, and I can understand that too. This issue of 
social participation and local master plans is new [for them], it had been never 
implemented [before in PAC]. They were never asked, nobody asked for their opinion […] 
Thus we went there, trying to establish a different process and that’s really hard to do. For 
that to happen there must be a very strong triangulation and a very strong policy from the 
municipality, from the consultants, from the own society, from the territory… When 
those conditions are inexistent, there is no possible articulation. It just didn’t happen! […] 
There was stubbornness from both the municipal structure and the social structure. 
Nevertheless, we were far better valued by PAC society than by the municipality. […] 
Specifically, we were successful no matter what the failures of the Master Plan were, in 
terms of citizen participation. From the point of view of power, we succeeded in coming 
closer to [the people] because we made it for as nobody else had done before, and then 
we started to work area by area, and one of those was La Victoria. […] When we could 
penetrate a bit they opened the door to us and worked with us. (Interviewed on 10 May 
2007) 
Mrs. Arditi clearly values as positive PULSO’s experience in working with PAC’s 
community, and she also addresses as legitimate PAC’s people’s initial rejection of the 
rezoning process. She also blames the municipality for not giving enough support to the 
process of planning and withdrawing from it. Yet, her view is also equally critical of 
(and gives same responsibility for the failure of the plan to) the local population, 
especially the leaders of La Victoria población.  257 
This experienced architect and planner categorically delivers a series of statements 
about this población, such as: it “does not want a change”, it is a “vacuum”, “a total 
failure”, “there isn’t a single public space there”, it is “a very perverse system”, no 
“alternative way [to development] is possible” there. It would be strange that the use of 
these concepts is involuntary. Instead, to some extent, it might reveal her interpretation 
of PAC local space as a blank canvas whose urban structure must be radically 
recomposed and re-imagined. This stance is close to several aspects of ‘entrepreneurial’ 
planning rationale (see definition in CHAPTER 2).  
I asked La Victoria leader Gloria Rodriguez why La Victoria people were reluctant to 
the proposed ‘renovation square’ planned in the middle of the población by PULSO, 
and she answered: “What do we want more squares for? For our children to have 
another place to take drugs? And at the cost of sacrificing houses?”  
She touches the point if the whole rationale of urban regeneration – underpinned by the 
broader official discourse of securitisation and eradication of drug dealing in the peri-
centre – considerably contradicts the fact that what La Victoria less needs at present is 
more visually uncontrolled, large scale open spaces. Narrow streets and small squares 
might be subject of criticism by most architects, but at least they seem to have proven 
means for social control and invigilation by the población’s own community.  
6.4. Chapter conclusions: summing up the process 
During the process of struggle, the local community’s agency overcame the structural 
limitations to citizen participation contained in the national Law and By-Law of 
Planning and Construction, LGUC and OGUC respectively, and the unilateral 
application of those codes by the municipality. These edicts prescribe that citizen 
participation in processes of master plan redrafting should take place only for a limited 
time, after the Draft has been produced. However, the law allows municipalities to 
voluntarily have participatory instances at earlier stages, and MINVU recommends this. 
Neither PAC municipality nor PULSO seriously attempted to do so.  258 
Great responsibility may fall on the consultancy firm PULSO for the mismatch between 
the new zoning proposed in the First Draft and the actual local socio-spatial structure of 
PAC. From a purely technical perspective of planning, it may seem clear that, in 
densely inhabited comunas like PAC, to count with direct grassroots’ feedback from the 
initial stage of diagnosis is a must, not just for envisaging plausible paths of urban 
development but for identifying the most sensitive aspects related to urban renewal, 
which can be indicated by the local community. This case shows that to pretend to 
conduct purely technical, de-politicised processes of urban planning, in territories like 
Pedro Aguirre Cerda, may be inadequate. Yet it is almost impossible not to see 
institutional liability in this problem too. PAC municipality, from the beginning, 
imprinted an entrepreneurial agenda for large scale urban renewal in the process of 
master plan elaboration. And it seemed clear to the grassroots leaders of Pedro Aguirre 
Cerda, since the first glimpse they could have in Risopatrón School, that PULSO’s first 
priority was in accordance with those lines.  
The evidence collected in the field confirms this. When I interviewed PULSO’s chair 
officer, she hinted some normative ideas of what a better-than-existing space must be. 
Although she has a technically informed discourse, her perception of La Victoria as a 
highly deprived space seems to reveal a limited understanding of the economic and 
social reality of that place. This could also be seen in the municipal Director of 
Construction who, to a great extent, defends the municipality’s radical perspective to 
urban redevelopment. Moreover, the latter official’s normative (and somehow 
authoritarian) approach to social participation reveals to what extent there is a moral 
appreciation from PAC municipality in regard to the local inhabitants. This could also 
reveal some degree of class bias
19.  
There seems to be sorts of methodological responsibility from the regional office of the 
Ministry of Housing and Planning (MINVU) too. Since the 1990s, the Chilean state at 
regional level has insisted on basing planning processes on the intervention of external 
technical teams. This is part of the model of state rolling out initiated during the 1980s 
by the dictatorial regime of the country (1973-1990). But this experience reveals that 
processes of rezoning in certain socially sensitive spaces, like PAC, in times of 
                                                 
19 None of the interviewed PAC municipal officers live in the comuna, but in upper-income areas in the 
eastern Barrio Alto of Santiago. The same applies for PULSO’s chair, Mrs. Arditi. 259 
democracy, cannot be simply left by the central authority to the criteria of external 
private consultants, many of whom seem to have constrained resources, including time, 
to afford them a deeper insight into the historical contradictions in the local spaces they 
are supposed to help plan. Moreover, to isolate the parallel processes in PAC and Lo 
Espejo made this specific political situation even less favourable. This may reveal that a 
more and better informed central state supervision is required, especially if the supposed 
central state’s goal is to articulate economic and social development together in all the 
comunas of Santiago. 
However, from the perspective of the local leaders interviewed, the outcome in PAC 
was in many ways an achievement. Their counter-proposal, despite its technical 
limitations and the fact that it is not entirely accepted by the consultants, could be 
highly influential in the elaboration of PULSO’s definitive version. However, in terms 
of the motivation of this social reaction, both public and private institutional actors 
agreed to assign key responsibility to the radicalised stance by the grassroots. In effect, 
the evidence cannot rule out totally that there may have been potential electoral benefits 
for Left parties in PAC
20. Yet, equally and probably more decisively, it should not be 
disregarded that the people of Pedro Aguirre Cerda were inspired by justified concerns.  
For one and a half decades, PAC residents had relentlessly seen the cases of San 
Miguel’s renewal and more recently Ciudad-Parque Bicentenario as two close 
examples of fast and large scale renewal. With PAC located in the middle between the 
two, local people could understand what happens when local spatial regulations are 
abruptly liberalised, and how much ground rent they could be dispossessed from if 
some of the speculative logics of the market of urban renewal they see in San Miguel 
comuna, such as the dilapidation of certain areas due to deliberately vacant plots, enters 
into PAC. Furthermore, as seen in chapters 4 and 5, most households in PAC are multi-
nuclear, making the currently low capitalised ground rent clearly insufficient in use 
value terms for those numerous, agglomerated households.  
                                                 
20 In 2008, Claudina Núñez become the first communist mayor in PAC’s short history. This time she was 
politically supported by a strategic national alliance of the Communists with the national ruling coalition 
Concertación (La Nación, 2008). The evidence available cannot confirm whether she won this time 
because of her successful performance as PAC neighbour leader during the master plan rezoning or 
because of this first-time centre-left electoral alliance in the last 20 years. 260 
A central historical-political point lies here, and this is PAC people’s right to land 
occupation. Chapters 3 and 4 showed how the peri-central space is much older and more 
socially consolidated than most peripheral and central areas of Greater Santiago. Given 
that many working-class urban poblaciones were politically and militarily targeted in 
times of the dictatorship – La Victoria población has a special memory of this (Finn, 
2006b; Lawner, 1984) – those who stayed there consider their location as part of their 
political heritage, inherited from almost two decades of fighting military state power. In 
consequence, most grassroots I interviewed believed the current democratic state – 
either at municipal or national level – has the obligation to preserve that right.  
By contrast, what PAC people saw at this stage was an attempt by the municipality to 
violate that social contract, a form of land dispossession by legal ways. This is because 
almost every PAC resident is a legal owner of their property, and a vast majority have 
already fully paid their mortgages. The process of plot regularisation in PAC is long 
dated, since the time of the military dictatorship. Thus, currently, in Pedro Aguirre 
Cerda, around 80% of residents own a single plot of land, or at least a flat built by the 
Housing Corporation (CORVI). Hence the only form of dispossession seen as feasible 
was land expropriation. CHAPTER 5 showed that PULSO’s First Draft implied several 
massive expropriations, and the central state also has compulsory purchase power in 
cases of ‘public interest’ (Gobierno de Chile, 2007b). Therefore, were the First Draft 
approved, the National Law of Housing and Planning would have given compulsory 
purchase powers to the municipality or, conversely, to sectoral and regional bodies like 
the Ministry of Public Works or the Housing and Development Service (SERVIU), to 
undertake those expropriations at any time.  
PAC leaders seem to have understood well which obstacles had to be overcome, in 
order to get more participation in preparing the plan: first, the constraints on citizen 
participation prescribed by the Chilean law; second, how to technically control the 
increases in potential ground rent through policy mechanisms. The evidence suggests 
that the high ability of PAC community to perform changes comes from the technical 
knowledge their leaders received from external parties. But this knowledge was also 
strategically filtered down toward the grassroots. Had this not happened, and had the 
negotiations been restricted to technicians and the local leaders, it would have been 
extremely difficult for PULSO to include the various demands coming from the various 261 
neighbourhood units and validate its final proposal. At some point, the radicalisation of 
the process fostered by the leaders of La Victoria población (especially Claudina Núñez, 
in her supposed search for electoral gain) may have helped PULSO to arrive at a 
relatively consensual outcome, because the communist grassroots leaders used already 
existing levels of politicisation to increase social participation and inform the residents 
about what was happening with the Master Plan. 
A relevant point to note is the high level of organisation and political and technical 
effectiveness to keep within legal boundaries, shown by the grassroots of PAC during 
their struggle. CHAPTER 3 addressed the historical dialectic of exclusion and repression 
during the first half of the 20
th century experienced by the urban poor in Santiago, the 
events of April 1957 that created the conditions for the seizure of the land in what is 
today La Victoria, and even the long periods of fierce protest and repression 
experienced during the military dictatorship. These are examples of effective social 
mobilisation undertaken by working-class actors, but with a character that – at those 
times – was always defined by the government and the bourgeoisie as ‘illegal’, and so 
they were heavily repressed. In contrast, the current struggle by the people of Pedro 
Aguirre Cerda showed a different approach, marking differences with the methods and 
resources used in the past. The methods used in 2005 could in fact be defined as 
‘bourgeois’: No violence was exerted, and practically no organised demonstration was 
conducted. Most of this should be explained by the high rates of homeownership in 
PAC. The process of mobilisation in PAC stayed most of the time within legal 
boundaries, and instead of simply opposing to the rezoning, the grassroots forced 
PULSO to deliver a Final Draft much closer to their own assessments and convenience 
as owner-occupiers.  
Nevertheless, PAC people’s power has many limitations and one of those is that they do 
not have the capacity to overcome PAC municipality’s internal bureaucracy, nor can 
they influence the higher administrative spheres of MINVU apparatus. The control 
people can exert over the local council is also limited. For this reason, the final 
resolution of the plan has not been clarified and the local Council has not encouraged a 
final resolution to the plan. At the time of writing, the outcome of this process of citizen 
participation is unknown and its implications are not easily determinable. Although 
PULSO delivered the plan to the municipality for approval, this has not facilitated the 262 
dissemination of this information to the local people. Instead, it stopped the process and 
prevented the knowledge of its outcomes by PAC people and even the regional MINVU 
authority.  
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CHAPTER 7. Policy-driven devaluation of Capitalised 
Ground Rent in the southern peri-centre of Santiago 
7.1. Introduction 
The previous two chapters illustrated, from an economic and a political perspective, the 
nature and the context in which Potential Ground Rent (PGR) was attempted to be 
produced in Pedro Aguirre Cerda (PAC) comuna between 2003 and 2005. As CHAPTER 
6 revealed, that production was not free of social struggle, since PAC’s grassroot actors 
were motivated not only by the potential loss of capitalised ground rent and 
expropriations, were the market of large-scale urban renewal to trickle down to their 
poblaciones, but also because the municipality’s approach to the new plan was not 
allowing small scale housing upgrading and in fact limiting it. 
In theory, a local urban Master Plan, through guidelines such as small minimum plot 
size, enlarged maximum building length, or higher percentage of abutment could allow 
small owners to legally extend their dwellings, horizontally and/or vertically, helping 
them to improve the use value of those properties. If small scale dwellers operate under 
the law, they could also receive municipal assistance and apply to the several forms of 
national state subsidy for social housing upgrading, especially the Fondo Solidario de 
Vivienda programme (discussed below). These factors may be influential at the time of 
increasing building values (BV), and hence capitalised ground rent (CGR) in their 
poblaciones. However, none of these regulations were considered by the municipal 
technical team of Pedro Aguirre Cerda in producing the new version of the Master Plan 
by late 2005. PAC grassroots reported this situation as follows: 
[W]hat was not sufficiently included in PULSO’s final proposal are norms for allowing 
growth according to our own possibilities. That would mean that the regulation [proposed] 
does not allow extensions, or the addition of a second or even third dwelling [in the plot]; 
that could only be made via a detailed sector-by-sector norm, or a guideline that generally 
permits this in the comuna. (PAC Community Leaders, 2005b: 10) 
This point is relevant because so far in the poblaciones of Pedro Aguirre Cerda it has 
been rare for small proprietors to disinvest or abandon residential space (as a stage of 264 
the gentrification process, according to the rent gap model; see CHAPTER 2). In contrast, 
as sub-section 4.2.4 shows, physical decay is concentrated in certain areas of Santiago’s 
inner city but not widespread across the peri-centre. In general, Pedro Aguirre Cerda 
comuna is not an area of concentrated physical decay but, as I could corroborate during 
the fieldwork, the rich social milieu in many poblaciones of PAC acts as a ‘brake’ that 
slows down extreme dilapidation, creating collaborative mechanisms of solidarity 
which, notwithstanding their limited own financial possibilities and virtual absence of 
support from private financial capital (since generally, low-income residents are rarely 
granted bank credit in Chile), maintain their dwellings in relatively good condition.  
The present chapter deals with what are probably the two main forms of fixed capital 
devaluation in Santiago’s peri-centre and PAC. The first, to be analysed in section 7.2, 
is the underperformance of a central-state programme named Fondo Solidario de 
Vivienda (Supportive Housing Fund, FSV), aimed at social housing upgrading of the 
lowest-income social strata. The results of this programme are relevant because, 
although there are two additional parallel social housing programmes
1  aimed at the 
lowest-income groups of the country, the FSV has recently emerged as the largest and 
most important one, also most suitable in the spatial and social context of Santiago’s 
inner city. This section outlines the main structural features of that programme, while a 
spatial analysis of its results, between 2001 and 2005, conducted at comuna  level, 
shows there is a higher underperformance of the FSV in a broad southern peri-central 
macro-zone
2 , in which PAC comuna  is included. Causes identified for this 
underperformance are: first, a lack of central state supervision in its application by 
municipalities (MINVU, 2006); second, the low electoral capital that the social housing 
upgrading represents to elected mayors in small-size comunas; third, the low priority 
that some low-income municipalities may be giving to the item of social housing 
upgrading, compared with other urban development goals at larger scale. Altogether, the 
                                                 
1  The Dynamic No-Debt Social Housing Programme (Vivienda Social Dinámica sin Deuda)  and the 
Incremental Housing Programme (Programa de Vivienda Progresiva). They run in parallel and have 
similar goals as the FSV, but are less flexible at covering the different possibilities of expansion and/or 
dwelling replacement needed in the peri-centre. Nor do those programmes seek social integration or are 
they based on collective applications to funds. They are also less flexible in their management principles. 
According to a recent report by MINVU (2006), these programmes should be at some point integrated to 
the growing Fondo Solidario de Vivienda programme. 
2 A relatively homogenous group of municipalities; see Appendix 2. 265 
analysis touches aspects of governance and observes a form of ‘unaccountable 
democracy’
3 in Pedro Aguirre Cerda comuna.  
Section 7.3 identifies a second factor of devaluation of fixed capital, which is 
interrelated with the former factor, namely the structural limitations to dwelling and 
neighbourhood upgrading contained in the national Law and By-Law of Planning and 
Construction (LGUC and OGUC respectively). This section focuses on the structural 
elements of these national codes that seek to regulate upgrading of low-income housing 
but restrict in many ways small scale construction. On the whole, this reflects an 
internal contradiction between goals of regulation and promotion of housing upgrading, 
within the same policy. 
Both factors are generators of inexpensive land for renewal in PAC comuna and the rest 
of the peri-centre of Santiago. However, although in any low-income urban area, the 
underperformance of state programmes and tight building regulations could be socially 
conflictive matters, because they limit potential addition of use value to residential 
properties, it is in the peri-centre – more specifically within the area of large scale urban 
renewal (URSA; see Figure 7.1) – that these factors of devaluation play a key role as 
facilitators of the accumulation of increased potential ground rent (PGR) by large-scale 
developers (see CHAPTER 5). These factors may also configure an ‘institutional’ form of 
creative destruction (see research hypothesis, CHAPTER 2) inherent to the dominant 
entrepreneurial rationale of the model of large scale urban renewal in application in the 
city since 1990. 
This chapter comprises a description and an analysis of these policies. It draws on 
interviews to two central state technicians, a national parliament member who is also an 
expert in building regulations, two architects and a planner that have worked with PAC 
community. Whilst in the previous two chapters, several grassroots’ discourses were 
cited to illustrate the social and political implications of the enlarged rent gap in Pedro 
Aguirre Cerda, in the current chapter, the experts’ discourses help explain the observed 
                                                 
3 In an accountable democracy, “the link between opinion formation in the public sphere and decision 
making in the elected government is sufficiently direct for policy makers to enact into law and put into 
practice expressed desires of citizens. In this sense, policy makers are accountable to the people.” (Paley, 
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contradictions within state policies as applied in the renewal of the peri-central space of 
Santiago. 
7.2. The Fondo Solidario de Vivienda (FSV) programme in the 
southern peri-centre 
7.2.1. Main features of the programme 
Early in the 2000s, the Chilean government ended its traditional modus operandi based 
on differentiated programmes of social dwelling production hitherto with direct state 
intervention in the allocation of subsidies, and supervision by the government either in 
dwelling construction, project management, or both. From then on, the state would 
completely pass the steering wheel of the social housing production and management to 
the market, i.e. property developers and building firms. The Housing and Development 
Service (SERVIU), created in 1975 with this purpose, would not purchase land anymore. 
The new strategy would seek to unify the several existing programmes and subsidies 
aimed at the production of social housing, those targeting the lowest two quintiles of the 
national population (around 6.2 million people, with per capita income below 67,000 
Chilean Pesos or US$ 120)
4. To replace them, a single flexible instrument of subsidy 
with direct participation of small scale private building firms, the Fondo Solidario de 
Vivienda or FSV, was created (MINVU, 2008d)
5. 
From then on, the national FSV programme would subsidise new residence and/or site-
densification with low required minimum savings, and exempt beneficiaries from 
paying mortgages. This subsidy is designed to use the residents’ own capacity of self 
organisation given that applications to the FSVS must be always collective. The 
programme is also largely more flexible than the so far individual Chilean housing 
subsidies, making it possible to build additional and rebuild dilapidated houses in situ 
(Gobierno de Chile, 2005). The fund is centrally managed by the Ministry of Housing 
                                                 
4 By 2003, the average per capita monthly income in the country was 150,000 Chilean Pesos, or US$ 270 
(MIDEPLAN, 2003). 
5 Additional characteristics of this programme are detailed in Appendix 12. 267 
and Planning (MINVU) and the Housing and Development Service (SERVIU) through 
their regional offices that produce a list of applicant households, which are prioritised 
according to a national system of Socio-Economic Ranking or Ficha de Caracterización 
Socio-Económica (CAS) (MIDEPLAN, 2009). 
Among other ends, the Fondo Solidario de Vivienda programme is meant to be suitable 
for small scale urban regeneration in already inhabited areas, like Santiago’s peri-centre. 
To be eligible, FSV projects have to be submitted to SERVIU by organised local 
communities composed of 10 or more households. They have to be technically operated 
by an Organising Entity which channels the demand (the group of applicants), external 
firms of Technical and Legal Assistance and a ‘social realtor’ called EGIS. The latter, 
vital in the materialisation of the ‘solutions’
6, can be a small-scale architecture firm, a 
social development organisation or even a municipality acting as a ‘social property 
developer’. EGISs assist applicants in the architectural design of the projects and 
support them during the construction (Tapia, 2009).  
Besides their potential participation as EGIS, municipalities play a vital role in the 
linkage between the community and funding from central government. Moreover, 
municipalities are key for granting the project’s building and/or ‘demolition licenses’ 
(in cases of in situ rebuilding), both of which must be in accordance with the local and 
national building regulations (Gobierno de Chile, 2006). However, this triple relation 
among the FSV, national building codes and the local space is one of the core conflicts 
observed in the peri-centre, as is to be illustrated in Section 7.3. 
The Fondo Solidario de Vivienda programme is aimed at ‘households in a condition of 
poverty’, and consists of three types of ‘solutions’ for in situ development, plus one for 
the acquisition of new accommodation in a different place (Gobierno de Chile, 2005). 
The three in situ development types are: a) house building, b) densification and c) 
construction of a new unit. The funds allocated for any of the three modalities of 
densification range between 280 UF (US$ 10,500) and 330 UF (US$ 12,340)
7, that can 
                                                 
6 Since the 1960s, policies in Chile use the euphemism ‘solution’ to refer to low-standard dwellings (see 
sub-section 3.4.2.3). 
7 The Unidad de Fomento or UF is a unit of account automatically adjusted to inflation. See Appendix 1-
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be extended to 330 UF and 370 UF (US$ 13,880) for projects if they are to be located in 
Greater Santiago (MINVU, 2006). The variability of these numbers is due to the type of 
‘solution’ dwelling but not the location of the projects in the city, a factor which is 
addressed by an extra mechanism of subsidy specifically aimed at absorbing the cost of 
land (outlined in Appendix 12). Through Fondo Solidario de Vivienda, it is possible:  
1.  To buy a dwelling, used or new, at any time in the year. If the unit is not newly 
built, it must be at least two years old.  
2.  To build a social dwelling in the same plot of residence, in a new plot, or in a 
new plot that comes from a subdivision made with this purpose (this point will 
be analysed in section 7.3). The modality is either through plot densification 
(adding more dwellings where there is space available) or resident site (sitio 
residente). The latter applies when the original house is so deteriorated, that the 
municipal Director of Construction can certify that it is uninhabitable, and 
approves the demolition license, so the dwelling can be replaced by a newer one. 
The new house should have a total floor size of 38 m
2 approximately, able to be 
extended up to 55 m
2. Applications for this kind of projects must always be 
collective. 
3.  To modify, repair or extend a house with the condition that as a result, two 
separate dwellings are created from the original one.  
From being a ‘pilot programme’ in 2001, the Fondo Solidario de Vivienda programme 
has turned in to the main social housing programme for subsidy of the lowest-income 
sectors of the country, since 2006. Between those years, a total of 2,000 FSV projects 
were approved nationally, benefiting around 125,000 households (SERVIU, 2007). 
From 2005 to 2006, the state budget for FSV increased by 15% (from 6.29 million UF, 
approximately US$ 236 million, to 7.24 million UF, approximately US$ 271 million) 
(MINVU, 2006). If the total national annual budget for social housing is 12.9 million 
UF, or approximately US$ 480 million, considering subsidies and ‘solutions’ completed 269 
and allocated by SERVIU (Astaburuaga, 2005)
8, the FSV in 2006 may have represented 
around 56% of the total budget aimed at social housing in the country
9. 
In sum, since 2002 the initiative of building social dwellings has been transferred from 
the state to private small scale developers, which produce them according to an existing 
and to-be-organised social demand. The role of the national state has been reduced to 
providing enough subsidy, letting the private sector – or the local state government 
acting as ‘social’ estate agent – organise and channel that demand, and produce the 
different ‘solutions’ available. In general, the FSV programme has been successful in 
many comunas in the Greater Santiago Metropolitan Area (GSMA) but, as shown below, 
the results in the southern peri-centre are considerably lower than the average.  
7.2.2. Results in Greater Santiago Metropolitan Area (GSMA) 
Figure 7.1 and Table 7.1 illustrate the outputs of this programme per municipality and 
macro-zones in GSMA. As seen in the table, the Fondo Solidario de Vivienda 
programme benefited 1.5% of the city’s population between 2001 and 2005
10. The share 
of households who benefited from the programme versus the total population of the 
comuna  is shown in Figure 7.1. While in the 34 municipalities comprising GSMA 
nearly 300 FSV projects were developed between 2001 and 2005, benefiting 16,986 
households or approximately 78,100 people, Pedro Aguirre Cerda and the rest of 
comunas of the southern-peri-centre within the Urban Renewal Subsidy Area (URSA), 
that is San Miguel and San Joaquín, showed null results. This situation reduces the 
general  
 
 
                                                 
8 UF and US$ dollars at 2009 prices. 
9  The annual national budget in 2006 was enough for building nearly 200,000 FSV units, using an 
estimated unit price of 370 UF. However, the national housing budget also comprises other subsidies 
aimed at higher income population, not only FSV. 
10 This might seem a relatively small number compared to the existing total social housing, but it has to 
be considered that the five year-period of this programme is a relatively short time compared with the 
several decades of social housing development in Chile. 270 
 
Figure 7.1. 
Households benefited 
by Fondo Solidario de 
Vivienda programme 
as a percentage of 
total comuna 
population, 2001-2005 
Source: own elaboration 
based on SERVIU (2007) 
and census data (INE, 
2002)  
 
 
 
 
Key 
(*) 
Metropolitan 
Macro-zone 
Number 
of 
comunas 
Total population 
2002 
Households that 
benefited 2001-
2005 
Population that 
benefited 2001-
2005 (**) 
% Population of 
macro-zone that 
benefited  
1 Centre  1  200,792  3,229  14,853  7.4  % 
2 Central-East  cone  6  787,288  1,041  4,789  0.6  % 
3 Peri-central  North  4  480,473  1,309  6,021  1.3  % 
4 Peri-central  West  4  410,628  983  4,522  1.1  % 
5 
Peri-central South 
(***)  7  716,401  846  3,892  0.55 % 
6 Periphery  North  2  200,588  512  2,355  1.2  % 
7 Periphery  West  3  812355  909  4,181  0.5  % 
8 Periphery  South  3  612,441  3,790  17,434  2.3  % 
9 Periphery  East  4  1,187,184  4,367  20,088  1.7  % 
TOTAL  34  5,408,150  16,986  78,136  1.44 % 
(*) Key numbers labelled in Figure 7.1. 
(**) It is considered an average size of 4.6 members in households of the first socioeconomic quintile (MIDEPLAN, 2003). 
(***) Including PAC, San Miguel, Lo Espejo and San Joaquín, among other comunas. 
Table 7.1. Population benefiting from Fondo Solidario de Vivienda programme by Greater Santiago 
macro-zones, 2001-2005 
Source: own elaboration based on SERVIU (2007) 271 
performance of the broader southern peri-central macro-zone (see Figure 7.1), which 
also comprises Lo Espejo, La Cisterna, La Granja and San Ramón. In this macro-zone, 
FSV has benefited only 0.55% of the population. 
The contrast with the rest of peri-central macro-zones is noticeable in Table 7.1. For 
instance, in the western peri-centre, 1.1% of the population are benefited, whilst in the 
northern peri-centre this is even higher, reaching 1.3%. All these peri-central comunas 
are relatively similar in social status to Pedro Aguirre Cerda. In starker contrast, the 
results during the five-year period of the programme in Santiago-Centre comuna show 
one of the highest rates (7.4%). This latter territory still hosts a large number of 
deprived enclaves but it has one of the largest (and probably most efficient) municipal 
administrative apparatuses in the country (see subsection 4.3.1 and also Valenzuela, 
2003) and a local population of only 200,000. 
The situation is more heterogeneous in the periphery than in the inner city. The three 
large peripheral comunas of the south (La Pintana, El Bosque and San Bernardo) reach 
a comparatively high rate of 2.3 % of households benefited, whilst the eastern 
peripheral  comunas  reach a bit less, around 1.7%. To the north, the rates decrease 
considerably to 1.2% and to the west (Pudahuel, San Bernardo and Lo Prado comunas) 
the index reaches 0.5% only. In the case of western peripheral Pudahuel and San 
Bernardo comunas, the lack of better results may be due to their ongoing vibrant low-
density, privately-led property markets, and the special priority that these municipal 
administrations may be giving to those processes of urban expansion. Also, the six 
comunas  comprising the well-off macro-zone labelled ‘2’ in Figure 7.1 show a 
relatively low 0.6% of people who benefited, although this is the traditionally affluent 
Barrio Alto of Santiago, hence this result would be even lower if the several low-
income enclaves situated in the fringes of these municipalities did not exist.  
7.2.3. Searching for the causes for the underperformance in PAC and the 
southern peri-centre 
When I enquired with technicians from the municipality of Pedro Aguirre Cerda about 
these results, they alleged the low results of the Fondo Solidario de Vivienda in the 272 
comuna were caused by local people’s lack of agency and negligence by its communal 
leaders in the application to the public funds. The mayor of Pedro Aguirre Cerda also 
added a different justification for the null results of the FSV in his comuna.  
[T]hese are too recent programmes
11. And our people are just showing some level of 
interest in them. But, in practice, when a room is built in a backyard […] our old 
homeowners are relegated to live on those backyard rooms, whilst their children [now 
head of households] take control of the main dwelling. Thus, given those kinds of 
densification, which are precarious, our old homeowners fear to do this. If they build a 
bedroom, or they create an attic, they will have to leave the main bedroom. There is an 
interesting sociological problem there [inside households]. I would say that until this 
current generation has not passed, we won’t have a solution to this. (Interviewed on 25 
April 2007) 
The social ‘agency’ explanation addressed by the municipal technicians of PAC, and the 
sociological explanation provided by the mayor might seem plausible, but they 
contradict several other cases of comunas which are similar to PAC in terms of the 
social composition and urban structure of their poblaciones. The question that arises is 
why these comunas show more positive outputs in the application of the FSV 
programme with similar levels of success to Santiago-Centre. For instance: Cerrillos 
(3.5% of population benefited), La Pintana (4.4%), San Ramón (3.5%), El Bosque 
(3.3%) and even Peñalolén
12  (5.2%) (see Figure 7.1). Advisors from the national 
Housing and Development Service (SERVIU) explained to me that these successful 
metropolitan municipalities have installed “real sorts of communal property firms” for 
capturing FSV funds. Although the evidence available may be not decisive, the 
observed general pattern of results of FSV projects in Greater Santiago Metropolitan 
Area (GSMA) seems to confirm that the priority given by the municipal administration 
is key at the time of generating positive results. 
Although the FSV programme has proven successful nationwide, there is concern 
among governmental interviewees from SERVIU and the Ministry of Housing and 
Planning (MINVU) about the lack of results in the application of this fund by these 
                                                 
11 The FSV programme started in 2001, six years before the interview, but he is referring to the older two 
existing programmes too. 
12 Peñalolén municipality has slightly more financial and technical resources than the previous cases 
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specific peri-central municipalities, especially those from the south. A recent report by 
MINVU (2006) explains the uneven application of the FSV programme across the 
country as result of the still little effective supervision conducted by the central-state 
agencies over the regional and local territories. In the south of Santiago, what is 
observed is a broad peri-central metropolitan area, covering around 11% of the city’s 
population, which has not been served adequately by the programme so far. I 
interviewed Dante Pancani, Chair of Housing Programmes Evaluation in SERVIU, 
about the specific case of Pedro Aguirre Cerda and the lack of applications to FSV 
arising from it:  
[Unfortunately, PAC municipality] neither commit to produce densification nor ‘resident 
site’ modalities. I can’t explain how people such as from La Victoria that own such 
damaged dwellings cannot turn to their mayor, demand from him a demolition permit, 
apply to the FSV programme and redevelop the whole area. […] PAC [municipality] in 
particular has shown very poor management. […] I have nearly 2,000 projects registered, 
and I try to find one from Pedro Aguirre Cerda. None!  
This is because they have a problem of municipal management; I mean, the whole district 
including Lo Espejo, San Miguel and San Joaquín. I’m sure of this because in the past I 
worked with MP Jorge [Inzunza] and I realised that in these three comunas [which 
Inzunza represents in the Parliament]
13 there are no municipal counterparts working to 
implementing FSV projects. [But] I really can’t explain how PAC, which is a space built 
more by their inhabitants than the state, is not a priority [for the municipalities]. The 9x18 
[metres] site supports densification. […] The point is that I don’t think PAC lacks space 
for densification. It does. I remember when I walked over there, I came into many houses 
and saw huge plots… there I realised those people can apply for subsidy for a ‘resident 
site’ plus densification in the same plot [… In contrast in] El Bosque comuna they have 
got already 17 FSV projects developed so far […] Mayor Zalaquett [from La Florida 
comuna, who belongs to UDI, a right-wing opposition party] with whom I don’t have 
special political affinity, he actually created a municipal property agency. He has been 
really driving us crazy with the numbers of FSV applications he sends to us. (Interviewed 
on 24 May 2007) 
Mr. Pancani confirms the responsibility that local governments have in the management 
of the fund, and also the material possibilities that a highly fragmented local structure of 
plots, like PAC’s, can generate for densification and in situ replacement of dwellings. 
Another SERVIU officer, Juan Morales, confirms that public investment in improving 
                                                 
13 I tried to interview this actor but he was unavailable.  274 
housing might be a feasible process in Pedro Aguirre Cerda comuna, even in its 
supposedly more politically troublemaking poblaciones. This latter point seems to 
contradict PAC municipality’s strongest argument for the low of results in FSV projects, 
based on the alleged lack of interest by their inhabitants. Mr. Morales addresses 
specifically población La Victoria:  
I know [the población], I know some of their leaders; they can organise themselves and 
see how this is to be done. That was how the programme Participatory Road Surfacing 
[Pavimentos Participativos] worked
14 and I would say that that was a very good way to 
make things happen […] All municipalities have an office for housing, that’s a sort of 
natural channel. If the people go to the municipality, this should be in conditions of 
informing them about the existing state housing programmes. Now, this is one of the 
problems that the FSV policy has, because the municipal counterpart does not work 
efficiently. One might have expected that from La Victoria some projects densification 
were presented to us, but there hasn’t been any. (Interviewed on 23 May 2007) 
I interviewed National Parliament Diputado  (MP hereafter) Patricio Hales, who has 
specific insight into both Santiago’s peri-central reality and general construction 
matters, because he represents peri-central Recoleta and Independencia comunas, he is 
an architect and has been a member of the National Parliament’s Housing and Urban 
Development Commission for years. He confirms that there are significant municipal 
management failures, not only in PAC, but generally in Santiago’s metropolitan peri-
central area. His opinion matters, for he is probably one of the most authoritative 
informants regarding urban issues among MPs in Chile. His opinion is also more 
‘political’ in terms of explaining the low results observed in the southern peri-centre 
than that of previous informants’. 
[The FSV programme is unsuccessful in the peri-centre] because it is a programme that 
produces low electoral gain. It doesn’t give enough votes to mayors. It is based on 
projects that require too much effort: to join people, to keep the group of households 
together, to make them deposit the [minimum required saving] in a special bank account. 
It is hard to give the project to an EGIS, to have the project approved so SERVIU can 
give the money for construction. Furthermore, it is so hard to find adequate land. So, 
effectively, the effort that a municipality could make takes almost 3 years, but a mayor’s 
                                                 
14 La  Victoria  población was one of the first areas in the country to implement the Pavimentos 
Participativos programme in early 1990s, as part of a bottom-up initiative aimed at solving the high 
number of un-surfaced streets in the comuna (Gobierno de Chile, 1994; Valenzuela et al., 2002). Many 
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period lasts only four years. So, their time is not enough for seeing the dwellings 
completed. And if [the mayor] has got them built, that would be very little to show. I 
mean, [that would be just] ten little new dwellings built in backyards. In contrast, in just 
three months, with considerably less money and effort, they can install a bit of synthetic 
grass over a precarious mini-football pitch, also installing a huge poster with their face 
and name in the front. […] Mayors in the peri-centre don’t want to work in what is not 
profitable in terms of their personal standing. (Interviewed on 17 April 2007) 
MP Hales helps to realise that the explanation for the lack of Fondo Solidario de 
Vivienda projects in many metropolitan comunas is manifold and complex. Causes for 
this misapplication range from exclusively technical to electoral reasons. His negative 
appreciation regarding municipal management in the peri-centre may seem a broad 
generalisation, given the uneven results achieved by the programme FSV in the 
different peri-central comunas. However, he confirms what is largely regarded by 
technical and political interviewees, and some bibliography on Chilean politics at 
municipal levels too, that the levels of effective public accountability – or ‘accountable 
democracy’ (Paley, 2004) – seem reduced roughly to every four years, when municipal 
elections are held (Kubal, 2006; Rivera-Ottenberger, 2008). Therefore, the lack of 
proper mechanisms of social accountability on housing and urban public policies at 
local levels prevents the community from avoiding the kind of mismanagement shown 
by the comunas of the southern macro-zone. Furthermore, the conflictive process of 
Master Plan rezoning in PAC, outlined in CHAPTER 6, points to a case of severe 
unaccountability at the municipal level too.  
Nevertheless, there are still physical reasons, mainly related to the small scale of plots 
and the relatively high price of land in comunas like Pedro Aguirre Cerda (compared 
with more peripheral low-income areas), that make the FSV programme less feasible in 
certain peri-central areas. The following section explain these points. 
7.3. Structural limitations to upgrading poblaciones: local and 
national building regulations 
The mismanagement of the Fondo Solidario de Vivienda funding by the local 
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for the low indices of social housing upgrading in the comuna. Another observed 
limitation to these projects are the building guidelines contained in the national Law and 
By-Law of Planning and Construction (LGUC and OGUC bills respectively). These 
guidelines seek to establish minimum levels of hygiene and security in construction and 
explicitly seek to discourage the subdivision of small plots in the inner city. Overall, 
they make construction more difficult in the typical, small-sized plots (down to 150 m
2) 
present for instance in many PAC poblaciones.  
The causes for this peculiarity, as has been explained in CHAPTER 3, are rooted in the 
peri-centre’s history: this is a space produced after massive processes of land seizure 
and self-help housing from the late 1950s to 1973. To a great extent, the self regulatory 
mechanisms of land distribution exerted by the grassroots during that period are 
nowadays a limitation for their upgrading, under the current regulations of planning and 
construction. This in turn impedes further processes of densification in many peri-
central areas, even if the public funding is available, like the case of the FSV 
programme. The mismatch between the policies aimed at funding small scale housing 
upgrading and the national frameworks that severely regulate them is analysed as 
follows. 
7.3.1. Analysis of guidelines in the National Law of Planning and 
Construction (LGUC) 
7.3.1.1. The national codes  
The National Law of Planning and Construction (LGUC) homogeneously regulates the 
planning and construction in the Chilean territory through standardised norms of 
construction and urban development. According to the Chilean Government (Gobierno 
de Chile, 2007a: gen 1-1), the LGUC bill is part of a system of three levels of actions, 
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1.  Principles, responsibilities, powers, privileges, rights, sanctions and other rules 
that govern the agencies, officials, professionals and individuals in the tasks of 
urban planning, urban development and construction.  
2.  The national By-Law of Planning and Construction (OGUC), which specify the 
building and planning regulations contained in the LGUC and governs its 
administrative procedure, the process of urban planning, development and 
construction, and technical standards of design and construction required by 
these. The National By-Law of Planning and Construction (OGUC) comprises 
Title 4, aimed at architectural and design issues; Title 5 aimed at regulating 
construction; and Title 6 aimed at special regulatory exemptions for ‘affordable 
housing’. 
3.  Technical Standards, which contain and define the technical characteristics of 
projects, materials and systems for construction and development, to meet the 
standards required by the National By-Law (OGUC). 
It was observed in CHAPTER 3 how, since its first constitution in 1931 and after several 
modifications, these national planning and construction codes have uninterruptedly 
regulated the production of physical infrastructure in Chilean cities, establishing 
guidelines for architecture and construction of every type of building, especially 
residential uses (Gobierno de Chile, 2007a). As also noted in sub-section 5.2.2, these 
national regulations transfer legal authority to local master plans for the definition of 
key building regulations, such as abutment in the plot (adosamiento), Setback Plane 
(rasante), Front yard Lines (antejardín), Building Density, and especially Plot Area 
Ratio (constructibilidad). Nevertheless, municipal guidelines must comply with the 
national guidelines for planning and construction anyway.  
The main role of the LGUC and OGUC is declaredly to assure minimal levels of quality 
and safety in the building sector. Also, although for the development of large-scale 
projects, the national codes define a series of exemptions that allow increases in 
building capacity, basically by enlarging the Plot Area Ratio when plots are merged
15, 
                                                 
15 Under certain additional conditions, and as incentive to large scale developers, Plot Area Ratio can 
increase from 30% to 50% when several plots are merged into a larger one, according to the National By-278 
for the case of small projects, the norm is considerably stricter. Aspects of setback plane, 
front yard line and Plot Area Ratio produce little building capacity (see CHAPTER 5) and 
practically no possibilities for dwelling extension. For instance, in Pedro Aguirre Cerda 
nearly 50% of the comuna land use corresponds to housing and more than 60% of 
which corresponds to plots smaller than 150 m
2 (SGA-IBERSIS, 2000). This situation is 
relatively common in the rest of low-income peri-central poblaciones, where the strict 
building regulations contained in the LGUC, plus the titles 4 and 5 in the OGUC, could 
hardly be materialised.  
For these reasons, the national codes provide specific exemptions to small scale housing. 
Title 6 in the OGUC specifically addresses a more flexible building regulation for 
‘Affordable Housing’ or Vivienda Económica (Gobierno de Chile, 2007b: 331). Article 
6.1.2 of the OGUC differentiates between ‘Affordable Housing’ (or Vivienda 
Económica) and Social Housing, either of which ought to meet the terms of relatively 
different guidelines, whilst social dwellings are the subject of softer regulations than 
affordable housing. The article defines: 
a)  Affordable Housing: This refers to housing built either according to the 
dispositions of 1959 DFL2 law (see sub-section 3.4.1, page 103) or by the 
former state Housing Corporations and the Corporation for Urban Improvement 
(CORVI and CORMU; examined in sub-sections 3.4.2 and 3.4.4 respectively). 
Also, commercial buildings that are already built and have been transformed 
into accommodation fall into this category. In all cases, the built area cannot be 
higher than 140 m
2. These dwellings benefit from the tax incentives contained in 
the 1959 DFL2 law. 
b)  Social Housing: Affordable housing whose cadastral value (including the land) 
should not exceed 400 UF (by 2009, around US$ 14,600). Exceptionally, social 
housing condominiums can increase this value by additional 30%. According to 
the National By-Law of Planning and Construction, article 6.1.4, it is the 
Municipal Director of Construction who grants the category of ‘social housing’ 
to a dwelling, after assessing the cadastral value of its plot, plus an estimated 
                                                                                                                                               
Law of Planning and Construction (Gobierno de Chile, 2007b; Wurman and Torrent, 2006). See also sub-
section 5.2.2.  279 
value of the dwelling according to a table of disaggregated costs of materials, 
published by MINVU quarterly (Gobierno de Chile, 2007b: 332).  
7.3.1.2. Exemptions for Affordable Housing 
Title 6 of the OGUC addresses special guidelines aimed at dwelling extension, for 
instance if several dwellings are to be built in groups known as ‘Condominiums of 
Affordable Housing’ (i.e. estates of ‘affordable’ units built simultaneously on sites 
larger than one hectare). In that case, Article 6.1.8 establishes as compulsory only the 
following guidelines: setback plane, inter-building distance, front yard and grouping 
system, disaster risk zones, land use, parking lots, building density (which is regulated 
by local master plan but can be increased 25% in the cases of ‘condominiums’) and road 
accessibility. These guidelines should be established by the local regulations contained 
in the master plan. Houses or residential blocks cannot exceed 14 metres in height and 
should consider at least 24 m
2 of backyard. In the same code, Article 6.2.5 also 
establishes that these condominiums should be subdivided into plots larger than 60 m
2.  
The more relaxed guidelines for affordable housing may be potentially a chance for 
producing collective projects of low-income dwelling upgrading or renewal, like those 
demanded by PAC community in its struggle against the local authority between 2004 
and 2005 (see CHAPTER 6). At a first glimpse, this context might represent a chance for 
local homeowners to rebuild collectively their dwellings at a higher density with fewer 
building restrictions, using, for instance, the funding from FSV programme analysed 
above. However, the exceptional regulations for ‘affordable housing’ are not especially 
aimed at social housing upgrading. In fact, the building restrictions that remain are still 
strict (this point is to be outlined in sub-section 7.3.3), thus most of these exception 
have been used by large scale, upper-income housing developers as a way of by-passing 
municipal planning guidelines, in order to enlarge and facilitate the production of 
housing estates, especially in the expanding peripheries of the city (Herman, 2007a). 
Therefore, another contradiction emerges here: policies that are aimed at regulating low 
budget housing and densification are used for clearly different purposes (see sub-section 
3.7.3 in page 134 for the tax implications of this). In contrast, the following sub-sections 280 
address the specific exemptions aimed at social housing, and how it is still hard to apply 
these in the context of Santiago’s peri-centre. 
7.3.1.3. Exemptions for Social Housing 
The National By-Law of Planning and Construction (OGUC) also establishes certain 
norms specifically aimed at social housing. As examined above, social dwellings are 
defined as properties with a cadastral value under 400 UF. Regarding the chances of 
densification in already serviced plots, Article 6.2.4 establishes that in urban areas, plots 
that accommodate only one social dwelling can be subdivided into plots larger than 100 
m
2 each (if the dwellings are to be one-storey) or 60 m
2 each (if two-storey), being 
released to comply with all the building guidelines established in the local master plan, 
with the exemption of the regulations on setback plane and inter-building distance 
(Gobierno de Chile, 2007b). This special scheme marks a difference with the previously 
analysed scheme aimed at affordable housing. 
Furthermore, Article 6.2.9 also allows subdivisions of plots with sizes larger than 150 
m
2, produced by the ‘site and services’ Operación Sitio programme in the 1960s and 
legally approved by the predecessor bodies of the Housing and Development Service 
(SERVIU), namely the Housing Corporation (CORVI) or the Corporation for Urban 
Improvement (CORMU; see CHAPTER 3).  
Article 6.2.9. In urban areas, plots with a social dwelling or plots that had been developed 
by Operación Sitio [see CHAPTER 3] and that have been urbanised by the legal ancestors 
of SERVIU, and whose area is not less than 100 square metres, can be subdivided into 
two and/or host the construction of a second social dwelling without complying with the 
rules of the local master plan, whereas those plots that have an area not less than 150 
squares metres can be subdivided into three and/or host the construction of up to two 
additional social dwellings. (Gobierno de Chile, 2007b) 
This article also regulates, for social dwellings, the percentage of abutment of the new 
dwelling to be built regarding the neighbouring sites, depending on the height of the 
dwelling located on the plot. Thus, for dwellings sized between 2 and 3.5 metres height, 
the permitted maximum percentage of abutment is 70%, while for dwellings sized 281 
between 3.5 and 6 metres height, the permitted abutment is 60% (Gobierno de Chile, 
2007b).  
7.3.2. Where the norm and social reality clash: three key actors speak 
As already mentioned, the OGUC Article 6.2.9 instructs that social housing 
redevelopments have to follow rules referred to distance and set back plane angle 
anyway. However, to act in accordance with the setback angle (fixed by law at 70° in 
Santiago) and the distance to the adjacent site, may reduce considerably the building 
possibilities if the dwelling to be built is detached or semi-detached, or if an extended 
volume is to be projected backwards from an original terrace-type dwelling. At this 
point, the national building code falls into an internal contradiction, because although in 
the ‘spirit’ of the law there are possibilities aimed at promoting social housing 
expansion, in practice, the code clearly restricts those possibilities.  
Moreover, as also mentioned above, there is another difficulty for the application of the 
regulatory exemptions contained in the national building codes, and this is the fact that 
the qualification of ‘social housing’, necessary for accessing to those legal exemptions, 
is monopolised by the municipality, more specifically the Municipal Director of 
Construction, who assesses the cadastral value of the plot and the building set on it 
before granting that exceptional category. 
The internal contradictions contained in the National Law of Planning and Construction 
were addressed by three key actors interviewed in 2007. Firstly, Architect Alfredo 
Rodríguez, chair of the SUR NGO, internationally recognised expert on housing issues 
(Rodríguez and Sugranyes, 2006a, b; Rodriguez and Winchester, 2001) and one of the 
key external empowering actors that participated in the struggle around the Master Plan 
in PAC between 2004 and 2005 (see CHAPTER 6). He summarises the observed 
incompatibility between the qualification of social housing and the reality experienced 
by most plots in Pedro Aguirre Cerda comuna.  
[T]he National By-Law generates a concept of ‘affordable housing’ based on the 
application of the DFL2 [basically, units up to140 m
2]. Thus any project smaller than 140 
m
2 could fit in the norm of the Title 6 of the OGUC. However, when that Title refers to 282 
permission of extensions in semi-detached or terrace types, it only defines this permission 
is for ‘social housing’. Yet ‘social housing’ is defined as a dwelling priced under 400 UF 
[and needs to be declared as such by the Municipal Director of Construction]. Therefore, 
all the peri-central comunas, although they have low-income population in the first 
quintile [the lowest in the national socio-economic scale], they’re all in a pickle. They are 
not entitled to social housing, because the plots are valued at above 400 UF. Therefore, 
any thing you build in a plot over 400 UF, you are excluded from the application of a 
norm that was conceived to allow poorer people from making better use of their 
properties.  
Legislators have understood that all their policies for densification, all those projects 
where they have theorised, all have failed because at the time of applying for a municipal 
permit, these are rejected. They [the ministry] pay consultancies to universities for 
research about ‘projects in backyards’, as they called them… but the fact is all those 
projects failed since any higher height in the backyards is not permitted. Hence, any 
architect’s theoretical speculation with volumes will clash with a Municipal Director of 
Construction who says “this is not possible”. Thus there is a total contradiction here: on 
the one hand, a desire of responding to a social need, especially to the poorest people, 
with an altruistic spirit; on the other, a functional dynamic of an eminently exclusionary 
system, which prevents any altruistic possibility of giving the poor a solution. 
(Interviewed on 27 March 2007) 
Mr. Rodríguez’s appreciation about the current possibilities for site densification is 
pessimistic. According to him, the production of alternative ways to the monopolised 
urban renewal in Santiago’s peri-centre may be attainable, but this could work in a 
different context where Fondo Solidario de Vivienda projects and the national norm 
contained in the National Law and By-Law of Planning and Construction acted together 
with a local master plan, contributing to create the local conditions for this to happen. 
For instance, smaller minimum plot sizes could be permitted, in accordance to the 
existing space. Also, larger maximum building lengths could be allowed in order to 
increase the building capacity of the plot, and so on. This could prevent excessively 
high rent gaps by keeping Plot Area Ratios low. Nevertheless, as chapters 5 and 6 have 
observed, the municipal agenda for PAC densification has gone precisely in the 
opposite direction.  
I further enquired with MP Hales about the contradictions between the existing 
attainable chances of upgrading in peri-central neighbourhoods, given the restrictions 
embedded in the LGUC and OGUC.  283 
You are touching a central point here. All these [legal] elements make difficult these 
programmes [of densification], especially the rules contained in the OGUC. The latter is 
an instrument of authoritarian presidential caesarism, that through decrees can starve 
people from everything. But if the government wants it, and this is something that I have 
been insisting on for a long time, they could make the regulations of the OGUC more 
flexible for permitting the application of the FSV programme. […] I should say that my 
own assessment about the architecture of the peri-centre is that there is a terrible social 
problem here. […] Thus I’m contemptuous of the current norm, so strictly rule-based. It 
is an illusion to have a single By-Law for every type of architecture, for the whole 
territory.  
I’d defend a more permissive attitude with respect to the norm, for two reasons: first, for 
the social benefit emanated of not creating new [peripheral] ghettoes, and for encouraging 
densification in order to avoid household dispersion. […] And the second thing is that, 
regardless of whether [municipalities] apply all the rules of the By-Law to the peri-central 
territories, the needs of these households have driven them to produce architecture 
without regulations, without norms, full of spontaneity. Moreover, during political 
elections, this spontaneity and irregularity come to be legalised by these laws called 
‘Sketch Law’
16, approved not by mayors but by MPs. We’ve had Sketch Law-1, Sketch 
Law -2 … Sketch Law ‘Strikes Back’
17  […] They are as holy water that comes to 
regularise the spontaneous dwelling and the free exercise of the client, not the 
professional [the architect]. Thus, at the end, spontaneity is legitimised for knocking 
down the national regulation […] [My question is] why don’t we rather perform a sincere 
act of putting all of this in order, and give rules for regulating those levels of spontaneity? 
In my opinion, it is a real urban and social crime that the pobladores who once built the 
periphery and now became peri-centrals, have been trapped in this kind of ring of wealth, 
where the land [price] has been multiplied 10 times. It is a crime that these people have 
two options: either they fall in the hands of speculators that are going to reap their 
benefits, buying their land at a despicable price […] they’re going to buy at blue-collar 
price to sell at white-collar price […] or even pobladores are not even considered by 
developers since the firms consider their plots a nuisance insofar as they are many small 
plots, where too much consolidation is needed, where too many people have to be cleared. 
The developer knows it is better to focus on plots of 2,000 or 3,000 m
2 without being 
troubled by the 9x18 [metres] plots. Thus, the poor miss out on profits. That is the exact 
point where I miss a greater degree of state intervention, regarding the creation of an 
agent which can give dynamism to these processes. (Interviewed on 17 April 2007) 
                                                 
16 MP Hales refers here to the national Law N° 19,667 (popularly known as Ley del Mono or Sketch Law) 
implemented in 2002 and 2007-8, aimed at regularising the thousands of irregular dwellings spread in 
Chilean cities. The name comes after the relatively easy process of regularisations, basically consisting on 
a rough sketch of the house plant and proof of fulfilment of basic fire and building regulations.  
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MP Hales seems to validate this thesis’ core proposition, which is that devaluation of 
building value and capitalised ground rent may be forms of dispossessing the local peri-
central inhabitants of their land rent, as part of a process that tends towards the 
accumulation of the rent gap by an oligopolic large scale property market. However, the 
MP goes further. He refers to the fact that for the National By-Law, which legally 
regulates construction in the whole country, small plots (9 x 18 metres, or even larger 
plots) are restricted to host up to 2-storey buildings with very strong restrictions for a 
third one. In the case of first floor housing extension in a plot, this is also restricted by 
the maximum building length (in terraced house type) determined by the local plan, a 
building rule which was hardened by PAC municipality’s initial new plan, but later 
softened by the community’s counter-proposal (compare tables 5.1 and 5.2 in CHAPTER 
5). MP Hales is touching another point too: for the Fondo Solidario de Vivienda to be 
fully successful in the peri-centre, or for any state subsidy for small scale housing 
upgrading to succeed in these areas, a necessary condition is a radical change in the 
national scheme of building regulations. This would involve parallel forms of regulation, 
more adequate to the specific scale of the peri-centre, that allow small scale building 
activity to operate under different rules.  
However, whilst the national building codes are based on sanitary and urban health 
principles as a way to avoid overcrowding, and so clearly restrict building at a small 
scale, it considerably enlarges the permitted building capacity insofar as the properties 
are merged and the investment is proportionally larger per plot (OGUC, Title 4). At this 
point, it seems clear that both the national and local norms may be one-sided. Architect 
Mario Álvarez, another key actor in the struggle analysed in CHAPTER 6, addresses this 
point too, but focusing more specifically on the one-sided interests of the national norm 
and the need of having differentiated regulations according to the different types of 
spaces and scale of plot subdivisions: 
What happens is that building guidelines in this country are made in the predominant 
interests’ own image and likeness. […] The OGUC is optimal when you’ve got plots of 
15 x 40 metres […] there you can apply the guideline, where the setback plane and other 
stuff is relevant. But if you’ve got a 60 m2 plot, don’t tell me I have to comply with a 
certain distance to the plot boundaries, and so on… because that means I can’t do 
anything. […]  285 
There must be a regulation that differentiates between micro and macro scales, so as in 
the micro scale you can use plausible standards according to the people’s perspective. But 
the OGUC is made for the big developer, not for the guy who’s to extend his dwelling. To 
the latter, the norms say “you can’t do this”. Conversely, for the guys who work at a large 
scale, there are a lot of legal exemptions aimed just for their benefit. If their project 
applies as Conjunto Armónico
18 they can increase by 50% the allowed height and modify 
lots of other things in their favour. Therefore, while you’ve got more, you receive more; 
and when you’ve got less, you get less. […] But if you are making a new local plan, you 
might generate local policies that improve on this segregating character of the general 
norm. (Interviewed on 11 April 2007) 
This informant stresses the contradiction of scales and goals in the Chilean building 
codes. His final statement is also relevant to help understand the motivations of the 
grassroots of PAC for struggling and proposing an alternative local regulation, more 
suitable with their local reality. However, as stated at the beginning of the present 
chapter, the alternative guidelines aimed by the grassroots at allowing more building 
capacity at smaller scale were not considered in the final version of the plan produced 
by the municipality’s external consultants. Nor was that plan approved by the local 
administration, and currently, the approval of the plan is an impasse. 
7.4. Chapter conclusions 
Pedro Aguirre Cerda is only one of several cases in Santiago where the national 
building norm and local spatial structure mismatch. Although the Chilean planning and 
construction codes have been historically conceived for assuring sufficient building 
standards, following criteria of sanitation and security, as the present chapter and the 
previous two chapters show, the National Law and By-Law of Planning and 
Construction (LGUC and OGUC respectively) define flexible regulations only on large-
scale construction, but allow less building capacity and are less flexible with 
construction at smaller scales. These regulations contradict the physical characteristics 
                                                 
18 According to OGUC Article 2.6.4. ‘Harmonic Groups’ projects should, among other requirements, be 
located in plots which are five times bigger than the minimum established by the local guideline (always 
above 5,000 m
2) or occupying totally a block, close to a broad road, and aimed at residential plus service 
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of most peri-central residential spaces, which are usually structured by plots of 9x18 
metres, or even smaller plots, plus narrow and dense roads.  
Also, the chances for applying the several exceptions contained in the national codes 
aimed to facilitate low-income dwellings upgrading can be discretionally monopolised 
by the municipality, since it is the Municipal Director of Construction who, at the end of 
the day, grants the necessary category of ‘social housing’ under an economic 
assessment of the cadastral value, necessary for the development of these ‘solutions’. 
And even exemptions supposedly aimed at small scale social construction are used by 
private realtors to amplify their profits. In a nutshell, plot dimensions and land values 
make incompatible the fulfilment of the national regulations in the inner city; therefore, 
most social housing upgrading at small scale is conducted illegally, with higher costs in 
terms of quality and security. As some informants hinted, an alternative regulatory 
framework is needed for the consolidated, low-income residential spaces of Santiago, 
and probably the whole country. 
Yet these limitations to small scale construction contained in the national codes are only 
one of the causes for the low results of the Fondo Solidario de Vivienda programme in 
the southern peri-centre. The other causes appear to be a deliberate mismanagement by 
these municipalities, motivated possibly by the FSV’s little electoral gain and the low 
priority given to the social housing upgrading versus the large scale renewal. Another 
cause of the low outcomes of the FSV is the little supervision of the programme 
conducted by the central state bodies at regional and local levels. Yet the low results of 
the FSV occur in a general context of ‘unaccountable’ municipal democracy, where 
official channels for citizen participation and accountability are scarce. The lack of 
social accountability is not strange in this case, given the evidence observed in CHAPTER 
6.  
The analysis confirms the hypothesis stated in the introduction of this chapter, namely: 
local and national policies visibly constrain the social housing upgrading, and this may 
be a form of creative destruction because they reinforce and accelerate the devaluation 
of existing dwellings in areas where an enlarged rent gap is necessary condition for the 
renewal at large scale. The less small properties can comply with the national 
regulations, the less small owner-occupiers can add use value to their properties, 287 
consolidate their environments, and increase their ground rents. Hence the capitalised 
ground rent produced by these spaces remains at its lowest level, whilst the only chance 
for capitalisation is, for many low-income dwellers, to sell out and leave the space 
towards different, usually less favourable, urban locations (see CHAPTER 5). 
There is an additional geographical aspect to note. Whilst the building regulations 
contained in the LGUC and OGUC apply in all the city, it is in the ‘heart’ of the low-
income peri-centre that they consolidate their most socially unequal character. More 
specifically, the southern peri-centre is the place where low outcomes from FSV 
programme considerably produced by these stiff regulations, and an enlarged and yet-
to-be-accumulated rent gap seem to coincide. Or, using Neil Smith’s words (1996b), a 
large part of the southern peri-centre is the ‘frontier’ where an expanding model of 
large-scale urban renewal and the social reality of the working-class space conflict.  
The analysis conducted so far substantiates that an enlarged potential ground rent is 
made possible by lax urban guidelines, whereas tight regulations to housing upgrading 
can be forms of ‘institutional’ redlining, exerted by central and especially municipal 
governments that respond to the state of competition set within the Urban Renewal 
Subsidy Area. Policy-led valuation and devaluation seek to attract the supposed benefits 
of the urban renewal, but this contradicts the goals of other state policies aimed at 
adding value into the low-income spaces of the city. The LGUC and OGUC codes 
create regulatory exemptions to the small scale construction but these are somehow 
inapplicable in the peri-centre. There are also contradictions between different policies, 
as the national codes harden the conditions for the application of a national subsidy for 
social housing upgrading. Conflicts of goals emerge at different scales, whilst the 
national policy depends on discretional municipal prioritisation of the urban local 
development. Also, ineffective supervision conducted by the national government in the 
application of its policies is noticeable in the peri-centre. At this point, urban 
entrepreneurialism, or the figure of the state acting a facilitator and key necessary 
conditions for the privately-led urban renewal of Santiago, seems a fragmented and 
interstitial practice within the state apparatuses and policies, as well as a discourse that 
dialectically coexists with, and contradicts, the more progressive policy for small scale 
urban regeneration, in application since 2001. 288 
CHAPTER 8. Conclusions 
8.1. Summary of research findings 
This thesis reveals that processes of urban ground rent valorisation and devaluation are 
concomitant, and part of historical trends of creative destruction. The evidence 
presented demonstrates that Santiago’s urban renewal is based on intense capital 
reinvestment and produces high revenues accumulated by large scale developers. 
Nonetheless, this accumulation must be underpinned by public urban policy, as it 
happens not only in devitalised former bourgeois neighbourhoods or derelict industrial 
zones but also and particularly in vibrant peri-central working-class poblaciones.  
The uneven rent gap distribution observed in the southern peri-centre of Santiago 
reflects the speed and intensity of a market of urban renewal that has taken place since 
1990 inside the Urban Renewal Subsidy Area (URSA). The apparently closed rent gap 
in San Miguel comuna reveals a well advanced process of state-subsidised, large-scale 
property market. The case of Cerrillos’ rent gap is different; this has gradually reduced 
since 2000, as a direct effect of the construction of the Ciudad-Parque Bicentenario 
project. In contrast, Pedro Aguirre Cerda (PAC) is where the largest and most static rent 
gap exists.  
Focusing on this latter comuna, this thesis has argued that necessary conditions for rent 
gap enlargement are structural limitations to existing programmes of housing upgrading, 
contained in national building codes and reinforced by municipal management practices, 
as well as urban regulatory changes at the local level that foster the potential ground 
rent increases. The evidence shows that the municipal administration of PAC attempted 
to adjust its local building guidelines to the needs of the market of large scale urban 
renewal, implementing in addition other structural interventions, such as planned new 
large-scale public spaces and a number of expropriations. It might be a matter of 
speculation, but had the new plan been approved in 2005 in PAC, it could have rapidly 
triggered large-scale urban renewal in some of the neighbourhoods most targeted by the 
plan.  289 
Grassroots activism in Pedro Aguirre Cerda counter-imposed a more balanced potential 
ground rent in the area. Grassroots actors showed an effective organisation, technical 
proficiency of their leaders and close attachment to institutional channels of 
participation as they focused their struggle as a conflict of rights between proprietors 
and the state. The latter may be a specific characteristic of the Chilean post-dictatorial, 
owner-occupiers grassroots movements, but their high levels of social mobilisation 
come from their constitution as working-class communities during the industrialising 
period of the 20
th century, and this attribute is specifically peri-central.  
The following sections address in more detail the abovementioned topics. Section 8.2 
relates them to the three research questions presented in CHAPTER 2, regarding: a) the 
way the processes of differential ground rent valuation and devaluation observed in the 
peri-centre can be part of a historical process of urban creative destruction, b) the 
economic and social impact of an enlarged rent gap in the context of Santiago, and c) 
the specific role of the state as ‘entrepreneurial’ facilitator for large-scale accumulation 
of the rent gap by large-scale developers. Section 8.3 addresses theoretical points related 
to gentrification vis-à-vis the evidence from the case, especially addressing the nature of 
the current peri-central social movements and the extent to which they can intervene 
and transform processes of rent gap enlargement and accumulation. Section 8.4 
addresses some basic policy recommendations whilst the final section advances 
potential topics for future research. 
8.2. Addressing the research questions 
8.2.1. Is the current process of urban renewal part of a historical 
continuum of creative destruction in Santiago? 
The hypothesis at the outset of this research proposed that the current process of peri-
central spatial reconfiguration in Santiago, observed from 1990 to 2005, is not an 
isolated phenomenon but another stage of a historical process of urban creative 
destruction. The analysis based on bibliographical data and interviews with key actors 
confirmed this assertion. From this point, several conclusions emerge. 290 
As seen in CHAPTER 3, the economic limitations of the industrialising mode of 
regulation (from the late 1930s to 1973) made the state relatively unable to both regulate 
urban sprawl and absorb the growing social demand for shelter via housing programmes. 
As a reaction, highly organised and mobilised squatter settlements (campamentos) and 
‘site and services’ enclaves multiplied across the fringes of the city. These forms of 
development were respectively tolerated and promoted by a progressive state that 
characterised the period from the late 1960s until 1973. These elements configured an 
important part of the current peri-central poblaciones, also generating a long-lasting and 
militant ‘peri-central’ working-class identity.  
Seen from a broader historical perspective, this historical attempt by the state to ‘include’ 
the masses in a relatively planned logic of urban production might have been an 
exception, as the historical rule since the early 20
th century and after 1973 was a sum of 
social-spatial segregation, low density urban sprawl, speculation with peripheral land, 
and a form of class-monopoly accumulation of the increased ground rent, allowed and 
sometimes promoted by the state.  
The neoliberal policy of the 1970s and 1980s reduced jobs and social welfare, and 
militarily attacked many of the inner city working-class enclaves, as an integral part of a 
process of economic and urban creative destruction. Two specifically ‘peri-central’ 
policies exerted by the military dictatorship were the de-industrialisation of the peri-
centre and the rolling-back of the governmental body oriented to inner city urban 
regeneration, i.e. the Corporation for Urban Improvement (CORMU). De-
industrialisation in Santiago was a process of relocation of manufacturing activity in 
certain metropolitan peripheral spaces, reflecting the historical tension between 
planned-centripetal and liberalised-centrifugal paradigms of urban development 
observed throughout the second half of the 20
th century. At the time, de-industrialisation 
created environmental externalities and the loss of many jobs with the consequent 
pauperisation of the local economic base. Currently, the effects of de-industrialisation 
are especially visible in the southern peri-central area, where a large number of former 
industrial sites lie vacant. On the other hand, the only relatively consistent policy that 
has attempted to comprehensively redevelop vacant peri-central industrial sites – i.e. the 
Santiago Inner Ring project, launched in 2001 – has been more recently downgraded 291 
into a handful of isolated urban interventions. This point partially reveals the current 
absence of a state-led, integral, long-term policy of inner city revitalisation in Chile.  
The second neoliberal policy, the rolling-back of a state body oriented to peri-central 
renewal, was part of an imposed and pervasive market-oriented model of housing 
production that largely reflected the distrust by the neoliberal state of the need to 
command and control the reconfiguration and re-densification of the peri-centre. To 
some extent, the state rolling-back of the 1970s created the basis for the current model 
of subsidised urban renewal, developed from the late 1980s on. Since then, the logic 
regarding privately-led inner city redevelopment has not changed, although there has 
been an evolution from the apparent radical laissez faire of the 1970s to the 
entrepreneurial 1990s and 2000s. This latter aspect will be further examined in sub-
section 8.2.3. 
However, real free-market has not existed in Chile since the dictatorship. If the military 
regime – following its Chicago-inspired monetarist logic – reconfigured the national 
economy by cutting the flow of public subsidy to the local manufacturing sector, it 
reinforced an already existing system of public subsidy to the construction and property 
markets, as demanded by the historically powerful national private building sector, via 
further tax exemptions and introducing extremely flexible planning instruments. This 
state intervention contradicted the purest laissez faire orthodoxy, revealing in fact two 
things. First, Santiago in the 1970s to a large extent saw capital switching from primary 
into secondary circuits, as the financial sector was keen to invest its accumulated idle 
capital in the expanding property market. This financial investment was initially 
concentrated in the peripheral expansion of the city but, from 1990 onwards, 
increasingly focused on the growing market of large-scale inner city renewal. Second, 
there was a populist core in the military dictatorial apparatus that, against its 
demonstrated technocratic rationale, maintained the historical state subsidisation of the 
privately-led housing market despite its productive inefficiency. Currently, the political 
power exerted over the state by the National Association of Building Firms is high. This 
is confirmed in cases like Ciudad-Parque Bicentenario and also in the recently failed 
attempts to eliminate the VAT exemption to the sector, as examined in chapters 4 and 3 
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Despite the high levels of subsidisation, the gradually more deficient housing ‘solutions’ 
provided by the dictatorship produced an increasingly pauperised periphery. This was 
reinforced by the violent policies of evictions implemented between 1979 and 1985. 
The emergence of a ‘new poverty’ in the peripheries of Santiago, observed in more 
recent times, is largely an effect of this, combined with a neoliberal strategy of 
transforming the role of the working-class from collectivised actors into individual 
market agents. Although I have not conducted comparative research to prove this, there 
might be considerable differences between ‘peripheral’ and ‘peri-central’ dwellers in 
terms of the strong belief in collective political struggle and social attachment to the 
place shown by the latter, because they directly or indirectly participated in the 
historical production of their residential space. And this specifically peri-central 
characteristic of identity, greatly transmitted to the newer generations, can be vital to 
give coherence to a social movement around the struggle for issues related to urban 
planning and rent gap, as was shown in CHAPTER 6. 
The structural limitations of the neoliberal approach to urban development of the 1970s 
also implied that the social demand for urban space and housing would only be partially 
met by the state, being absorbed by many peri-central households in the form of 
allegados
1. This process of informal and precarious residential densification played the 
vital role of a ‘social’ safety valve during the dictatorship, yet it also reinforced a 
historical problem with conflictive consequences for today’s low-income peri-central 
comunas, like Pedro Aguirre Cerda (PAC). As this study identified, a central problem 
related to allegados is the incapacity of large numbers of dwellings to expand given the 
limitations to social housing upgrading contained in the national and local building 
regulations, and the limited access to public funding for upgrading. From an economic 
perspective, the problem of allegados can be understood as an effect of, but also a factor 
in, peri-central devaluation. And insofar as properties remain undervalued in the peri-
centre, the selling price that owner-occupiers would receive in an eventual market 
transaction (at current market prices) would be insufficient for securing similar 
accommodation elsewhere. 
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In a nutshell, this thesis’ historical analysis of the peri-centre gives considerable 
importance to the processes of national industrialisation and market liberalisation in the 
production of the material and cultural conditions that led to peri-central urban creation 
and destruction. This contradicts part of the literature about the Latin American inner 
city reviewed in CHAPTER 2, insofar as some authors have seen less preponderance of 
the effects of processes of national industrialisation in the creation of these spaces than 
their city-counterparts in the global North. This point leads to a general epistemological 
conclusion, which is the need to conduct more specific analyses of the urban realities of 
Latin America, while ‘archetypical’ models of Latin American urban spatiality (based 
on the examination of a few cases) might seem inappropriate
2. 
8.2.2. How wide is the rent gap in the peri-centre and what are its effects 
in the space of Santiago?  
It is in the context of a highly liberalised urban economy that an uneven rent gap can be 
observed in the peri-centre of Santiago from 1990 onwards. Comparing the three 
transects analysed in CHAPTER 5, several conclusions emerge. First, as observed 
historically, ground potential values are created through policy regulation and public 
investment in infrastructure. The ground rent variations experienced after the 
application of the urban renewal subsidy (URS) in San Miguel comuna and the radical 
transformations of Cerrillos’ airport into Ciudad-Parque Bicentenario demonstrate to 
what extent public policies are needed for attracting the market of urban renewal into 
the formerly industrial and socially produced peri-centre. This is especially relevant in 
spaces where acquiring and merging fragmented plots appear unattractive to developers. 
The case of PAC comuna substantiates this too, as its visible rent gap could only be 
accumulated if the new local guidelines were to be approved.  
                                                 
2 This also confirms both the strengths and limitations of small-N case-study methods as they can sustain 
processes of Analytical Inference (i.e. contrasting theoretical models with evidence) but can hardly 
sustain generalisations applicable to an ample array of cases. The key goal should be to find theoretical 
principles instead of detailed events. In the case of PAC comuna, political and electoral junctures may 
have helped to considerably shape the conflict around its Master Plan, making the nature of the case in 
many ways ‘unique’, even though, as mentioned in CHAPTER 6, the government has recently accepted that 
in ten additional similar cases in Santiago, there has been social contestation to local authorities (MINVU, 
2008). Therefore, the structural principles and social-political connotations of the rent gap discovered in 
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In the peri-centre, land value gains and therefore capitalised ground rent will increase 
depending on the decisions taken by an oligopoly of large scale developers operating in 
this market since 1998. The public strategy of the Urban Renewal Subsidy seems to be 
precisely to create the general conditions to allow this to happen, without exerting 
planned rationales on which areas are more socially convenient for redevelopment, or 
where this redevelopment could trickle down in a more effective way into other areas. 
Moreover, the most successfully renovated areas have been so far those that had better 
amenities and infrastructure, but not those neighbourhoods with high social needs or the 
areas with more available land for renewal. The latter point is substantiated by the 
downgraded Santiago’s Inner Ring project, but more decisively by the fact that the 
Urban Renewal Subsidy has aimed less at inner city regeneration and more at attracting 
rent-seeking, market-led redevelopments.  
For instance, CHAPTER 4 demonstrated that the goal of inner city repopulation, which 
was in the agenda set by the Ministry of Housing and Planning (MINVU) in the early 
1990s, was not met. Moreover, comprehensive protection of urban heritage has been 
rather absent, whilst the market has largely led to the deterioration of several traditional 
neighbourhoods and produced a number of increasingly transient residential 
environments. The urban renewal market of Santiago also shows particular forms of 
maximised rent gap accumulation. A regular practice by developers, which is also 
destructive in surrounding areas, is to acquire properties at low prices and keep them 
undeveloped, awaiting further central-state provision of infrastructure and/or more 
flexible local regulations, hence keeping reserve-land for future operations. Whilst this 
has created destructive conditions in those neighbourhoods of the centre and peri-centre 
that have experienced more intense renewal, whenever and wherever municipalities 
have attempted to constrain urban density and permitted heights under heritage-
protection schemes (as it happened in Santiago-Centre in 1998) the market has 
responded by descending into zones with more flexible regulation. 
But the evidence suggests that the large-scale accumulation of the ground rent is also 
subsidised by the state, as this market’s operation is based on five elements: a) a fixed 
state subsidy of 200 UF per every unit sold; b) gradually smaller units delivered; c) 
relatively stable unit prices (so the price per m
2 rises); d) increasing land values in the 
peri-centre, which is produced precisely by state subsidisation; and e) inexistent systems 295 
of capture of land value rise by the state. Hence, there is a subsidised market that 
produces increasingly smaller residential units with stable selling prices, in plots 
acquired by developers before land prices soar. This evidence reveals that the public 
subsidy and its effects on land prices are to a large extent absorbed by market operators 
of urban renewal. This point also reinforces the need for transforming the current 
strategy of urban renewal from its essentially rent-seeking goals into a more socially 
concerned policy, as will be proposed in section 8.4. 
In the specific case of Pedro Aguirre Cerda (PAC) comuna, the examination of the 
process of rent gap enlargement showed the particular absence of large scale developers 
in that space. Only some prospective activity by realtors and speculators was detected 
by residents and the municipality in some areas of the comuna. Nonetheless, this does 
not mean that PAC is not currently facing changes associated with urban renewal, but 
this fact confirms that in Santiago there are at least two types of territories of renewal. 
First, those subject to ‘easy’ redevelopment where the market does not encounter social 
resistance and the urban fabric and local building regulations are suitable for rapid 
renewal. These spaces are epitomised by Santiago-Centre and San Miguel comunas, 
where developers and realtors have found secure niches to exploit, while negative 
externalities are mainly constrained to destruction of urban heritage and other 
environmental effects associated to large-scale construction. The specialised Chilean 
literature has mostly focused on these spaces. 
Yet a relevant conclusion of this research is that there is a second type of space of ‘hard’ 
renewal, where the leading role in opening the space for renewal is taken by the state, 
more specifically certain sectoral bodies and local governments. These spaces – i.e. the 
intensely owner-occupied areas like Santiago’s peri-central poblaciones – are only 
potential markets for renewal, and thus they are not yet controlled by large-scale private 
firms. These have seldom been addressed by the Chilean literature. The rent gaps in 
these spaces are wider and more static in time, as they resemble Neil Smith’s metaphor 
of ‘urban frontiers’, or the border spaces toward which the market expands. In the case 
of Santiago, these are the geographical boundaries of the Urban Renewal Subsidy Area, 
but also the spaces where urban governance becomes less accountable, its outcomes 
more uncertain, and the social conflicts related to renewal emerge more crudely. Whilst 
the social connotations of this second form of renewal are examined in section 8.3, the 296 
political role of the state in the peri-central ‘frontier’ is critically scrutinised in sub-
section 8.2.3. 
Another main conclusion to address, precisely related to this second type of space, is the 
twofold nature of the actual Capitalised Ground Rent. When the land is owned by small 
landowners as a product of collective schemes of fragmented property distribution, like 
those that emerged in most neighbourhoods of Pedro Aguirre Cerda comuna during the 
industrialisation period, there appears to be a certain maximum level of ground rent, a 
limit to capitalisation which cannot be surpassed by the current owners. This level of 
capitalised ground rent can be called CGR-1, and needs to be understood basically as 
differential rent, produced by the currently allowed building capacities and/or by 
location, given all the externalities present in the peri-central area. For inner city owner-
occupiers, the CGR-1 is the price they would receive for their plots in an eventual sale 
under the current regulatory conditions. Although this price is comparatively low, 
should the urban renewal market enter into a given neighbourhood, the price can 
increase up to a certain value only. This is evident in the limited increase of the ground 
value curves observed in San Miguel, Cerrillos and PAC, as shown in CHAPTER 5. 
However, following changes in local urban and building regulations, a considerably 
higher level of potential ground rent emerges. If this is to be capitalised, it can be only 
done by developers involved in large-scale dwelling production and able to brush aside 
the strict restrictions imposed on more modest, small scale housing projects enshrined in 
national and local building regulations. This second level can be called CGR-2. This is 
classically class-monopoly rent, as it is only realised by agents with enough financial 
credit and capacity for construction at a large scale, being also the only ones that can 
meet the tight norms established by the national and local regulations in their quest for 
maximum profit
3. At any rate, this is the potential ground rent that interests large scale 
private developers and that peri-central municipalities would like to ‘produce’ in their 
local spaces. But the CGR-2 may be not only a highly profitable potential rent 
accumulated but also, as confirmed by this research, a predatory way of extracting 
                                                 
3 CGR-2 might also be a form of Differential Rent II, according to the definition given in sub-section 
2.3.1 (see page 57).  297 
ground rent in a certain space, given the environmental and urban effects that its 
production generates in surrounding areas. 
There is a clear separation between these two levels of capitalised ground rent, and this 
division is produced by the capacities of control of land supply by developers and the 
state monopolisation of building capacity contained in building regulations (the 
grassroots’ intervention in the redrafting of PAC Master Plan was key in counteracting 
this monopolisation). Since developers acquire land at a faster rate than it valorises due 
to changes in the building regulations, they are able to capitalise the highest rent minus 
the (lower) price of the land paid to the original homeowner (received by those as CGR-
1).  
This issue is important, since the Marxian contradiction between productive capital and 
idle landlordism – as an inherently capitalist conflict seen in CHAPTER 2 – seems to be 
resolved in Chile through the full appropriation of both resources: the land and the 
means of exploiting it, by urban agents who monopolise that exploitation. Based on 
Smith (1979), and more specifically Clark (1995), and including these two different 
levels of rent, my interpretation of the rent gap theory is represented in the scheme 
below (compare with Figure 2.2, page 65).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.1. Rent gap model adapted to Santiago 298 
The general phases of CGR devaluation seem to occur in Santiago as predicted in the 
theory – though with some specificities – as the process of revaluation and replacement 
of the existing fixed capital experiences the separation between CGR-1 and CGR-2. 
Although specific evidence of landlordism, blockbusting and blowing-out (see section 
2.3 for a definition of these concepts) could not be detected in Santiago, there is enough 
evidence to claim that the general model of urban renewal in that city rests on an 
institutionalised system of redlining which works through national norms and local 
master plans, in order to reduce building capacity in targeted spaces, whilst the flow of 
resources from the central state for neighbourhood upgrading is redirected and to some 
extent manipulated by municipal agencies. From this realisation, the third research 
question of this study can now be answered.  
8.2.3. What are the main policies and agents of rent gap enlargement and 
accumulation in Santiago and how do they operate in PAC? 
According to the rent gap theory, the only way that an increased potential ground rent 
can be realised is by devaluing and finally destroying the outmoded fixed capital set on 
the space. But in Santiago’s peri-centre, developers are actually not capable of doing 
this in most low-income areas, because they find social resistance to this destruction. 
Hence this must be brought on by the state, especially the municipal administration. In 
fact, it has been shown theoretically in CHAPTER 2 that a main goal of urban 
entrepreneurialism is precisely to devalue the space and allow the access of financial 
capital into the city, and this might comprise aggressive and even revanchist practices 
towards the existing social context that ought to be transformed. In Santiago, one way is 
to stop alternative ways of renovation and upgrading by keeping low the local 
capitalised ground rent.  
The case of PAC confirmed the extent to which public sector actors are influenced – not 
conditioned – by the destructive and inherently exclusionary logic of entrepreneurial 
urbanism. The same applies to municipal technical officers and hired private consultants 
involved in local urban planning. Their discourses reveal powerful ideological aspects 
related to large-scale urban renewal: the peri-centre is generally blighted by the state, 
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practically uninhabitable. Yet this appraisal does not come from rigorous analyses 
conducted at a local level but responds to broad generalisations. For instance, urban 
space that only twenty years ago was considered inhabitable, today is no longer so, 
despite the fact that it has retained similar environmental conditions, active social 
networks and spatial proximity to work, services and transport networks. Perceptions by 
peri-central inhabitants and objectively conducted assessments about the quality of their 
living environment are not included in the public sector’s diagnoses. This lack of 
feedback was also a major problem at the stage of diagnosis in the process of rezoning 
in PAC comuna. However, while this research proved that decay takes place in certain 
peri-central areas of Santiago only, the main solution to ‘peri-central decay is presented 
by the Chilean public sector, mostly MINVU, as a system of high density, privately-led, 
laissez faire urban redevelopment in a central and peri-central area covering 8,500 
hectares, firmly based on the idea of a desirable urban image to be implanted at any cost 
in this zone.  
A second aspect of discourse is the de-legitimisation, by official channels, of processes 
of social contestation like the one experienced in PAC. This reveals the extent to which 
there might be a sense of technical and even moral superiority in regard to the working-
class peri-central space. It also reveals how, currently, grassroots’ mobilisation and 
social opposition to urban entrepreneurialism is associated by the state to forms of 
misbehaviour. A question that arises then is to what extent perceived class differences 
between public officers and peri-central inhabitants ‘nurture’ the entrepreneurial 
approach to peri-central development shown by the public apparatus. My analysis of 
most of the official informants’ interviews revealed several aspects of class-bias in their 
discourses, as could be seen especially in CHAPTER 6. 
The municipal government of PAC acted in accordance with these stances but even in 
more straightforward ways. The evidence shows it deliberately curtailed the flow of 
resources for housing upgrading as a way to devalue spaces targeted for urban renewal. 
Not only PAC but practically the whole southern peri-centre is clearly where the lowest 
results of application of the Fondo Solidario de Vivienda national programme 
concentrate, whereas many other low-income comunas  in the periphery show 
considerable better rates of application. Although this concentrated misapplication in 
some places might be due to electoral calculations, in general these underperforming 300 
peri-central comunas are those that have established aggressive strategies for market-led 
urban renewal. Also, many strict norms contained in the National Law and By-Law of 
Planning and Construction (LGUC and OGUC respectively) applied in the national 
territory are incompatible with small scale upgrading projects in the peri-centre, as the 
several exceptions contained in these bills that may ease the regulations to small scale 
construction seem discretionally monopolised and curtailed by the municipal apparatus. 
PAC municipality also attempted to transform its local urban regulations seeking to 
increase building capacity, encourage plot merging and make feasible building at 
higher-densities. This revealed that, in fact, their preference was for large-scale 
redevelopment. The case of PAC showed that the correlation between an enlarged 
potential ground rent and institutionally induced building and ground rent devaluation is 
more than plausible. 
Nevertheless, if in terms of ideology and discourse, PAC municipality responded to an 
entrepreneurial logic, in terms of practice, its performance was particularly contentious. 
First, the local administration did not show too much imagination in creating new ways 
of private-municipal partnership management, similar to those CORDESAN 
accomplished in the 1990s in Santiago-Centre. As seen in CHAPTER 4, this agency, and 
also the most recent experience of Ciudad-Parque Bicentenario, fulfilled the five main 
aspects of entrepreneurialism defined in the theoretical chapter
4. Santiago-Centre 
municipality also showed an impressive capacity to articulate its several goals of inner 
city reinvigoration (i.e. urban regeneration, market-led redevelopment and repopulation) 
with the broader goals of converting Santiago’s CBD into a more competitive regional 
market centre. On the contrary, PAC municipality, at a smaller scale, showed low 
capacity to actually activate the market of renewal in its territory as its intervention was 
purely reduced to increasing the local potential ground rent and imposing a new local 
urban road structure.  
Second, PAC municipality showed aversion to political confrontation and/or negotiation 
of its entrepreneurial agenda with its own citizens. In fact, its discourses were based on 
a stigmatisation of many residents and their poblaciones as spaces of crime and thus 
                                                 
4 i) Capacity to attract external funding into the renewing place, ii) contradiction with traditional previous 
managerial ways, iii) use of transport and communication improvements for land appreciation, iv) focus 
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subject to cleansing and large-scale renewal. Moreover, public scrutiny was inexistent 
during most of the process of Master Plan redrafting, until the grassroots resolved to 
intervene in it. Although the municipality might argue that the lack of positive results 
from that process was due to the extreme politicisation of the grassroots, it seems 
relatively clear that there was a substantial lack of institutional commitment in 
establishing more consensually adapted conditions for the plan to succeed.  
These series of facts reveals that in Santiago, rather than a sophisticated entrepreneurial 
practice conducted by a cohesive state, there are entrepreneurial goals, conducted with 
uneven capacities and results by different institutional actors. And here, again, the 
separation between spaces of ‘easy’ and ‘hard’ renewal becomes evident. In the case of 
the latter, real resources for activating a local market of urban renewal are more present 
in the central-state bodies and regulations, whilst the potential political costs of these 
actions are transferred to peri-central municipalities. Even involuntarily, municipalities 
like PAC might be currently acting as buffers for the political reactions by potentially 
dispossessed local people against policies conceived at central state levels. And the 
municipal policy of ‘facilitation’ may be also more aggressive
5. Although the evidence 
based on a single-case study is not enough for establishing generalisations, PAC 
confirms that the level of intervention that local people can exert is enough for 
temporarily transforming urban regulations at a local level but not intervening beyond, 
in the national regulations that accelerate the devaluation of peri-central land. 
In sum, the observed state intervention makes possible the realisation of the potential 
ground rent only for large scale developers by keeping immovable the insurmountable 
limit between CGR-1 and CGR-2. However, in my view, rent-gap theorisers may have 
failed to detect the relevance of state intervention in the production of rent gap and the 
forms of accumulation it fosters. The case of Santiago shows that an enlarged potential 
ground rent is made possible by lax urban guidelines, while tight regulations on housing 
                                                 
5 This study revealed the particular dialectic entrepreneurialism/revanchism in Chile. Whilst the former is 
practiced in many different (effective and ineffective) ways by the state, the latter is arguably a policy 
followed by local governments. No ‘zero-tolerance’ policies, no police or military power was observed. 
Nevertheless, the state apparatus depicted PAC grassroots’ struggle as an unfair confrontation over urban 
rights between the few (the peri-centrals) and the many (the rest of the city). This can be seen as a form of 
‘blaming the dispossessed’. As this research proved, PAC residents were not mobilised by a ‘not-in-my-
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upgrading can be forms of ‘institutional’ redlining in densely and legally occupied areas. 
The latter may be a phase of devaluation and rent gap enlargement, yet are exerted not 
by banks and/or finance institutions (as the rent gap theory predicts) but by central and 
especially peri-central municipal governments that respond somewhat frenetically to the 
laissez faire competition set within the URSA. Valuation and devaluation exerted by the 
local state seek to attract the supposed benefits of large-scale urban renewal, but this 
contradicts the goals of other state policies aimed at adding use and exchange value to 
the low-income spaces of the city without dispossessing their current owner-occupiers.  
In sum, two issues must be highlighted. First, the state as a whole cannot be 
characterised as a monolithic actor, but as the sum of many – usually contradictory – 
apparatuses and policies. Second, notwithstanding this, the devaluation of actual ground 
rent and the monopoly accumulation of higher potential ground rent are processes 
manipulated by public policy. Inner city gentrification exists in Santiago de Chile and it 
is politically constructed. 
8.3. Towards an appropriate conceptualisation of 
gentrification in Santiago 
As anticipated in this thesis’ introduction, some particular points observed in this 
research present something of a challenge to the structural principles of the rent gap 
theory (outlined in CHAPTER 2). In general, the literature about inner city gentrification 
has been mainly produced in (and focused on) western cities of the global North. Very 
few contributions have been produced in the global South including Latin America. 
However, this research confirms that gentrification does exist in a peripheral country 
like Chile and that the phenomenon responds to generally established theoretical 
principles, although with several particularities.  
There is a noticeable difference in the scale of capital, as the intervention of large scale 
global financial reinvestment is not a necessary condition for capitalist urban creative 
destruction in Santiago. Furthermore, the scale of capital involved in the urban renewal 
of Chile’s capital city, as shown in CHAPTER 4, could seem irrelevant when compared 303 
with the scale of capital involved in the redevelopment of the largest cities of the global 
North.  
Yet the theory of rent gap has probably not focused enough on the abovementioned 
social effects that the rent gap produces in owner-occupied, low-income areas, where 
dispossession of capitalised ground rent leads to displacement towards more 
disadvantaged locations in the city, as was seen in chapters 4 and 5. Even if no 
displacement has yet been seen in an area of a city experiencing a process of renewal, 
observed forms of potential dispossession of an increased capitalised ground rent (such 
as severe restrictions on upgrading imposed on social housing, with the perverse effects 
that this generates on small-scale owners) may suffice for gentrification to exist. A main 
conclusion is that gentrification in a city like Santiago, more specifically in a ‘frontier’ 
comuna  like Pedro Aguirre Cerda (PAC), may not necessarily be an evident 
phenomenon, in the way described elsewhere by sociological studies, but is instead 
evident in the generation of the material conditions for class-monopoly accumulation of 
ground rent in an area with high levels of property-ownership. I call this particularity 
‘gentrification by dispossession of the ground rent’. 
Thus gentrification in most parts of the peri-centre of Santiago seems to reflect less the 
type of radical class-contradiction between different income groups (as a significant part 
of the cultural-based theory of gentrification essentially claims) and more a specific type 
of contradiction between an existing working-class stratum and the urban 
entrepreneurial logic, policies, market and state actors seeking to renew that space. It is 
for this reason that I argue that theoretical approaches to ‘rent gap’ gentrification need 
to be more open to document forms of social contestation. This may imply a necessary 
adaptation of the theory of gentrification to cities such as Santiago, and possibly other 
Latin American cities too, and the need to recalibrate the roles of the social and 
economic actors in processes of gentrification and/or renewal as described in the 
international literature. In peri-central areas like PAC, the state and the grassroots are 
more relevant as factors of gentrification than developers and upper-class newcomers.  
However, dialectically, as the case of PAC proved, better knowledge about the 
appearance of a rent gap could also be an effective political means for urban movements 
of low-income local owner-occupiers, to help them understand their potential losses of 304 
capitalised ground rent and mobilise them to stop (or at least temporarily manage) 
waves of large scale urban renewal impacting on their territories. 
In fact, probably the most important realisation gathered from the fieldwork is that 
Santiago’s peri-central poblaciones, originally born as working-class enclaves, represent 
essentially use value for their residents. Their complex social and economic relations 
are inextricably intertwined with their physical structures, while the existing fixed 
capital seems almost irrelevant as exchange value when compared to the city’s average 
property prices. The peri-centre serves extremely useful social functions that 
nevertheless do not fit into the developmental rationales of state planners, nor do they 
appear in the official land market indices.  
The concept of ‘spatial fix’ helps to understand the latter characteristic. As defined in 
CHAPTER 2, ‘spatial fix’ is a property of the fixed capital that, due to its inherent 
characteristics, locks a certain level of ground rent. In material terms, the quality of the 
buildings and infrastructure in the peri-centre firmly locks the capitalised and potential 
ground rent, hence the need by the market to devalue and destroy it. Nonetheless, it 
must be stressed that many poblaciones in Santiago’s peri-centre represent a spatial fix 
which is extremely rich in social terms and in terms of organisation capacity of their 
inhabitants. This observation substantiates why rent gap theory must be conceived and 
interpreted from Marxian principles, “because value expresses not merely a relation 
between one commodity and another, as does price, but rather the relation between the 
price of the commodity and the labour objectified in it” (Marx, 1973: 446-447). Use 
value is what makes urban space more or less resilient to market-based spatial 
reconfigurations and the risks associated to speculation with urban land.  
Social characteristics of the peri-centre are mainly its working class consciousness and 
mobilising social capacities, which were key in its historical constitution and are still 
valid and effective resources for political struggle
6 . This was proved by PAC 
                                                 
6 Yet, for this research, the relevance of the influence of PAC grassroots in the process of Master Plan 
redrafting emerged during the fieldwork and was not anticipated in the theoretical writings. This was a 
deliberate decision that became increasingly relevant as a complementary element to introduce in the 
structural logic of gentrification. The goal was to avoid a pre-established, complicated social theorisation 
attached to the rent gap theory. This point also confirms the relevance of the deductive-inductive stance 305 
communities between 2003 and 2005. In general, a shared sense of historical continuity 
and a social duty to preserve what past communal actors achieved could be perceived 
among the grassroots interviewed. And yet, on the other hand, PAC grassroots leaders 
accept that the currently lower levels of political participation and negative factors like 
drug dealing and crime undermine their social base. Furthermore, and although this was 
not an element specifically addressed in this research, it is a fact that practically all PAC 
local leaders are women (see Appendix 5 for a list of interviewees). This comes from 
the very foundation of the working-class peri-centre of Santiago, and the observed 
historical need of resolving gender contradictions and strategic leadership from early on 
in the original configuration of the campamentos. As CHAPTER 3 examined historically, 
female pobladoras were seen either as potential political leaders or housewives, but not 
both. Past and present social attributes are synthesised in the current peri-central 
grassroots movements. 
Peri-central people’s concerns about urban issues have also changed from those in the 
1960s and 1970s. As factors to overcome, peri-central grassroots today face the 
expansion of their households in precarious living conditions that lead to increasing 
number of allegados. As factors to protect, their struggle is to defend their high levels of 
owner-occupancy and recognition of their locality, by the authority, as political 
patrimony, and even as the result of almost two decades of fighting military state power. 
Yet more than a largely symbolic social capital, the peri-central land represents material 
social capital. Their status of proprietors endangered by PAC municipality’s attempts at 
expropriation triggered the reaction of PAC communal actors. However, the same 
reason meant that their mobilisation was constrained practically all the time to 
institutional ways. The grassroots, instead of simply opposing the rezoning via 
mobilisation and disruption of the top-down process of planning, intervened in it and 
forced the private consultant to deliver a Final Draft which was much closer to their 
own assessments and expectations, while attempting to change the material conditions 
for urban renewal within legal boundaries.  
The evidence also suggested that the ability to perform changes deployed by PAC 
community was high because of the technical knowledge their leaders acquired from 
                                                                                                                                               
proposed in CHAPTER 1, or in other words, that in urban research, theoretical conceptualisation and 
empirical observation ought to have equal weights. 306 
external parties. This is not unique, as external technical support was a key element in 
the historical production of the peri-centre too. In sum, the current social contestation of 
PAC grassroots proved a synthesis between historical social struggle and a post-
dictatorship movement of owner-occupiers collectively mobilised by the potential 
dispossession of their economic asset. 
8.4. Policy implications 
In many ways, the enlargement of CGR-1, were this conceived as exchange or use value, 
should be a matter of public policy. Central state bodies provide resources for an 
incremental, small-scale urban renewal in peri-central poblaciones, but these resources 
are not being efficiently allocated due to inconsistencies within the state’s own 
regulations, and the lack of supervision and social accountability regarding the 
application of that funding by local governments. Thence, the Fondo Solidario de 
Vivienda  programme (or a different, improved version of this) ought to act more 
independently from unintended, or even deliberate, municipal mismanagement, while 
central and regional MINVU should have a much greater role to play in monitoring the 
programme. A more widely spread and better focused model of mid-density urban 
renewal could create more residential capacity than the current privately-led, large-scale 
model, helping to reverse more decisively the loss of population from the peri-centre, 
support small building enterprises, and even foster micro-rental housing markets.  
In addition, a reconfiguration of the state-subsidised, privately-led model of urban 
renewal seems necessary for Santiago and probably other large Chilean cities too. 
Several, better localised zones for intensive large-scale renewal might be more effective 
than the current single, large Urban Renewal Subsidy Area within which regulation is 
guided by a laissez faire approach. These zones would not interfere with the most 
needed spaces for social housing upgrading. Moreover, the main stakeholders in the 
urban renewal of these cities should no longer be the large-scale developers. Since the 
accumulation of the 200 UF of Urban Renewal Subsidy and most of the increasing CGR 
largely benefit large-scale developers, public sector efforts should be aimed at creating a 
more socially responsible alternative for peri-central renewal. The emphasis should be 
placed more in the social capitalisation of the CGR-1 and less in the amplification and 307 
class-monopoly accumulation of the CGR-2. The Chilean state can, and must, intervene 
and modify the current laissez faire logic in the urban renewal of the peri-centre. 
In sum, if there must be a peri-central-oriented urban renewal policy in Santiago, it 
should not be based simply on trading-off urban plots at their current exchange values, 
but on recognising the high potential of the land in terms of the use value for the people 
who inhabit it. 
8.5. Projecting research to the future 
Three topics emerge from this case as further potential research projects. They arise 
largely from the limitations of a single-case study like the present one. A first area that 
needs more in-depth understanding is the historical conditions of production of the peri-
central space, not only in Santiago but also other Latin American cities. A theoretical 
model could be based on the four main factors of urban production addressed in 
CHAPTER 3, i.e. i) ground rent speculation, ii) national modernisation with economic 
industrialisation, iii) state urban regulation, and iv) empowered urban social movements. 
This model could be tested in, and compared with, other national and international cases.  
A second research area consists of more specific observations of rent gap in other areas 
of Santiago’s peri-centre, or in other cities’ peri-centres, whilst the use of more detailed 
cadastral information and other sources of historical land transactions could be useful. 
This observation should be complemented with more detailed analysis and engagement 
with market agents, especially developers and realtors, and a specific monitoring of the 
amounts of rent accumulated by the different intervening actors through the processes of 
renewal. In fact, an important goal should be to accurately quantify CGR-1 and CGR-2, 
which have been identified mostly conceptually in this thesis.  
The third area of further research is related to action-research and consists of exploring 
alternative forms of peri-central social housing and neighbourhood upgrading in 
Santiago, with a view to add use and exchange value to the properties and so help 
reduce the gap between the CGR-1 and CGR-2. Such a research project should lead to 
policy recommendations for strengthening social housing upgrading programmes in 308 
Chile, and is more closely related to Architecture and Urban Design. That research 
design should also consider the participation of peri-central communities, using their 
demonstrated organisational capacities and their potential for understanding technical 
issues, as documented in this research.  
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Appendix 1. Glossary 
The main goal of this appendix is to define particular concepts related to the urban 
development of Santiago. A secondary goal is to expand the definition of general 
concepts used and briefly defined in the thesis. Although these concepts might be well 
known by the reader, the goal here is to contextualise them in social, economic, cultural 
and/or geographical dimensions, specifically in Chile and/or Latin America. 
 
Allegados: Drop-in guests, people or households that inhabits someone else’s dwelling 
or backyard patio, usually kin to the homeowner, as temporary solution for their 
economic incapacity to own or rent a dwelling. After the military coup in 1973, as land 
seizures and campamentos  were banned, and many people were economically 
disqualified by the public system of housing subsidies by the regime, the number of 
allegados dramatically increased in Santiago (Gilbert, 1996; Klaarhamer, 1989). By 
1985, 53% of Chilean households shared space with additional families (Collins and 
Lear, 1995). This was one of the acutest social problems in Chile during the 1970s and 
1980s (Sugranyes, 2006). Similar forms of informal emergency accommodation are 
known as ‘backyard shacks’ in South Africa (Morange, 2002). 
Alliance for Progress: Alianza para el Progreso. Financial and social aid programme 
from USA to Latin America performed between 1961 and 1970. It comprised a total of 
US$ 20,000 million to be allocated through the Inter-American Development Bank 
(IDB) and the Pan-American Development Foundation (PADF). In the event, only 12 
billion were disbursed. Among other ends, the aid was aimed at counterbalancing the 
‘Cuban communist threat’ to the US interests in the region. It contributed to finance 
large scale, affordable housing-urban projects and infrastructure across Latin America. 
In Santiago, the Operación Sitio programme received considerable funding from this 
programme.  
Autonomous Comunas, Law of: Ley de Comuna Autónoma. Passed in 1891 after the 
civil war that one year earlier overthrew constitutional President Balmaceda. This 
complete municipality-based reorganisation of the Chilean urban and rural territory was 336 
far more efficient than the previous scheme based on provinces, yet it allowed and 
reinforced political power and corruption exerted by oligarchic families in those 
municipalities, facilitating, among other things, class-monopoly speculative control of 
land subdivisions and ground rent accumulation. 
Barrio Alto:  Metropolitan eastern macro-zone where Santiago’s affluent population 
concentrates. The barrio alto started to be developed in the late 19
th century but its 
development intensified from the 1920s onwards. Currently, Barrio Alto comunas are 
Providencia, Las Condes, Vitacura, Lo Barnechea, La Reina and Ñuñoa. From 1979 to 
1985, the dictatorship evicted people who lived in campamentos and legal state-built 
poblaciones  from this area, considerably increasing its socio-economic homogeneity 
(see Appendix 2). 
Brunner, Karl: Austrian planner who worked in University of Chile, Santiago-Centre 
Municipality and Ministry of Public Infrastructure between 1929 and 1934. His major 
legacy in Chile was the 1934 Plan for Santiago comuna. This plan would be the first 
serious attempt to consolidate urban regulation at metropolitan level, integrating 
physical, functional, cultural and aesthetic dimensions (Cáceres, 1996). The Plan 
differentiated three concentric rings of marked socio-spatial differentiation. Brunner 
aimed at ‘modernising’ Santiago, even its most deprived areas, recommending 
incentives to the upper class for returning to the centre. However, the legal approval of 
the Plan took place only in 1939 (De Ramón, 2000). As previously occurred with the 
National Law of Planning and Construction (LGUC) between 1931 and 1936, this fiver-
year gap accelerated speculation and accentuated sprawl in the areas to be most 
controlled by the Plan. Twenty years after its approval, Brunner’s Plan proved 
inefficient at controlling the expanding territory, had lost its original quality due to 
successive amendments (Parrochia, 1996a) and had to be replaced by the 1960 PRIS. 
However, Brunner’s zoning continued in force in Santiago-Centre comuna until 1990, 
when it was radically changed, in order to promote market-led urban renewal. 
Callampa:  Pejorative term in  Chilean slang, used to describe informal settlements 
created by the poorest rural immigrants settling in the city, especially during the 19
th 
and most of the 20
th centuries. They located in the worst or most dangerous peripheral 
areas (other forms were conventillos or as allegados).  Callampa  literally means 337 
‘mushroom’; the association might come from their spontaneity, speed of growth, or 
even their location in usually wet land, i.e. riversides or channels. The term is still in use. 
Campamento:  Extremely organised squatter movement in which the land has been 
seized and developed through self-help construction. Campamentos  are different to 
callampas because the former were more organised and many of them have been 
consolidated. They were intensively developed in Santiago mainly from 1957 to 1973, 
with some sporadic cases in the 1980s during the military dictatorship. What makes 
Chilean campamentos unique was their self-sufficient organisation and resistance to 
state and right-wing opposition, although they usually depended on a political party. For 
the latter reason, Manuel Castells supposed that Chilean campamentos lacked social 
agency and had limited chances for consolidation (Castells, 1974, 1985a), but more 
recent evidence proved that many of them turned into ‘normal’ poblaciones. One of the 
most significant campamentos  (and probably the first one) in Chile is La Victoria, 
started in 1957 and, as this thesis substantiates, currently a vital población in the 
southern peri-central area of Santiago. 
CESCO, Consejo Económico y Social Comunal: Local Economic and Social Council. 
Municipal institution composed by the mayor, local councillors and organised 
communities. CESCO is convoked in specific moments for, among other duties, assess 
and give approval to new master plans. 
Chilean Way to Socialism: Via Chilena al Socialismo. Alternative name given to the 
process of national social and economic radical transformation, led by the government 
of the Popular Unity, headed by President Salvador Allende (see Appendix 3 for list of 
national presidents). 
Comuna: Administrative local-level territory governed by a municipality. Its space is 
regulated by a local urban master plan. The term can be used to refer a territory, the 
people who inhabit it or the municipality that governs that territory. Greater Santiago 
Metropolitan Area (GSMA) comprises 34 comunas. See Appendix 2 for map of GSMA. 
Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia:  Concerted Action of Parties for 
Democracy. Political coalition that has governed Chile since the end of the dictatorship, 338 
in 1990. Notwithstanding Concertación included Communists until 1992, its current 
party members are: Christian Democratic Party (PDC), Socialist Party (PS), Party for 
Democracy (PPD) and the Radical Socialist Democratic Party (PRSD, formerly Radical 
Party, of social-democratic orientation). Since 1990, four consecutive Concertación 
presidents have taken office in La Moneda presidential palace, namely Patricio Aylwin 
(1990-1994), Eduardo Frei (1994-2000), Ricardo Lagos (2000-2006) and Michelle 
Bachelet (2006-2010); see Appendix 3. In the national mayoral elections of 2008, PS 
and PPD parties forged an agreement with the Chilean Communist Party. This let social 
leader Claudina Núñez be elected as mayor of Pedro Aguirre Cerda. 
Conventillo: A form of maximised multi-occupation of a site or building, usually in a 
dilapidated house, located in central or peri-central areas. Historically conventillos have 
been associated with social malaise, sickness and lack of opportunities, but they 
represented (for their residents) far better location than the more distant callampas or 
campamentos. From a historical bourgeois perspective, conventillos were, on the one 
hand, forms of milking capitalised ground rent by oligarchic or bourgeois speculative 
property owners; on the other, they helped to reduce the building value and dilapidate 
the neighbourhood, this increasing the rent gap in the area. In Argentina, equivalents are 
called inquilinatos; in Mexico, vecindades.  
CORDESAN,  Corporación para el Desarrollo de Santiago:  Corporation for 
Development of Santiago. Municipal-private agency which since 1985 promoted, and 
from 1992 to 1995 managed, the process of large-scale urban renewal in Santiago-
Centre comuna. The entrepreneurial model of CORDESAN was later exported to other 
peri-central comunas with uneven results.  
CORFO,  Corporación de Fomento de la Producción:  Corporation for Productive 
Development. Created in 1939, this state agency was central for underpinning the next 
35 years of national import-substitution industrialisation. It created new, and 
monopolised already existing, productive capacity, developing macroeconomic policies 
and installing and financing new manufacturing infrastructure and entrepreneurial 
capacities in the country. 339 
CORMU,  Corporación de Mejoramiento Urbano: Corporation for Urban 
Improvement, founded in 1965 during Frei’s national administration. Officially closed 
in 1976 by the military dictatorship. It was dependent on the Ministry of Housing and 
Planning (MINVU) and its main goal was the densification of central and peri-central 
areas through projects aimed at middle-income population. CORMU was responsible 
for many innovative collective-housing projects, using principles of modern architecture. 
It organised an international project competition for remodelling a peri-central western 
quarter close to the CBD, as part of the 1972 International Housing Exhibition to be 
held in Chile, sponsored by the government and the International Union of Architects 
(IUA). Nevertheless, compared with the large scale of the current market-led urban 
renewal, in quantitative terms, CORMU’s production in Santiago’s inner city might 
seem irrelevant. 
CORVI, Corporación de Vivienda: Housing Corporation. Created by Ibáñez’s military 
dictatorship (1927-1932) but actually operative since 1953 during democratic 
Alessandri’s government (1952-1958), this public agency promoted intensive 
production of ‘affordable’ and social housing mainly located in the periphery. CORVI 
articulated public and private sectors, it had attributions to expropriate and buy land, 
build, sell, lease and swap properties, request and provide loans, open accounts, accept 
and endorse bills of exchange, sign business documents and credits, secure its 
obligations to mortgages, pledges, ballot banking, insurance, and generally perform acts 
and contracts necessary for its purposes (Hidalgo, 2005). CORVI developed the 
Housing Plan in 1953 with the also newly created Planning Office of the Ministry of 
Public Works. CORVI promoted academic research on new materials and methods of 
construction, developed and implemented a plan for streamlining and mechanisation of 
the construction industry, and coordinated, together with the Ministry of National 
Defense’s Military Service Labour, the Housing Plan prepared by the Ministry of Public 
Works. When MINVU was created in 1965, CORVI became part of its apparatus, 
though it did not lose its administrative independency and relatively progressive 
political orientation. It was closed in 1975 by the dictatorship. 
CPB,  Ciudad-Parque Bicentenario Project: Large urban project sponsored by the 
Chilean state, located in the peri-central south west area of Santiago, more specifically 
in the site of the former Cerrillos Airport. CPB is a 250-hectare intervention comprising 340 
residential, office, retail, service and manufacture activities, including a 50-hectare 
Central Park. By 2009, the project is still in construction.  
Dependent Countries: Nations of the global South which enter into the centre-
periphery relations imposed by the industrialised powers, constrained by forces such as 
“multinational corporations, international commodity markets, foreign assistance, 
communications, and any other means by which the advanced industrialised countries 
can represent their economic interests abroad” (Ferraro, 1996). Castells stresses the fact 
that capitalist independent and ‘dependent societies’ develop analogous patterns of 
urban land monopolisation and class-related conflict in the urban realm (Castells, 1985b; 
Susser, 2002). Quijano (1967, 1968) argued that high levels of international economic 
dependency produced the emergence of masses of economically and socially 
marginalised population (mostly rural), unable to participate in the capitalist, externally-
commanded national system of production.  
DFL2,  Decreto con Fuerza de Ley N° 2:  Promulgated  in 1959 by Alessandri’s 
government and still in force in Chile, the DFL2 is a law for tax exemption to builders 
of the so-called ‘affordable housing’, namely properties with an area of less than 140 m
2. 
Given that the DFL2 tax exemption is financed by considerable state effort, and about 
95% of the dwellings produced in Chile fall into this category (Astaburuaga, 2005), 
many scholars claim that the economic goals of this policy favour the bourgeois housing 
sector, both builders and owners (see for instance Gilbert, 1993; Kusnetzoff, 1987; 
Rojas, 2001).  
Diputado: MP, Member of the Lower Chamber in the National Parliament.  
ECLAC or UN-ECLAC: United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America 
and the Caribbean. This influential think tank nested the main theories of development 
in the 1960s, partially a Marxist-rooted dependency theory, being also close to Theory 
of Marginality during the same period. ECLAC’s role in establishing the conceptual 
basis for the constitution of the modernising regimes in Latin America and their 
processes of import-substitution industrialisation (ISI) during the 1960s until 1973 was 
indisputable (Hopenhayn, 1995). 341 
Ensanche: Literally ‘widening’. The concept was used in Spain in the late 19th century 
to name the planned new expanded urban areas of industrialising cities and the 
construction of neighbourhoods under grid plans (e.g. Barcelona’s ensanche  or 
eixample). The term was used by PULSO, the consultants hired by the municipality of 
Pedro Aguirre Cerda, in its First Draft Master Plan to name the high-speed corridors 
that would have crossed the comuna north-south and west-east. According to the zoning 
proposed, the borders of these axes would have comprised medium-size buildings. See 
section 5.4. 
Executive order: In Chile, an Executive Order (Decreto Ley) is a legal procedure for 
passing laws directly from the executive power in cases of “extraordinary and urgent” 
necessity, e.g. when the parliament has been suppressed (Figueroa, 1996). 
Fordism: A regime of accumulation that dominated the capitalist world from the 1930s 
to the early 1970s. According to Ritzer (2000), its main characteristics are: a) mass 
product of homogeneous production; b) inflexible technologies (assembly line) and 
standardised labour routines; c) big economies of scales for increasing productivity; d) 
homogenisation of labour which resulted in mass workers and bureaucratised unions 
and forms of negotiation; e) growth of market and consumption patterns for 
homogenised products of mass-consumption productivity; f) a rise in wages generated 
by unionisation, leading to an increased demand for mass-produced assets; g) this 
market for products was often controlled by a Keynesian macroeconomic policies, but 
the market for labour is handled by collective bargaining supervised by the state, and h) 
a mass educational system which provides the mass workers required by the system.  
Althusser (2001) claims that the latter point is an essential means for perpetuating the 
‘ideological state apparatuses’. Different world Fordist policies had in common the 
acceptance that “the state should focus on full employment, economic growth, and the 
welfare of its citizens, and that state power should be freely deployed, alongside of or, if 
necessary, intervening in or even substituting for market processes to achieve these 
ends.” (Harvey, 2005: 10)  
This regime of accumulation grew during the 20
th century especially in USA, reached 
its peak in the 1960s and started to decline in the early 1970s, especially with the oil 342 
crisis of 1973, the consequent fall of the North American automobile industry, and the 
radical reconfiguration of the manufacturing system in this country and Western Europe. 
Therefore, it became essentially as antinomy to more advanced and flexible forms of 
production (Hirst and Zeitlin, 1989). World Fordism had major implications in the 
development of peripheral economies like the Chilean one, especially related to the 
cultural imposition of Rostowian principles of growth-accumulation-take off, the 
fixation of prices of commodities and the exportation of old fashioned technology, both 
commanded from the US. Some Chilean scholars address the implications that Fordism, 
as ideology and policy, had in the urban development of the country, from the 1930s 
onwards (Daher, 1996; De Ramón, 2000; Palma, 1984; Raposo and Valencia, 2004; 
Raposo et al., 2005). This latter point is core for the analysis in CHAPTER 3. 
GSMA, Greater Santiago Metropolitan Area: Área Metropolitana del Gran Santiago, 
composed of 34 comunas located in the middle of the Region of Santiago. Thirty two of 
them belong to Santiago Province, while San Bernardo comuna  belongs to Maipo 
Province, and Puente Alto comuna belongs to Cordillera Province (See Appendix 2). 
Housing Emergency Plan: Plan de Vivienda de Emergencia. To be implemented by 
the Popular Unity government between 1970 and 1976, the Plan aimed at reducing 
definitively the national housing shortage. Its goals were: a) to undertake a 
comprehensive programme of housing production, services and infrastructure; b) to give 
the Chilean workers access to decent housing with real chances of social/urban 
integration; c) to increase building-related jobs; d) to boost the building sector and the 
production of building materials; e) to promote the industrialisation of the housing 
sector by opening new sources of production and general economic incentives (Raposo 
and Valencia, 2004). The plan was highly successful in 1971 (nearly 80,000 units 
produced by the state only) but dramatically reduced to 35,000 in the forthcoming years. 
The Plan was eliminated in 1973 by the military Junta. 
Import-Substitution Industrialisation (ISI): Basically, a historical process 
experienced by peripheral countries that attempted to reverse their dependence to the 
industrialised world through the local production of manufactured products. In Latin 
America, most countries, led by the UN Economic Commission for Latin America 
(ECLAC), went through processes of ISI in the 1950s and 1960s, especially Mexico, 343 
Brazil, Argentina and Chile (Gatica, 1989). This happened much as a result of the 
World War II and the momentary readjustment of the global market, the international 
division of labour and its uneven north-south relations of dependency. However, 
according to Biel (2000), and although the virtuous cycle of increased demand with 
domestic production might have seem a step towards economic independence (seen 
from the perspective of the newly industrialising countries), the fact is that in global 
terms, ISI was an outcome of international capital looking for cheap labour and hence 
higher surplus in the periphery. Nevertheless, this mode of regulation implicitly had an 
end. In peripheral countries, the more the demand grew, the more salaries increased; 
thus this essentially capitalist system became unsustainable. In the 1970s and 1980s, 
following  Ricardian  premises of international comparative advantages, most Latin 
American countries restored their neo-colonial relations of production/consumption.  
Some authors argue that in Chile there were internal political and economic 
preconditions, specifically since the Great Depression, that conditioned an earlier 
beginning of ISI, in the late 1930s (Salazar, 2003). In fact, although Chile was severely 
hit by the Great Depression, the recovery begun in late 1932 through a pragmatic policy 
of selective stimulation of internal production, as institutional, political and economic 
capacity installed before the Great Depression helped to stabilize the national situation 
(Marfán, 1984). From then on it would be clear that only the state had the capacity to 
manage capital and obtain external credit and necessary technology. It was therefore 
necessary to modify structural situations inherent to a small peripheral country, going in 
counter flow to the inertia of capitalism in that period (Moulian, 1997). Just before the 
World War II, the governing Popular Front turned into monopolise almost all the 
productive sectors and macroeconomic policies, installing and financing new industrial 
capacities in basic sectors and infrastructure, also improving technical and 
entrepreneurial capacities (Ffrench-Davis, 2004). Most of them were concentrated in 
Santiago (Chateau and Pozo, 1987).  
The state occupied a primal role in stimulating, financing, and establishing basic 
industrial sectors such as steel, electricity and oil. On the other hand, the government 
used several protectionist instruments to make the internal market grow, including price 
control of those basic goods, subsidies, loans to diverse productive and service activities, 
and the control of the currency rates (Espinoza, 1988). Using momentum generated in 344 
the early 1930s, numbers of additional state industries were created for providing 
energy and basic intermediate products. In parallel, the formerly financial foreign 
private capital turned into the activation of the industrial sector using already existing 
skills and know how, creating in fact more productive capacity than the state agencies 
of development. The increasing state control of copper production and the 
unprecedented state monetarist monopoly opened many possibilities for the state to plan 
economic and social development, despite the relative backwardness experienced in the 
agricultural sector during the period (Ffrench-Davis, 2004) that reinforced rural-urban 
migration (Camus and Hajek, 1998). A domestic Keynesian approach was also vital, as 
by 1940, he Popular Front increased salaries in 20%. The Chilean ISI was also 
supported by an invigorated state bureaucracy and also succeeded in reinforcing 
democracy by expanding people’s political participation (Espinoza, 1988).  
The end of the World War II marked the beginning of a decline. By 1952, the 
dependence to the imports in technology became evident. Despite the multiple 
protectionist barriers to primary assets, the already existent barriers for importing 
intermediate goods were uninstalled, with the exception of oil, iron and steel. This 
obviously reinforced the historical Chilean dependency to the North, first, to its 
commodities, and second, to the international technology market (Salazar, 2003; Salazar 
and Pinto, 1999a). The growing social demand superseded the available state resources 
extracted from the copper production. By the mid 1960s, the state was unable to cope 
with the ‘promise’ of modernity and welfare. An hypertrophied state would become 
more vulnerable to the volatility of the masses and in last instance, to the military power 
of deliberation (Salazar and Pinto, 1999a). The military coup in 1973 ended the process 
of ISI in the country, beginning a new era of dictatorial radical economic liberalisation. 
La Victoria: Probably the first campamento in Chile. It is located in the southern peri-
centre of the GSMA, in the core of what today is Pedro Aguirre Cerda comuna. La 
Victoria población was one of the most severely attacked working-class enclaves during 
the military dictatorship (1973-1990). This thesis’ fieldwork was to a great extent based 
on La Victoria.  345 
Law of Municipalities: Ley Orgánica Constitucional de Municipalidades (LOCM), 
passed in 1994, it legalised the already existing functional and administrative structure 
of municipalities in Chile (Gobierno de Chile, 2004).  
LGUC, Ley General de Urbanismo y Construcciones: National Law of Planning and 
Construction. Passed in 1931, it can be considered the first properly technical, universal 
and multisectoral regulation of urban plot subdivision and city growth (Gurovich, 2000). 
Its major contribution was the prescription that every municipality with a population of 
more than 8,000 inhabitants should have a local master-plan, in order to control urban 
sprawl and the chaotic distribution of land uses.  
In 1953, following international experiences like Abercrombie’s London Plan, Costa’s 
Brasilia, Bardet’s sociological-territorial school and CIAM, the planners of the Ministry 
of Public Works deeply reformed the LGUC, reshaping its competences over territorial 
planning at three different levels: a) national planning system and regional plans; b) 
inter-municipal master-plans (developed only after late 1950s) to regulate sprawling 
cities, urban areas shared by two different comunas or cities under processes of 
conurbation; c) local master-plans. According to the 1953 version of the LGUC, local 
plans would have to define minimum standards for the development of residential, 
economic, industrial and recreational land uses, definitions of the quality of the 
buildings to produce and limitation of sprawl through urban perimeters. These 
guidelines came to fill a vacuum in the Chilean legislation, but usually acted after facts, 
when sprawl and developments have already taken place (Hidalgo, 2000). The law 
would be again deeply modified under military dictatorship in 1976 and received 
additional minor modifications during democracy, whilst its By-Law (OGUC) would be 
modified successively in 1970, 1976 and 1992.  
Macro-zone:  Comunas of the GSMA grouped under similar characteristics, such as 
average household income, population growth rate and so on. See Appendix 2 for 
spatial analysis of macro-zones in Santiago. 
Marginality, Theory of: Probably the  main political and ontological approach to 
development by the Centre for Latin American Social Development (DESAL), created 
by the Jesuit Roger Vekemans, greatly influential in the Chilean reformist Christian 346 
Democratic government and its project of Revolution in Freedom (1964-1970). By 1964, 
the newly elected government’s and DESAL’s diagnoses agreed with the Theory of 
Modernisation as follows: progress means modernisation thus social structures should 
be developed in order to make the modern world to receive the marginal masses.  
Authors like Quijano argued that there is a close relation between economic dependency 
and marginality. Vast ‘marginalised’ social groups were those that could not meet with 
the labour structure and societal norms imposed by a dependent, increasingly technical 
domestic system of production. Therefore, dependency engendered marginalisation 
(Quijano, 1967, 1968).  
The poor were defined by this theory as individuals incapable of producing culture or as 
masses which only after a deep learning process would be capable of receiving it. 
Marginal people were conceived as dangerous, a threat to social stability (Jelin, 2004), 
also supposed to be incapable of self deliberation, being described not only as internally 
atomised but also disabled to overcome their limitations by themselves. The marginals 
were also supposed to be source of traditionalist, male-centred ways of life (Safa, 2004). 
Therefore, the only way for the ‘marginal’ world to become acceptable and legitimate 
by the state, was to be functional to the developmental goals set by the central power, 
otherwise it would be banned or considered out of the social system and flung to the 
extremes of society (Piña, 1987). 
The ultimate explanation for the origin of the marginal sectors was one: immigrants, 
either from the countryside or smaller towns. Immigration and ecological marginality 
appeared as independent variables affecting cultural attributes of urban people, like 
psychological anomie, deviant behaviour and/or political apathy. The theory associated 
marginality to a cultural environment related to the traditional rural world, an urban 
subculture with different levels of difficulty to adapt to the urban life, or even originated 
in the juxtaposition of the Hispanic world into the indigenous one (Salazar and Pinto, 
1999b). The Theory of Marginality explained the poor’s supposed conformism, fatalism 
and passivity as typically traditional attitudes. The term ‘marginal’ was also associated 
with poblador, whilst the latter became at the same category level than ‘worker’ or 
‘peasant’. Furthermore, spatial localisation was supposed to be correlative with the 
concentration of marginal people: central areas in decline, and especially spontaneous 347 
peripheral settlements and suburban planned low-income estates, although they 
represented different levels of integration to the urban life.  
Yet this theory neglected the relation between life conditions and position in the 
productive apparatus. As Castells argued, given that ‘marginals’ were situated  
in available fiscal lots of little value in Santiago’s fringes, it seemed obvious to call them 
‘marginal’, since they were ‘in the margins’ [… But n]obody realised that the brand new 
luxurious residences located for instance in Las Condes were at same or greater distance 
to the centre. Obviously the urban amenities, accessibility available, the car, made the 
latter self sufficient and permanent houses in this city-society, around which the new 
barbarians were camping. (Castells, 1974: 250) 
Subsequent research demonstrated there were not relevant differences, in term of misery, 
access to the means of communication or urban life in general, between non-marginal 
and the alleged marginal poor people. Castells (1974, 1985a) also demonstrated that 
there was no correlation between the people living in the margins of Santiago with the 
supposed characters that were associated to them: illiteracy, rural immigrants, informal 
employment, and so on. On the contrary, at this time, callampas and campamentos in 
Santiago hosted people with broad ranges of occupations and social positions, whereby 
social, economic, and cultural heterogeneity were dominant features. And in many cases, 
the impoverished dwellers came from other parts of the same city but not rural areas. 
His conclusion was soundly clear: urban marginality does not coincide with 
occupational marginality, but it is consequence of the official systemic incapacity to 
respond to the needs of most of the lowest-income sectors. Moreover, the high social 
and spatial heterogeneity among the supposedly marginal people made the concept even 
more blurred. From the late 1960s, the Theory of Marginality was subject of academic 
and political contestation, essentially from the Marxian-oriented political thinking that 
reached the government of the country in 1970. 
MINVU,  Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo: Ministry of Housing and Planning, 
founded in 1966 during Eduardo Frei’s government. Since its creation, MINVU had 
responsibilities in housing and urban planning, namely: a) centralised management of 
every plan in the territory; b) the Municipal Assistance Plan (PAM) that sought to 
underpin technical apparatuses, especially in non-metropolitan municipalities, closed in 
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a National Urban Policy (Pavez, 2006). The latter was not achieved until 1979, under 
radically different neoliberal principles though (see sub-section 3.6.2). Currently, 
MINVU’s structure comprises seven different divisions, among which the División de 
Desarrollo Urbano (DDU, Urban Policy Division) is key for the short- and long-term 
spatial planning in the cities of the country, with an entrepreneurial orientation 
nonetheless. 
Mode of Regulation (MOR): First proposed by the French School of Regulation, the 
concept refers to a property, inherent to a local social system, that avoids (or slows 
down) entropy within a regime of accumulation (Biel, 2007), but also to a structure that 
sooner or later leads to crises. A MOR is a stable process of social equilibrium, not 
historical norm but an exceptional phenomenon unlikely to develop. A hypothesis 
suggest that it took almost twenty years, in the 1990s, to stabilise economic relations 
and promote sustained growth in important part of the western world through a new 
mode of regulation, namely neoliberalism, that essentially contradicted the former one 
(Goodwin and Painter, 2005).  
MORs are specific to every national historical construction. Key elements of regulation 
are: a) the existence of a certain infrastructure (cultural basis), b) an active state 
apparatus, and c) to have class contradictions resolved or controlled (Gertler, 2000c, d). 
Urban space and state institutions specifically oriented to the production of the former 
also appear as key elements in the provision of sufficient conditions for the achievement 
of a mode of regulation. A MOR mitigates contradictions and promotes social 
reproduction during a certain period before being destabilised by a successive crisis. 
The latter can be triggered by several causes: a) own systemic contradictions, b) its 
replacement by a different MOR, or c) “the regulatory process becomes an object of 
regulation in its own right” (Goodwin and Painter, 2005: 182). A good example of the 
latter is the several national crises that took place after the rolling-back of the Keynesian 
state and its managerial practices (formerly essential part of the Fordist MOR) into 
flexible and fragmented forms of local governance imposed by neoliberalism (Gregory, 
2000). The crisis of Fordism fractured the political compromise between workers and 349 
owners
7, in the relation between salary and productivity gains, and – probably most 
crucial – in the balance between the aggregate productive capabilities of the economy 
and the aggregate purchasing power of the workers, as consumers (Gertler, 2000b).  
Modernisation, Theory of: Deeply rooted in the World Bank initial developmental 
agenda, just after the World War II (Frediani, 2006), ‘modernisation’ was defined as 
universal values of progress which the most developed capitalist societies in the world 
should be examples of. According to this theory, economic, political and technological 
sectors are keys for social development. Although  ‘modernisation’ has also many 
implications for sociology, economy, architecture, and other disciplines, in the context 
of Latin American urban development, this idea was central for establishing an 
industrialising developmentalism (i.e. the need of integrating and educating workforce). 
Raposo et al. (2005: 316) summarise the Theory of Modernisation as follows: 
Backward societies […] had no more than to implement a coherent set of policies, which 
generally consisted of those which, at that time, were operating in developed economies. 
[…] the theory of modernisation replaced the class conflict (Marxian-rooted) with the 
opposition and juxtaposition between a structural social subsystem of modern progress 
and another of traditional and underdevelopment.  
In the case of Chile, both the ‘Revolution in Freedom’ and ‘Chilean Way to Socialism’ 
of the Popular Unity agreed in the need of promoting three key axes for development: 
industrialisation, development and modernisation. Whilst for both governments the 
image of ‘modernisation’ was essentially urban and a key axis for the construction of 
the urban apparatus, for the latter socialist government, modernisation was a way to 
emancipate the working-class and force a further transformation of the national politico-
economic structures. City and architecture were elements for a new ‘modern paradise’ 
promised by CORVI and especially CORMU, from mid 1960s until 1973.  
Yet by the end of the 1960s, modernisation, as axiom, clashed with the unleashed 
agency of the social movements. These forces contested the many forms of normalised 
economic and social participation predicted by the theory, and, among other effects, led 
to the development of campamentos in the city. Theory of Marginality precisely aimed 
                                                 
7 As seen in CHAPTER 3, in Chile the relation between workers and the state was more central for the local 
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at explaining this contradiction, but as seen above, its main assumptions were not totally 
valid for the case of Chile.  
National Association of Building Firms: Cámara Chilena de la Construcción. Since 
its creation in 1951, key aspects such as the DFL2 law, the creation of MINVU, the 
liberalisation of the urban and housing market in 1975 and the exemption of 65% of 
VAT to construction firms have been highly supported by this federation. The 
Association of Builders also gave fierce opposition to Allende’s Emergency Housing 
Plan (1970-1973), provoking severe shortcuts in the supply of materials and workers. 
Currently, it represents a highly empowered developers’ and builders’ union with 
considerably influence over the government, national parliament (see MP Escobar’s 
speech in sub-section 3.6.3), mass media and public opinion. Aspects like deregulated 
urban expansion and subsidised real estate market are leitmotivs of the current 
Association’s lobbying. 
Neighbourhood Committees: Juntas Vecinales.  Created by a law in 1954, but 
operative from 1964, the Neighbourhood Committees were initially conceived by the 
state for both improving the management of housing production and underpinning 
grassroots’ organisation. The Christian Democratic government (1964-1970) used this 
resource to channel urban social movements, looking for support that at the time the 
government could not get from the leftist unions (Alvarez, 2007). Thus the Law of 
Neighbourhood Committees was used for, on the one hand, encourage social 
mobilisation, on the other, dilute radicalised social demands, becoming a platform of 
popular participation upon which the pobladores could sustain their mobilisation always 
within legal boundaries. The Committees had jurisdiction over a territory called 
Neighbourhood Unit (see chapters 5 and 6 for the use of this concept) and responded to 
Popular Promotion Councils, dependent directly to the President of the Republic. 
However, Neighbourhood Committees soon became more autonomous than how they 
were planned and often were platforms for squatter movements and campamentos 
(Espinoza, 1988). During the latest period of the military dictatorship, Neighbourhood 
Committees were co-opted by the authoritarian apparatus and lost credibility among the 
population. Once recovered democracy, they partially recovered their original 
importance in the popular world. 351 
Neoliberalism: Economic model based on the assumption “that human well-being can 
best be advanced by the maximisation of entrepreneurial freedoms within an 
institutional framework characterised by private property rights, individual liberty, free 
markets and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional 
framework appropriate to such practices.” (Harvey, 2006b: 145) Rachel Weber (2002: 
520) defines neoliberalism as a “hypermarketized style of governance (ie government 
through and by the market) that denigrates collective consumption and institutions. It is 
also an ideological fetishization of pure, perfect markets as superior allocative 
mechanisms for the distribution of public resources. […] Although recent neoliberal 
policy moves draw from earlier tactics and discourses, they also refashion them in 
certain critical ways.” In fact, neoliberalisation has evolved in such a way as to depart 
significantly from its original theoretical template of laissez faire and monetarism. The 
uneven and somehow chaotic geographical development of state institutions, powers 
and functions under neoliberalism
8 suggests that the neoliberal state may be an unstable 
and contradictory political form (Harvey, 2005). 
Under global neoliberalism, peripheral countries stepped into patterns of international 
competition ushered by competitive advantages, but also became subordinated to 
different forms of trade and economic dependency (Watts, 2000). Chile was one of the 
first cases in the world were the hitherto ‘revolutionary’ and controversial theory of 
radical ‘monetarism and economic shock’, as Frank (1976) called it at the time, could be 
imposed via a persistent and pragmatic economic agenda made possible by 17 years of 
dictatorial military power. Precisely Klein (2007) uses the case of Chile, among many 
others, to prove that the dominance and evolution of neoliberalism in the western world 
has been usually accompanied by the application of institutionalised forms of state 
violence and repression, in order to frighten and silence alternative societal projects at 
the same time than destroying the heritage from previous Keynesian-style modes of 
regulation. Actually, there have been practically no cases of neoliberal imposition in the 
world without those ‘states of shock’. As seen in CHAPTER 3, Santiago’s economic and 
territorial reconfiguration from 1975 on is a case of this.  
                                                 
8 Also, the more recent global crisis initiated in the unregulated financial/mortgage markets of the US and 
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Nonetheless, in dialectical terms, “[t]he trajectories, potentialities, and limits of 
neoliberalization cannot be understood in the absence of attention to contestation. […] 
Dialectics of contestation are part and parcel of understanding neoliberalism’s uneven 
ascendancy, calling attention to the inescapably political nature of these phenomena.” 
(Leitner, Peck et al. 2007) Neoliberalisation implied processes of involution of the 
previous managerial centralized state, with rolling back and subsequent rolling out of 
state attributions. The latter means advanced policies of privatisation of public assets 
and firms, and municipalisation of services. However, recent evidence shows how 
alternative social movements can emerge precisely from neoliberal processes of rolling-
out (i.e. the dissolution of social bonds between social communities and the state, and 
their replacement by processes of municipalisation) develop flexible yet more 
contesting ways of social development (Bondi and Laurie, 2005; Peck and Tickell, 
2002), in trends that have come to be named ‘actually existing neoliberalism’. The case 
of PAC grassroots’ contestation is probably a melange of historical capacities of 
collective association and pragmatic defence of individual property rights, exerted by 
small homeowners against neoliberal municipal management.  
OGUC, Ordenanza General de Urbanismo y Construcción: The National By-Law of 
Planning and Construction contains the specific building regulations of the LGUC and 
governs the administrative procedure, the process of urban planning, development and 
construction, and technical standards of design and construction in Chile. As chapters 6 
and 7 show, the OGUC has a key role at preventing more adequate regulatory schemes 
for small-scale building and densification in Santiago’s peri-central poblaciones.  
Peri-centre, peri-central: Whilst inner city can be understood as “an ill-defined area 
close to the central business district in capitalist cities, usually associated with 
dilapidation, poor housing and economic and social deprivation” (Johnston, 2000a: 396), 
peri-centre is a slightly more specific concept, directly related to Latin American cities. 
Peri-centre means inner city, excluding the central area and its relatively immediate ring 
of higher development. The justification for this distinction lies in the extended usage of 
the term by scholars and policymakers in Chile, and its direct association to a specific 
macro-zone of comunas  and neighbourhoods. Both concepts (‘inner city’ and ‘peri-
centre’) respond to the socio-ecological spatial rationale and categorisations of the 
School of Chicago models. Both are recent target of intense processes of regeneration or 353 
gentrification (the use of the terms depends on one’s political stance). Yet the term 
‘inner city’, being slightly more ample, is used in this thesis accordingly. See Appendix 
2 for comparison of Santiago’s peri-centre with the rest of geographical areas of the city. 
PLADECO,  Plan de Desarrollo Comunal:  Comuna  Development Plan. Key 
instrument for social, economic and cultural development at local level. PLADECOs 
must remain in force at least for four years, and for its preparation, several channels of 
citizen participation must be considered. The municipality should also be in necessary 
coordination with other public services, as they hire technical counterparts for the 
elaboration of PLADECOs, in a similar way they do for master plans. See Appendix 11 
for more definition of PLADECO. 
Población: Although its literal translation is ‘population’, in Chile the term is more 
ample and refers to any low-income, consolidated, relatively low density residential 
estate. 
Poblador/es: People who inhabit a población or a campamento. 
Popular Front: Frente Popular, centre-left coalition that ruled the country between 
1937 and 1941, a key force that channelled the already existing material conditions (but 
did not created, as it is commonly believed; see Salazar, 2003) for national import-
substitution industrialisation, under a capitalist, highly state-subsidised mode of 
regulation, close to Keynesianism. The Popular Front was in fact an alliance between 
the national bourgeoisie and the unions and parties representing initially miners and a 
variety of workers from small industries, manufactures and later industries and services. 
But the ‘Popular Front’ model was also international, promoted by the Communist 
International as a measure to confront fascism, and had been practiced in the Spanish 
Republic. Whilst the model did not work in many places, it succeeded in Chile because 
the relevant parties already existed: Radical (national bourgeoisie with a social-
democratic orientation), Socialist and Communist, Democratic and Radical Socialist 
parties, as well as social organisations like the Confederación de Trabajadores de Chile 
(CTCH), the unified Mapuche movement and the feminist Chilean Emancipatory 
Women’s Movement (MEMCh). 354 
Popular Housing Fund: Fondo de Vivienda Popular. Between 1936 and 1953, this 
public initiative financed projects with the 25% of the return from taxes to the real 
estate market, plus incomes from employers that paid 5% of their net profit to the Fund. 
Given the unstoppable growing housing shortage and the reproduction of callampas in 
Santiago, the Fund was replaced in 1953 by the more technically efficient CORVI. 
Popular Unity: Unidad Popular, first democratically elected Marxist-socialist 
government in the world, composed by a coalition of Socialists, Communists and 
Social-Democratic parties. The Popular Unity was led by Salvador Allende, who 
governed the so-called Chilean Way to Socialism from November 4
th 1970 to 
September 11
th 1973. The politico-economic agenda of the Popular Unity was internally 
to radically reduce the social gap, improving production and distribution whilst, 
externally, its goal was to advance towards a greater political and economic autonomy 
of Chile through two deep changes: first, by reinforcing a radical nationalisation of the 
commodities produced in the country (up to then greatly owned by foreign firms, 
mainly from the US); second, by nationalising means of production, namely 
underperforming industries and service suppliers. In September 11
th, 1973, the UP was 
overthrown by a military coup d’état headed by General Augusto Pinochet.  
Populism: As result of the structural limitations of the Keynesian-inspired mode of 
regulation that took place in Chile from the 1930s until the early 1950s, populism was a 
safety valve that rested in increased but satisfied social demand without real social 
participation in the state apparatuses. Populism can be thus seen as the use of particular 
socioeconomic advantages for incorporating the popular sectors into a system of 
domination; hence, populism is antithetic to popular. The latter aims autonomic working 
class agency whilst the former weakens it (Moulian, 1997). Some authors argue that the 
Chilean mode of regulation stepped into a populist phase from the 1950s to 1973, in 
order to resolve the contradictions of an exhausting model of regulations based on 
import-substitution industrialisation. Yet there is still a debate about if the short-lived, 
highly revolutionary project of the Popular Unity was actually ‘popular’ or ‘populist’. 
The key seems to lay in the inclusion of the masses and its representatives into the 
power structures of the state, which during the Popular Unity was only partially 
accomplished. 355 
PRIS, Plan Regulador Intercomunal de Santiago: The 1960 Greater Santiago Master 
Plan was an unprecedented, technically complex attempt of state control of the 
territorial growth of Santiago. For the first time a centralised planning system sought to 
control urban sprawl (to be absorbed through planned multinuclear suburban growth), 
the construction of new roads, the development of manufacturing agglomerations in the 
inner city, supply networks and sewage systems (Ponce de León, 1996). PRIS 
comprised a micro-regional and a metropolitan level of planning, and zoned residential, 
industrial, commercial, transport, open spaces, among other activities.  
Privatism:  According to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary (2005), privatism is “the 
attitude of being uncommitted to or avoiding involvement in anything beyond one's 
immediate interests”. Sociologically, the transit from a collective social order into 
privatism implies that the public sphere reduce its importance while the pursuit of 
personal or family interests acquires more relevance. The replacement of any form of 
collectivism by the private realm is so essential to neoliberalism, that it is the element 
probably most explicitly addressed by Milton Friedman in one of his original 
theorisations (Friedman, 1962). Essentially, under privatism, the citizen becomes client 
(Pratt, 2000) 
PULSO: Consultancy firm hired by Santiago Regional Office of MINVU and Pedro 
Aguirre Cerda municipality in order to develop a new local Master Plan in the comuna, 
between 2003 and 2005. PULSO’s top-down, entrepreneurial First Draft developed 
between 2003 and 2004 was opposed by most PAC residents for it implied widening 
excessively the rent gap in the comuna and facilitated its accumulation by large scale 
developers. PULSO later produced a much more conciliatory Final Draft, which in turn 
was rejected by the municipality (see chapters 5 and 6).  
Reforma Urbana:  National urban development programme launched in 2000, 
consisting of a number of proposals seeking to reform the way MINVU coordinates 
urban planning in Chile (Tala, 2003b). Most projects, programmes and initiatives of 
urban redevelopment, including a broad strategy for peri-central urban renewal, are 
allegedly part of the Reforma Urbana. During the government of President Bachelet 
(2006-2010), the concept of Reforma Urbana lost importance.  356 
Revolution in Freedom: Revolución en Libertad. Political project led by the Christian 
Democratic government in Chile (1964-1970; see Appendix 3) and supported by the US 
– Alliance for Progress that aimed national social emancipation without subverting the 
political and economic roots of the hitherto existing capitalist, Keynesian-inspired mode 
of regulation. The project was based on deep conceptions of social and economic 
modernisation without subverting the structure of private property of the Chilean 
commodities or means of production. The sole exception to the latter was the national 
Agrarian Reform, started in 1962 but seriously intensified from 1966 onwards.  
Santiago’s Inner Ring Project: Launched in 2001 as a comprehensive, state-led 
operation to cleanse and renew the so-called Iron-Belt of Santiago, hitherto a vast 
derelict industrial zone since the 1970s which roughly coincides with the zone of decay 
identified in Figure 4.5 (CHAPTER 4). Whilst initially the Ring was based on proposals 
from four national university teams, comprising high- and mid-density new housing, 
commercial uses and a numbers of emblematic projects (MINVU, 2003), it was soon 
downgraded only to particular interventions such as the transformation of Zanjón de la 
Aguada canal into a thematic park (Allard and Rosas, 2007) to be finished in 2010 
(Rojas, 2007) with practically zero intervention in the 13 inner city comunas considered 
from the beginning (PAC included). Similarly to CPB, the Parque de la Aguada has 
been funded with central-state public resources (MINVU, 2008a). 
Santiaguino: A person who lives in, or comes from, Santiago. 
SEG, Socio-Economic Group: a statistical classification for market research which 
groups population in five categories, based on two variables: 1) level of education of the 
household’s head and 2) number of assets owned by the household (from a maximum of 
ten). From higher to lower, the Chilean Socio-Economic groups (SEG) are: ABC1, C2, 
C3, D and E. SEG are usually associated to certain ranges of income level, having also 
great correspondence with the forms of socio-spatial distribution in Chilean cities (see 
CHAPTER 4 and Appendix 2 for spatial analysis of this). ABC1 corresponds to the top 
11.3% of Greater Santiago’s population, C2 is 20.1%, C3 is 25.3%, D is 34.5% and E is 
8.5% (ADIMARK, 2000, 2004). 357 
SEREX:  Private  consultant  firm attached to the Catholic University, appointed to 
produce Lo Espejo comuna urban Master Plan, from 2003 to 2005, the same time when 
PULSO developed PAC Master Plan.  
SERVIU, Servicio de Vivienda y Urbanización: Housing and Development Service. 
Public agency created under the dictatorship in 1975 and operative until now. SERVIU 
absorbed CORVI and its functions, being gradually rolled-back into a scheme of mere 
administration of the delivery of the social housing vouchers (Sugranyes, 2006). 
Sitio Residente:  One of the modalities of housing upgrading allowed by the FSV 
programme, based on in situ densification or replacement of an old dwelling in a plot. 
Sueldo Vital: Minimum monthly salary, a measure of minimum income in a household. 
In 1966, almost 17% of households in Santiago earned less than one sueldo vital, 50% 
earned between one and two, almost 20% earned three, and only 3.3% of the national 
population earned more than four sueldos vitales (Garcés, 2002). This reflects the 
highly polarised income structure in Santiago in the 1960s, and the impossibility of 
numbers of people to access to the official channels of housing provision during that 
decade and also the two following ones. 
TRANSANTIAGO: Metropolitan Transport Plan of Santiago, in full operation since 
February 2007. Transantiago is an attempt by the Chilean state to control the 
traditionally privately-led, unregulated public transport system of the GSMA (which 
was regulated by the state until 1979). The plan sought to transform the transport 
network of the city, up to then comprised by thousands of operators, into one state-
controlled regime of ten private suppliers (organised by macro-zones), a brand new 
network of bus lines integrated with the Metro system and a unified system of tariffs. 
Whilst the private-public rationale is close to entrepreneurialism (especially in the role 
assumed by the state at absorbing the economic risks and social costs of the project), the 
outcome aimed is similar to Colombian ‘Transmilenio’ Transport Plan. Nevertheless, 
shortly after the implementation of Transantiago, the plan denuded several pitfalls: poor 
coverage in peripheral and peri-central areas, excessive time delays, lack of control over 
some deficient suppliers, lack of coordination between lines. These elements generated 
enormous chaos and social unrest in the city during 2007, also generating a latent 358 
political crisis to the government which only started to be solved in the next year, based 
on a noticeable increment of its initially planned budget. During 2007, the organised 
grassroots organisations of Pedro Aguirre Cerda, after several months of negotiation 
with the national Transport Authority, achieved a decisive improvement of the bus 
network in the comuna. 
UF: The Unidad de Fomento (UF) is a Unit of account used in Chile that reflexes the 
constant adjusting exchange rate between the UF and the Chilean peso due to inflation, 
so that the value of the UF remains constant. By 2009, it is equivalent to US$ 36.5. In 
Chile, prices of land, homes and real estate financing instruments are defined at UF. The 
Urban Renewal Subsidy corresponds to 200 UF.  
Urban redevelopment: Seen from an economic perspective, urban redevelopment is a 
process of reinvestment that takes place generally in a central or peri-central area, in 
order to achieve its subsequent revitalisation. The use of the term ‘redevelopment’ 
supposes that the space to redevelop is underdeveloped, dilapidated or has a potential 
ground rent being poorly capitalised, so that it needs public or private-led reinvestment. 
Precisely for its arguable nature (e.g. not everybody might agree with the need of 
‘redevelopment’) the term is controversial. In Chile, it is used by developers and 
entrepreneurial public bodies, sometimes indistinctively, along with terms of 
‘regeneration’, ‘revitalisation’, or ‘urban recycling’. 
Urban renewal: According to Ley (2000: 881), urban renewal are “both the process, 
and the result, of large-scale redevelopment of the built environment in downtown […] 
and older inner city neighbourhoods, typically on massive scale, and undertaken by the 
state, or more recently in the strategic form of a public-private partnership.” Key 
attempts to urban renewal were undertaken by the 1960 Greater Santiago Master Plan, 
CORMU and more recently Santiago-Centre municipality through its private/public 
corporation called CORDESAN. The latter entrepreneurial model, highly successful in 
quantitative terms, has produced enormous revenues for the private developers 
operating so that it has been replicated in practically all the peri-central comunas, with 
dissimilar results though.  359 
URSA: Urban Renewal Subsidy Area, zone under public subsidy of 200 UF for the 
purchase of new apartments priced at less than 2,000 UF. There are several URSAs in 
the country’s main cities. In Santiago, the main URSA covers the central and nine peri-
central comunas with a size of around 8,500 hectares. Comunas with additional small 
URSAs in the city are: Ñuñoa (in the centre-east affluent Barrio Alto), San Bernardo 
and La Pintana. Further comunas of Santiago Region with URSAs are: Buin, Talagante, 
Melipilla and Colina (see Figure A1). As observed in CHAPTER 5, the Urban Renewal 
Subsidy not only has generated ground rent increments in the peri-centre but also in 
peripheral San Bernardo comuna.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A1. URSAs in the 
Region of Santiago 
Source: own elaboration 
 
 
Vicuña Mackena, Benjamín: Prolific mayor of Santiago, 1872-1875. Although of 
great importance in improving urban planning regulations, the mayor set up a system of 
segregation based on a dual city: the inner Ciudad Propia (own city), inhabited by a 
relatively affluent bourgeoisie, and the external city, inhabited by ‘barbarians’, were 
moral and physical sickness cohabited with severe environmental problems (León-360 
Echaíz, 1975). Two radically different kinds of policies should be applied over either 
part. Whilst the former should receive as much modernisation and beautification as the 
republican government of the late 19
th century could afford, the latter should be 
depositary of policies of cleanse, sanitation and moral education. In fact, the mayor 
described Santiago’s fringes as an “immense sewer of infection and vice, crime and 
plague, a real death field.” (quoted in Romero, 1987: 210) Some of Vicuña Mackena’s 
ideas pervaded future urban and housing operations that took place in Santiago during 
the 20
th century, for instance Brunner’s plan for urban modernisation. 
Zanjón de la Aguada:  Water  source  built  during colonial times for irrigating 
agricultural land at the South and West of Santiago. During the city’s early process of 
industrialisation in the late 19
th century, the water of the Zanjón started to be 
increasingly polluted. This channel occasionally downloaded in Mapocho River (the 
main river in the city) and was occupied by poor squatters who lived in its borders. By 
1957, more than 15,000 people inhabited these callampas. After the worse of several 
fires occurred there, some organised squatter leaders, supported by the Communist 
Party, resolved to seize the La Feria land plots (hitherto owned by CORVI) and build 
what today is La Victoria población. The Zanjón currently represents the southern 
boundary between Santiago-Centre and its peri-central neighbouring comunas. Its 
course is currently subject of a project of beautification named Parque de la Aguada 
developed by MINVU (Allard and Rosas, 2007).   361 
Appendix 2. The Peri-centre as a Macro-zone 
According to López (2005), the peri-centre is a macro-zone that surrounds the 
metropolitan core and excludes the affluent centre-east macro-zone. The peri-centre is 
also separated from the periphery by the Américo Vespucio beltway
9 (red line in figures 
A1 and A2) with the sole exception of the western peri-centre, and can be sub-grouped 
in peri-centre north, west and south. These three macro-zones show relatively 
homogeneous rates of population growth, average land value and general urban 
morphology. Basic demographic and socio-economic characteristics (aggregated by 
macro-zone) are shown in Figure A2. From the 1970s onwards, due to a process of peri-
central de-industrialisation and the intense state-subsidised, privately-built social 
housing production concentrated in the periphery, the peri-centre started a process of 
de-population which apparently has not slowed down since then.  
Between 1992 and 2002, the peri-central macro-zones (with Santiago-Centre) showed 
the highest rates of depopulation in the city, contrasting with the much higher rates of 
population increase in the expanding macro-zones of the periphery. In terms of 
predominant Socio-Economic Groups
10, the peri-centre does not considerably differ 
from the periphery, showing averages around the groups D and E (the lowest two in the 
social ladder), but it considerably contrasts with Santiago-Centre comuna (that hosts 
mainly groups C2 and C3) and much more with the eastern barrio alto (that 
concentrates ABC1 groups, though with some socio-economic diversity observed in 
Providencia, Ñuñoa and Lo Barnechea comunas). Nonetheless, at a metropolitan level, 
the peri-centre does reflect a more advanced process of socio-spatial segregation. This is 
because, as Sabatini et al. (2001) claim, the periphery of Santiago currently experiences 
higher rates of inter-class proximity, with more middle- and upper-income residential 
enclaves located in the outskirts of the city. 
 
                                                 
9 The metropolitan urban perimeter defined by the 1960 Plan Intercomunal de Santiago (PRIS). Right 
after approved, this limit came to be surpassed by successive illegal and state-led urban expansions until 
now (see CHAPTER 3). 
10 See definition of ‘SEG’ in Appendix 1-Glossary. 362 
 
Figure A2. Greater 
Santiago 
Metropolitan Area 
(GSMA) and its 
macro-zones in 2002 
Source: own 
elaboration based on 
López (2005) and INE 
(1992, 2002) 
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Appendix 3. National Governments, 1938-2006 
President  Period  Politico-economic orientation 
Pedro Aguirre 
Cerda  
(1879-1941) 
1938-1941  Led the Popular Front in alliance with communist, socialist and radical 
parties. His government promoted two axes of development: national 
industrialisation and social education. He started the Chilean policy of ISI, 
for which the creation of CORFO was key element. 
Juan Antonio Ríos  
(1888-1946) 
1942-1946  Continuation of ISI and greater impulse to CORFO as its main promoter. 
The coalition with the left parties finishes during his mandate. 
Gabriel González 
Videla  
(1898-1980) 
1946-1952  Continuation of ISI and CORFO, his government created several key 
national industries and founded educational centres, but had to lead with 
economic contraction, and legally banned the Communist Party, despite 
initially it had been part of the governing coalition. 
Carlos Ibáñez  
(1877-1960) 
1952-1958  Populist: vacillating transition from economic contraction recommended 
by IMF to Keynesian-populism and higher state expenditure.  
Jorge Alessandri  
(1896-1986) 
1958-1964  Liberal-Conservative: expansive policy, informal attempt to control 
inflation (shocks prescribed by the US Klein-Sacks mission) and to turn 
entrepreneurial classes into political power. 
Eduardo Frei 
Montalva  
(1911–1982) 
1964-1970  Christian Democratic: social developmentalism, attempt to rise national 
productive capacity without state control of the means of production. The 
country reached its regulatory limits by the end of the 1960s. 
Salvador Allende  
(1908-1973) 
1970-1973  Chilean Way to Socialism: increase in welfare, command-and-control and 
massive social participation in the economic national structure. It was 
overthrown in 11 September 1973.  
General Augusto 
Pinochet  
(1915-2006) 
1973-1990  Neoliberalisation of the housing sector via state subsidisation, defining 
the roots of the current Chilean economic system. This regime banned 
campamentos and de-industrialised the peri-centre.  
Patricio Aylwin  
(1918) 
1990-1994  ‘Protected’ political democracy with continuation of the  previous 
economic model. The production of social dwellings rose to 100,000 units 
a year, yet maintaining its considerably low quality. 
Eduardo Frei Ruiz-
Tagle  
(1942) 
1994-2000  Continuation of the neoliberal model, more state firms were privatised. 
The nation initially enjoyed higher rates of growth but by 1997 the Asian 
crisis produced acute economic contraction. The low quality of the social 
housing produced several social conflicts in the winter of 1997 and the 
whole policy would be reformulated in the following years. 
Ricardo Lagos  
(1938) 
2000-2006  Continuation of the neoliberal model with more accents in local 
development. The country’s economy recovers to rates of growth around 
5%.  Reforma Urbana and  Bicentenario  urban projects were launched 
with uneven results.  
Table A1. Presidents of Chile 1952-2006 
Based on Moulian (1997), Salazar & Pinto (1999a), Salazar (2003), Ffrench-Davis (2004)364 
Appendix 4. A model of research self-assessment 
 
Research self-assessment was important for this thesis, not only at its final stage, but 
also as a constant and recursive process of self-control, especially during the phases of 
collecting and analysing the evidence. However, quantitative and qualitative researchers 
disagree about to what extent this control must be exercised over a small-N case study 
like the present one, without losing the exploratory advantages inherent to case-oriented 
research (Ragin, 1997).  
The models of self assessment presented below are based on a method produced by 
Munck (1998) and adapted for comparing its phases with those of the present research. 
In the scheme below, columns at the right have been added to the original model. 
Although Munck’s represents an ‘ideal’ positivistic research, its cyclical conception is 
useful in assessing the pros and cons of my specific research design. Every column on 
the left expresses a condition to be fulfilled, while the columns on the right express 
criteria of self-assessment conducted by the researcher. Although gray cells represent 
possible research methodological limitations of this study, these pitfalls are justified by 
the inherent constraints of single-case study methods. 
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Figure A3. Circular process of quantitative self-assessment  
Source: Own elaboration, based on Munck (1998) 
THE RESEARCH 
PROBLEM 
 
1. Relevance I: The 
‘real’ world 
YES 
2. Relevance II: The 
scholarly literature 
YES 
3. Testability: Can it 
be studied? 
YES 
 
THE MODEL OR THEORY  
4. Falsifiability: Can it be 
wrong? 
YES, although falsibility is 
interpreted here as 
‘reinterpretation’ 
5. Logical consistency: Is it 
internally consistent? 
YES (there are no internal 
contradictions in the 
theory) 
6. Conditional 
independence I: Does it 
avoid the problem of 
endogeneity? 
YES (the biggest 
‘independent’ variable is 
exogenous: the State) 
7. Leverage: How much 
does it explain? 
Little, but it constructs 
‘typological theorisation’ 
8. Omitted variable bias: 
Does it exclude relevant 
variables? 
NO 
9. Efficiency: Does it 
include irrelevant 
variables? 
NO. The development of 
CSM dismisses irrelevant 
variables 
 
THE POPULATION  
10. Unit homogeneity: Are 
the cases comparable? 
Not applicable. This is 
Single Case Study 
11. Conditional 
independence II: Do the 
cases avoid the problem of 
endogeneity? 
YES (the independent 
variable is exogenous: 
State) 
 
DATA ANALYSIS  
18. Summarising 
historical detail with a 
focus on the outcome to 
be explained. 
YES. Chapters 3 and 4 
are aimed to this 
19. Estimating and 
reporting case selection 
bias and uncertainty. 
A certain level of case 
selection bias is admitted 
in rare cases analyses 
(Harding et al., 2002) 
20. Estimating and 
reporting measurement 
error and uncertainty. 
YES. See conclusions 
 
THEORY 
REFORMULATION AND 
RETESTING 
 
21. The level of 
generality question: Are 
theories reformulated to 
cover more cases? 
YES, with the limited 
capacity of inference 
implied in single-case 
research 
22. The blindness test: Is 
the use of ‘old’ data to 
test ‘old’ theories 
avoided? 
YES. Information as 
recent as possible has 
been used 
 
 
DATA COLLECTION  
15. Validity: Do the 
measures measure what 
they are supposed to 
measure? 
NO important ‘measures’ 
are done, but CAUSAL 
OBSERVATIONS 
16. Reliability: Would the 
same data-collection 
process always produce 
the same data? 
NOT necessarily, but this 
is justified by case-
oriented approach 
(Ragin, 1992, 1997) 
17. Replicability: Can 
others reproduce the 
process through which 
your data was generated? 
YES. In a general sense, 
this Case Study could be 
replicated; however, 
interviewees and answers 
could differ 
CASE SELECTION  
12. Indeterminacy I: Are the 
number of cases and 
observations sufficient? 
Clearly NOT, but 
justified by limitations of 
a PhD 
13. Indeterminacy II: Is the 
problem of multi-colinearity 
avoided? 
Maybe NO (State and 
Private agents could be 
affecting each other) 
14. Intentional selection: Is 
selection bias avoided? 
YES, as much as a 
case-oriented ‘rare’ 
case allows 
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Appendix 5. List of interviewees 
Primary informants 
Table A2. List of primary informants 
    Name  Sector  Role  Profession  Topic discussed  Date  Hour 
1 Mr 
Jimmy 
Gonzalez 
PAC Grassroots 
Representative 
PAC resident-
former student 
Architecture 
Student 
Current situation of PAC; 
process of new urban plan 
9-
Mar  15:00 
2 Mr 
Ivan 
Pincheira 
PAC Grassroots 
Representative 
Social worker in La 
Victoria población  Sociologist 
General scope about La Victoria 
first contact to local communities 
in PAC 
26-
Mar  11:30 
3 Mrs 
Alicia 
Cáceres 
PAC Grassroots 
Representative 
Community leader 
La Victoria 
población - 
Director of the local 
nursery 
No 
profession 
History of La Victoria: 
foundation, military repression, 
social resistance (subjective 
perspective) 
Current situation of PAC; the 
new Master Plan 
26-
Mar  12:30 
4 Mrs 
Claudina 
Núñez 
PAC Grassroots 
Representative 
Community leader 
La Victoria 
población - former 
municipal 
councellor 
Student 
public policy 
Thesis' proposition (hypothesis):  
Her experience of living in LV 
and as community leader, from 
1980s to the present 
31-
Mar  11:00 
5 Mrs 
Gloria 
Rodrigue
z 
PAC Grassroots 
Representative 
Community leader 
La Victoria 
población - 
Vicepresident  Secretary 
History of La Victoria: 
foundation, military repression, 
social resistance (subjective 
perspective) 
Current situation of PAC; the 
new Master Plan  5-Apr  11:00 
6 Mr 
Luis 
Garrido 
PAC Grassroots 
Representative 
Community leader 
La Victoria 
población - 
President 
Construction 
worker 
Current situation of LV; the new 
Master Plan  7-Apr  11:30 
7 Mrs 
Luz 
Castillo 
PAC Grassroots 
Representative 
Community leader 
San Joaquin 
población 
No 
profession 
History of La Victoria: 
foundation, military repression, 
social resistance (subjective 
perspective) 
Current situation of PAC; the 
new Master Plan 
3-
May  17:00 
8 Mrs 
Mirta 
Lagos 
Leiva 
PAC Grassroots 
Representative 
Community leader 
Ochagavía 
población 
Cornershop 
owner 
History of La Victoria: 
foundation, military repression, 
social resistance (subjective 
perspective) 
Current situation of PAC; the 
new Master Plan 
9-
May  11:00 
9 Mrs 
Berta 
Alarcón 
PAC Grassroots 
Representative 
Community leader 
Nva. Lo Valledor-
62 población 
No 
profession 
Current situation of PAC; the 
process of new urban plan 
Problems of delinquency, 
particularly in her district 
11-
May  15:00 
10 Mrs 
Eliana 
Arias 
PAC Grassroots 
Representative 
Community leader 
Davila población 
No 
profession 
Current situation of PAC; the 
process of new urban plan 
14-
May  16:00 367 
11 Mr 
Gerardo 
Martínez 
PAC Grassroots 
Representative 
Community leader 
Villa Centenario 
población 
Public 
service - 
Retired 
History of La Victoria: 
foundation, military repression, 
social resistance (subjective 
perspective) 
Current situation of PAC; the 
process of new urban plan 
16-
May  17:00 
12 Mrs 
Erna 
Saavedra 
PAC Grassroots 
Representative 
Community leader 
Villa Numancia 
población 
No 
profession 
Current situation of LV and 
process of future renewal 
24-
May  11:00 
13 Mrs 
Ljubitza 
Del Rio 
PAC Grassroots 
Representative 
Community leader 
Villa Numancia 
población 
No 
profession 
Current situation of LV and 
process of future renewal 
24-
May  12:00 
14 Mr 
Roberto 
Villar 
PAC Grassroots 
Representative 
Community leader 
Alessandri 
población 
National 
Railways 
worker - 
retired 
Current situation of LV and 
process of future renewal 
24-
May  16:00 
15 Mrs  Lidia 
PAC Grassroots 
Representative 
Community leader 
Las Lilas población 
No 
profession 
Current situation of PAC; the 
process of new urban plan 
25-
May  16:30 
16 Mr 
Luis 
Aguilera 
PAC Grassroots 
Representative 
Community leader 
Villa Los Maitenes 
población  Taxi driver 
Current situation of PAC; the 
process of new urban plan 
25-
May  18:00 
17 Mrs 
Francesc
a 
Clandesti
no 
Technical 
community 
advisor 
Colegio de 
Arquitectos-
Community advisor  Architect 
CPB-subjective perspective from 
a technical perspective 
Current situation of PAC; the 
process of new urban plan 
19-
Mar  15:00 
18 Mr 
Mario 
Alvarez 
Technical 
community 
advisor 
Independent 
professional   Architect 
CPB-subjective perspective from 
a technical perspective 
Current situation of PAC; the 
process of new urban plan 
11-
Apr  17:00 
19 Mr 
Alfredo 
Rodrigue
z 
Technical 
community 
advisor 
SUR Consultores 
NGO  Architect 
CPB-subjective perspective from 
a technical perspective 
Current situation of PAC; the 
process of new urban plan 
27-
Mar  11:00 
20 Mr 
Juan 
Saavedra 
PAC Local 
Government  PAC Mayor  Sociologist 
Municipality's standpoint of new 
urban plan in PAC 
technical and official perspective 
for urban development in PAC 
25-
Apr  11:00 
21 Mrs 
Beatriz 
Estate 
PAC Local 
Government 
PAC Urban 
Advisor 
Architect - 
MSc urban 
planning 
Municipality's standpoint of new 
urban plan in PAC 
technical and official perspective 
for urban development in PAC 
25-
Apr  11:00 
22 Mrs 
Gilda 
García 
PAC Local 
Government 
Director of 
Construction  Architect 
Municipality's standpoint of new 
urban plan in PAC 
technical and official perspective 
for urban development in PAC  2-Apr  13:00 
23 Mrs   
PAC Local 
Government  Director of GIS  Geographer 
Current situation of PAC; the 
process of new urban plan 
PAC Cartographies       
24 Mrs 
Clara 
Arditi 
PULSO-
Consultants  Chair of PULSO 
Architect - 
MSc urban 
planning 
CPB-subjective perspective from 
a technical perspective 
Current situation of PAC; the 
process of new urban plan 
4-
May  10:00 368 
Secondary informants 
Table A3. List of secondary informants 
    Name  Sector  Role  Profession  1st Topic discussed  Date  Hour 
1 Mr 
Javier 
Wood 
Central 
Government 
Regional MINVU-
Chair of Planning  Geographer 
Thesis' proposition (hypothesis) 
Instruments of redevelopment; 
impact in pericentral area 
19-
Mar  11:00 
2 Mrs  Ana  Devia 
Central 
Government 
MINVU-
Governmental 
Urban Observatory   Sociologist 
Instruments of redevelopment; 
impact in pericentral area 
Social effects of urban renewal 
in central areas 
18-
May  10:00 
3 Mr 
Camilo 
Arriagada 
Central 
Government 
MINVU-Ministry 
Advisor  Sociologist 
Thesis' proposition (hypothesis) 
Instruments of redevelopment; 
impact in pericentral area 
16-
Apr  16:00 
4 Mr 
Dante 
Pancani 
Central 
Government 
MINVU-Chair of 
Housing 
programmes 
evaluation  Social worker 
Thesis' proposition (hypothesis) 
Current state subsidies for 
modest housing densification 
24-
May  14:00 
5 Mr 
Eduardo 
Bresciani 
Central 
Government 
MINVU-Chair 
Central Urban 
Development 
Agency 
Architect - 
MSc urban 
planning 
Thesis' proposition (hypothesis) 
Instruments of redevelopment; 
impact in pericentral area 
12-
Apr  9:00 
6 Mrs 
Elvira 
Guerrero 
Central 
Government 
Regional MINVU-
Chair Urban Plans  Architect 
Instruments of redevelopment; 
impact in pericentral area 
10-
Apr  10:00 
7 Mr 
Héctor 
López 
Central 
Government 
MINVU-Ministry 
Advisor  Architect 
Instruments of redevelopment; 
impact in pericentral area  4-Apr  9:00 
8 Mr 
Juan 
Morales 
Central 
Government 
SERVIU-Housing 
programmes 
designer  Architect 
Thesis' proposition (hypothesis) 
Current state subsidies for 
modest housing densification 
23-
May  11:00 
9 Mr 
Nelson 
Morales 
Central 
Government 
MINVU-Regional 
Ministerial 
Secretary 
Sociologist - 
PhD Urban 
Planning 
Thesis' proposition (hypothesis) 
Instruments of redevelopment; 
impact in pericentral area 
17-
May  9:00 
10 Mr 
Sergio 
Galilea 
Central 
Government 
CEO Ciudad-
Parque 
Bicentenario (CPB)  Engineer 
structural aspects of the project 
social effects in adjacent 
comunas 
10-
Apr  10:00 
11 Mrs 
Francisca 
Galvez 
Central 
Government 
SERVIU-Housing 
Subsidy 
Programme 
assessor  Architect 
Current state subsidies for 
modest housing densification 
23-
May  10:00 
12 Mr 
Jaime 
Carrasco 
Central 
Government 
CPB site 
administrator 
National 
Airforce - 
retired 
cerrillos outlook 
fieldwork visit 
9-
May  15:00 
13 Mr 
Sergio 
Leon 
Central 
Government 
MINVU-Chair 
Urban Observatory 
Architect - 
MSc urban 
planning 
Instruments for densification – 
SERVIU 
general apprach to peri-central 
development 
15-
May  14:00 
14 Mrs 
Alexandra 
Peterman 
Corporative 
interest 
Building sector – 
National 
Association of 
Building Firms 
representative 
Economist / 
PhD urban 
planning 
Thesis' proposition (hypothesis) 
Instruments of redevelopment; 
impact in pericentral area. 
Debate about urban expansion 
in Santiago 
26-
Apr  11:00 369 
15 Mr 
Pilar 
Gimenez 
Corporative 
interest 
Building sector – 
Chamber of 
Builders 
representative 
Architect - 
MSc urban 
planning 
Instruments of redevelopment; 
impact in pericentral area. 
Debate about urban expansion 
in Santiago 
2-
May  10:00 
16 Mr 
Pablo 
Contrucci 
Corporative 
interest 
CORDESAN - past 
CEO 
Architect - 
MSc urban 
planning 
Instruments of redevelopment; 
impact in pericentral area 
Urban Renewal Programme 
(subsidy, area of application, 
experience) in detail 
16-
Apr  16:00 
17 Mr 
Ricardo 
Posada 
Corporative 
interest 
Largest developer 
operating in CPB  Developer 
The process of urban 
redevelopment in Ciudad-
Parque Bicentenario  9-Apr  18:00 
18 Mr 
Jorge 
Domeyko 
Local 
Government 
Urban Planning 
Chairman-Estación 
Central 
Municipality 
Architect - 
MSc urban 
planning 
His experience within 
CORDESAN and urban renewal 
in Estación Central comuna 
Case specific conflict-orientation 
to other informants  3-Apr  9:30 
19 Mr  Juan  Avila 
Local 
Government 
Urban Planning 
Chairman-Quinta 
Normal 
Municipality 
Architect - 
MSc urban 
planning 
His experience with urban 
renewal in Quinta Normal 
comuna 
To detect possible case of study 
within QN (rejected) 
27-
Mar  15:30 
20 Mr 
Alvaro 
Escobar  MP 
National 
Parliament Urban 
Development 
Committee – 
Independent 
affiliation  Actor 
CPB-subjective perspective from 
a political perspective 
forms of pressure exerted to 
MPs from private sector 
(possible corruption too)  5-Apr  17:00 
21 Mr 
Patricio 
Hales  MP 
Parliament Urban 
Development 
Committee – PPD 
Party  Architect 
CPB-subjective perspective from 
a political perspective 
Possible forms of urban 
redevelopment for peri-central 
areas 
17-
Apr  15:00 
22 Mr 
Miguel 
Lawner 
Independent 
professional 
Chair of CORVI 
during the Popular 
Unity government  Architect 
History of La Victoria: 
foundation, military repression, 
social resistance 
Spatial aspects of first planning 
of LV. 
22-
May  15:00 
23 Mr 
Patricio 
Hermann  NGO 
Agrupacion 
Defendamos la 
Ciudad 
No 
profession 
CPB-subjective perspective from 
a technical perspective 
20-
Mar  10:30 
24 Mr 
Josef Van 
Der Rest 
(SJ)  NGO 
Jesuit priest. 
Director Hogar de 
Cristo ‘Un Techo 
para Chile’ 
Housing 
Programme  Priest 
CPB-subjective perspective from 
a technical perspective 
CPB-subjective perspective from 
a technical perspective 
18-
May  13:00 
25 Mr 
Jorge 
Rodríguez  Scholar 
Researcher in 
CELADE-UN 
ECLAC 
Sociologist - 
Demographer 
Policy of regeneration-
demographic implications 
Social effects of urban renewal 
in peri-central areas from 
demographic standpoint 
13-
Apr  10:00 
26  Mr  Luis  Scholar  PUC's Urban  Geographer -  Social effects of urban renewal  25- 12:15 370 
Fuentes Observatory    MSc  urban 
planning 
in central areas.  May 
27 Mr 
Alberto 
Gurovich  Scholar 
Professor FAU-U. 
de Chile  Architect 
Thesis' proposition (hypothesis) 
History of peri-central area; 
Social effects of urban renewal 
in central areas.  4-Apr  16:00 
28 Mr 
Alfonso 
Raposo  Scholar 
Professor FADU- 
U. Central  Architect 
Thesis' proposition (hypothesis) 
History of peri-central area and 
state agencies for social housing 
(CORVI-CORMU) 
28-
Mar  15:30 
29 Mr 
Hugo 
Romero  Scholar 
Professor FAU-U. 
de Chile 
Geographer - 
PhD 
geography 
Thesis' proposition (hypothesis) 
History of peri-central area; 
Social effects of urban renewal 
in central areas. 
21-
Mar  10:00 
30 Mr 
Jonás 
Figueroa  Scholar 
Professor -U. de 
Santiago 
Architect - 
MSc urban 
planning 
Thesis' proposition (hypothesis) 
Social effects of urban renewal 
in central areas. 
28-
Mar  12:00 
31 Mr  Jorge  Ortiz Scholar 
Professor FAU-U. 
de Chile 
Geographer - 
PhD 
geography 
Thesis' proposition (hypothesis) 
Social effects of urban renewal 
in peri-central areas from 
demographic standpoint 
23-
Mar  11:00 
32 Mr 
Mario 
Torres  Scholar 
Lecturer FAU-U. 
de Chile  Architect 
Thesis' proposition (hypothesis) 
Social effects of urban renewal 
in central areas. 
22-
Mar  15:00 
33 Mr 
Pablo 
Allard  Scholar 
Lecturer Catholic 
University-
Chairman PUC's 
Urban Observatory 
Architect - 
MSc urban 
planning 
Thesis' proposition (hypothesis) 
Social effects of urban renewal 
in central areas. 
11-
May  17:30 
34 Mr 
Ricardo 
Tapia  Scholar 
Lecturer FAU-U. 
de Chile- Housing 
Institute (INVI)  Architect 
Thesis' proposition (hypothesis) 
Social effects of urban renewal 
in central areas. 
29-
Mar  17:30 
35 Mrs 
Eugenia 
Pallarés  Scholar 
Chair Postgraduate 
School FAU-U. de 
Chile 
Architect – 
PhD Project 
Management 
Building prices in Chile and 
URSA (interview by email) 
14-
May-
2008   
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Appendix 6. Semi-structured interview sheets  
Semi-structured interview schedule for primary informants 
 
Urban creative destruction and social struggle: A case of entrepreneurial redevelopment in the 
urban peri-centre of Santiago de Chile 
Ernesto López  DPU-UCL 2007  Date and Hour: 
Interviewee’s name:  Position: 
Voice Recorded:    Yes     No  Notes taken:      Yes     No  Place: 
 
The length of this interview should not exceed one and a half hours, and starts with a brief explanation by 
the interviewer about the research’s general topic and its theoretical formulation. The interview focuses on 
historical and present processes of urban production, decay and redevelopment in Pedro Aguirre Cerda. 
The following are general topics to discuss, yet these should not be taken as rigid but flexible starting 
points to further conversation and analysis. Due to the heterogeneity of interviewees, emergent topics, or 
new issues presented are welcome, and they even could be used as further questions in successive 
interviews. 
QUESTIONS: 
1.  Which of the following sectors represents you better? Municipality, private sector, state officer, 
social leader, local resident, professional adviser.  
2.  Could you explain your role in the process of redevelopment in PAC comuna? 
3.  What are the most positive elements you see in PAC, and/or your neighbourhood in specific? (i.e. 
aesthetic, history related to your life, sense of place, affordable land value, job opportunities, etc.). 
4.  Has been there a process of urban decline in PAC and/or your neighbourhood (effects and 
causes)? Since when? 
5.  Have changes in land value affected you in any form from 1990 onwards? 
6.  What is your evaluation of the central-state’s intervention in the redevelopment of PAC? 
7.  What is your evaluation of the municipality’s intervention in the redevelopment of PAC? 
8.  What is your evaluation of the private sector’s intervention in the redevelopment of PAC? 
9.  Any other actor you might consider as relevant in that process? 
10.  What is your assessment regarding urban policies and planning instruments of redevelopment 
applied in PAC? (e.g. effects in land market, local jobs, transport, environment, neighbourhood’s 
organisation, urban security, etc.) 
11.  What is the meaning of ‘urban renewal’ and ‘social participation’ for you? 
12.  Would you recommend any other possible interviewee that could provide more relevant 
information? 
 
Thank you very much for your time! 372 
Semi-structured interview schedule for secondary informants 
 
Urban creative destruction and social struggle: A case of entrepreneurial redevelopment in the 
urban peri-centre of Santiago de Chile 
Ernesto López  DPU-UCL 2007  Date and Hour: 
Interviewee’s name:  Position: 
Voice Recorded:    Yes     No  Notes taken:      Yes     No  Place: 
 
The length of this interview should not exceed one and a half hours, and starts with a brief explanation by 
the interviewer about the research’s general topic and its theoretical formulation. The interview focuses on 
historical urban process of production, decay and redevelopment in the peri-centre of Santiago. The 
questions should not be taken as rigid but flexible starting points to further conversation and analysis; 
some questions can be considered in less detail or not be asked, depending on the interviewee and the 
issues that might emerge from his/her discourse. 
 
QUESTIONS: 
1.  In your opinion, what are the main economic and social factors that determine the decay of 
Santiago’s peri-centre? 
2.  Does it exist in Chile an urban policy oriented toward the redevelopment of central and peri-
central spaces? If it does, what are its main elements? 
3.  Do you see evolution in the current mechanisms for peri-central redevelopment, namely planning 
and management instruments, since 1990? 
4.  How is your assessment about the social and spatial effects generated by central state 
intervention in the peri-centre? 
5.  How is your assessment about municipalities’ intervention in peri-central urban renewal, 
especially through urban planning? 
6.  How is your assessment about the social and spatial effects generated by the private sector 
(large scale property market firms) in these areas? 
7.  Do you consider that the current instruments of peri-central urban redevelopment are socially 
participative or inclusive? In what form actors are considered or not in these processes? 
8.  Would you recommend any other possible interviewee that could provide more relevant 
information? 
 
Thank you very much for your time! 
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Appendix 8. Quantitative data used in GIS 
Table A4. Description of quantitative data used 
Cover name  Cover description  Name of 
shape  Type  Source 
Urban Aerial 
Images 
Greater Santiago Metropolitan Area (GSMA) in 2001. 
This image was produced from previous studies, and 
elaborated with more recent satellite images and aerial 
photography.  
Several 
Images Image 
Military 
Geographical 
lnstitute (IGM) 
Urban Area in 
the Region 
Developed area of GSMA and suburban centres in 2001, 
subdivided by comunas.  
AREA_URBA
NA_REGION Polygon 
Military 
Geographical 
lnstitute (IGM) 
Open spaces 
and parks 
Open spaces and parks by 2000. For its elaboration it 
was used a study developed by CONAMA in 1997 and 
Regional Office MINVU 1994.  
AREAS_VER
DES  Polygon 
Regional 
Government 
Comunas 
Graphic definition of comunas comprising data about 
population, gender, urban-rural, age groups, level of 
education, etc.  
In urban areas, information about physical structure 
(height, quality of building), land use and cadastral value.  COMUNAS Polygon 
National Office 
of Statistics 
(INE) 
Census districts 
1992 
Graphic definition of census districts by 1992, comprising 
data of gender, age groups, level of education, etc. 
DISTRITO_C
ENSAL92 Polygon 
National Office 
of Statistics 
(INE) 
Census districts 
2002 
Graphic definition of census districts by 2002, comprising 
data of gender, age groups, level of education, etc. In 
urban areas, information about physical structure (height, 
quality of building), land use and cadastral value was 
added. 
DISTRITO_C
ENSAL Polygon 
National Office 
of Statistics 
(INE) 
Urban growth 
evolution  Urban expansion during different historical periods.  
EVOLUCION_
CRECIMIENT
O  Polygon  SEREX - IGM 
Metropolitan 
urban perimeter 
GSMA Urban Perimeter defined according to 2007 
legislation. 
PRMS_LIMIT
E_URBANO Line   
Regional Office 
MINVU 
Santiago 
Urban blocks 
Graphic representation of urban blocks, it contains the 
most disaggregated social and urban data in Santiago. 
Sources are national population census and cadastral 
values. In terms of population, the data comprises 
number of residents, gender and age groups, level of 
education, labour occupancy, etc. In terms of housing, 
the data comprises housing and basic service shortage. 
It also covers aspects such as existing plot area ratio, 
plot coverage, height of buildings, plot size, age of 
buildings, gross urban density, etc.  MANZANAS Polygon 
National Office 
of Statistics 
(INE) 
Building permits 
Building permits in GSMA from 1980 to 2001, 
disaggregated by type of activity (residential, commercial, 
industrial, etc.) 
PERMISOS 
_EDIFICACIO
N  Point 
National 
Association of 
Building Firms  
Urban Area  Actually developed area of GSMA.  PLANTA_UR Polygon  National Office 375 
BANA of  Statistics 
(INE) 
Block edges  Shape of urban blocks in GSMA.  SOLERAS  Line  GEOCEN 
Metropolitan 
road system 
Main road structure in accordance with local and 
metropolitan plans.  PRMS_VIAL Line  MINVU 
Land price 
zones 
Average value per years from 1990 to 2005, defined at 
sub-zone level.  ZCOMERC Polygon 
TRIVELLI 
Consultants 
Urban renewal 
subsidy area 
(URSA) 
Urban Renewal Subsidy Areas (URSAs) defined by 
Regional Office MINVU Santiago. 
Z_RENOVACI
ON_URBANA Polygon 
Regional Office 
MINVU 
Santiago 
Local (comuna) 
building 
regulations 
Zonning in accordance with current local Master Plans. 
This data comprises permitted land use and building 
regulations.   PRC_ZONA  Polygon  Municipalities  
Land use  Existing land use by activity, at district level 
SII 
USOS.SHP Polygon 
Internal 
Revenue 
Service (SII) 376 
Appendix 9. Example of Potential Ground Rent 
calculation 
 
Table A5 shows a detailed example of the calculations of Potential Ground Rent (PGR) 
conducted in sections 5.3 and 5.4 (tables 5.1 and 5.2 respectively). The calculation here 
consider as an example, a fixed plot area of 2,000 m
2, assuming that several plots have 
been merged, as it usually happens in large scale urban renewal. This plot area is meant 
to make the calculation realistic, but it does not affect the net PGR (see rows Q and R). 
Table A5. Example of calculation of PGR 
Key  Guideline 
PAC 1 - housing at 
neighbourhood scale 
A  Plot Area in m2 2,000  m2 
B  Max Site Coverage  80 % 
C  Max Plot Area Ratio  1.2 
D  Max Plot Area Ratio incremented 30% for plot merge  1.6 
E  Building capacity of the plot: (A) x (D)  3,120 m2 
F  Average size residential units with subsidy  60.5 m2 
G  Number of units allowed to be built: (E) / (F)  51.6 units 
H  Average market price of residential units  1,300 UF 
I  Selling price of the building: (G) x (H)  67,041 UF 
J  Fixed building cost of residence  12 UF/m2 
K (*)  Building cost of parking lots  8.0 UF/m2 
L  Total building cost: (E) x (J)  37,440 UF 
M  Extra selling and soft costs  30 % 
N  Building cost + Extra costs: (L) x (1+M)  48,672 UF 
O  Land price per m2 (**)  4 UF 
P  Total land price: (A) x (O)  8,000 UF 
Q  Gross Potential Ground Rent: (I) - (N) - (P)  10,369.3 UF 
R  Net Potential Ground Rent: (Q) / (A)  5.2 UF/m2 
(*) This cost is not considered in the calculation of PGR because it is usually charged to buyers 
as an extra price 
(**) Land has been considered at a price of 4 UF/m2, deliberately high for PAC averages 377 
Appendix 10. Brief history of Pedro Aguirre Cerda 
comuna’s development 
Phases of development of PAC 
Until the 1950s, the current Pedro Aguirre Cerda’s territory consisted of large rural land 
plots and inhabited by employed or independent peasants. Their production was sold in 
the markets of the southern area of what today is Santiago-Centre comuna. There were 
also callampas aside the Zanjón de la Aguada, in the northern limit with Santiago-
Centre comuna. During the 1950s and 1960s, there would be considerable urban growth 
to the extent that in 1970, the available land for urban development in current PAC 
territory had been reduced to 8%. In general, PAC had four phases of growth, as seen in 
Figure A5.  
 
  
 
 
Figure A5. The four phases of development of Pedro Aguirre Cerda (PAC) comuna 
Source: own elaboration based on SGA-IBERSIS (2000) 
The first phase started in the mid 1920s and was much reinforced by the state-led 
import-substitution industrialisation in the city. As CHAPTER 3 examined, this generated 
formal and informal residential enclaves adjacent to industries, water sources and train 
stations, mainly inhabited by people of rural origins. In the case of PAC, the first 
densely populated area located in north of the comuna (current Neighbourhood Units 7 
and 8, El Carmelo and Alessandri poblaciones respectively), close to Santiago-Centre 
downtown and at time, belonging to Santiago-Centre. The built structures in the area are 
currently dilapidated. Dwellings are mainly terrace-type and many were used at the time 378 
as multi-occupied houses or conventillos. This area also comprised the series of 
callampas  located aside Zanjón de la Aguada that housed around 15,000 people. 
Important part of these people was the original pobladores  that participated in the 
squatter movement (campamento) that would become later La Victoria población. 
A second, more intense phase of development occurred in the 1950s produced by the 
rapid increase of immigration to industrialising Santiago. This development was 
articulated through the action of CORVI’s housing programmes in the eastern area of 
the comuna, reaching to hold 56% of the available land at the time, intended primarily 
for industrial workers (see Figure 3.2 in CHAPTER 3). These developments correspond to 
settlements located near the Norte-Sur motorway, and were built using similar standards 
to the middle-income estates of San Miguel comuna. The most representative of these 
poblaciones  is Miguel Dávila. Also the neighbourhoods comprising San Joaquín 
población in the north of PAC were developed during this decade. Meanwhile, squatter 
movements started in 1957 with La Victoria and would continue over the next decade.  
The third phase took place in the 1960s. The action of the state would still be important 
(Cardenal José María Caro población was completed at the beginning of this decade) 
but had been much replaced by squatter movements as the main driving force of urban 
occupation. During this period, most part of the remaining land of the comuna was 
consolidated whilst its rate of population growth reached 4% yearly. Squatters 
intensified in the west of the comuna beyond the train line, plus other remaining plots in 
the north. This pattern of growth would increase until 1970 with no major fluctuations, 
until it was halted for over a decade for the lack of available land and the dictatorial ban 
of campamentos. When the military dictatorship ended, a fourth phase of development 
would be initiated in 1992. Nueva Sur población  was built by SERVIU, located 
between the railroad and Villa Sur población. Other state-built poblaciones were Doña 
Juanita, on a site originally intended to be an open space, and Villa Florencia, in 1997, 
in a site that used to be the large Ochagavía vineyards. Informal densification also 
occurred in the area of El Esfuerzo población. These developments completed the 
occupation of the comuna. 
This rapid and relatively disarticulated urban growth, mainly achieved in just two 
decades (1950s and 1960s), is the main cause for the currently inadequate urban 379 
infrastructure and services in Pedro Aguirre Cerda. The surrounding metropolitan 
motorways made PAC a relatively isolated territory, and this characteristic has been 
accentuated during the 1990s with the addition and upgrading of faster and newer ways 
in the north (Isabel Riquelme motorway) and west (General Velázquez motorway).  
Administrative creation of PAC as a municipality 
The municipality of Pedro Aguirre Cerda was created in 1981 through the Law 1-3260, 
amidst a state operation that doubled the number of comunas  in Greater Santiago 
Metropolitan Area, from 16 to 32. According to that piece of legislation, which 
responded to the neoliberal agenda of urban spatial reconfiguration and segregation, the 
neighbourhoods in current PAC presented a “homogeneous demographic and socio-
economic reality, also with shared similar development problems that deserved close 
attention from a specific and close municipal authority.” The authority proceeded to 
separate different territories that belonged to Santiago-Centre, La Cisterna and San 
Miguel comunas. However, all of these were low-income quarters. The goal of this 
strategy was that the new local administration would achieve cohesion of its inhabitants. 
Yet these different areas of the comuna  were officially administered by its original 
municipalities until 1991, when the Municipality of Pedro Aguirre Cerda would be 
actually in operation.  
A main disadvantage soon observed in 1981 was that the resulting space did not have a 
proper internal configuration, with no centre and/or places of reference, and the 
motorways that surrounded the newly born comuna were in fact barriers for in- and out-
displacements. Moreover, La Cisterna municipality kept most of its industries, which 
represented sources of local labour and municipal revenues, while San Miguel kept the 
best residential areas (e.g. El Llano neighbourhood), amenities and services. The 
resulting PAC area was also excessively narrow, thus the perimeter defined in 1981 
would have to be reshaped in 1988, configuring the current ‘square-shape’ of PAC. 
With this modification, the southern boundary of the comuna became Lo Ovalle Avenue, 
its west boundary became the current General Velásquez motorway (also known as 
Autopista Central). By the north, the limit would be constituted by Carlos Valdovinos 
avenue and Isabel Riquelme motorway, whereas by the east, the boundary would be the 
Norte-Sur motorway.  380 
Appendix 11. Municipalities and instruments of urban 
planning in Chile 
The municipality and its competences 
According to the Political Constitution of Chile, the Chilean state is a unity and its 
territory is divided in regions and provinces. For local administration, provinces are 
divided into comunas. The administration of comunas is assumed by municipalities. 
Municipalities are “autonomous corporations with legal entity and own patrimony, the 
aim of which is at satisfying the needs of the local community and assuring its 
participation in the economic, social and cultural progress of the local territory and its 
population” (Gobierno de Chile, 1980: 125-126). The municipality is constituted by a 
Mayor and a Local Council, appointed by direct election for a four-year period, 
renewable indefinitely. Local Councillors are elected in the same election with Mayors 
but on a separate ballot.  
Municipalities are ruled according to the Law of Municipalities
1  (Ley Orgánica 
Constitucional de Municipalidades, LOCM) (Gobierno de Chile, 2004). This legislation 
states that municipalities must play decisive roles in social and urban development, and 
territorial planning, and be quite active in the production of local building regulations
2. 
The municipal government is in turn advised by the Consejo Económico y Social 
Comunal  (CESCO, Local Economic and Social Council), which is composed by 
representatives of the most important social organisations in the comuna.  
According to the LOCM, Municipal functions are: a) to constitute the Local 
Development Plan (Plan de Desarrollo Comunal, PLADECO), the application of which 
must be coherent with the national and regional plans of social, economic and territorial 
development; b) local planning and regulation of the urban space of the comuna, 
elaborating the local Master Plan (Plan Regulador Comunal) according to the current 
                                                 
1 Law 18,695, 1994. 
2 Comparatively, with lower financial or even political autonomy than the European or North American 
local councils though (see sub-section 4.3.6). 381 
legislation of the nation; c) to promote social development of its local population; d) to 
apply national legal norms about transport and public traffic within the comuna; e) to 
apply national legislation about construction and development (mainly contained in the 
Law of Planning and Construction, LGUC), among other aims.  
The LOCM defines the PLADECO as a fundamental driver towards the social, 
economic and cultural development of the comuna. The PLADECO must remain in 
force at least for four years. For its preparation, several channels of citizen participation 
must be considered and the municipality should be in coordination with other public 
services. Municipalities hire technical counterparts for the elaboration of PLADECOs, 
in a similar way they do for master plans. 
The local Master Plan 
The Law of Municipalities states that, for the fulfilment of its goals, a municipality has 
the attribution (among others related to education, health and environment protection) of 
carrying out the goals and policies contained in the Local Development Plan 
(PLADECO) as well as approving the local Master Plan, if the comuna integrates a 
broader territory regulated by a metropolitan or inter-comuna Master Plan. The latter is 
the case of PAC comuna (Gobierno de Chile, 2004).  
In 1999, a detailed scheme for Master Plan elaboration and rezoning was defined by the 
MINVU’s Urban Policy Division (DDU), namely Circular-55 (MINVU, 1999). Up to 
now, this circular guides Chilean planners about what the conditions of a Master Plan 
should be, how the plan should be elaborated and how it might work better in a ‘social-
market economy’ like Chile’s. The Master Plan is defined by this document as 
part of the comuna  Development Strategy which sets out the main guidelines for 
development […] making the use of the comuna physical space as spatial expression of 
the [PLADECO] and encouraging investment decisions that seek to exploit the local 
qualities [of the comuna]. To be successful, a Master Plan should become indispensable 
for fuelling the local territory growth, helping the comuna to discover and relieve its best 
attributes and making the service of its own people and those who use it and/or want to 
adopt it as a place of residence or work. (MINVU, 1999: 4) 382 
The Master Plan in Chile must be gradual in time and space, so that it smoothly 
enhances the development of a comuna through the planning process across its territory. 
The plan must also promote the following elements: a) a broad variety of land uses in 
the comuna, avoiding the concentration of exclusive functions, b) good insertion within 
the general urban system, c) adequate urban density in order to make the best use of the 
comuna’s land, and d) it should decisively promote social inclusion. At this latter point, 
Circular-55 points out that it is important to give attention to the effects that a Master 
Plan can produce at fomenting or increasing social segregation. In general, as the 
document points out, “the experience indicates that those neighbourhoods where more 
diverse people coexist – in terms of their income – contribute to create more inclusive 
urban environments” (MINVU, 1999: 22). 
A  comuna Master Plan should refer to land use zoning, localisation of community 
services and amenities, parking, road structure hierarchies, densities and determination 
of priorities for development in cases of urban expansion. According to the LGUC 
(Gobierno de Chile, 2007a), its main objectives are: 
1.  To promote harmonious development of the comuna territory, in agreement with 
regional goals of economic and social development. To ensure adequate healthy, 
safety and comfort conditions in buildings and urban spaces, and to channel the 
functional relation between residential, labour, facilities and recreation areas.  
2.  To define a form of built environment organisation, foreseeing spatial 
requirements and location of amenities to support the various activities existing 
in the local space. Moreover, it should generate a morphology that adds value to 
the whole local space.  
3.  To establish rules regarding land use, community facilities and their location, 
parking, hierarchies of the road structure, definition of urban perimeters, urban 
density and intensity of land use. 
The LGUC also states that the Master Plan should be basically composed by three 
elements. Firstly, an Explicative Report containing socio-economic aspects, 
demographic growth, industrial development and other technical records for sustaining 383 
the goals of urban development in the comuna. This report must be approved by the 
municipality, its local community organisations represented by the Local Economic and 
Social Council (CESCO), and the regional office of the Ministry of Housing and 
Planning (MINVU). Its main components are: i) diagnostic and objectives; ii) 
description of the process of formulation of the plan; iii) technical records (study of 
feasibility for water supply and sewage networks in relation with the projected urban 
growth, transport, etc).  
Second, the Master Plan should contain a local by-Law that includes building guidelines, 
description of the local territory and definition of the comuna’s boundaries. Third, there 
must be a set of maps to show graphically the land use zoning, location of services and 
amenities, the road system, comuna urban perimeter, urban development priority areas, 
and so on. The local by-Law and the maps must contain at least four elements: 1) the 
urban perimeter, 2) the zoning proposed, 3) special mechanisms of compensations, 
zones of conditioned development, etc, and 4) environmental issues to be tacked by the 
plan.  
Definitive zoning comes from the macro-zones and system of public spaces defined in the 
Draft Master Plan. Public spaces are particularly important to be zoned, because they 
generate the declaration of public interest [hence potential expropriations. …] The zones 
of the plan contain detailed and precise planning decisions with respect to locations, type 
and intensity of the land use, depending on the particularities of the territory and the 
specific objectives of the Plan. (MINVU, 1999: 51) 
The Master Plan zoning defines and articulates two basic elements: the land use destiny 
and the land use intensity. Within the latter, aspects such as allowed urban typologies, 
urban density, plot area ratio, site coverage, height, set back plane, front yard line, 
system of grouping volumes and minimum and maximum plot sizes should be stated by 
the local regulation (see analysis of this in CHAPTER 5), among other environmental and 
security considerations.  
Other issues to address in Master Plans are the adaptation of conditions emanated from 
plans at higher levels planning, i.e. metropolitan and regional master plans, into the 
space of a comuna. This is especially relevant for the definition of a road system, to be 
articulated with the road structure of neighbouring comunas, and the shaping of comuna 384 
areas for urban renewal, according to their location in the metropolis and their potential 
for redevelopment.  
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Appendix 12. The Fondo Solidario de Vivienda (FSV) 
programme: additional information 
Among other ends, the Fondo Solidario de Vivienda programme was meant to be highly 
suitable for process of small scale regeneration in already inhabited peri-central areas. 
To be eligible, FSV projects have to be submitted to SERVIU by organised local 
communities composed by 10 or more households. They also have to be technically 
operated by an external manager, named EGIS, which can be a small-scale firm of 
architecture or a social development organisation, which assists them in the application 
to the fund and the architectural design of the projects.  
EGISs are fundamental for linking the people with the official mechanisms of housing 
production or upgrading, for the more they get involved in the process, the more they 
become experienced and better regarded by the public sector. If they perform well, 
EGISs have better chances for subsequent applications. Thus they have to prove able to 
intervene as strategic partners in a triangle also composed by the community and the 
state, more specifically the Ministry of Housing and Planning (MINVU), its specific 
branch aimed to dwelling provision, SERVIU, and the respective municipality. EGISs 
organise the demand, socially, administratively and technically linking society with 
state (Tapia, 2009).  
In operative terms, an EGIS has to develop a complete proposal for the projects. In the 
previous more centralised housing scheme, it was SERVIU which assigned the spatial 
location of the beneficiaries in the metropolis, according to an assessment of every 
household through a global index of social needs and credit scoring. The new FSV 
programme is radically different. Projects origin in the people and crystallise already 
existing forms of association in a same place. This means that several households join 
and interact with an EGIS, which has to design and apply, through an external technical 
consultant. EGISs have also to coordinate a plan for ‘social enabling’, aimed to 
empower the people’s capacities with improved techniques for community life. With 
this purpose, SERVIU provides a set of references for better social development 
improvement (MINVU, 2005: 34).  386 
EGISs have also to search for available plots in the city to locate the projects. These 
plots have to be ideally near the areas where their demand is originally located. That 
means that they act also as a new kind of social property developers, but constrained to 
the availability of land regulated by market rules. Furthermore, they pivot the 
development of the projects of architecture and surrounding environment management. 
SERVIU centralises the several proposals entered by local communities (through EGISs) 
and integrate them in a single Project Bank. When all the conditions of application are 
fulfilled (including the minimum required saving), and according to SERVIU’s ranking, 
the resources are allocated to the projects. 
But fundamental is the role of municipalities in the linking between the community and 
the central government, and obviously in the approval of the project’s building permit in 
accordance with the local and national building regulations (Gobierno de Chile, 2006). 
Municipalities can act as EGISs, but they also grant ‘demolition licenses’ in cases of in 
situ rebuilding. Municipalities approve building permits in accordance with the national 
guidelines for social housing and their own local building regulations.  
The Fondo Solidario de Vivienda programme consists of three types of ‘solutions’ for in 
situ development, plus one for acquisition of new residence in a different place. The 
three  in situ development types are: a) dwelling building, b) densification and c) 
construction of a new unit. The funds allocated for any of the three modalities of 
densification range between 280 and 330 Unidades de Fomento, or UF. The variability 
of this numbers is due to the type of solution but not the location of the projects in the 
city. For the latter factor, there is an extra mechanism of subsidisation which is analysed 
below. 
The FSV programme is oriented to ‘households in poverty condition’ and is composed 
by FSV-1 and FSV-2. Although both programmes share similar characteristics, FSV-2 
allows applications at any time of the year (walk-in system), since it is oriented to 
households with slightly more saving capacity. The FSV-2 also assists applicants in the 
purchase of new or second-hand dwellings at any time of the year. Additional private 
financial credit is allowed in both modalities, provided this funding comes from 
recognised institutions (MINVU, 2008b).  387 
Both modalities share the following features: applicants must be heads of households, 
older than 18, living in poverty conditions (this can be assessed through the National 
Index of Social Poverty ‘CAS’, an instrument of constant updating, largely utilised for 
resource allocation in Chilean social programmes), single people older than 60, 
disadvantaged people, ethnic indigenous people, or people benefited by the Report of 
Political Prisoners and Torture
1 (MINVU, 2005: 4).  
Additional support from municipal or private sources can be given cash, through works, 
infrastructure or by providing land, if the ownership of the latter is to be legally 
registered on behalf of the occupants. The FSV scheme releases households of being in 
debt for years and even decades, since FSV does not require additional credit thus 
people do not have to pay mortgages. This is probably the most important difference 
with the previous scheme of the Chilean housing policy. The funding of FSV-1 projects 
can also be complemented with two (of a total of three) additional central-state funding 
aimed at improving location and infrastructure (Gobierno de Chile, 2005), such as: 
1.  Since September 2006, an extra Subsidy for Improving Location. This funding 
underpins the purchase of land for projects, larger than 150 units, located inside 
the urban perimeter of cities with a population of more than 30,000 inhabitants. 
The location had to be accessible by sewage networks, with good access to a 
public way and public transport, close to health and educational centres 
(nurseries and primary schools). Furthermore, 60% of the applicants should 
come from the same comuna where the project is to be allocated. The amount of 
this extra subsidy varies according to the public cadastral value of the land and 
the planned density of the projected estate, but it can be up to 150 UF per unit. 
The only restriction is that, after granted the subsidy, the dwellings cannot be 
sold for 15 years. Nevertheless, according to Mr. Morales, the number of these 
subsidies for improving location in Greater Santiago Metropolitan Area (GSMA) 
has been hitherto lower than expected. 
                                                 
1 A list of people who was victim of human right violations during the military dictatorship and are 
currently eligible for state-funded compensation (Comisión Nacional sobre Prisión Política y Tortura, 
2004). 388 
2.  An extra Subsidy for Urban Amenities finances infrastructure and 
neighbourhood improvement, with 5 UF per household. Subsidies of location 
and amenities do not require application. SERVIU just allocates these funds 
after assessing every case.  
3.  An extra Subsidy for Initiatives, consisting of 7 UF granted to households that 
completed an extra saving amount of 0.5 UF. This is optional funding for 
neighbourhood improvement.  
As observed, the two FSV schemes are highly flexible and adaptable to a broad kind of 
cases across the country and cities.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 